- PTAB · Dec 8, 2021 · IPR2021-00608 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied under § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same arguments were previously presented and examiner error was not shown.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its petition. Id. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“Advanced Bionics, we exercised our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) and determined not to institute inter partes review. Dec. 7−26 (citing Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte Gmbh, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential)). As to Part 1 of the Advanced Bionics framework, we determined that the same or substantially the same arguments were presented previously to the Office. Id. at 10−13. Under Part 2 of the Advanced Bionics framework, we determined that Petitioner failed to show that the Examiner erred by not realizing that Chu ’330 and Chu ’886 qualify as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) prior art and are material to the patentability of the claims in the ’654 patent. Id. at 14−26.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s arguments are new arguments raised for the first time in its Rehearing Request. Petitioner acknowledges that “NRG and Hollmer were not cited in the Petition.” Req. Reh’g 10. Nevertheless, Petitioner alleges that it “could not have anticipated the Patent Owner’s mischaracterization of the Droplets decision, nor the Board’s reliance on this mischaracterization,” and that Petitioner was not authorized to file a reply to the Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Id.; see also id. at 2−3, fn.1. Petitioner’s new arguments in connection with Hollmer and NRG are improper. As we discussed above, Patent Owner did not mischaracterize and we did not misapprehend Droplets. It was not necessary to authorize Petitioner to file a reply, as we were capable of determining whether Patent Owner mischaracterizes Droplets. As discussed above, Petitioner fails to recognize that the language relied upon by Patent Owner in Droplets is consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 and MPEP § 608.01(p). Although Petitioner relies on MPEP § 608.01(p) in its Petition, Petitioner now in its Rehearing Request for the first time suggests that we should ignore MPEP § 608.01(p) and the case law cited in MPEP § 608.01(p). Pet. 11–12; Req. Reh’g 6−7. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to submit new arguments, after the decision has noted the deficiencies in the petitioner’s original analysis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). It is Petitioner’s burden to identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked in our Decision to Institute. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked the new arguments that were not presented in the record until after the Decision.” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“Contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, section 1.57 of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations is not a “statute,” but a regulation that became effective on September 21, 2004. See 69 Fed. Reg. 56,482. The ’882 application, which incorporated Chu ’886 by reference, was filed on September 8, 1998, and issued as Chu ’330 on February 5, 2002. Ex. 1005, codes (21), (22), (45), (60), 6:1–7. The ’654 patent, which incorporated the ’882 application by reference, is a reissue of Application No. 09/312,199 (“the ’199 application”) filed on May 14, 1999, now U.S. Patent No. 6,634,777 (“the ’777 patent”), issued on November 4, 2003. Ex. 1001, codes (63), (64); 5:63–67. Both the ’882 application (issued as Chu ’330) and the ’199 application (reissued as the ’654 patent) were filed and issued as patents prior to the effective date, September 21, 2004, of 37 C.F.R. § 1.57. Petitioner does not explain why the applicant should have complied with 37 C.F.R. § 1.57, which did not exist at the time of filing of those applications or issuance of those patents that incorporated by reference Chu ’886 and the ’882 application. Pet. 7–8, 10−17; Req. Reh’g 1−12. We decline to apply 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 retroactively to the incorporation by reference statements submitted in the ’882 application and the ’199 application.” slip op. at 6
§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denial - PTAB · Dec 2, 2021 · IPR2021-00607 · APJ Joni Y Chang · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Samsung’s rehearing request, leaving in place its § 325(d) denial of institution because it found no material examiner error.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), a petitioner who requests rehearing of a decision denying institution must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in its petition. Id. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315−16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dInstitution denied
“In the Decision, after applying the two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics, we determined to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) not to institute inter partes review. Dec. 6−22 (citing Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte Gmbh, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17−18, 24 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5, first paragraph)). As to Part I of the Advanced Bionics framework, we determined that the same or substantially the same arguments were presented previously to the Office. Id. at 8−11. Under Part II of the Advanced Bionics framework, we determined that Petitioner failed to show that “[t]he Examiner erred by not realizing that Chu ’330 and Chu ’886 qualify as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) prior art and are material to the patentability of the claims in the ’140 Patent.” Id. at 11−22.” slip op. at 3
