- Apple, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 21, 2018 · IPR2016-01738 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Apple's rehearing request, leaving intact its decision that the proposed substitute claims were not shown patentable over the cited art because Settsu did not disclose preloading during the same boot sequence.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“First, as explained in the Decision, when construing the claims at issue (1) we looked at the language of the claims themselves, (2) we consulted the patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms, because the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part,” Trading Techs. Int’l, v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)), and (3) we reviewed “the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the [US Patent and Trademark Office] for a second review” (Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See Decision, 6–7.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructioncites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 8,880,862 - Apple, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 21, 2018 · IPR2016-01737 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving intact its finding that the prior art did not disclose the substitute claims’ preloading limitation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“First, as explained in the Decision, when construing the claims at issue (1) we looked at the language of the claims themselves, (2) we consulted the patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms, because the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part,” Trading Techs. Int’l, v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)), and (3) we reviewed “the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the [US Patent and Trademark Office] for a second review” (Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See Decision, 6–7.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructioncites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 8,880,862 - Airwatch LLC / Vmware, Inc. v. Route1 Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 3, 2018 · IPR2017-02145 · APJ John A Evans · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show that the Board overlooked or misapprehended its obviousness arguments.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which provides in relevant part: A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing[,] without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. A rehearing request is not an opportunity for the requesting party to reargue its case or merely to express disagreement with the Final Decision, which is all Petitioner has done in this instance.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In denying the Petition, the Board determined Petitioner did not present a sufficient rationale for combining either Dingman (Ex. 1007, US 2004/0024879 A1) or Flowers (Ex. 1014, US 2003/0105812 A1) with Cook (Ex. 1011, US Patent No. 7,424,736 B2) under KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)(“‘[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.’”) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Decision 17, 19–20. Petitioner requests rehearing of our decision not to institute inter partes review. Paper 10, (“Rehearing Request,” “Req. Reh’g.”). Petitioner states two grounds for rehearing. Req. Reh’g. 1. The stated grounds are: (1) the Board overlooked or misapprehended “the legal significance of the evidence confirming that the ‘notifications’ limitation is trivial”; and (2) the Board overlooked or misapprehended the legal significance of Cook’s teachings of “additional benefits of its notification scheme.” Id. at 1–2. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner’s request for rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“The Decision concludes that Petitioner failed to provide sufficient persuasive evidence or reasoned explanation upon which we could make a finding of motivation to combine the Dingman and Cook references. Decision 16.” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,814,216 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / EMC Corporation v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 20, 2018 · IPR2017-00477 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 9 are unpatentable as obvious over Cramer and Banga; claim 9 is also anticipated by Cramer, while anticipation was not shown for claim 1.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“skill in the art should be adopted nor how the different levels affect the parties’ analyses. Although there are slight differences between the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art, the parties agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a four-year technical degree with work experience in computer networks or storage systems. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 26); Ex. 2001 ¶ 18. Both parties also agree that additional education may take the place of educational experience. