• Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2024-01186 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Kwatra does not teach or suggest minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration as required by the claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have the following characteristics: “a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing or digital cameras.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner states that, “[a]lternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing 6 Patent Owner asserts objective evidence of nonobviousness. Prelim. Resp. 19–27. or digital cameras.” Id. Petitioner further contends “[a]n advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 14–15. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’894 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner “does not believe any terms require a formal construction.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner agrees “no claim terms presently require construction to resolve any current dispute between the parties.” PO Resp. 15. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Kwatra teaches, at Equation 7, minimizing velocity and acceleration of a function representing camera path (P). FF ¶¶ 6, 8–9. Kwatra does not state that this camera path function considers rotation. Rather, the words “camera path” suggest x, y, z movement of the camera rather than rotation of the camera. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony that Kwatra’s minimization of a smoothed camera path does not result in minimizing rotational velocity and acceleration is credible because this testimony is consistent with Kwatra as a whole and consistent with the other evidence of record. Id. ¶ 10. Kwatra recognizes that image rotation angle (“θ”) may not remain smooth. Id. ¶ 12. But rather than attempting to minimize velocity and acceleration of rotation of the camera housing, Kwatra states that applying a smoothness constraint on rotation angle “may be non-linear.” Id. ¶ 13. Consistent with Kwatra, Dr. Foroosh credibly explains the difficulty of applying linear techniques to rotation. Id. Thus, Kwatra proposes instead constraining the sine and cosine of theta. Id. ¶ 14. The Kwatra provisional application is part of the Kwatra reference (id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “(id. ¶ 15), and it similarly opts for simpler schemes rather than estimating all parameters for all frames jointly. Id. ¶ 16. The provisional explains that the rotational component is relatively small such that non-linear computations minimizing velocity and rotation can be avoided. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Foroosh, explaining the provisional is credible (Ex. 2018 ¶ 72) because it is consistent with Kwatra’s complete disclosure. Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more credible than the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Katsaggelos, because Dr. Katsaggelos did not review the Kwatra provisional application and, thus, did not review the entire disclosure of Kwatra. Id. ¶ 19; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (obviousness analysis considers whether “the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 10,574,894 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,574,894
• Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, IncNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01165 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Zhou does not teach the claimed low-light high-pass or stickiness parameter limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “4. Conclusion for the Prior Art Analysis In sum, we find that Zhou does not disclose the low-light high-pass parameter or the stickiness parameter. Petitioner’s grounds for both independent claims 1 and 16 rely on Zhou for teaching a low-light high-pass parameter or a stickiness parameter. Pet. 23–28, 64. Because we find Zhou does not teach these limitations, all of Petitioner’s grounds fall for this reason. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, we determine that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that any claim of the ’840 patent would have been obvious in view of the prior art cited.” slip op. at 18

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) in the field of the ’840 patent would have a bachelor’s degree in engineering or computer science, or equivalent field, and two years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. Alternatively, a POSITA would have four years of experience working on image or video processing, or digital cameras. An advanced graduate degree in the disciplines cited above may make up for the work experience indicated above. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Patent Owner applies the same standard. PO Resp. 26–27. We use this agreed-upon standard for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We review this testimony based on the strength of the underlying factual basis. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations, however, may render the testimony of little probative value . . ..”). Here, the underlying factual basis is not very strong for either witness. That said, we find that Dr. Foroosh’s testimony is more logically sound and consistent with the ’840 patent disclosure. Based on our reading of the specification, we find a clear indication that “stickiness” has to do with the past. In order to control “the extent by which preceding portion(s) . . . impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory” (emphasis added), one must control the degree by which the past frames impact determination. And to control the degree of the past’s influence, one must, as a consequence, favor the past over the future. That is, the frame of reference of the stickiness parameter is the past. The specification could have used a time-agnostic term, like a “nearness” or “adjacency” parameter, but it did not. Thus, the fact that “stickiness” is used in conjunction with “preceding” indicates that it deals with a preference for preceding frames. On this basis, we find Dr. Katsaggelos’s testimony less persuasive than Dr. Foroosh’s.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “That said, we do not construe a stickiness parameter as prohibiting consideration of future frames. Instead, we determine that the stickiness parameter’s value determines the impact of the preceding portions, versus the following portions. The ’840 patent recognizes this, when it says that a stickiness parameter value of “1,” representing a “lazy” stabilizer that maximally favors the past, would not override a violation of the margin constraint based on the look-ahead (i.e., would not allow the viewing window to fall out of bounds in the event of large future motion). See Ex. 1001, 22:26–30; see also id. at 12:61–13:29 (acknowledging that favoring the past may lead to a conflict with the viewing window determination), 15:39–60 (adjusting the viewing window to ensure it does not violate a margin constraint). Thus, while a past-favoring parameter by necessity favors the past over the future, it does not prohibit consideration of the future. In view of the above, we construe the claimed “stickiness parameter” as a parameter that controls the extent by which preceding portions of the trajectory impacts determination of the smoothed trajectory, with an understanding that in order to favor preceding portions, to some extent, the parameter must relatively disfavor following portions.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 10,958,840 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,958,840
• Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, IncNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01164 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Shi does not disclose the claimed low-light high-pass parameter required by the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Given the teachings of the specification, we agree with Patent Owner that a low-light high-pass parameter is a parameter of a smoothing function that favors high frequencies (high pass) when exposure times are long (low light). See Tr. 42:10–18 (Patent Owner’s counsel stating that “high-pass” means “there’s a bias or preference for high frequencies”); Ex. 2020, 93:23– 94:15 (Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Katsaggelos, agreeing that a high-pass system attenuates the low frequency of a signal). Although we acknowledge Petitioner’s position that the specification provides other ways or considerations in implementing a smoothing function, based on our above analysis of the specification, we find that the specification describes the lowlight high-pass parameter as a specific component of a smoothing function. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:17–25 (setting out several parameters besides the low-light high-pass parameter used in trajectory smoothing).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “position and a real device position. Id. at 18:27–40. In other words, the blur is addressed by analyzing the image to identify motion and then shifting the image. Shi, however, does not disclose how its parameter is based on low light (or the long exposure times indicative of low light). In its Petition, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “blurs can be caused by low light conditions.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 111). Although this is true, that does not mean that Shi’s blurs are identified by a parameter that considers low light. As we just described, Shi identifies the blur by quantifying the amount of motion of the points in an image, not by identifying low light. This is simply a different way to determine the presence of motion blur. In Shi, blur is measured, whereas in the ’840 patent, it is inferred based on low-light conditions (e.g., by observing the exposure time). See, e.g., Ex. 1007, 18:7– 26; Ex. 1001, 19:12–26. In its Reply, Petitioner does not point to any further disclosures. Accordingly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “low-light” aspect of the claimed low-light high-pass parameter. This is sufficient to determine that Petitioner’s ground does not meet all claim limitations. Similarly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “high-pass” aspect of the parameter. Shi’s blur compensation uses a spherical interpolation to modify the image. Ex. 1007, 18:27–40. The low-light high-pass parameter, as we have construed the term, allows more high frequencies. To allow more high frequencies, this necessarily means either allowing fewer low frequencies, or allowing more high frequences as opposed to some counterfactual situation in which fewer high frequencies were going to be allowed. See Ex. 2020, 94:23–95:15; Ex. 2022. We are directed to no persuasive evidence from Petitioner that Shi’s spherical interpolation favors high frequencies over low frequencies. Accord Ex. 2018 ¶ 107 (Patent Owner’s expert stating that Shi’s spherical interpolation “reintroduce[es] both high- and low-frequency motion”). Even if Shi allows the viewing window to track the camera position “consistent with the natural blur in the image” (Ex. 1007, 17:63–67), we are not provided with sufficient evidence to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that providing a similar visual goal as a high-pass parameter (Ex. 1001, 22:16–18, “the output motion may include high frequencies that mask motion blur”) is the same as having a high-pass parameter. Again, merely preserving high frequencies is not the same as having a “high-pass parameter” because, as construed, a “high-pass parameter” also involves some degree of attenuation of low frequencies or relative increase of high frequencies. Accordingly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “high-pass” aspect of the claimed low-light high-pass parameter.