- Apple Inc. v. Ald Social, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01399 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against ALD Social, LLC on claims 1–16 of the ’158 patent and terminated IPR2023-01399 after finding Patent Owner unequivocally abandoned the contest.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, and abandonment of the contest is construed by the Board to be a request for adverse judgment. See IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)). Our orders also stated: Under the specific circumstances of this case, we determine Patent Owner’s failure to file long-overdue mandatory notices required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) to demonstrate Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c), in the particular circumstances of this case, and in the interests of justice, we set a deadline for Patent Owner to file mandatory notices pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) no later than June 10, 2024. IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4 (emphasis in original); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4 (emphasis in original). Our orders further explained that we “would view, in the particular circumstances of this case, Patent Owner’s filing of mandatory notices by the deadline as an indication that Patent Owner had not abandoned the contest.” IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4; IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 9,402,158 - Apple Inc. v. Ald Social, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01398 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against ALD Social, LLC on claims 1–14 of the ’054 patent and terminated IPR2023-01398 after finding unequivocal abandonment.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, and abandonment of the contest is construed by the Board to be a request for adverse judgment. See IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)). Our orders also stated: Under the specific circumstances of this case, we determine Patent Owner’s failure to file long-overdue mandatory notices required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) to demonstrate Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c), in the particular circumstances of this case, and in the interests of justice, we set a deadline for Patent Owner to file mandatory notices pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) no later than June 10, 2024. IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4 (emphasis in original); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4 (emphasis in original). Our orders further explained that we “would view, in the particular circumstances of this case, Patent Owner’s filing of mandatory notices by the deadline as an indication that Patent Owner had not abandoned the contest.” IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4; IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 9,198,054 - PTAB · Oct 11, 2023 · IPR2023-00830 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds and granted T-Mobile’s motion to join the CommScope IPR, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“challenged claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. CommScope IPR, Paper 18 (institution decision); see also CommScope IPR, Paper 1 (the “CommScope petition”). Petitioner here challenges the same claims and asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as those on which we instituted the CommScope IPR. Compare Pet. 3, with CommScope petition, 4; see also Mot. 1 (asserting that “[t]his Petition and supporting declaration are substantively identical to the petition and declaration submitted in the CommScope IPR”; “Petitioner here asserts that the same claims are obvious over the same prior art based on the same arguments presented by the same expert as in the CommScope IPR”). As indicated, Petitioner also relies on the same declarant as in the CommScope IPR. Mot. 1; compare Ex. 1003 (Declaration of Anthony Acampora, Ph.D.) with CommScope IPR, Ex. 1003 (same). Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the CommScope IPR and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the CommScope IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See CommScope IPR, Paper 18, 19–41 (analyzing challenges in the CommScope petition).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition is substantially identical to the CommScope petition, contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and relies on the same declaration of Anthony Acampora, Ph.D. (Ex. 1003). Mot. 1, 4–5. Petitioner represents that joinder will not impact the CommScope IPR schedule. Id. at 5. Petitioner also represents that it “agrees to take an ‘understudy’ role in the joined proceeding, so long as CommScope remains an active party.” Id.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 10,334,499 - PTAB · Aug 14, 2023 · IPR2023-00818 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all petitioned grounds and granted AT&T’s motion to join the Ericsson IPR, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView, LLC, IPR2013- 00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is substantially identical to the Ericsson petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) relies on the same declaration of Henry Houh, Ph.D. (Ex. 1012). Mot. 1, 4–5. Petitioner represents that joinder will not impact the Ericsson IPR schedule. Id. at 5 (listing reasons as to why “joinder will not impact any schedule that may issue or otherwise prejudice the Patent Owner.”). Petitioner also represents that it “will maintain only an ‘understudy’ role in the proceeding, if joined.