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s arguments are new arguments raised for the first time in its Rehearing Request. Petitioner acknowledges that Hollmer and NRG were not cited in the Petition. Id. at 10. Nevertheless, Petitioner alleges that it “could not have anticipated the Patent Owner’s mischaracterization of the Droplets decision, nor the Board’s reliance on this mischaracterization,” and that Petitioner was not authorized to file a reply to the Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Id.; see also id. at 2−3 n.1. Petitioner’s new arguments in connection with Hollmer and NRG are improper. As we discussed above, Patent Owner did not mischaracterize, nor did we misapprehend, Droplets. It was not necessary to authorize Petitioner to file a reply, as we were capable of determining whether Patent Owner mischaracterizes Droplets. Petitioner fails to recognize that the language relied upon by Patent Owner in Droplets is consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 and MPEP § 608.01(p). Although Petitioner relies on MPEP § 608.01(p) in its Petition, Petitioner now in its Rehearing Request for the first time suggests that we should ignore MPEP § 608.01(p) and the case law cited in MPEP § 608.01(p). Pet. 12; Req. Reh’g 6−7. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to submit new arguments, after the decision has noted the deficiencies in the petitioner’s original analysis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). We could not have misapprehended or overlooked the new arguments that were not presented in the record until after the Decision. Id.” slip op. at 13
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Under Part II of the Advanced Bionics framework, Petitioner has the burden to show that “the Examiner erred by not realizing that Chu ’330 and Chu ’886 qualify as 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) prior art and are material to the patentability of the claims in the ’140 Patent,” as Petitioner alleges in its § 325(d) analysis. Pet. 7−8. Upon consideration of Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments.” slip op. at 4
Discretionary denial - Peddinghaus Corporation v. Ficep CorporationRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 8, 2021 · IPR2020-01707 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Peddinghaus’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution on claims 1–14 because Hashimoto did not disclose the claimed intersection parameters.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Reh’g Req. 7–8. Although Petitioner avers that the “identifying” of intersection parameters, or connecting holes, is completed in Hashimoto by the member totaling module before any order list is prepared, the order list is pertinent evidence for that assertion and there is nothing inappropriate in discussing that evidence. We recognize no other evidence which was identified by the Petitioner in the Petition, and Petitioner points to no such other evidence that we overlooked. Indeed, Petitioner states: “The Petition references the order list depicted in Figure 19 as merely providing a summary of the information (the ‘total’) that was previously identified and extracted by the member totaling module.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). As we stated in our Decision, Petitioner points to no description or disclosure in Hashimoto that its member totaling module recognizes the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, from a nonconnecting hole. Dec. 27. Hashimoto’s member totaling module “automatically totals, by cross section or length, the information including the shape, length, quantity, hole shape and the hole position (design drawing information) of all the light gauge sheet steel used for the steel house existing in the CAD system” and “[b]ased on this total, an order list (steel member order list) is prepared (FIG. 19).” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Nowhere in this exhaustive list of hole information, however, is mentioned any data that identifies the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, and a non-connecting hole. Further, Petitioner’s statement on page 8 of the Rehearing Request that “hole shape” and “hole position” constitute intersection parameters is not persuasive because, from this information, it is unknown how the hole is intended to be used. Moreover, the order list of Figure 19 – which “merely shows the number of holes and the die numbers and positions of where those holes are formed”1 – is the only indicated output of the member totaling module.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“meaning of “fastening holes” changes from the first to second embodiment.3 For example, in the Background section of Hashimoto, “fastening holes” are defined generally as holes formed “in the light gauge shape steel for the fastening tools.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 4. The same Background paragraph provides examples of “fastening tools such as a tapping screw and a one-side rivet.” Id. (Emphasis added). Thus, this definition does not strictly limit fastening holes to connecting holes, since it does not foreclose the likely possibility of fastening tools including wires or wiring. Moreover, a “machine for forming the fastening holes” is also disclosed in the Background, the same “non-stationary fastening hole forming machine 5” discussed in Figures 20-21 of the second embodiment. Id. ¶ 5. Thus, when “fastening holes for passing the electrical wiring” (emphasis added) are disclosed in the discussion of Figures 20-21 in Hashimoto’s paragraph 154, there is no evidence suggesting that a different type of “fastening hole” other than what has been generally described in the Background is being mentioned. Id. ¶ 154. The same applies for the 3 The statement made in footnote 3 on pages 11–12 of the Rehearing Request that the only holes in Figure 18 are joints only establishes that the holes in Figure 18 may be connecting holes, not all “fastening holes” in Hashimoto. disclosure that “fastening hole information includ[es]…[where] the wiring holes [are] formed in the stud” in paragraph 156 and how character c in Figure 23 “designates a hole for electrical wiring or a fastening hole for mounting the stud on the structural face plate” (emphasis added) in paragraph 157. Id. ¶¶ 156–157. Thus, it is a much more reasonable reading that in all embodiments of Hashimoto, the definition of “fastening holes” includes both connecting holes and non-connecting holes – such as those for wiring.