- Google LLC v. Parus Holdings, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00279 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing and instituted review of claims 1–4 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 2 are unpatentable over Kovatch and Burrows.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify specifically all matters we misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When reconsidering a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For purposes of this Decision, we thus make a preliminary determination that collateral estoppel precludes Patent Owner from relitigating the issue of whether Kovatch teaches a ranking associated with web site addresses indicating the order in which to access a plurality of preselected web sites. In challenging independent claims 1 and 2 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Kovatch and Burrows, the Petition presents an element-by-element analysis to support its position. Pet. 14–32. That analysis relies on Kovatch’s disclosure of the HeyAnita system for accessing web sites to retrieve information a user requested, and relies on Burrows for disclosure of a system for ranking database records that are “presented to the users in a rank order where the pages having a higher rank are presented first.” Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 1006, 27:28–32, 32:14–47). Petitioner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to apply Burrows’s numbered ranking and polling approach to Kovatch’s destination tree to better identify and present the records of the most interest to the user.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:56– 58). In particular, because Burrows explains that “there needs to be a way to rank order the list in a meaningful manner,” Petitioner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to apply Burrows’s numbered ranking to Kovatch’s destination tree web pages to provide those of interest first.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 115); Ex. 1006, 27:28–29. Petitioner’s element-by-element analysis explains Petitioner’s position as to how each limitation of independent claims 1 and 2 is met within such a combination. Id. at 14–32. Although Patent Owner makes a number of arguments in its Preliminary Response why the combination does not meet certain limitations, those arguments are precluded by our preliminary determination that collateral estoppel applies. See Prelim. Resp. 29–44.7 We have thus re-evaluated the parties’ arguments in light of the findings made in the 846 IPR, and affirmed by the Federal Circuit, and we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claims 1 and 2 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Kovatch and Burrows. We accordingly grant Petitioner’s Rehearing Request and institute an inter partes review of all claims on all grounds asserted in the Petition.8 See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 20
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner
“The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show: “(1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) [the party against who collateral estoppel is being asserted] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.” Google, 54 F.4th at 1381. Each of these requirements appears to be met with respect to the issue of whether Kovatch discloses rankings associated with the order in which web site addresses are accessed. First, the claim limitations at issue in the two proceedings are sufficiently similar to raise the issue of collateral estoppel. See Ohio Willow Wood, 735 F.3d at 1342 (“If the differences between the unadjudicated patent claims and adjudicated patent claims do not materially alter the question of invalidity, collateral estoppel applies. . . . Thus, the mere use of different words in these portions of the claims does not create a new issue of invalidity.”). For example, claim 1 of the ’705 patent recites “a rank number assigned to each one of said web sites and stored in said database” and “access[ing] one of said web sites having the highest said rank number,” while claim 10 of the ’431 patent recites “a ranking associated with each said web site address, said ranking indicating the order in which the plurality of pre-selected web sites are accessed.” Ex. 1001, 19:58–59, 19:65–66; 846 IPR, Ex. 1001, 21:9–11.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“determination that collateral estoppel precludes Patent Owner from relitigating the issue of whether Kovatch teaches a ranking associated with web site addresses indicating the order in which to access a plurality of preselected web sites. In challenging independent claims 1 and 2 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Kovatch and Burrows, the Petition presents an element-by-element analysis to support its position. Pet. 14–32. That analysis relies on Kovatch’s disclosure of the HeyAnita system for accessing web sites to retrieve information a user requested, and relies on Burrows for disclosure of a system for ranking database records that are “presented to the users in a rank order where the pages having a higher rank are presented first.” Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 1006, 27:28–32, 32:14–47). Petitioner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to apply Burrows’s numbered ranking and polling approach to Kovatch’s destination tree to better identify and present the records of the most interest to the user.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1006, 3:56– 58). In particular, because Burrows explains that “there needs to be a way to rank order the list in a meaningful manner,” Petitioner reasons that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to apply Burrows’s numbered ranking to Kovatch’s destination tree web pages to provide those of interest first.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 115); Ex. 1006, 27:28–29.” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,721,705 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq Ise, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00031 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s rehearing request by authorizing a request for Director rehearing of the final written decision finding claims 1–9 unpatentable under § 101.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,246,093 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq Ise, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Jan 27, 2022 · CBM2018-00021 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for rehearing and authorized it to seek Director rehearing of the final written decision within 30 days.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“STANDARD A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 42.71 (b)–(d). An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,618,707 - Platform Science, Inc. v. Omnitracs, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on all petition grounds for claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 44
