- PTAB · Apr 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01465 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 1–19 under § 314(a), finding that the Fintiv factors overall favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“As noted above, the district court has set a trial date of October 6, 2025, which is almost seven months before the final written decision in this proceeding would be due in late April 2026. Although a number of cases may be scheduled for jury selection on the same day as the District Court Litigation, nothing in the record indicates a trial in the District Court Litigation would not take place months before our deadline to reach a final decision. Because the District Court Litigation will address the issues relating to the validity of the ’750 patent in a trial scheduled to occur several months before we would issue a final written decision, we weigh the second Fintiv factor as favoring discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,087,750 - PTAB · Apr 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01464 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1–18 under § 314(a), finding that the Fintiv factors overall favored discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 5–6. In considering these factors, we apply the guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding “Guidance on USPTO’s recission of ‘Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation,’” issued by the Chief Administrative Patent Judge of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board on March 24, 2025 (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).7” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,393,461 - Charter Communications, Inc. v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 11, 2025 · IPR2024-01232 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any obviousness ground; it also found the petition time-barred.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“later than one month after we initially instituted inter partes review in the Comcast IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). As discussed above, however, inter partes review is no longer instituted in the Comcast IPR. Under these circumstances, we do not grant Petitioner’s Joinder Motion because there is no pending proceeding to join. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition . . . that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review.”). Petitioner’s Joinder Motion is denied.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“least in part on a second message including at least one command in a second format.’” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1104, 168–173). The cited portion of the prosecution history shows that the applicant distinguished its claims from the prior art based on different first and second formats. The applicant argued in particular, Applicant submits that [the prior art] is completely silent with regard to “receiving, from the remote server device, a first message that includes at least one command in a first format, wherein the first message is received based at least in part on a second message including at least one command in a second format having been sent from the associated remote computing device.” In fact, [the prior art] never describes commands in different formats. . . . Ex. 1104, 170. Based on the applicant’s argument in this regard, we find that the prosecution history limits the scope of claim 1 to different first and second formats. In other words, the applicant’s argument during prosecution distinguishing its claims from the prior art based on different first and second formats overcomes the presumption based on claim differentiation that claim 1 encompasses first and second formats that are the same. See Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco P’Ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Although claim differentiation is a useful analytic tool, it cannot . . . relieve any claim of limitations imposed by the prosecution history.”). Accordingly, claim 1 is limited to different first and second formats.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“argument and evidence. As discussed above in the claim construction section, the recited first and second formats are limited to different formats. See supra Part IV.A. To satisfy this aspect of limitation 1D under its theory, Petitioner needs to show that in Danciu the format of the control information sent from the remote control to the server is different from the format of the control information sent from the server to the controlled device. The cited disclosures in Danciu, however, do not teach or suggest that these formats are different. Nor does Petitioner explain adequately how Danciu’s disclosures teach or suggest the two formats are different. We recognize that the control information in Danciu may be “processed” or “repackaged,” as Petitioner asserts, but it is not clear that the control information is processed or repackaged such that the format of the control information sent from the remote control to the server and the format of the control information sent from the server to the controlled device are different. Petitioner does not rely on Mahajan to teach or suggest the recited first and second formats but relies on Mahajan instead as providing “implementation details for transmission of commands for controlling a client.” Pet. 27. Petitioner contends that its proposed combination of Danciu and Mahajan would have provided a system where “Danciu’s remote control would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a generic format, transmit them to the controlled device, which would translate them to a command associated with a second type of media playing application for execution.” Id. at 31. In other words, the controlled device would receive the generic commands sent from the remote control and then translate the generic commands. It is not clear how the proposed combination in this way teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the remote control to a server is different from the format of a command sent from the server to the controlled device.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Aldrey and Mahajan meets limitation 1D under Petitioner’s second theory. Petitioner only alleges that it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan that Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module could operate at a server like Aldrey’s service provider network 103. Pet. 65. The Federal Circuit has explained that “obviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner does not adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating Mahajan’s abstraction module at a server, even if the abstraction module could operate at the server. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”). We note Petitioner further argues that combining Mahajan and Aldrey would have provided a system where “Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a command associated with a second type of media playing application on a STB.” Pet. 66–67; see also id. at 66 (“Mahajan’s server-command teachings could be implemented on Aldrey’s end terminal remote control.”). Arguing that Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands seems inconsistent with Petitioner’s earlier argument for locating Mahajan’s abstraction module (which translates commands) at Aldrey’s network service provider. See id. at 65–67. Moreover, it is not readily apparent how command translation by Aldrey’s end terminal––rather than Aldrey’s network service provider–– teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the end terminal to the network service provider is different from the format of a command sent from the network service provider to the STB. Petitioner does not close these logical gaps.