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As we stated in our Decision, Petitioner points to no description or disclosure in Hashimoto that its member totaling module recognizes the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, from a nonconnecting hole. Dec. 27. Hashimoto’s member totaling module “automatically totals, by cross section or length, the information including the shape, length, quantity, hole shape and the hole position (design drawing information) of all the light gauge sheet steel used for the steel house existing in the CAD system” and “[b]ased on this total, an order list (steel member order list) is prepared (FIG. 19).” Ex. 1005 ¶ 101. Nowhere in this exhaustive list of hole information, however, is mentioned any data that identifies the difference between a connecting hole, or intersection parameter, and a non-connecting hole. Further, Petitioner’s statement on page 8 of the Rehearing Request that “hole shape” and “hole position” constitute intersection parameters is not persuasive because, from this information, it is unknown how the hole is intended to be used. Moreover, the order list of Figure 19 – which “merely shows the number of holes and the die numbers and positions of where those holes are formed”1 – is the only indicated output of the member totaling module.” slip op. at 3
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,974,719 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 17, 2021 · IPR2019-01615 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Roku’s rehearing request, leaving intact its determination that claims 1, 3, 5, and 7 were not shown unpatentable over Chardon.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. DISCUSSION On request for rehearing, “[t]he burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, reply, or a sur-reply.” Id. We have reviewed Petitioner’s Request and carefully considered all of the arguments presented. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any arguments or evidence, and thus we decline to modify the Decision.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“first communication method” and “second communication method” recited in claim 1 with Chardon’s “CEC command codes” and “IR command codes,” respectively, where Chardon’s command codes are stored in a database linked to the Extended Display Identification Data (EDID) for target devices. Dec. 20–21. We thus evaluated whether command codes in an EDID-linked database teach or suggest the claimed listing comprised of at least a first communication method and a second communication method, and determined that “the record falls short of providing evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood stored command codes to act as an identification of communication methods to be used.” Id. at 21–22. slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,716,853 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · May 25, 2021 · IPR2019-01619 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Roku’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution on claim 1 under § 325(d) because the petition did not show material Office error.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. Because Petitioner seeks rehearing of our Decision denying the Petition, it must show an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.”). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 10 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (designated precedential Mar. 24, 2020) (“Advanced Bionics”). Factors (c), (e), and (f) “relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office” in its prior consideration of that art or arguments. Id. Under a two-part framework set forth in Advanced Bionics, we first determine whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office by considering factors (a), (b), and (d). Id. at 8, 10. If “either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied”—that is, if “the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office” or “the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office,” we then consider factors (c), (e), and (f) to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id. at 8, 10.” slip op. at 4
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“argument by Petitioner that “the detailed mapping in the Petition” demonstrated material error by the Examiner by showing that Herz discloses various limitations of claim 1, including “limitations [1.0]–[1.3], and [1.5].” Req. 5–6. But Petitioner did not present such an argument in the Petition or the Reply. See Pet. 46–48; Reply 1–5. In addition, Petitioner did not explain how its mapping of Herz to disclose certain limitations of claim 1 demonstrates material error by the Examiner. See Advanced Bionics, 9 (“If reasonable minds can disagree regarding the purported treatment of the art or arguments, it cannot be said that the Office erred in a manner material to patentability.”). That is, Petitioner did not meaningfully connect its obviousness mapping to a demonstration of Examiner error during the Reexamination Proceeding. See Pet. 15–48; Reply 1–5. We could not have misapprehended or overlooked arguments or evidence that were not presented or developed in the Petition or the Reply.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,782,309 - Shenzhen Mediatek Tong Technology Co., Ltd. v. The Noco CompanyRehearing deniedPTAB · May 17, 2021 · IPR2020-01387 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place the denial of institution on claims 1–3, 5, 8–17, 19–21, and 23 because Petitioner did not show an abuse of discretion.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not reached