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 26); Ex. 2001 ¶ 18. Based on the evidence of record, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we adopt Patent Owner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, specifically that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had “bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with two to three years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” We agree with both parties that additional education would make up for less professional experience. Ex. 2001 ¶ 18; Ex. 1002 ¶ 26. We note, however, that our analysis would be the same if we adopted either party’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The Decision on Institution addressed the broadest reasonable interpretation of “control portion,” determining that this term “encompasses a portion of an information packet that includes information used to determine how the packet should be routed.” Dec. on Inst. 14. During the trial, Patent Owner stated that it “does not concede the Board’s construction is correct and maintains that a control portion should be construed to mean ‘a contiguous portion of a packet that includes information used to determine how the packet should be routed.’” PO Resp. 8. Patent Owner, however, further states that “the Board does not need to resolve this issue to decide any dispute in this IPR.” PO Resp. 8. Following institution, the parties did not otherwise address claim construction. See PO Resp. 8; Pet. Reply 2. Based on the record developed during trial, we determine that we need not expressly construe any term in the challenged claims to decide the issues of patentability before us.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“insufficient to support Petitioner’s assertion of anticipation because Cramer does not describe associating first and second host addresses with a common frame address. PO Resp. 21–25. We agree with Patent Owner. Although Cramer describes a filer with a single network adapter, Cramer never expressly describes associating two host addresses with the MAC address of that adapter. In step 410 of Figure 4 of Cramer, “the IP address for the storage device is mapped to a network interface controller (NIC).” Ex. 1005, 9:44–45 (emphasis added). Cramer discloses repeating the process in Figure 4 for each additional device that needs to be configured (Ex. 1005, 10:4–6, Fig. 4 (step 414), but it does not expressly describe that the next volume’s IP address will be mapped to the same NIC. As Patent Owner correctly points out, “[t]he remainder of Cramer’s discussion and figures do not mention or illustrate a single instance where two IP volumes are assigned to the same NIC and therefore share a common frame address.” PO Resp. 22. For example, referring to Figure 5, Cramer discloses: “Connected to Filer 1 is a volume of disks 510. In this example, Filer 1 includes three separate network interface [controllers] (NICs), namely E0, E1 and E2. Filer 2 has NICs E4A and E4B.” Ex. 1005, 10:15–19. Figure 5, therefore, does not show two volumes whose IP addresses are assigned to the same NIC. We do not find express disclosure in Cramer of this many-toone correspondence of IP addresses to frame address. In its Reply, Petitioner notes Cramer describes that filers can serve 150 or more volumes, and Petitioner argues that “there is no suggestion in Cramer that any filer would have 150 or more NICs.” Pet. Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1005, 2:19–21, 4:47–50); see Ex. 1005, 2:19–21 (“Currently available filer implementations can serve a large number of discrete volumes (150 or more, for example).”). This disclosure may make readily apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art the desirability of using fewer NICs in such a situation and sharing those NICs among multiple volumes, but this is insufficient for anticipation because Cramer still lacks disclosure of associating two IP addresses with the MAC address of one NIC. See Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”). Furthermore, Petitioner does not assert that this feature is inherent in Cramer. See Paper 29, 7 (In response to Patent Owner’s Observation 8, Petitioner states: “Petitioner has not relied upon the inherent teachings of any references.”). Having considered the record developed during trial, we determine Petitioner has not shown Cramer expressly describes “the first and second host addresses . . . are both associated with a common frame address that corresponds to a network interface that communicatively couples the packet processor to a network.”” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner’s position that pointing out similarities in references may not be, by itself, sufficient to support a legal conclusion of obviousness. Rather, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We, however, do not understand Petitioner’s arguments regarding the similarities of Cramer and Banga to be the rationale to combine. Instead, we understand these arguments to be directed to reasonable expectation of success. For example, Petitioner quotes Dr. Karlin’s testimony that “[t]his combination would be straightforward, since Cramer and Banga have similar system designs and would require no more than routine skill in the art because, e.g., the two patents are both NetApp patents, describe similar systems, and are directed to the same person of skill in the art.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 75, quoted in Pet. 60. Petitioner provides separate reasoning to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Banga’s teaching of assigning multiple IP addresses to a common MAC address with the teachings of Cramer. Pet. 59. In particular, Petitioner argues: As explained by Dr. Karlin, “a person of ordinary skill in the art reading Cramer and Banga would be motivated to utilize the common frame address with multiple IP addresses disclosed in Banga with the multiple virtual objects associated with multiple IP addresses disclosed in Cramer. For example, Banga discusses that with a common frame address, ‘the capabilities of the NIC are effectively shared between’ multiple virtual objects and a person of skill in the art would understand the advantages of associating multiple virtual objects with a single NIC having a single MAC, i.e., allowing the capabilities of a single NIC to be ‘effectively shared.’ Banga at 12:1-9.” Pet. 59–60 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶ 75). Patent Owner argues this is not sufficient articulated reasoning to” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 8,387,132 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,387,132 - EMC Corporation / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 20, 2018 · IPR2017-00374 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–9, 13, 15, 16, and 18–21 are unpatentable as obvious over OceanStore; anticipation and the OceanStore–Condor combination were not established, nor was claim 17 obvious over OceanStore.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“The parties dispute the proper construction of the limitation “[r]epresenting with the corresponding software-based NAS component that the selected distributed devices respectively comprise NAS devices” as recited in claims 1 and 13. See Pet 11–12; PO Resp. 8–11; Reply 3–8. Specifically, the parties proposed the following constructions: Petitioner “using the corresponding software-based NAS components of the selected distributed devices to mimic dedicated NAS devices”” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Although we agree with Patent Owner regarding the use of the term “respectively,” we do not understand its use to require “the selected distributed devices to cause each selected distributed device to separately appear to network-connected user devices as a dedicated NAS device.” We cannot construe individual terms in isolation. Rather, we must consider the claim as a whole in view of the specification. Specifically, we must consider the implications of other terms recited in claims 1 and 13 (e.g., “location information”) and how the claims are supported by the disclosed embodiments.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contests Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, specifically arguing that “Petitioners’ proposed requirements, especially with regard to work experience, are higher than can be reasonably supported.” PO Resp. 5–6. Patent Owner notes that Petitioners’ declarant, Dr. Kubiatowicz, testified on cross-examination that “somebody coming directly out of college, likely, would need a couple of extra years to understand this,” and that “a little bit of professional experience might help them -- would help them understand the details involved in this case.” Id. at 6 (citing Ex. 2002, 25:13–14; 26:2–5). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Shenoy, testified that, at the time “of the ’827 patent, one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with 1–2 years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 19. According to Dr. Shenoy, “[l]ack of experience can be remedied by additional education or vice versa.” Id. Based on our review of the ’827 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’827 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr. Kubiatowicz and Dr. Shenoy, we adopt and apply Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, specifically that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with 1–2 years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” We also determine that such a person would have been familiar with computer systems architecture and design, and would have been aware of design trends relating to distributed processing systems.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. Based on the record before us, we are not satisfied Petitioner has shown adequately for an anticipation challenge that OceanStore discloses “wherein the respective client agents for particular distributed devices of the plurality of distributed devices have corresponding software-based network attached storage (NAS) components configured to assess unused or under-utilized storage resources in selected distributed devices of the plurality of distributed devices” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 13. Although it appears OceanStore discloses distributed routing in order to find and fulfill a request for an entity with a GUID (global unique identifier) (see Ex. 1003, 193), there does not appear to be an explicit disclosure that any software-based network attached storage (NAS) component on a distributed device assesses unused or under-utilized storage resources in selected distributed devices. Nor does Petitioner adequately explain how such an assessment would be inherent in the disclosure of OceanStore. We note that Petitioner cites to the prosecution history of the ’827 patent while making arguments regarding claim construction. See Pet. 12 n2. Although the ’827 patent prosecution history states that its “client agent programs must be capable of assessing what capabilities are spare and/or unused (unused or under-utilized)” (Ex. 1015, 8), such a statement by the patent applicant does not relieve Petitioner of its burden to point out where such a feature is found in the prior art reference that forms the basis of its anticipation challenge. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that OceanStore describes this limitation of claims 1 and 13. d. Summary Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that OceanStore describes every limitation of claims 1 and 13. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 13 are anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) based on OceanStore. 3. Analysis of Cited Art as Applied to Dependent Claims 3–9 and 15–21 Petitioner contends dependent claims 3–9 and 15–21 of the ’827 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) in view of OceanStore. Pet. 36–44, 46. For the same reason as discussed above in regard to independent claims 1 and 13 above, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 3–9 and 15–21 of the ’827 patent are anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) based on OceanStore.