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.6 Petitioner 6 As noted above, Petitioner raises a second claim construction issue in its Rehearing Request. See Req. Reh’g 12–15 (asserting that the claims require only one instance of copying information from a formatted message to a response message based on which formatted message was received). Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Petition, Patent Owner has not had an contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 2–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“VI. ANALYSIS Legal Standards – Anticipation “[A] claim is anticipated ‘if each and every limitation is found expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Anticipation is a question of fact, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009), assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, see Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,925,308 - Shopify, Inc. / Priceline.Com LLC et al. v. DDR Holdings, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 26, 2020 · IPR2018-01014 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
Granted petitioner’s rehearing request and held claims 1–3, 5, 7, 8, 11–13, 15, 17, and 18 unpatentable over the listed prior-art grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Petitioner’s argument on rehearing is persuasive, particularly under the broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard of claim construction applied in this proceeding. See Dec. 12–13 (Final Written Decision noting that, for an inter partes review proceeding based on a petition filed prior to November 13, 2018, “the Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear”). Petitioner clarifies that the Petition identifies Exhibit 1009’s buy page as corresponding to the “composite web page contain[ing] one or more selectable URLs” recited in the claim and identifies the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages linked to the “buy” page as corresponding to the recited “hierarchical set of additional pages.” See Req. Reh’g 11 (asserting “the Petition demonstrated that the ‘view cart,’ ‘modify cart,’ and ‘checkout’ links satisfy the second ‘wherein’ clause”). In doing so, Petitioner points us to specific portions of its Petition that we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 102 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 21; Ex. 1002 ¶ 102. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 102 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’825 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22. Petitioner thus demonstrates that the buy page shown in Exhibit 1009, i.e., the recited “composite web page,” contains one or more selectable URLs connecting the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages to the buy page, i.e., the recited “hierarchical set of additional web pages,” as required by the claim. Because each of those pages “pertain[s] to a subset of the product offerings in the electronic catalog,” such as those selected for purchase, Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each limitation of the second “wherein” clause of claim 3 is met by the Digital River Publications.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“the broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard of claim construction applied in this proceeding. See Dec. 12–13 (Final Written Decision noting that, for an inter partes review proceeding based on a petition filed prior to November 13, 2018, “the Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear”). Petitioner clarifies that the Petition identifies Exhibit 1009’s buy page as corresponding to the “composite web page contain[ing] one or more selectable URLs” recited in the claim and identifies the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages linked to the “buy” page as corresponding to the recited “hierarchical set of additional pages.” See Req. Reh’g 11 (asserting “the Petition demonstrated that the ‘view cart,’ ‘modify cart,’ and ‘checkout’ links satisfy the second ‘wherein’ clause”). In doing so, Petitioner points us to specific portions of its Petition that we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 102 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 21; Ex. 1002 ¶ 102. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 102 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’825 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22. Petitioner thus demonstrates that the buy page shown in Exhibit 1009, i.e., the recited “composite web page,” contains one or more selectable URLs connecting the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages to the buy page, i.e., the recited “hierarchical set of additional web pages,” as required by the claim. Because each of those pages “pertain[s] to a subset of the product offerings in the electronic catalog,” such as those selected for purchase, Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each limitation of the second “wherein” clause of claim 3 is met by the Digital River Publications.” slip op. at 5
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 102 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 21; Ex. 1002 ¶ 102. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 102 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’825 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,515,825 - Shopify, Inc. / Priceline.Com LLC et al. v. DDR Holdings, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 26, 2020 · IPR2018-01012 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
