- Ericsson Inc. / Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 8, 2017 · IPR2015-01664 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 8–12 and 18–22 not shown unpatentable as obvious over Dulin, Yamaura, Zhuang, and Hwang because the combination did not teach the entire broadcast channel within the core-band.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Upon further review of the ’431 patent, particularly in view of Patent Owner’s arguments supported by Dr. Zeger’s testimony discussed above, we are persuaded that our preliminary partial construction was unreasonably broad to the extent that construction indicated the transmitting a broadcast channel limitation would be met by the transmission of a broadcast channel that is only partially within the core-band. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that to show that the transmitting “a broadcast channel in an” OFDMA core-band limitation is met, Petitioner must demonstrate that the prior art teaches or suggests transmitting a broadcast channel, wherein the entire channel is contained within the core-band.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“as calling signals) in a “broadcast burst” (including Yamaura’s BCH and FCH) using only a subset of the subcarriers near the center of the bandwidth that makes up the channel. Pet. 27–29, 36–37; PO Resp. 30; Ex. 1003, 1:65–67, 6:5–8, 20:65–67, 21:30–32, 24:6–14; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 65–68. There is some ambiguity, however, regarding whether Yamaura transmits signals outside of its narrow band during the time slots assigned to the alleged broadcast channels BCH and FCH (e.g., SC1 and SC2 as depicted in Figure 17 of Yamaura). See Ex. 1003, 21:1–43, Fig. 17. After reviewing the relevant portions of Yamaura, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Yamaura transmits signals only in its narrow band during the BCH and FCH time slots for the reasons discussed below.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“Petitioner argues there are no signals other than calling signals sent during BCH and FCH because “the whole broadcast burst is part of the calling signal.” Tr. 102:17–103:2. However, upon review of the complete record and in the context of Yamaura’s entire disclosure, we credit Dr. Haas’s testimony that Yamaura’s repeated references to calling signals being specific control signals or part of the control signals indicates that Yamaura transmits other control signals during the BCH and FCH time slots. PO Resp. 30–31; Ex. 2001 ¶ 107.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 7,787,431 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,787,431 - Westerngeco, L.L.C. v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00310 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 23, 24, and 30 are unpatentable as anticipated by de Kok; claims 23, 24, 28, and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Beasley and Edington.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the “indexed” limitation requires more than merely “selecting” times. Petitioner offers no explanation how Dr. Ikelle’s testimony that “indexed” should be construed broadly to mean “selected,” Ex. 2002, 184:8–11, would be consistent with the rest of the limitation that requires enabling separate identification of events originating from different sources. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, however, is unduly narrow to the extent it requires recording. As explained in the passage cited by Patent Owner, recording the signal and indexing are two separate aspects of the process involved in the ’981 patent. Ex. 1001, 5:62–67 (“A recording is made of the signal . . . that is indexed to a known time reference with respect to time of firing of the first source) (emphases added). The ’981 patent demonstrates that the term “indexed” is used in the “indexed” limitation according to one of its ordinary meanings that one thing is arranged in reference to another. Id.; see also id. at 6:66–7:1 (“[A] time of firing of each source with respect to a time index” is shown in Figure 4.), 8:33–40 (“[W]hen time is indexed with respect to the firing time of source A,” source B events are not coherent between firing sequences.).” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Owner’s distinctions between what de Kok discloses and what claim 23 recites are inapposite. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments, which Patent Owner does not contest, that de Kok’s firing times for each source are indexed (as we have construed the “indexed” limitation) to the reference time in a way that allows the shot records to be separated into source records. Because de Kok discloses both indexing and enabling separate identification of seismic events originating from each source, de Kok discloses the “indexed” limitation as we have construed it.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“unpersuaded. Petitioner’s challenge relies on Edington for its teaching that time-delays can be used to encode and decode signals. Based on the arguments and evidence presented during trial, we are persuaded by Petitioner that a person having ordinary skill would have used time-aligning signals, as taught by Edington, as a type of decoding without needing to take multiple shots from the same source. Accordingly, a person having ordinary skill would have been able to decode a signal for a given encoding scheme, and we find Patent Owner’s assertion that an ordinarily skilled artisan would “lack[] an effective decoding scheme” unpersuasive.