“We recognize that Paragraph 50 of Zhang describes two ways to measure the voltage “at the two terminals” of the vehicle battery, and the other way is by the small teeth of the output power clip. Ex. 1006 ¶ 50. But Zhang describes the two ways as occurring “at the same time,” and not as alternative implementations. Thus, measurements at both points are taken to obtain the voltage at the two terminals of the vehicle battery. Dr. Hartup does not address or explain how a measurement can be taken at the input terminal of the DC contactor that would be indicative of the voltage of the external vehicle battery connected to the output terminal of the DC contactor, if the DC contactor is not already closed. Ex. 1003 ¶ 59. The Petition does not address Zhang’s disclosure of measuring the voltage of the vehicle battery on the input side of the DC contactor at the same time a measurement is taken by the small teeth of the output power clip. Paper 9, 33 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 3
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,007,015 - ROKU, Inc. v. Universal Electronics, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · May 13, 2021 · IPR2019-01595 · APJ Minn Chung · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its decision denying institution on claims 1 and 2, finding no abuse of discretion on priority entitlement or motivation to combine Darbee and Golender.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision,” and the challenging party “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed” in a 1 Petitioner also filed a request for the Precedential Opinion Panel (“POP”) to review the Decision (Paper 13 (Notification of Receipt of POP Request)), which the POP denied (Paper 14 (Order)). paper of record. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Because Petitioner seeks rehearing of our Decision denying institution of trial based on the Petition, it must show an abuse of discretion. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c) (“When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.”). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Thus, a request for rehearing is not an opportunity merely to disagree with the Board’s assessment of the arguments or weighing of the evidence, or to present new arguments or evidence that could have been presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“issue upon which the priority determination turns—what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art—because Dr. Medvidovic did not provide any testimony on that issue. And we did not overlook or misapprehend any testimony of Dr. Medvidovic regarding what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art because we could not have overlooked or misapprehended any testimony that was not presented in the Medvidovic Declaration. As discussed above, Dr. Medvidovic’s testimony based on what is expressly disclosed in or necessarily follows from the disclosures of the priority applications was insufficient because Dr. Medvidovic did not explain adequately why the disclosures in the priority applications would not reasonably have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art the subject matter of the User Action Limitation. Thus, Dr. Medvidovic’s testimony was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Although Patent Owner’s declarant, Mr. Bear, provided detailed testimony and explanations regarding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the priority applications to describe the subject matter recited in the User Action Limitation (see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 111–122, 126–127), Dr. Medvidovic did not provide adequate testimony or explanations to the contrary on the issue (see Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 53–63).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“misapprehend or overlook 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). The mere fact that Dr. Medvidovic provided testimony different from the testimony of Mr. Bear does not by itself raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The mere existence in the record of dueling expert testimony does not necessarily raise a genuine issue of material fact.”). As the Request acknowledges, Dr. Medvidovic in his Declaration (Ex. 1010, “Medvidovic Declaration”) testified that the subject matter of the User Action Limitation is “neither expressly disclosed [in] nor necessarily follows from” the descriptions in the priority applications about event journal data. Req. 3 (emphases added) (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 57–62). As discussed above, however, the test for determining compliance with the written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is whether the original disclosure of the earlier-filed application reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of the earlier-filed application. Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1351. The record shows that Dr. Medvidovic did not provide any testimony in his Declaration as to what the disclosures in the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 53–63. Nor did Dr. Medvidovic explain adequately in his Declaration why the disclosures in the priority applications would not reasonably have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art the subject matter of the User Action Limitation. See id.