Granted Petitioner’s rehearing request and held claims 1–3, 5, 7–8, 11–13, 15, 17, and 18 unpatentable, including claims 4, 5, 12, and 13 over the Digital River Publications.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“Petitioner’s argument on rehearing is persuasive, particularly under the broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard of claim construction applied in this proceeding. See Dec. 12–13 (Final Written Decision noting that, for an inter partes review proceeding based on a petition filed prior to November 13, 2018, “the Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear”). Petitioner clarifies that the Petition identifies Exhibit 1009’s buy page as corresponding to the “composite web page contain[ing] one or more selectable URLs” recited in the claim and identifies the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages linked to the “buy” page as corresponding to the recited “hierarchical set of additional pages.”” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 105 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 23; Ex. 1002 ¶ 105. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 105 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’228 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22. Petitioner thus demonstrates that the buy page shown in Exhibit 1009, i.e., the recited “composite web page,” contains one or more selectable URLs connecting the “view cart,” “modify cart,” and “check out” pages to the buy page, i.e., the recited “hierarchical set of additional web pages,” as required by the claim. Because each of those pages “pertain[s] to a subset of the product offerings in the electronic catalog,” such as those selected for purchase, Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each limitation of the second “wherein” clause of claim 4 is met by the Digital River Publications.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 105 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 23; Ex. 1002 ¶ 105. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 105 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’228 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,043,228 - Shopify, Inc. / Priceline.Com LLC et al. v. DDR Holdings, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Oct 26, 2020 · IPR2018-01011 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Rehearing
Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted; claims 1–3, 5, 7, 8, 11–13, 15, 17, and 18 were held unpatentable over the listed grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“II. LEGAL STANDARD A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The burden of showing a decision should be modified on a request for rehearing lies with the party challenging the decision. Id.” slip op. at 2
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“we find provide sufficient support for this position. Specifically, the Petition cites to paragraph 107 of Dr. Shamos’s Declaration, and both the Petition and that Declaration cite multiple times to page 1 of Exhibit 1009. See Pet. 25; Ex. 1002 ¶ 107. In describing the correspondence to the “hierarchical set of additional pages,” Dr. Shamos testifies that “[t]he buy pages also provide a link (i.e., selectable URL) to a shopping cart, which, as described by the 21 Software Drive website, allows a user to add products to a shopping cart, view a shopping cart, modify a shopping cart, and check out.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 107 (citing Ex. 1009, 1). We credit this testimony, which is unrebutted on the record before us. Indeed, Dr. Shamos’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have understood Exhibit 1009’s sequence of URLs as satisfying the claimed “hierarchical set of additional webpages” is consistent with the manner in which the ’876 patent itself describes its shopping cart functionality—namely, as nothing more than the ability to “ADD TO CART,” “VIEW SHOPPING CART,” “UPDATE QUANTITIES,” and “CHECK OUT.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 22.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Petitioner’s argument on rehearing is persuasive, particularly under the broadest-reasonable-interpretation standard of claim construction applied in this proceeding. See Dec. 12–13 (Final Written Decision noting that, for an inter partes review proceeding based on a petition filed prior to November 13, 2018, “the Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear”). Petitioner clarifies that the Petition identifies Exhibit 1009’s buy page as corresponding to the “composite web page contain[ing] one or more selectable URLs” recited in the claim and identifies” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,639,876 - Miami International Holdings, Inc. / Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC et al. v. Nasdaq Ise, LLCRehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 15, 2019 · CBM2018-00021 · APJ Kristi L R Sawert · CBM · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing on the ethics rules and granted Interrogatories 4 and 5 and Document Request 2, while denying rehearing on the remaining specified discovery requests.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedRehearing, deniedGranted in part
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that a decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party must identify all matters it believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, an opposition, or a reply. Id. When rehearing a decision, we review the” slip op. at 2
- Additional discoveryAdditional discovery, grantedGranted in part