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 10,334,499 - PTAB · Jun 30, 2023 · IPR2023-00646 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 over all petition grounds and granted AT&T’s motion to join IPR2022-01212, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be authorized unless the information in the Petition and any preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’338 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented. We also grant Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView, LLC, IPR2013- 00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is substantially identical to the Ericsson petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) relies on the same declaration of Henry Houh, Ph.D. (Ex. 1003). Mot. 1, 4–5. Petitioner also represents that joinder will not impact the Ericsson IPR schedule. See, e.g., Mot. 6 (“[A]llowing [Petitioner] to assume an understudy role to Ericsson, will also have little, if any, impact on the Ericsson IPR because no new grounds will be added, the schedule will not be affected, no additional briefing or discovery will be required, and no additional burdens will be placed on Patent Owner.”).” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 8,682,338 - PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2019-01200 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Remand
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the remanded proceedings concerning claim 20 because the Board had not yet decided the remanded merits.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandGranted
“Generally, the Board expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement, unless the Board already has decided the merits of the proceeding. PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 86 (Nov. 2019).6 Here, although the Board already has issued a Final Written Decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the part of that decision addressing claim 20 of the ’552 patent and remanded to the Board for further proceedings regarding claim 20. The Board has not issued a decision on remand and, thus, has not decided the merits of the issues that were remanded to the Board. Under these circumstances, we determine it is appropriate to grant the Motion and terminate the proceedings.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part
“The parties also jointly request that the Agreement be treated as business confidential information and be kept separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Req. 2. We have reviewed the Agreement, which contains confidential business information regarding the settlement terms, and we determine that good cause exists to treat the Agreement as business confidential information pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) and keep it separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Accordingly, we grant this aspect of the parties’ Joint Request. The parties also “request that the Board order that in the event a person or entity makes a written request, as stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c)(1)-(2), for access to the settlement agreement, that any such written request be served upon Patent Owner and Petitioner on the day the written request is provided to the Board.” Req. 2. However, neither the statute nor the regulation provides for any such notification, and the parties have not provided any reason or special circumstance that would justify issuing an order that purports to impose an additional requirement. Accordingly, we deny that portion of the parties’ Joint Request.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,247,552 - PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2019-01199 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board terminated the proceedings after settlement because it had not decided the remanded merits concerning claim 20.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandGranted
“Generally, the Board expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement, unless the Board already has decided the merits of the proceeding. PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 86 (Nov. 2019).6 Here, although the Board already has issued a Final Written Decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the part of that decision addressing claim 20 of the ’552 patent and remanded to the Board for further proceedings regarding claim 20. The Board has not issued a decision on remand and, thus, has not decided the merits of the issues that were remanded to the Board. Under these circumstances, we determine it is appropriate to grant the Motion and terminate the proceedings.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part
“The parties also jointly request that the Agreement be treated as business confidential information and be kept separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Req. 2. We have reviewed the Agreement, which contains confidential business information regarding the settlement terms, and we determine that good cause exists to treat the Agreement as business confidential information pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) and keep it separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Accordingly, we grant this aspect of the parties’ Joint Request. The parties also “request that the Board order that in the event a person or entity makes a written request, as stated in 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c)(1)-(2), for access to the settlement agreement, that any such written request be served upon Patent Owner and Petitioner on the day the written request is provided to the Board.” Req. 2. However, neither the statute nor the regulation provides for any such notification, and the parties have not provided any reason or special circumstance that would justify issuing an order that purports to impose an additional requirement. Accordingly, we deny that portion of the parties’ Joint Request.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,247,552 - PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2019-01198 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Remand