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“Beasley clearly states that “no time shift” results in “no spatial reflection-point smearing.” Ex. 1004, 7:61–62. Both parties agree that some amount of spatial reflection point smearing would result from using Edington’s time delay encoding with Beasley’s seismic surveying system. See Tr. 28:3–8, 38:14–15 (counsel for Patent Owner stating that “frankly, any time you have a time delay at all, there is spatial reflection point smearing”). However, neither party pointed us to evidence explaining the relationship between the amount of delay and the amount of smearing, or how much smearing would be tolerated in marine seismic surveying. One consequence of the lack of evidence on this point is that it is unclear whether Beasley is stating that simultaneous activation versus sequential activation avoids smearing or if simultaneous activation versus near-simultaneous activation avoids smearing. Beasley’s disclosure regarding the benefit of eliminating smearing immediately follows the discussion that distinguishes between sequential and concurrent source activation. Based on the record before us, we find Beasley indicates that simultaneous (or near-simultaneous) activation of sources avoids the smearing that otherwise results when activating the sources sequentially. Ex. 1004, 7:52–63. Furthermore, Patent Owner has not argued, and we do not find, that claim 23 should be construed to exclude any amount of spatial reflection point smearing.10 The parties have pointed to no evidence or argument explaining sufficiently why the level of smearing resulting from Petitioner’s proposed combination of Beasley and Edington would be unacceptable, but the level of smearing resulting from the time delay encoding recited in the ’981 patent would be acceptable. Therefore, to the extent that incorporating Edington’s time delay encoding into Beasley’s system generates reflection point smearing, the evidence does not support a finding that claim 23 excludes any amount of smearing. Based on the record before us, we are not 10 When asked whether the subject matter of the ’981 patent suffered from spatial reflection point smearing because of its use of time delays, counsel for Patent Owner stated “I do think it suffers it to some degree.” Tr. 41:14– 15. persuaded the smearing allegedly introduced by combining Edington’s time delay encoding with Beasley’s system would have led an ordinarily skilled artisan away from that combination.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 6,906,981 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,906,981 - Westerngeco, L.L.C. v. PGS Geophysical AsSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 8, 2016 · IPR2015-00311 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 31, 32, and 35–37 are unpatentable as obvious over Beasley and Edington; the Board did not find claims 31–34 and 36–38 anticipated by de Kok or claims 33–34 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner initially argued for a specific construction of “wavelet time” as “the duration of the source signature.” Pet. 14–15. For purposes of the Decision on Institution, we preliminarily construed wavelet time consistent with Petitioner’s proposed construction. Dec. on Inst. 14–15. Now, with the full record before us, we determine an explicit construction of “wavelet time” is not necessary to resolve this controversy. Petitioner does not clearly set forth a proposed construction for any other term in its Petition. Patent Owner argues for specific constructions of “quasi-randomly” and “randomly.” PO Resp. 15–19. The constructions of “quasi-randomly” and “randomly” are not in dispute, and an explicit construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy; accordingly, we do not provide an explicit construction of “quasi-randomly” or “randomly.” Therefore, we determine there is no need to construe explicitly any term for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that de Kok’s polarity encoding and decoding process does not disclose the “time aligning” step. As Patent Owner argues, de Kok describes a polarity encoding and decoding system that does not align the “recorded signals with respect to a firing time of the second source in each firing sequence.” Specifically, de Kok explains that it uses activation sequences and polarity to generate signals, from which “source records may be derived” “using a combination of shot record summations, inversions and filtering.” Ex. 1003, 2:51–53; see also id. at 4:55–5:4, 5:55–65. To the extent de Kok discusses time delay encoding, any arguable time alignment applies to the firing of the sources, not the recorded signals. Id. at 5:66–6:2, 6:41–52. Accordingly, Petitioner has not pointed to persuasive evidence that de Kok’s polarity encoding and decoding discloses the “time-aligning” step.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“The relevant passages cited by both parties demonstrate that Beasley distinguishes between alternating and concurrent firings. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 7:52–63. Although Herkenhoff states that the concurrent disclosure in Beasley means “exactly concurrently,” Patent Owner has not pointed to any clear disclosure in Beasley itself indicating “concurrently” should be understood as excluding any amount of time delay. Petitioner, however, has pointed to multiple references where Beasley explains that sources may be fired “simultaneously or nearly simultaneously.” Pet. Reply 12 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:46–47); Pet. 38 (quoting Ex. 1004, 1:19–25 (“The present invention, in certain aspects, is directed to seismic survey systems and methods in which two or more seismic sources are fired simultaneously, or significantly close together temporally . . . .”)); see also Ex. 1004, 1:47–51, 8:44–47, 9:5–10, 12:26–29. Moreover, claim 1 of the ’655 patent, which Patent Owner asserts claims the “first embodiment” of the ’981 patent, recites a method including the step of “substantially simultaneously launching a first acoustic wavefield,” from the leading source, “the first wavefield being characterized by a first unique code and launching a second acoustic wavefield” from the trailing source, “the second acoustic wavefield being characterized by a second unique code.” Ex. 2009, 6:46–53. Accordingly, Beasley does not exclude time delay encoding from its disclosed “concurrent” activation embodiments. Patent