“Upon reconsideration, we agree with Patent Owner that the timing of Dr. Hendershott’s preparation and the editing of common paragraphs 18–36 is unclear on the current record. For example, Dr. Hendershott testified that he could not remember whether Fish suggested that he provide a history of Wall Street and the exchanges, which are embodied in paragraphs 18–36. See Ex. 1062, 53:14–19. Dr. Hendershott also testified that he received from Fish versions of his declaration containing edits, but did not remember whether any of those edits were substantive in nature. See id. at 51:19–25, 52:8–22. Dr. Hendershott also did not review the edits to his declarations and thus was arguably not prepared to testify as to the circumstances surrounding the creation and editing of the common paragraphs. See id. at 58:2–8. Thus, we grant Interrogatories 4 and 5 and Discovery Request 2, as relevant information only in the possession of Fish and Reed Smith (Bloomberg Factor 3). We deny Document Request 3, however, because we remain unpersuaded that it is relevant to showing that confidential information could have found its way from Fish to Reed Smith. Ord. 11. In particular, Document Request 3 relates to information flowing from Reed Smith to Dr. Hendershott, and is therefore not relevant to whether Fish used or revealed information to Reed Smith relating to its prosecution of the Nasdaq patents.” slip op. at 12
NonePatents in suitUS 6,618,707 - Neil Ziegmann / N.P.Z., Inc. v. Carlis G. StephensRehearing grantedPTAB · Sep 6, 2017 · IPR2015-01860 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted rehearing in part, reaffirmed denial of IPR under § 325(d), and granted the request for an expanded panel.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted in part
“[dissatisfied] party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). Moreover, as the moving party, the burden of persuasion falls on Petitioner. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). When rehearing a decision on institution, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may arise if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“arguments” is self-evident, so we focus on the next part, “substantially the same prior art or arguments.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphasis added). We conclude that a set of prior art or arguments may be considered “substantially the same” if they are “cumulative to or substantially overlap with issues previously considered by the Office with respect to the patent.” 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). In order for a party to bring this issue to the Office’s attention, the focus of the “substantially” analysis should be on the differences (or lack thereof) between the prior art and arguments presented in the petition, and those “previously . . . presented to the Office.” A party making assertions relevant to Section 325(d) should identify such differences (or lack thereof), whether substantive or procedural, and explain the relevance of those differences (or lack thereof).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Taker Magazine (Ex. 1027) and the Declaration of Neil Ziegmann (Ex. 1024) that purportedly show that the Examiner’s determination was erroneous. We note that Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony is discounted, in that he is an interested party in this proceeding. Cf. Finnigan Corp. v. ITC, 180 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he level of interest of the testifying witness is an important consideration when such testimony is offered to corroborate another witness’s testimony.”). Moreover, even when accorded some weight, we are unpersuaded that the Fur Taker advertisement and Mr. Ziegmann’s testimony come close to showing that the Examiner’s determination concerning nexus was erroneous. In particular, the vast majority of the evidence concerning secondary considerations in the prosecution history has not been challenged by Petitioner, and, thus, for the reasons set forth above, is treated as undisputed fact. To hold otherwise would allow Petitioner to make an end-run around Section 325(d) by merely submitting any piece of new evidence, no matter how minor or inconsequential.” slip op. at 27
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,881,447 - Duncan Parking Technologies, Inc. v. Ips Group Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Aug 18, 2017 · IPR2016-00067 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted IPS’s rehearing request and held claims 1–5 and 7–10 not shown unpatentable as anticipated by King ’054 under § 102(e).
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“without prior authorization from the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing that the decision from which rehearing is sought should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“communicated to the inventors of King ’054 by Mr. King. In that respect, we observe the following: (1) it is undisputed that Mr. King and the D+I inventors invented the substantive content that became claims 8 and 10 of the ’310 patent; (2) Mr. King is a common inventor as between each of the ’310 patent and King ’054; (3) the record reflects that there was frequent and numerous collaborative exchanges between Mr. King and the other inventors of King ’310 (i.e., the D+I inventors); and (4) those exchanges occurred prior to the filing of the application that became King ’054. See, e.g., Exs. 2018–31, 2034–42.” slip op. at 6
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedOther
“Response to IPS’s Request for Rehearing, provides little, if any, basis undermining the above-noted inference. DPT’s attempt, as a part of its Response, to belatedly seek rehearing of our Final Written Decision as to claims 1–5, 7, and 9 of the ’310 patent is both untimely and inadequately supported on the present record.4 Indeed, all the Response does is inappropriately seek rehearing of our Final Written Decision as to claims 1– 5, 7, and 9 of the ’310 patent, and does not follow our instruction of being responsive to the subject of the Request for Rehearing, i.e., the anticipation of dependent claims 8 and 10. See Paper 32, 2 (“The panel would like to hear from DPT as to the content of IPS’s Request for Rehearing. Accordingly, the panel authorizes . . . DPT to file a reply to IPS’s Request for Rehearing.”).” slip op. at 6
§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,854,310
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.