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,048,751 - Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Enovsys LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00825 · APJ Andrew L Nalven · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Step 1 of Figure 7 begins by obtaining the geographic information of the area to search for possible remote targets. Id. at 8:57–59. In step 2, the next geographic region where a possible search for a PRU is estimated. Id. at 8:64–66. In step 3, a page is sent out to that geographic region for remote units in the region to reveal their location. Id. at 9:2–4. In steps 4 and 5, if remote units are identified in the paged area, that information is forwarded to the network and the process continues to step 7 where the process is aborted. Id. at 9:4–6. Step 6 is performed if no units are identified in the paged area. Id. at 9:6–9. There, a check is done to establish if there are any remaining cells or grids higher up in the chain to be searched, and if so, the process returns to step 2 to search additional geographic areas. Id. at 9:9–12. The iterative process described in Figure 7 is consistent with Patent Owner’s proposed construction requiring forwarding a notification to only one or more PRUs currently located in a specific geographic boundary. Ex. 2001 ¶ 55; see also Ex. 1001, 8:32–54 (describing a grid search technique that may be implemented by the process of Figure 7).” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related location tracking techniques, or the equivalent.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 28–30). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proffered definition as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the Specification and asserted prior art.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“We are further not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that forwarding notifications to the PRUs only within a specified geographic region renders element 12[D]’s step of verifying whether the PRUs exists within said region unnecessary. Pet. 35 n.8. Rather, we credit Mr. McAlexander who testifies that forwarding notifications to individually pollable geographic boundaries “does not obviate the need for the PRU to identify that the notification has been received or verify its location within the individual geographic boundary before responding.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 155.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,199,726 - Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Enovsys, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00827 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 15, or 22 unpatentable on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. We, therefore, deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the research, design, development, and/or testing of GPS and related location tracking techniques, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Andrews Decl. ¶ 25). At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute this contention. Prelim. Resp. 5. For the purpose of determining institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’918 patent specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“means.” See Ex. 1001, 11:60–12:4, 12:6–8, 15:30–37. The use of the word “means” in a claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 63 applies. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). 3 Section 4(c) of the AIA re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’918 patent has a filing date before the We must first identify the claimed function. Then, we must determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function. Id. at 1351 (citation omitted). The parties do not dispute that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies to those “means” elements recited in claims 1, 2, and 22. See Pet. 7–12; Prelim. Resp. 9–21. slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Having reviewed Patent Owner’s position on claim limitation 1[C], we determine that we do not need to expressly construe this claim term to effective date of the relevant amendment, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112. Owner acknowledges that the asserted network “includes control units programmed to obtain the locations of the offender and victim devices,” and does not base its arguments on the construction of this limitation. Id. at 42.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,756,918 - Dental Imaging Technologies Corporation v. 3shape A/SInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 29, 2024 · IPR2024-00849 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review for claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 12–17 under General Plastic discretion and denied joinder; it did not reach the merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“g. Summary and Conclusion In summary, we determine that factors 1, 3, and 6 weigh in favor of discretionary denial, factors 2, and 4 weigh against discretionary denial, and factors 5 and 7 are neutral. Considering these factors as a whole, and on this record, we determine that the facts here weigh in favor of exercising discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution. Significant to our analysis is that the similarities in the facts in the instant proceeding and Uniloc outweigh the differences. Specifically, the primary difference between the facts here and the facts in Uniloc is that Petitioner explained its knowledge of the prior art and, as to Lehmann II, Petitioner demonstrated that it was not aware of Lehmann II prior to filing the first petition. In Uniloc, Apple made no such showing. As we discuss above, however, the significance of Lehmann II in this proceeding may be limited, given our initial determination of the merits of Patent Owner’s arguments against Lehmann II in the Medit IPR. As such, the lack of knowledge of Lehmann II is insufficient to counter the similarities between this proceeding and Uniloc.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“2. Merits Analysis Having decided to exercise discretion to deny institution, we need not turn to the merits of the Petition and Motion. III. CONCLUSION We determine that exercising our discretion to not institute this proceeding is warranted based on our precedential decisions in General Plastic and Uniloc. Accordingly, the Petition and Motion are denied.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
“(c) JOINDER.—If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter parties review under section 314. “To join a party to an instituted [inter partes review (IPR)], the plain language of § 315(c) requires two different decisions.” Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “First, the statute requires that the Director (or the Board acting through a delegation of authority) . . . determine whether the joinder applicant’s petition for IPR ‘warrants’ institution under § 314.” Id. “Second, to effect joinder, § 315(c) requires the Director to exercise h[er] discretion to decide whether to ‘join as a party’ the joinder applicant.” Id. As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to joinder. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013).” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,695,151 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00324 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Rehearing