Owner’s argument that time delay encoding results in a plain wavefield rather than an encoded wavefield and, therefore, using time delay encoding would not fall within Beasley’s “any type of coding,” is similarly unpersuasive. Patent Owner fails to address that Beasley distinguishes between “a signal with no encoded feature, individual identifier, tag, discriminating feature, or separate signature” and “signals that can be discriminated from each other due to some identifying characteristic, parameter, signature or feature.” Ex. 1004, 9:67–10:8 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that time delay encoding generates signals with an identifying parameter or characteristic (the timing) that would allow the signals to “be discriminated from each other.” Pet. Reply 11–12. Furthermore, Dr. Lynn acknowledged that “Edington’s time delay source coding is ‘a type of source signature encoding.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 1022, 148:18–23).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“nonobviousness. PO Resp. 55–60. The factual inquiries for obviousness include secondary considerations based on evaluation and crediting of objective evidence. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). However, to accord substantial weight to objective evidence requires the finding of a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “Nexus” is a legally and factually sufficient connection between the objective evidence and the claimed invention, such that the objective evidence should be considered in determining nonobviousness. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The burden of showing that a nexus exists lies with the patent owner. Id.; see In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Patent Owner points to various prior attempts (including Edington, Beasley, and de Kok) to conduct simultaneous shootings in a marine environment and the failings of each of them. Id. at 43–44. Patent Owner also points to various published papers allegedly “investigat[ing] data processing techniques for use with data sets modeled on [the ’981 patent]’s varied time delays” and field trials and studies allegedly using the ’981 patent’s “time-delay acquisition and indexing methods.” Id. at 44–48. Petitioner argues Patent Owner has shown no nexus between Patent Owner’s proffered secondary considerations and the invention of the ’981 patent. Pet. Reply 20–22. Petitioner contends Patent Owner’s focus on the varied time delays of claim 31 is insufficient because time delayed encoding “existed long before the ’981 patent.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not demonstrated sufficiently a nexus between the secondary considerations and the alleged novelty of claim 31. First, as Petitioner points out, and as borne out by the evidence in this case, time delay encoding for seismic surveying existed prior to the ’981 patent. E.g., Exs. 1006, 1021. Second, the majority of the evidence cited by Patent Owner focuses on the randomness of the time delays, not just the use of time delays generally. Consequently, Patent Owner has not presented persuasive evidence or analysis linking the claims at issue with the alleged “long-felt but unmet need, industry praise, and copying.” See PO Resp. 55.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 6,906,981 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,906,981 - Under Armour, Inc. v. Adidas AGRehearing deniedPTAB · Feb 29, 2016 · IPR2015-01532 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Under Armour’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claim 17 for anticipation by Bouve and, alternatively, Kim.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision[,]” which party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues it just needs to show “that Kim discloses storing data that falls within the scope of the plain words ‘a length of the route.’” We agree with Petitioner that the plain meaning of “a length of the route” is the appropriate construction because, on this record, we find no reason to give the phrase a special meaning. The Petition, however, did not present persuasive argument that the plain meaning of “a length of the route” encompasses Kim’s total altitude distance.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“users needed to manually estimate route distances between points of interest. Pet. 17–18 (quoting Ex. 1004, 1:28–35). The Petition asserted “Bouve improved upon the prior art system by maintaining route length information in a database.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). In support of that assertion, the Petition pointed to Bouve’s disclosure that “The processors . . . compute the mileage indication, along the retrieved travel route(s), for each individual item of travel information which is retrieved from the data bases,” and concluded that Bouve computes mileage information along a route and route length between points of interest using route length information stored in a database. Id. (quoting Ex. 1004, 8:18–22 (underlining added). The Petition, however, failed to identify any disclosure in Bouve that “route length information” is maintained in a database. The Petition also argued Bouve discloses recommending a route “based on that stored length of a route” because Bouve allows a user to select the shortest route between two points. Id. at 19.” slip op. at 3