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Under Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, “less education can be remedied with additional work experience (e.g., 5–6 years).” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 64–67). As stated in the Bear Declaration, Mr. Bear’s work experience includes at least 9 years of computer software programming using a variety of coding languages, such as BASIC, Pascal, C, C++, and 68000 Assembly Language. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 10–12. Thus, Mr. Bear is qualified to testify from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art under Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. As discussed in the Decision, although we did not find the parties’ proposals for the level of ordinary skill in the art to be materially different, to the extent the testimony from the parties’ declarants on the level of ordinary skill in the art raised a genuine issue of material fact, we adopted and applied Petitioner’s definition for purposes of the Decision, being mindful of the rule that “a genuine issue of material fact created by such testimonial evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner solely for purposes of deciding whether to institute an inter partes review.” Dec. 9 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c)). Thus, the record shows that, under Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in consideration of § 42.108(c), the Decision appropriately credited Mr. Bear’s testimony on what the priority applications reasonably would have conveyed to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 8,015,446 - ZTE (USA), Inc. / LG Electronics Inc. v. Cywee Group Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 4, 2020 · IPR2019-01203 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied CyWee’s rehearing request, leaving intact its decision allowing joined petitioner LGE to oppose CyWee’s revised motion to amend.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsDecided for petitioner
“In our Rehearing Decision, we determined that “the adversarial system is better served if we allow a Petitioner to raise [statutory, regulatory, or patentability] issues in response to CyWee’s Revised Motion to Amend.” Reh’g Dec. 8. Therefore, we held that LGE may present arguments and evidence, independently from ZTE, in response to CyWee’s Revised Motion to Amend, and that LGE may request an oral hearing limited solely to the issues raised in the Revised Motion to Amend. Id. at 9.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,441,438 - ZTE (USA), Inc. / LG Electronics Inc. v. Cywee Group Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 4, 2020 · IPR2019-00143 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied CyWee’s rehearing request, leaving in place its decision allowing joined petitioner LGE to oppose the Revised Motion to Amend.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“ANALYSIS The party challenging a decision in a request for rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019). A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed.” Id.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 8,441,438 - Google LLC v. Uniloc 2017, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 16, 2020 · IPR2019-01584 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Google’s rehearing request, finding no abuse of discretion in denying institution of review of claims 1–3, 5, 6, 8, 39, and 41 under its General Plastic analysis.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The party requesting rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for patent owner
“petitions are only relevant if Petitioner was a party to the prior proceedings, or had a relationship with the prior petitioners. Reh’g Req. 7. But a review of the cited precedential decision does not reflect Petitioner’s suggestion. See General Plastic, Paper No. 19 at 15−19 (“Our intent in formulating the factors was to take undue inequities and prejudices to Patent Owner into account.”). General Plastic does not proscribe panels of the Board from considering whether a subsequent petitioner knew of the prior art cited in the subsequent petition at the time of filing of the first petition, per the second factor. Similarly, we are not barred, under General Plastic, from considering the length of time that elapsed between when a petitioner learned of the art and when the petition, based on that art, was filed, or whether petitioner provides an adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions, per the fourth and fifth factors. Additionally, we are not persuaded that the factors enumerated in General Plastic, as viewed through the lens of Valve Corp., must all be limited by any possible relationship between the multiple petitioners. Although the discussion of the first factor in Valve Corp. makes clear that “any relationship between those petitioners when weighing the General Plastic factors” must be considered, the remaining factors take into account the knowledge of the second petitioner irrespective of a specific relationship. See Valve Corp., Paper 11 at 9−15. As such, the relationship between the different petitioners certainly has some bearing on what the second petitioner knew, when they knew it, and when they acted upon it, but the consideration of the second through seventh factors does not require a showing of a specific relationship between the petitioners to consider those factors.” slip op. at 5
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,519,005
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.