- PTAB · Apr 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00123 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled original claim 1 and denied substitute claim 2 for lack of written-description support; it did not reach the obviousness or enablement grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill is inappropriate because it “requires qualifications that exclude even the sole inventor of the ’190 Patent, Dr. Edward Neuwelt.” MTA Opp. 1. According to Petitioner, Dr. Neuwelt is “a neurosurgeon,” not a pediatric oncologist, and lacks the requisite “at least 2 years” experience in platinum-based therapies. Id. (citing Ex. 1003, 18; Ex. 1038, 98:9–17, 100:15–101, 4). We agree with Petitioner. It is well settled that inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner presents persuasive evidence to show that under Patent Owner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill, Dr. Neuwelt, the sole inventor, would not qualify as an ordinarily skilled artisan, because he is not a pediatric oncologist, even though he is considered “one of the world leading experts on this compound [STS] and otoprotection” and “an expert in the area of [STS] as a . . . drug to use in children with medulloblastoma.” Ex. 1038, 98:9–17, 99:17–18, 101:18–102:13.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Paragraph 102 of Dr. Rassekh’s Declaration, however, does not support Patent Owner’s assertion. Instead, Dr. Rassekh testifies that [t]he stratum of previous craniospinal radiation therapy contained 8 participants: 2 of the 4 (50%) participants receiving STS had hearing loss compared to 4 of the 4 (100%) participants not receiving STS, and none of the hearing loss assessments were changed at the 1 year follow up period. (Ex. 1001 at 20: 28-32, 47-50.) Ex. 2024 ¶ 102. Dr. Rassekh offers no opinion on how many osteosarcoma patients with prior cranial irradiation and how many medulloblastoma patients with prior cranial irradiation had hearing loss.” slip op. at 20
- 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“In sum, we find the disclosures of the ’243 application that Patent Owner relies on do not provide sufficient written-description support for the ototoxicity efficacy limitation.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“F. Petitioner’s Asserted Unpatentability Grounds In light of our determination above that Patent Owner has not shown sufficient written-description support for proposed substitute claim 2 in the ’243 application, we do not reach the grounds of unpatentability set forth in Petitioner’s Opposition. See Revised MTA Opp. 17–25 (alleging non-enablement and obviousness).” slip op. at 26
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,596,190 - PTAB · Mar 17, 2023 · IPR2022-01242 · APJ John R Kenny · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board declined Fintiv denial and instituted review of claims 1–20 on all seven asserted obviousness grounds, finding a compelling challenge to claim 1 under Ground 1.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“denial, and Fintiv Factor 1 is neutral. Collectively, the first five Fintiv Factors favor discretionary denial.” slip op. at 60
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“that Petitioner will prevail in its challenge to claim 1 under Ground 1. Thus, Petitioner has set forth a compelling, meritorious challenge that plainly leads to the conclusion that at least one claim is unpatentable (based on the current record).” slip op. at 74
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“that RF carriers, CDMA codes, TDMA time slots or other information defining and describing the way data is being transmitted do not include underlying data that is transmitted. In isolation, the phrase “not including underlying data that is being transmitted” could be subject to different interpretations. It could simply mean that data being transmitted by itself is not a radio resource, but the RF carrier transmitting the data could be a radio resource. Patent Owner makes clear, however, that this interpretation is not the intent of its construction by arguing that, under its construction, Hettstedt’s RF carriers are not radio resources because they have data modulated on them. Prelim. Resp. 24–27. Similarly, Patent Owner argues that Wu’s carriers are not radio resources because they have payload data encapsulated in them. Id. at 34; see also id. at 35. Patent Owner, however, cites nothing from the Specification that indicates RF carriers, CDMA codes, or TDMA time slots cease to be radio resources merely because data is modulated or encapsulated on them. Prelim. Resp. 12–18. Further, we see no such teaching in the Specification.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Wellington’s teachings to Hettstedt’s system to obviate the need for a human user to perform the load balancing (i.e., improve the system by making it automatic) as a threshold-based trigger avoids the need for the system to wait for user inputs. Ex. 1003 ¶ 130. Further, an ordinarily skilled artisan would naturally use a threshold for the trigger as taught by Wellington because a threshold is readily programmable and machine executable. Id. In addition, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to implement Wellington’s teaching to improve the adaptability of Hettstedt’s system. Id. A benefit of a threshold-based trigger is that it allows a system to fine-tune the load balancing by adjusting the threshold. Id. Further, there is no need to reprogram significant software when using a threshold-based trigger. Id.” slip op. at 72
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,026,232 - PTAB · Oct 7, 2022 · IPR2021-00680 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7, 9–11, 14–16, 19, 21, 32–37, 39, 47, and 49–57 are unpatentable as obvious; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.
Nonecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,469,934 - PTAB · Aug 12, 2020 · PGR2019-00032 · APJ David Cotta · PGR · Final written decision
The Board granted cancellation of claim 8 and denied entry of substitute claim 11 because Petitioner showed it would have been obvious over Omura, Tsuji, and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In our Institution Decision, we agreed with the position Patent Owners took in their Preliminary Response – i.e, that the focus of the challenged claims was enzyme-based biosensors and thus the POSA would have more than just a familiarity with enzyme-based biosensors and protein chemistry. Inst. Dec. 8–9. Accordingly, based on the record before us at the time, we accepted the definition provided in Patent Owners’ Preliminary Response, which was consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art references and in the specification of the ‘987 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Neither party challenges the identification of the POSA set forth in our Institution Decision. See generally, R. Mot.; Opp.; Reply; Sur-reply. Additionally, we find that the fully developed trial record supports the POSA identification we made in our Institution Decision. Accordingly, in this decision, we apply the identification of the POSA set forth in our Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 9.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For purposes of this decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“first, substitute claim 11 would have been obvious over Omura in view of the knowledge of the POSA, and second, substitute claim 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Omura and Tsuji in view of the knowledge of the POSA. Opp. 7–24. We have considered the question of patentability in view of all the evidence and arguments presented in this proceeding. Based on the record developed during this proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that substitute claim 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Omura, Tsuji, and the knowledge of the POSA. Because Petitioner has proven that substitute claim 11 would have been obvious, as discussed in detail below, we do not consider whether Patent Owners’ motion otherwise complies with the statutory and regulatory requirements for a motion to amend. See, 35 U.S.C. § 326(d)(1)(B) (requiring that the amendment propose a “reasonable number of substitute claims” and requiring that the substitute claims do “not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new matter”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221 (additionally providing, inter alia, that a motion to amend “may be denied where . . . [t]he amendment does not respond to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial”). Similarly, because we have determined that substitute claim 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Omura, Tsuji, and the knowledge of the POSA, as discussed in detail below, we do not reach the question of whether substitute claim 11 would also have been obvious over only Omura in view of knowledge of the POSA.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“includes “research experience and/or knowledge in enzymology . . . and biosensors,” we agree with Petitioner that it would have been obvious to a POSA to substitute FAD-conjugated glucose dehydrogenase derived from the claimed strain of Aspergillus oryzae for FAD-conjugated glucose dehydrogenase derived from Aspergillus terreus as disclosed in Omura.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,976,125 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2018 · IPR2016-01404 · APJ Kamran Jivani · IPR · Final written decision
The Board found claims 1, 2, 13, 14, 33, 34, 39, 46, and 48 not shown unpatentable: Bensimon did not disclose the claimed restricted-access mode, and Takahashi did not cure that deficiency.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner states––and Patent Owner does not dispute––that “a person having ordinary skill in the art of secure computer data storage devices (i.e. in the art for the ’459 patent) would have had (i) a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and (ii) approximately two years of experience in the design or research of secure computer data storage devices.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). We agree with Petitioner’s statement of the level skill of an ordinary artisan at the time and adopt it as our own. Although Patent Owner does not directly address an ordinary artisan’s level of skill, Petitioner’s description of the level of skill accords with that of Patent Owner’s witness Dr. Goldschlag. Compare id., with Ex. 2004 ¶ 21 (opining that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or equivalent training, as well as two to three years of technical experience in the field of computer security and storage devices.”). We further find the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau,” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“within an electronic circuit embedded within the storage device.” Ex. 1001, 9:58–59, 10:34–35. Although these claims are not at issue in this case, they evince the patentee’s desire to employ each of the terms “unique” and “specific” where each is intended. It is well established that ordinarily different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meanings. . . .”); CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of these different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”). Further, the Specification describes that, depending on the selected security level, a cryptographic key can be generated using in part “device-specific security information derived from the unique format information of the removable storage device.” Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:1. The Specification thus describes the format information of the removable storage device as “unique” but describes the security information of the device merely as “specific,” not “unique.” Finally, the Specification discloses “for exemplary purposes only” an embodiment wherein “a unique, device-specific security information can be generated from the unique characteristics of the underlying storage medium.” Id. at 7:43–47 (emphasis added). The Specification thus describes device-specific security information as unique in a particular, non-limiting example and explicitly indicates that the device-specific security information derived in that example is “unique.” See id. In light of the foregoing description, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments that “specific” in the context of the claim term “device-specific security information” means unique. Construing “specific” to mean “unique” as Patent Owner urges would render meaningless the subsequent use of “unique” in claims 9 and 17, without a clear indication in the Specification of such an intent. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480. Instead, we accord the word “specific” its ordinary and customary meaning and construe “device-specific security information” as meaning “information particular to, but not necessarily unique to, a storage device and used to secure access to the storage device.” Although we construe the disputed term “device-specific security information,” our determination that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the Instituted Claims are unpatentable is not dependent upon our construction, as detailed below.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner has not identified in Bensimon explicit or inherent disclosure of the claimed restricted-access mode. Claim 1 requires operating in restrictedaccess mode “when the storage device does not have the device-specific security information.” Ex. 1001, 9:24–26. Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, either alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as meeting the claimed device-specific security information. Reply 13; Pet. 22. Thus, in order to meet the requirements of claim 1, Petitioner is required to show that Bensimon discloses operating in restricted-access mode when the storage device does not have the read/write password, or alternatively does not have the combination of the read/write password and password-enabling flag. See, e.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d at 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that in order to show anticipation, claimed elements must be arranged as required by the claim). Petitioner does not make the required showing. As Petitioner argues: “these claims recite operating in one mode if ‘the device-specific security information’ (i.e., that instance of device-specific security information) is present, and operating in another mode if ‘the device-specific security information’ (i.e., that instance of device-specific security information) is not present.” Reply 16. Petitioner identifies Bensimon’s read/write password, alone or in combination with the password-enabling flag, as the device-specific security information, yet Petitioner does not identify in Bensimon an explicit disclosure that Bensimon’s storage device operates in the claimed restricted-access mode when the read/write password is absent from the device. See id. at 16–22. Rather, Bensimon describes two different possible modes of operation when the read/write password is absent from the storage device, namely either no protection or write protection. Ex. 1004, 5:33–39, 6:3–4, 6:13–29. Contrary to the claim language, operation in Bensimon’s write protection mode depends upon the presence of the write protection password, not upon the absence of the read/write password and password-enabling flag (i.e. the claimed device-specific security information). Ex. 1004, 6:13–23; see also Reply 16 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 18) (asserting the claimed restricted-access mode is met “when Bensimon’s storage device 100 only has the write-protection (read-only) password”). This disclosure is insufficient to establish anticipation because claim 1 requires operating in restricted access mode when the storage device does not have the device-specific storage information, which Petitioner asserts is the read/write password and password-enabling flag. “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claims is found.” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil. Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We similarly are not persuaded that Bensimon inherently anticipates claim 1. “Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the cited disclosure identifies two possible modes of operation when the read/write password and password-enabling flag are absent from Bensimon’s storage device, neither of which necessarily must occur.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“E. Obviousness of Claims 2 and 34 based on Bensimon in combination with Takahashi Petitioner asserts dependent claims 2 and 34 would have been obvious in light of Bensimon and Takahashi. Pet. 36–40 (analysis of claim 2) and 42–43 (analysis of claim 34). Petitioner’s analysis of these claims does not repair the deficiencies described above with regard to the claimed restrictedaccess mode. See id.; see also Reply 25. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above in the context of claim 1 and based on the full trial record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2 and 34 would have been obvious in light of Bensimon and Takahashi. See supra Section III.D.2.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,968,459 - PTAB · Dec 6, 2017 · IPR2016-00320 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 8–10 are unpatentable based on the instituted obviousness grounds after the Board reconsidered the record on rehearing.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“be heard regarding the allegedly new circuits set forth in specific paragraphs of the Baker Reply Declaration. No more was required. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion is denied. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“With no Board denial of concrete, focused requests before us, we are not prepared to find that [the appellant] was denied a meaningful opportunity to respond.”)24; Opp. 15 (“Patent” slip op. at 68
- RehearingOther
“Subsequently, Patent Owner filed a Request for Rehearing. Paper 41 (“Rehearing Request” or “Reh’g Req.”). Based on the Rehearing Request, the Board withdrew the First Final Written Decision as set forth in the Decision on Rehearing. Paper 42 (Withdrawal of Final Written Decision and Authorization of Sur-Reply) (“Rehearing Decision” or “Reh’g Dec.”). As set forth in the Rehearing Decision, we granted Patent Owner’s request for additional briefing in the form of a Sur-Reply (Paper 43). See Reh’g Dec. 5–6; Sur-Reply.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,169,503 - PTAB · Sep 17, 2015 · IPR2015-00531 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Order