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,275,827 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,275,827 - EMC Corporation / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 20, 2018 · IPR2017-00439 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–6, 8, 9, 13, 15–18, 20, and 21 are unpatentable over Carter; claims 5 and 17 are also obvious over Carter and Pitzel.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Patent Owner regarding the ordinary meaning of the term “respectively.” Specifically, we understand that the word “respectively” can be an adverb that means “for each separately or in turn, and in the order mentioned.” The use of “respectively” as an adverb in the English language requires parallelism. See Ex. 3002. In other words, there must be a direct one-to-one correspondence and specific referents must be individually identified before there can be a “parallel list” of attribute values applicable to each, in that order. The term “respectively” also can be an attributive adjective that means “concerning or appropriate to each of several individually.” Id. In the present case, the term “respectively” appears to modify “the selected distributed devices.” Because specific referents are not individually identified, we understand the term to act as an attributive adjective modifying each of several selected distributed devices. Although we agree with Patent Owner regarding the use of the term “respectively,” we do not understand its use to require “the selected distributed devices to cause each selected distributed device to separately appear to network-connected user devices as a dedicated NAS device.” We cannot construe individual terms in isolation. Rather, we must consider claims as a whole in view of the specification. Specifically, we must consider the implications of other terms recited in claims 1 and 13 (e.g., “location information”) and how the claims are supported by the disclosed embodiments.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contests Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, specifically arguing that “Petitioners’ proposed requirements especially with regard to work experience, are higher than can be reasonably supported.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner notes that Petitioners’ declarant, Dr. Kubiatowicz, testified on cross-examination that “somebody coming directly out of college, likely, would need a couple of extra years to understand this,” and that “a little bit of professional experience might help them -- would help them understand the details involved in this case.” Id. (citing Ex. 2002, 25:13–14; 26:2–5). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Shenoy, testified that, “at the time of the ’827 patent, a person of ordinary skill in the art should have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with 1–2 years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” Ex. 2003 ¶ 19. According to Dr. Shenoy, “[l]ack of experience can be remedied by additional education or vice versa.” Id. Based on our review of the ’827 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’827 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Dr. Kubiatowicz and Dr. Shenoy, we adopt and apply Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, specifically that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or equivalent, with 1–2 years of work experience in the field of computer networking, storage systems, or a related field.” See id. We also determine that such a person would have been familiar with computer systems architecture and design, and would have been aware of design trends relating to distributed processing systems.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Despite Patent Owner’s arguments, we find that Carter’s policy element 290 (a software module) is configured to assess unused or under-utilized storage resources in selected distributed devices of the plurality of distributed devices. We understand policy element 290 to satisfy this limitation because Carter specifically discloses that policy element 290 “acts as a controller to determine the availability of resources, such as printer capabilities, hard-disk space, available RAM and other such resources.” Ex. 1140, 36:27–29 (emphases added). We credit the testimony of Dr. Kubiatowicz, who during his deposition stated, “I would say this policy controller certainly can evaluate the hard disk space on the local node, but could also potentially evaluate storage throughout the system by communicating with other nodes.” Ex. 2002, 86:13–16; see id. at 88:5–7; see also id. at 88:12–16 (“What I said was that this policy element is determining the availability of resources. So it’s assessing whether or not hard disk space of various sorts is available. So it’s availability, not just available.”); see id. at 88:18–89:18, 90:5–91:1. We further credit the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Shenoy, who testified that Carter discloses “determin[ing] the free volume space available for allocation.” See Ex. 1144, 142:19–20 (referencing Ex. 1140, 19:14–17). Reading directly from Carter, Dr. Shenoy further testified that Carter discloses “request[ing] the total available space information and us[ing] this information to quickly determine whether to proceed with the allocation processing.” Id. at 142:14–17, 143:1617. In view of the explicit disclosure of Carter and the testimony of both declarants, we find that Carter’s controller performs an “assessment” in order to “determine the availability of resources.” Additionally, Carter states that policy controller 290 “can employ any of the suitable heuristics to direct the elements, such as the paging controller, disk directory manager, and other elements to dynamically distribute the available resources.” Ex. 1140, 36:29–37:2. Thus, we agree with Petitioner’s argument, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Kubiatowicz, that policy element 290 assesses the unused or underused storage resources when it determines the availability of such resources and uses some heuristics when distributing those resources that were assessed. See Pet 39 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 118). Accordingly, based on the entirety of the record before us, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Carter discloses the “assessing” limitations of claims 1 and 13.” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to offer sufficient explanation as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Carter and Condor. Rather, Petitioner appears to argue that, based on the advantages described by Condor (Ex. 1017, 5), and using well-known techniques with unspecified predictable results, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had sufficient reason to combine these disparate elements taught in the prior art references to render the challenged claims obvious. Pet. 61–66. Yet, other than Petitioner’s cursory assertion of “advantageously incorporat[ing] the central coordinator in Condor to provide a centralized mechanism to manage resource sharing” (Pet. 66), which cites equally cursory and unsupported testimony by Dr. Kubiatowicz (Ex. 1102 ¶ 199), Petitioner fails to identify what particular advantages or efficiencies would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Condor’s scheduler with Carter’s system. Furthermore, Dr. Kubiatowicz’s testimony regarding predictable results and obviousness to try are similarly lacking in elaboration and substantiation. See Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 200–201. Such conclusory statements and unspecific testimony without evidence on the record cannot satisfy the Petitioner’s burden of demonstrating obviousness. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016); I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 F. App’x 982, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The testimony of the Defendants’ expert amounts to a ‘mere conclusory statement’ that may not serve as a basis for finding the asserted claims obvious.”); see also InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that expert’s testimony could not support a finding of obviousness where “testimony primarily consisted of conclusory references to [the expert’s] belief that one of ordinary skill in the art could combine these references, not that they would have been motivated to do so”); see also 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Although Petitioner has not provided a sufficient rationale to combine in this asserted ground of unpatentability, Petitioner has otherwise demonstrated that claims 4, 6, 16, and 18 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because they are anticipated by Carter. Petitioner, however, has not asserted claims 7 and 19 are unpatentable under any other ground in this proceeding. Therefore, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 7 and 19 of the ’827 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Carter and Condor.” slip op. at 59
Patent outcomesUS 8,275,827 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,275,827 - Quantificare, Inc. v. The Proctor & Gamble CompanyRehearing deniedPTAB · Jun 12, 2018 · IPR2017-02113 · APJ Jeffrey A Stephens · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place the denial of institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims were unpatentable on the asserted § 103 grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single request for rehearing without prior authorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Pet. 53–54. As an initial matter, as we explained in the Decision, this contention lacks sufficient “explanation, expert testimony, or other evidence” regarding: (1) how teachings from the references are combined or modified, (2) the reasons one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined or modified the teachings to arrive at the claimed invention, or (3) whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to combine the teachings in the manner claimed.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Pet. 53–54. As an initial matter, as we explained in the Decision, this contention lacks sufficient “explanation, expert testimony, or other evidence” regarding: (1) how teachings from the references are combined or modified, (2) the reasons one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined or modified the teachings to arrive at the claimed invention, or (3) whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to combine the teachings in the manner claimed.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Decision, including a reference to Lobo’s teaching of “human visual inspection,” and states that “[e]ach of these sentences of the Board are confirmed in writing as being erroneous by Dr. Niels Lobo himself (see attached Lobo Declaration).” Reh’g Req. 4. Petitioner’s Rehearing Request does not cite to or explain the significance of any particular paragraph of the Lobo Declaration. We have, however, reviewed the Lobo Declaration and do not find therein sufficient explanation of the Lobo patent’s reference to “human visual inspection” that persuades us the regions shown in Figure 13 of Lobo are determined electronically. The Lobo Declaration primarily consists of reproductions of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response and the Decision, followed by conclusory assertions that the reproduced statements are erroneous. The Lobo Declaration does not cite specific portions of Lobo that support the declarant’s statements, other than a single reference to the “specification, the figures, the description, and even the title” of the reference. Ex. 1043 ¶ 8. The Lobo Declaration provides that “Lobo doesn’t specifically state that ‘human visual inspection’ is used with the wrinkle geography map to choose a bounding region for a grid used to analyze wrinkles within the grid,” but provides no other alternative explanation for Lobo’s teachings at column 24, lines 34–36. Ex. 1043 ¶ 7(f). Thus, we afford the Lobo Declaration little weight.2 In addition, the Lobo Declaration and its substance are not part of the Petition, and the Board could not have misapprehended or overlooked arguments that were not in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The request [for rehearing] must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”).” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 6,571,003 - Nike Inc. v. Jezign Licensing, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 29, 2018 · IPR2017-00246 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable over Shkalim and Chiaramonte; claim 3 is unpatentable over Shkalim and Powell, Chien and Powell, and Chiaramonte and Powell.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner misapprehends Petitioner’s proposed construction for “sole,” and the Board’s initial adoption thereof. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, we understand that Petitioner does not assert “sole” to mean “heel,” or is otherwise synonymous with “heel.” See Pet. 12–14. Also contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, the Board merely stated: “[t]he ’590 patent does not define the term ‘sole’ or disavow the heel portion of the athletic shoe as being part of the sole,” and that “Patent Owner fails to address the disclosures in the ’590 patent or explain why the record as a whole, including the intrinsic evidence, requires a narrower construction of the term ‘sole.’” Dec. 9–10. We reiterate that the ’590 Patent (to include the incorporated ’586 Patent) does not include a lexicographical definition that specifies that the heel is distinct from the sole. Further, as detailed below, the ordinary meaning of the heel being a portion of the sole is consistent with the Specification.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner asserts “[a] person of skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’590 patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in footwear, apparel, or industrial design or an equivalent field and 1–3 years of work experience in footwear, apparel, or industrial design, or a high school education with 2-4 years of work experience in footwear, apparel, or industrial design.” Pet. 4–5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. 1–23. We adopt Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“b. Analysis of Claims 1 and 2 Petitioner contends that Shkalim discloses “[a]n illuminated shoe comprising: an upper; a sole attached to said upper, the sole including a translucent perimeter surface,” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 21–23. Petitioner bases it contention on Shkalim’s disclosures in Figures 1, 2, and 7 of a sole attached to the upper, Shkalim’s disclosure of a transparent housing or cover 3 containing lighting elements inserted into channel 15 that runs along substantially the whole sole of the shoe, and Shkalim’s disclosure that the connection between the cover and the material of heel and sole can be effected by incorporating the plastic material of cover 3 into the material of the heel. See id. (citing Ex. 1003, [57], 1:1–2, 1:5–10, 1:40–53, 3:6–34; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 62, 63, 65). We find that Shkalim discloses “a light source disposed within said sole,” as recited in claim 1, based on Shkalim’s disclosure of lighting elements 4 in transparent housing or cover 3, and channel 15 in the sole or heel to which housing or cover 3 may be inserted.7 See Pet. 23–24; Ex. 1003, 3:6–50, 4:5–9, Figs. 1(b), 2, 2(a), (b), 3, 5; Ex. 1002 ¶ 66. Petitioner contends Shkalim discloses “a push-button switch coupled to the light source to activate the light source such that the light source provides continuous illumination across a substantial portion of the perimeter surface, regardless of whether the wearer is standing still or walking,” as recited in claim 1. See Pet. 24–26. Petitioner bases its contention on Shkalim’s disclosure in Figure 1 of on-off switch 2 that lights lighting elements 4 contained in transparent housing or cover 3, and rechargeable battery 8 connected to lighting elements 4 and switch 2. See id. (citing Ex. 1003, Figs. 2(a), 2(b), 3, 4, 2:24–26, 3:6–10, 3:34–40, 3:55–4:4; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). We agree with Petitioner and find that Shkalim’s disclosures of transparent cover 3 containing lighting elements 4 in the channel 15 of sole, which runs along substantially the whole sole of the 7 Here, and through our analysis, we note that our Scheduling Order cautions Patent Owner “that any arguments for patentability not raised in the [Patent Owner’s Response] will be deemed waived.” See Paper 13, 5; see also See In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2016). shoe, meets the claims limitation of “the lighting elements provide illumination across a substantial portion of the perimeter surface” of the sole. See Pet. 25; Ex. 1003, 2:24–30, 3:15–25, 3:41–45, Fig. 3. Petitioner further contends Shkalim’s switch 2 allows the user to turn” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to combine the illuminated nameplate on the sole of the Powell shoe with the illuminated sole of the Shkalim shoe” to arrive at the sole required by claim 3. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 85). More specifically, Petitioner asserts combining the features of Shkalim and Powell “would have required nothing more than the application of ordinary skill, and would have been the simple substitution of one known element (a sole with a continuously illuminated translucent region) with another (a sole with translucent regions arranged to spell a word) with nothing more than predictable results.” Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 89). Petitioner further contends “[i]t would have been simple to modify the translucent portion of Shkalim so as to create translucent letters to form a word.” Id. at 34–35 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 89; Ex. 1006, 2:24–27). Petitioner asserts that it was known in the prior art, including Shkalim and Powell, to add lights to shoes to enhance aesthetic appeal and appearance. Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:1–5, Ex. 1006, 1:31–35; Ex. 1014, 2:10–15; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 90–92). Petitioner relies on Mr. Rake to support its position. Mr. Rake generally testifies that during the late 1990s, ordinary artisans in the field of apparel design recognized the rise in consumer demand for personalized apparel and that this era of increased attention on personalization would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to incorporated Powell’s name plate into the light-up athletic shoes disclosed by Shkalim. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 93–95 (citing Exs. 1015, 1016). Petitioner then argues, [g]iven the similarities in the structure and function between Powell and Shkalim, as well as their aesthetic objectives and the robust consumer demand for personalized goods, a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to incorporate into Shkalim the translucent regions being formed in the shape of alpha numeric characters and being arranged to spell a word of Powell. Pet. 35; Ex. 1002 ¶ 89 (Petitioner’s declarant Mr. Rake stating the same). On the foregoing bases, we agree with Petitioner that the combination” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 6,837,590 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,837,590 - Hamamatsu Corporation v. Sionyx, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 28, 2018 · IPR2016-01910 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–11, 13–18, 21, and 23–25 were held unpatentable; claims 12 and 26 were not, based on the stated anticipation and obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenMixed
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). Furthermore, Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how the prior art anticipates the challenged claims and how the proposed combinations of prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. We analyze the challenges presented in the Petition in accordance with the above-stated principles. slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Souri, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’591 patent “would hold a bachelor’s degree in physics, electrical engineering, or a related discipline, and have at least one year of experience working in the field of semiconductor processing or optoelectronic device design.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 32; Pet. 8. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this proceeding. PO Resp. 7 n.2. Based on our review of the ’591 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’591 patent and cited prior art, the testimony of Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s declarants, and the arguments and evidence adduced at trial, we agree with and apply Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention. See Inst. Dec. 14–15.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“that it would not affect incident light.7 We agree with Petitioner that Nakashiba’s “contact surface S1 is exposed to air, which has a refractive index of about 1, and is formed on a silicon substrate, which has an index of refraction between 3.5-6.5, depending on the wavelength of light,” and “[t]hus, there will be an interaction (reflection and/or refraction) with [incident] light at the contact surface S1.” Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 30, 31); see id. at 7. We credit the testimony of Dr. Souri, who testifies as to differences in the refractive indices of air, silicon, and a finger, and that, when there is a change in refractive index between materials, there is an interaction with light. See Ex. 2012, 119:22–121:16. Dr. Souri further testifies that [W]hen light is incident upon a boundary between materials of different refractive index, both refraction and reflection occur, as is depicted in the diagram above. The fraction of incident light that is refracted, and the fraction which is reflected, may be calculated by Fresnel’s equations, using the angles of incidence and refraction given by Snell’s law. . . . [A] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that these reflection and refraction effects constitute an interaction with electromagnetic radiation; and, consequently, said person would understand that the roughened surface S1 of Nakashiba satisfies the requirements of the term “interact” as used in the claims of the ’591 patent.