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 8,652,009 - NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2015-01316 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that VESA P&D and VESA Flat Panel were publicly accessible printed publications, so claims 6–10 could not rely on them.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated, under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of any of claims 6–10 of the ’724 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any claim.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive. Petitioner does not explain adequately whether or how the VESA documents were made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” Lister, 583 F.3d at 1311. Instead, Petitioner merely asserts that “VESA is a well-known standards setting organization that promulgates standards relating to video in electronics.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58); id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 75). As such, we determine that Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that the VESA documents are printed publications under § 102(b). See Lister, 583 F.3d at 1317 (burden is on the proponent to show the purported reference was publicly available). Therefore, based on the record before us, we conclude Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing that either VESA P&D or VESA Flat Panel may be relied upon as prior art with respect to claims 6–10 of the ’724 patent.” slip op. at 6
§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,804,724 - NVIDIA Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 9, 2015 · IPR2015-01315 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that Lai qualified as prior art, defeating both asserted grounds for claims 1, 3, and 26–29.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable
“Lai issued from U.S. Patent Application No. 10/236,794, which was filed on September 6, 2002 and claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/328,284, filed on October 9, 2001 (Ex. 1004, “the Lai Provisional”). Ex. 1003, [21], [22], [60], 1:8–12. Because Lai’s filing date postdates the effective filing date of the ’602 patent, Lai must be entitled to the benefit of the Lai Provisional filing date to qualify as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Lai is entitled to the benefit of the Lai Provisional filing date if the disclosure of the Lai Provisional supports the claimed subject matter of Lai in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.1 See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A reference patent is only entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application if the disclosure of the provisional application provides support for the claims in the reference patent in compliance with § 112, ¶ 1.”).” slip op. at 5
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“In a conference call with the parties, the panel authorized Petitioner to submit a five-page, non-argumentative claim chart showing how the claims of a reference patent asserted by Petitioner are supported by a provisional application. Paper 9, 3. The panel also authorized Patent Owner to file a five-page response to Petitioner’s claim chart. Id. at 4. Petitioner filed a claim chart. Paper 8. Paper 8 included two pages of text in addition to the five-page claim chart. Because these two additional pages are not in compliance with our Order (see Paper 9), we have considered the claim chart only and none of the arguments presented in the additional two pages. Patent Owner subsequently filed a response to Petitioner’s claim chart. Paper 10.” slip op. at 2
§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,819,602 - International Business Machines Corporation v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 21, 2015 · IPR2014-00682 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 26, 28, and 30–33 are unpatentable as obvious over Porras and Cheswick; the Board did not find claims 26 and 30–32 anticipated by NetRanger.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“1. “anomaly” In the Decision to Institute, we construed the term “anomaly” as “a departure from the usual or expected; an abnormality or irregularity.” Dec. 6. Specifically, we agreed with Patent Owner’s assertion that this is the plain meaning of the term and is consistent with the specification of the ’084 patent. Id. at 7. For example, the ’084 patent states that “[a]nomaly detection systems look for statistically anomalous behavior . . . [s]tatistical scenarios can be implemented for user, dataset, and program usage to detect ‘exceptional’ use of the system.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 3:54–57). Neither party contests this construction. We see no reason to deviate from this construction of “anomaly.”” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“As explained above, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “data” or the data limitations excludes “anomaly reports” or “analysis results” sent to a central collection and processing center. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the claimed data collection and processing center must monitor and analyze data “firsthand” as Patent Owner contends. PO Resp. 1–3, 7. In its Response, Patent Owner bases its narrow reading of the scope of claim 26 on the description in the ’084 patent that “all communications sent to each host 220, 230, 240, 250 are forwarded to, or otherwise captured by, the data collection and processing center” and “[t]hus, the data collection and processing center receives all communications (i.e., the data) originating from a user on the computer network 204 and flowing to . . . all . . . hosts (and vice versa).” Id. at 2–3 (quoting Ex. 1004, 7:37–44). Nothing in this language, however, limits the data collection and processing center to receiving communications that directly originate from a user. In other words, nothing in this language prevents a device from intercepting the communications, doing some data manipulation or analysis, and then forwarding the resulting product on to the data collection and processing center. In fact, the language itself seems to contemplate that scenario—“all communications . . . are forwarded to, or otherwise captured by, the data collection and processing center.” Ex. 1004, 7:36–37 (emphasis added). We are not persuaded to the contrary by Dr. Goldschlag’s testimony, which simply recites the claim language and concludes that “[m]onitoring and analyzing reports based on such data does not satisfy the claim language.” Ex. 2017 ¶¶ 21–23. Moreover, Patent Owner does not address, in