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion and terminated the remanded proceedings; it also granted in part their request to protect the settlement agreement.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandGranted
“Generally, the Board expects that a proceeding will terminate after the filing of a settlement agreement, unless the Board already has decided the merits of the proceeding. PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 86 (Nov. 2019).6 Here, although the Board already has issued a Final Written Decision, the Federal Circuit reversed the part of that decision addressing claim 20 of the ’552 patent and remanded to the Board for further proceedings regarding claim 20. The Board has not issued a decision on remand and, thus, has not decided the merits of the issues that were remanded to the Board. Under these circumstances, we determine it is appropriate to grant the Motion and terminate the proceedings.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted in part
“business confidential information and be kept separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Req. 2. We have reviewed the Agreement, which contains confidential business information regarding the settlement terms, and we determine that good cause exists to treat the Agreement as business confidential information pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c) and keep it separate from the files of the ’552 patent and these proceedings. Accordingly, we grant this aspect of the parties’ Joint Request.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 7,247,552 - Nichia Corporation v. Document Security Systems, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 18, 2022 · IPR2018-01165 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted adverse judgment against Patent Owner as to claims 16–19 after their statutory disclaimer and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Moreover, under 37 § C.F.R. 42.73(b), a “party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” The only claims before us on remand have been disclaimed. Accordingly, we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer to be a request for adverse judgment as to those claims which remain before us, which we now grant.” slip op. at 3
- RemandOther
“Written Decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Papers 31, 32. The court issued its decision affirming our findings as to all claims except claims 15–19. Nichia Corp. v. Document Sec. Sys., Inc., Nos. 2020-2261, 2020-2287, 2022 WL 1218036, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2022). Specifically, the court reversed our determination that Petitioner had not shown independent claim 15 to be unpatentable and remanded for further proceedings regarding dependent claims 16–19. Id. On June 14, 2022, the court issued the formal mandate. Paper 33. On June 23, 2022, Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed claims 16–19 of the ’087 patent. Thus, claims 16–19 are no longer part of this proceeding and no issues remain for us to consider on remand. See Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc., 933 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (noting that disclaiming claims effectively eliminates those claims from the patent as though the disclaimed claims had never existed (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Asetek Danmark A/S v. CoolIT Sys., Inc., IPR2020-00747, Paper 42 at 6 (PTAB Sept. 30, 2021) (determining that a proceeding); cf. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,524,087 - Captioncall, L.L.C. v. Ultratec, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 14, 2016 · IPR2015-01355 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13, 15, and 18 are unpatentable under § 103 over the stated combinations of Liebermann, Aronow, O’Toole, and McLaughlin.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not challenge directly Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony. See generally PO Resp. 5. Mr. Ivan Zatkovich, Patent Owner’s declarant, does not propose a level of ordinary skill in the art to be adopted, but he does testify that the opinions set forth in his declaration would not change if he “assumed that [one of ordinary skill in the art] had the qualifications set forth in Mr. Occhiogrosso’s declaration.” Ex. 2098 ¶ 24 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 27). Having reviewed the prior art asserted in this proceeding (see, e.g., Exs. 1002–1005), we determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner’s declarant and employed by both declarants is consistent with the challenged patent and the referenced prior art, and we adopt Mr. Occhiogrosso’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below.” slip op. at 11