Patent Owner’s rehearing request was granted; the Petition was denied and no trial instituted because the challenges did not meet the compelling-merits standard under Fintiv.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision [i]s based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “The burden of showing that a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalTerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Our reviewing court has explained that “[t]he prosecution history modifies the scope of a claim term if ‘the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.’” Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 228 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“discretion to deny institution due to the advanced state of parallel litigation, taking into consideration the six factors identified in Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential), as well as applying guidance set forth in a Memorandum regarding the “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” issued by the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter, “Guidance Memo”).5 Inst. Dec. 6–43. We determined that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial,6 and that the Petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability as to independent claims 1, 12, and 17 under the sixth Fintiv factor. Id. at 15–16, 23–43. Because “the PTAB will not deny institution based on Fintiv if there is compelling evidence of unpatentability,” we declined to exercise our discretion to deny. Guidance Memo 5; Inst. Dec. 15–16.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“those arguments. See Inst. Dec. 45–47. As to Petitioner’s arguments on the claimed first and second formats of limitation 1D in particular, we found the record provided “some support” for Petitioner’s position that “it would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that one or more RTS Media Abstraction Modules could operate at a server, such as in [Aldrey’s] Service Provider Network 103,” even though Petitioner asserted that Mahajan teaches command conversion at the client. Id. at 45–46 (citing Pet. 66–67). Yet assuming Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module could have operated at a server, as Petitioner argued, it is not readily apparent why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating the RTS Media Abstraction Module at a server based on Mahajan’s disclosure of command conversion at a client. See also Pet. 66 (“[I]t would have been obvious to a [person of ordinary skill in the art] that the RTS Media Abstraction Module could be located on the client or server.” (emphasis added)). Nor did Petitioner adequately explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have considered locating Mahajan’s RTS Media Abstraction Module at a server. We note Petitioner further argued that combining Mahajan and Aldrey would have provided a system where “Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands associated with a first type of media playing application to a command associated with a second type of media playing application on a STB.” Pet. 68; see also id. at 67 (“Mahajan’s server-command teachings could be implemented on Aldrey’s end terminal remote control.”). Arguing that Aldrey’s end terminal would translate commands seems inconsistent with Petitioner’s earlier argument for locating command conversion at Aldrey’s network service provider. See id. at 66–68. Moreover, it is not readily apparent how command translation by Aldrey’s end terminal––rather than Aldrey’s network service provider––teaches or suggests the format of a command sent from the end terminal to the network service provider is different from the format of a command sent from the network service provider to the STB. Petitioner did not close these logical gaps, leaving its case short of compelling.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,048,751 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLC.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00434 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–20 because Petitioner did not justify a third parallel petition after instituting its first-ranked petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. . . . In addition, multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the vast majority of cases. To date, a substantial majority of patents have been challenged with a single petition. Practice Guide 59 (emphasis added). The Practice Guide provides examples of “circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. None of these examples are pertinent here. For example, a second petition might be justified “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation or when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Petitioner does not argue that the number of claims in the parallel litigation is “large.” And while Petitioner does argue that the prior art relied upon on might be antedated, “Patent Owner stipulates that if the Board were to institute only Comcast’s second ranked petition (IPR2024-00433), and deny IPR2024-00432 and IPR2024-0434 as improper parallel petitions, then, in the IPR2024-00433 proceeding, Patent Owner will not challenge the status of Petrovic and Eidson as prior art.” Prelim. Resp. 41.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that the facts presented by Petitioner justify a second petition challenging the same claims of the ’362 patent as the petition in IPR2024-00432. We therefore exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Petition is denied and inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’362 patent is not instituted on the grounds asserted in the instant Petition.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,210,362 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00439 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not justify a second parallel petition after instituting review in IPR2024-00438.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“CTPG 59 (emphases added). The Practice Guide provides examples of “circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. None of these examples are pertinent here. For instance, a second petition might be justified “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation or when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references.” Id. Petitioner does not argue that the number of claims in the parallel litigation is “large.” Additionally, while Petitioner does argue that the prior art relied on might be antedated, Patent Owner responds by “stipulat[ing] that if the Board were to institute only [Petitioner’s] second ranked petition (IPR2024-00439), and deny IPR2024-00438 and IPR2024-[0]0440 as improper parallel petitions, then, in the IPR2024-00439 proceeding, Patent Owner will not challenge the status of Petrovic and Cholas as prior art.”11 Prelim. Resp. 41.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,399,206 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00440 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims under § 314(a), because the third parallel petition would add unnecessary burden after instituting the first petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Our Practice Guide provides guidance on handling situations involving multiple petitions by a single petitioner challenging the same patent claims: Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. . . . In addition, multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the vast majority of cases. To date, a substantial majority of patents have been challenged with a single petition. CTPG 59 (emphases added). The Practice Guide provides examples of “circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary.” Id. None of these examples are pertinent here. For instance, a second petition” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,399,206
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.