its brief, the very next sentence of the ’084 patent, which describes a situation similar to that described by Porras, where the data collection and processing center does not monitor the data “firsthand.” Ex. 1004, 7:45–47 (“It should be noted that certain devices can be used as sensors to sense data traffic and pass their findings on to the data collection and processing center.”) (emphasis added). During oral argument, Patent Owner suggested that this language reflects an embodiment with functionality not encompassed by claim 26.7 Tr. 34 (“The specification contemplates additional embodiments that are not claimed here, and this claim does not prevent taking additional information, such as reports from the sensors, and using that information further.”). We are persuaded, however, that the correct reading of this language, in context, is that the ’084 patent contemplates network devices that may implement various amounts of processing of incoming data prior to forwarding that data on to the central data collection and processing center. At the very least, the ’084 patent does not clearly restrict that amount of data manipulation and processing. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Porras discloses an enterprise-layer monitor that “analyz[es] 7 Petitioner objects to this argument as improper new argument. Tr. 49.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“computer with a firewall coupled to a computer network.” Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1007, 041; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 233–34). Specifically, Petitioner asserts that NetRanger’s Director teaches the claimed data collection and processing center. Id. There is no dispute that NetRanger discloses the Director comprising a computer. To support the firewall portion of this limitation, Petitioner relies solely on the following language from NetRanger in a section titled “How Existing Firewalls Affect NetRanger Installation”: The NetRanger NSX can work in conjunction with existing firewalls as long as they are appropriately placed within your network. Ideally, the NetRanger NSX should be located in front of the existing firewall. If the NetRanger NSX packet filter is placed behind a firewall, intrusion detection will be limited to traffic that has been allowed through the firewall, and it will not generate alarms on reconnaissance or failed malicious activity. In cases where there is no need for address translation or other proxy services, NetRanger can replace firewalls. If there is no need for address translation or other proxy services, NetRanger works best without a firewall and has less impact on network performance. Id. (quoting Ex. 1007, 041) (emphases added); Reply 13. According to Dr. Bellovin, “[o]ne having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that, since NetRanger could ‘replace firewalls,’ NetRanger was a firewall itself.” Ex. 1001 ¶ 233. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner doesn’t identify a single disclosed embodiment where NetRanger’s Director comprises a computer with a firewall coupled to a network as required by the claims. PO Resp. 22. Instead, Petitioner states that the NetRanger system, generically, may replace a firewall, or can work in conjunction with a firewall. Pet. 48 (citing Ex. 1007, 041; Ex. 1001 ¶¶ 233–34). In its reply, Petitioner states that it “provided a block quote in support of the fact that NetRanger teaches that the Director was a computer with a firewall” referring to a portion of the paragraph reproduced above. Reply 13 (citing Pet. 48; Ex. 1007, 041). Nonetheless, Petitioner does not explain, and it is not clear on its face, how the cited language supports a teaching that the Director can replace a firewall, as opposed to, for example, the entire NetRanger system or NetRanger’s NSX component replacing the firewall. Thus, Petitioner has not shown persuasively that NetRanger discloses this limitation. We conclude, therefore, that Petitioner has not met its burden to show,” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 6,715,084 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,715,084 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2015 · IPR2015-01025 · APJ Justin Busch · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Bruwer did not teach the claimed touch-sensor-triggered find-in-the-dark indication, and Petitioner gave no persuasive reason to modify it.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“evidence of record, and we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in establishing that claims 1, 3, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Bruwer. Although Patent Owner does not specifically contest Petitioner’s assertions that Bruwer’s disclosures render the subject matter of the challenged claims obvious we find Petitioner has not met its burden of establishing that the subject matter of the challenged claims would have been obvious in view of Bruwer.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Figure 11 and its accompanying description, however, describe a circuit that activates the FITD indication either “when switch 1111 is closed by the user” or “[w]hen microchip 1113 pulls the line 1114 to high.” Ex. 1004, 13:29–30. Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the portion of Bruwer cited by Petitioner and Dr. Horenstein does not disclose that the microchip activates the FITD indication in response to input from switch 1111, as required by claim 1. Although Petitioner provides a rationale as to why it would have been obvious to activate the FITD indication when the load is inactive, Petitioner provides no persuasive analysis or rationale for modifying Bruwer’s disclosed circuit to teach that the “microchip, in response to at least a signal from the touch sensor, is configured for activating a visible find-in-the-dark indication, when the load is not activated,” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,265,494
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.