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“a textured region interacting with electromagnetic radiation in a manner that results in an enhanced response and/or filtering of the radiation, the embodiments do not require the textured region to provide this enhanced response and/or filtering and further, do not define the term “interaction” as an enhanced response or filtering. See Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 908 (“[T]he specification does not describe the invention as limited to embodiments having pressure jackets, and none of the other reasons that have been invoked for giving claims a narrow reading are present.”). The claim language “interact with” is plainly broader than Patent Owner’s proffered construction, and the “position” limitations can be read to encompass features not described in the written description. See Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 908 (“The fact that a patent asserts that an invention achieves several objectives does not require that each of the claims be construed as limited to structures that are capable of achieving all of the objectives.”)” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 8,680,591 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,680,591 - Unified Patents Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 26, 2018 · IPR2016-01643 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 12, and 14 are unpatentable: claims 1, 4, 12, and 14 as anticipated by Karedla, and claim 2 as obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Citing the testimony of Dr. Paul Franzon (“Dr. Franzon”), Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time “would have had (i) a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, or (ii) approximately two years of experience or research related to computer systems.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 44). Although Patent Owner does not propose its own skill level, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Frederic T. Chong (“Dr. Chong”), testifies “Dr. Franzon’s formulation of the field of the invention and the level of ordinary skill in the art is sufficiently accurate to resolve all of the issues I analyzed and opined on in this declaration.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 23. Based on the evidence of record, including the testimony of the parties’ declarants, the subject matter at issue, and the prior art of record, we determine that Petitioner’s proposed skill level is appropriate, and we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art for our analysis below. Ex. 1002 ¶ 44; Ex. 2006 ¶ 23.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Petitioner proposes constructions for the following terms/phrases: “reading extending segment(s) of data”; “files”; “frequency factor(s)”; and “selftuning.” Pet. 15–19. Patent Owner only proposes construction of the term “frequency factor.” PO Resp. 8–29. For our analysis in this Decision, we determine that only “frequency factor” requires express construction.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proposed requirement of “showing with fair degree of certainty how often each of the corresponding files are requested” excludes the self-tuning embodiments disclosed in the specification from the scope of the claims. Reply 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:8– 10; Ex. 1017, 29:10–20). Such a result is inconsistent with the claims themselves. For example, dependent claims 7 and 13, which depend, respectively, from claims 4 and 12, expressly recite that the caching methods are “self-tuning,” and, therefore, the scope of the independent claims necessarily encompasses self-tuning. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has stated “the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which [it] appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1315. In particular, a “claim construction that excludes [an] . . . embodiment [described in the specification] is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.” Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Here, Patent Owner’s construction would exclude not only embodiments disclosed in the specification but also those expressly claimed, as noted above. We agree with Petitioner that the intrinsic evidence in the specification is more instructive than extrinsic evidence such as a dictionary definition of “indicate.” See Phillips at 415 F.3d 1317. Furthermore, claims 4 and 12 do not limit the frequency factor to indicating a count of the number of times each of the corresponding files are requested. Rather, claims 4 and 12 recite frequency factors “indicating how often each of the corresponding files are requested.” Thus, we determine that a frequency factor is not limited to indicating a count but encompasses indicating a relative metric such as “how often.” See Ex. 1017, 39:12–17. Given the use of the word “frequency” in the claim term, the frequency factors must be based to some extent on frequency of access or use. We determine that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “frequency factor” recited in claims 4 and 12, read in light of the specification, including the self-tuning embodiments, encompasses at least “an indicator based on frequency of use or access.”” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“2. Analysis a. Karedla as prior art Petitioner contends that Karedla is prior art to the ’745 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 4, 19 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1004, 2–3; Ex. 1013; Ex. 1012 ¶ 3). Patent Owner does not challenge in its Response that Karedla is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). See generally PO. Resp. We determine that Karedla was published in March 1994. See Pet. 19; Ex. 1004, 1 (“March 1994”), 2 (Library of Congress stamp dated “MAR 22 1994”), 4 (“March 1994”); Ex. 1013 (printout from Library of Congress website identifying publication history and frequency). Accordingly, we find that Karedla is prior art to the ’745 patent, which issued from an application filed September 7, 2001, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 6,775,745 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 6,775,745
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.