The Board terminated the proceedings as to MediaTek Inc. and MediaTek USA, Inc., vacated the scheduling orders, and continued the proceedings as to Bandspeed, Inc.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingNot reached
“IPR2015-01581, and IPR2015-01582 (“the related proceedings”). In each of the related proceedings, a petition was filed by Qualcomm Incorporated on July 12, 2015, with a motion to join a respective one of these proceedings. Papers 1, 2 in each of the related proceedings. We note that the joinder motions in the related proceedings were filed before the instant motions to terminate were filed in these proceedings. Patent Owner opposes the joinder motions in the related proceedings. Paper 8 in each of the related proceedings. If the joinder motions are not granted, the related proceedings are barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Patent Owner has not yet filed a preliminary response in any of the related proceedings, the deadline for which is October 28, 2015, nor sought to expedite the related proceedings by filing a waiver under 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(b). It is thus 2 Citations are to IPR2015-00314. premature to decide the joinder motions in the related proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Nevertheless, we discern no compelling interest to be served by delaying termination of these proceedings with respect to MediaTek Inc. and MediaTek USA, Inc., both of which have settled with Patent Owner. See 35 U.S.C. § 317 (“An inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and the patent owner unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed” (emphasis added)). These proceedings are at an early stage, and no motions are pending in any of these proceedings. Under these circumstances, we determine that it is appropriate to terminate these proceedings with respect to MediaTek Inc. and MediaTek USA, Inc. We exercise the discretion afforded under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) to decline, at this time, to terminate these proceedings with respect to Patent Owner. Because no petitioner remains in these proceedings, we vacate the Scheduling Order in each proceeding (Paper 13 in IPR2015-00314, IPR2015-00316, and IPR2015-00531; and Paper 15 in IPR2015-00315). If necessary, we will revisit scheduling for these proceedings after decisions on the joinder motions are made in the related proceedings. If appropriate, we will also revisit the Motions to Terminate as to Patent Owner after ruling on the motions for joinder in the related proceedings.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part
“The Joint Motions to Seal are granted to the extent that they request that the agreement be treated as business confidential information and be kept separate from the patent files under 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) but otherwise denied. The requests should not have been filed as “Motions to Seal,” which has other meaning, under 37 C.F.R. § 42.14, with respect to the underlying document in the context of the proceeding, e.g., expungement or made public under certain circumstances.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,542,643 - PTAB · Sep 23, 2014 · IPR2014-01007 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated each proceeding as to both parties without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions, we determine that terminating each of the proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner, at this early juncture, promotes efficiency and minimizes unnecessary costs. Based on the facts of these cases, it is appropriate to enter judgment in each case without rendering a final written decision.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,635,583 - PTAB · Sep 23, 2014 · IPR2014-01001 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions to terminate all four proceedings and terminated each as to both parties, without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner. Id. at 2–4. The parties submit that termination is appropriate because each “proceeding is in its infancy.” Id. at 4. Issues raised during the trial have not been briefed fully and the Board has not yet decided the merits of each proceeding. Id. Petitioner indicates that it will no longer participate even if the Board does not terminate the respective proceeding. Id. According to the parties, Congress and federal courts have expressed a strong interest in encouraging settlement in litigation. Id. at 3. In exercising our independent determination, we generally expect that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions, we determine that terminating each of the proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner, at this early juncture, promotes efficiency and minimizes unnecessary costs. Based on the facts of these cases, it is appropriate to enter judgment in each case without rendering a final written decision.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,258,547 - PTAB · Sep 23, 2014 · IPR2014-00999 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motions and terminated all four proceedings as to both parties without a final written decision.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The parties urge the Board to terminate each of these instant proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner. Id. at 2–4. The parties submit that termination is appropriate because each “proceeding is in its infancy.” Id. at 4. Issues raised during the trial have not been briefed fully and the Board has not yet decided the merits of each proceeding. Id. Petitioner indicates that it will no longer participate even if the Board does not terminate the respective proceeding. Id. According to the parties, Congress and federal courts have expressed a strong interest in encouraging settlement in litigation. Id. at 3. In exercising our independent determination, we generally expect that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement. See, e.g., Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Upon consideration of the parties’ contentions, we determine that terminating each of the proceedings with respect to both Petitioner and Patent Owner, at this early juncture, promotes efficiency and minimizes unnecessary costs. Based on the facts of these cases, it is appropriate to enter judgment in each case without rendering a final written decision.4 See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.72.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,264,049
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.