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Turning to the merits of the Motion to Exclude, we find Patent Owner’s assertion that a person of ordinary skill in the art “must know the relevant prior art of telephone technology for the deaf and HOH” (Mot. Exc. 4) lacks sufficient factual corroboration or explanation. For example, Patent 10 Mr. Zatkovich is referring to the level of ordinary skill discussed previously and which we adopted for this proceeding. 14 Owner does not address the sentence that immediately precedes the single citation in the challenged patent on which Patent Owner relies: “[t]he present invention relates to the general field of telephone communications.” Ex. 1001, 1:13–14. Nor does Patent Owner discuss the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art of record or other factors that may be considered, including the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. Even if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, we find Mr. Occhiogrosso meets Patent Owner’s proffered level of ordinary skill: “must know the relevant prior art of telephone technology for the deaf and HOH” (Mot. Exc. 4). Mr. Occhiogrosso’s experience providing expert testimony in proceedings regarding assistive technologies for the deal or hard of hearing is uncontroverted. See Mot. Exc. 4–5 (identifying three inter partes reviews); Ex. 2105, 5:23–6:10 (deposition on August 9, 2016 indicating Mr. Occhiogrosso has been deposed between twelve and twenty times concerning Patent Owner’s patents). Furthermore, the five prior art references Mr. Occhiogrosso considered for this case (Ex. 1008 ¶ 28) all involve telephone technology for the deaf and HOH and support his qualification under the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art now offers for the first time in its Motion to Exclude (and after it relied on the testimony of its declarant as to a different level). 15” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Mr. Occhiogrosso testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would consider the screen in Figure 6 [shown on a cellular phone] as analogous to the screen depicted in Figure 8.” Ex. 1043 ¶ 6; see Pet. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 1043 ¶ 4–7). Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony relies on, and better comports with, Liebermann’s description of Figure 8 as illustrating “a layout for the visual display to present multiple information to the deaf person.” Ex. 1002, 6:29–36; Ex. 1043 ¶ 6. Mr. Occhiogrosso opines that the layout in Figure 8 “can be applied to different devices with displays of varying dimensions,” including the cellular embodiment of Figure 6, the personal computer embodiment in Figure 5a, and the kiosk embodiment in Figure 5c. Ex. 1043 ¶ 6. Mr. Occhiogrosso explains that Figure 8 depicts a “three-part, logical screen layout [that would be] identical and would be scaled appropriately, depending on display size.” Id. We credit Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony over that of Mr. Zatkovich because Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony better comports with the express disclosure of Liebermann—Figure 8 is not described as being limited to the embodiments in Figures 5a–5c or otherwise not being applicable to the cellular phone embodiment shown in Figure 6. Rather, Figure 8 is described more generally as being “a layout for the visual display.” Ex. 1002, 6:31– 34 36. In addition, Mr. Zatkovich opines that one of ordinary skill in the art purportedly would not incorporate the display shown in Figure 8—that is, the three-part display. At issue here, however, is only a small portion of that display—the incoming text screen—showing the text communication representing a transcription of the voice of the person speaking to a user of the personal interpreter device.” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“skill in the art would combine Aronow’s initiation switch into Liebermann’s device to save power. PO Resp. 35–36. We agree with Patent Owner that, because the initiation switch is not an “on/off switch” that would enable a user to turn off the device and save power, Mr. Occhiogrosso’s power saving rationale (Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 58–59) is an insufficient motivation to combine the initiation switch. PO Resp. 35–36 (citing Ex. 2098 ¶ 62; Ex. 2097, 141:21– 142:12). Similarly, we also agree with Patent Owner’s challenge regarding Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony that Aronow’s switch improves Liebermann’s communicator by making it a “low cost, self contained telephonic interface device requiring no programming for operation.” Id. at 36. Relying on Mr. Zatkovich’s testimony, Patent Owner indicates “the communicator/cellular phone embodiment of Fig. 6 of Liebermann[] already appears to be a self-contained device.” Id. (citing Ex. 2098 ¶ 61). Nevertheless, we note that there is no dispute that Liebermann’s communicator and cellular telephone implementations provide for a user initiating a call to the center by dialing the center. See, e.g., PO Resp. 36 (“As a special case of a telephone, Liebermann can initiate a call simply by dialing a stored number to the Center.”). We disagree with Patent Owner that the addition of Aronow’s switch would not simplify the communicator 48 of Liebermann. Id. Common sense suggests that a single initiation switch is a simpler way to initiate a call than by dialing the multiple digits of a telephone number. Furthermore, we credit Mr. Occhiogrosso’s testimony of the simplifying benefits of a user-operated initiation switch, which is based on Aronow’s discussion about the benefits of the initiation switch to simplify operations of the telephonic device, especially for elderly people who are hard of hearing. Ex. 1008 ¶ 58. For these reasons, we determine that Petitioner has provided sufficient” slip op. at 48
Patent outcomesUS 5,974,116 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 5,974,116
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.