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 10,958,840 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,958,840
• DBR Finance, Inc. v. Rugged Cross Hunting Blinds, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 29, 2025 · IPR2024-00291 · APJ Cynthia L Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–19 not unpatentable because Petitioner did not prove the proposed Whybrew–Strength combinations disclosed the claimed mesh panels with spaced holes.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We question, therefore, whether someone having an education in textile engineering or physics, but no experience in the field of hunting blinds, would be consistent with the level of skill portrayed by the ’535 Patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note that Petitioner’s expert’s experience, education, and qualifications are rooted in textiles, fibers and physics, and sophisticated subjects related thereto. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 14–20. But his deposition revealed that he has little or no experience in the field of hunting blinds. See Ex. 2038, 8–14.5 5 The same might be said of Patent Owner’s expert. See Ex. 2031, ¶¶ 6–7; Ex. 1023, 16. However, our obviousness analysis leaned lightly, if at all, on her declarations and testimony.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. Mesh Material In the Petition, Petitioner asks that “the term ‘mesh material’” be interpreted in accordance with “a plain and ordinary usage.” Pet. 25. Per Petitioner, the “plain and ordinary” meaning of the term “mesh material” is “a woven material of open texture with spaced holes therein.” Id. Per Petitioner, “[o]ther typical terms used to describe a mesh-like material” are “a screen material, or a netting material, which are believed to be synonyms.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute that a mesh material would have an open texture with spaced holes therein. See PO Resp. 18. We find that Petitioner’s proposed construction aligns with the ’535 Patent’s specification. See Ex. 1001. The drawings in the ’535 Patent depict the mesh material 26 as having an array of uniformly spaced circular holes forming a net-like structure (see id., Fig. 1A, 1B, 4, 9) or an array of uniformly spaced rectangular openings (see id. Fig. 8) forming a screen-like structure. The embodiments of the mesh material 26 listed in the ’535 Patent (e.g., a mesh banner material, scrims, a network of fibers, etc.) are materials having net-like or screen-like structures. See id. at 6:47–7:28.6” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Our construction aligns with the claim language; Petitioner’s proposed construction does not. See Ex. 1001, 10:4–19. The independent challenged claims set forth “one or more panels of mesh material” and then set forth “said one or more panels comprising: a first side with a camouflage pattern; and a second side with a dark color coating.” Id. at 10:4–11. The recited “said one or more panels” corresponds to the previously recited “one or more panels of mesh material,” not panels comprising a material that was only a “mesh” prior to printing/coating. See id. Also, the independent challenged claims set forth that “the one or more panels of the mesh material define an outer surface of the camouflage structure.” See id. at 10:18–19, 1:23–24 (emphasis added). And the panel(s) defining a hunting blind’s outer surface would include the dark color coating. Our construction aligns with the ’535 Patent’s specification; Petitioner’s proposed construction does not. See Ex. 1001. The ’535 Patent repeatedly describes the relevant panel material in the hunting blind (i.e., post printing/coating) as a mesh material. See id., Abst., 1:19–5:34, 6:47–7:28, 9:16–54, Figs. 1A, 1B, 9. The ’535 Patent expressly describes and depicts the mesh material 26 as including the camouflage pattern and the dark-color coating. See id. at 1:52–56, 3:24–25, 3:31–33, Figs. 1A, 1B. The ’535 Patent says that “panels” of this coated mesh material 26 “are used to form” a hunting blind. Id. at 3:22–26. The ’535 Patent says that “[m]esh material is presented for a hunting blind with a camouflage pattern printed on a first side and a second side with a color coating.” Id. at Abst. The ’535 Patent says that “mesh material of interwoven fabric is provided for a hunting blind including a camouflage pattern printed on a first side and a second side with a dark color coating.” Id. at 1:19–22; see also id. at 1:44–49. Our construction aligns with the ’535 Patent’s prosecution history; Petitioner’s proposed construction does not. See Ex. 1006. As mentioned above, throughout prosecution of the ’535 Patent, the same prior art material was mapped to the claimed panel(s) of mesh material. See Ex. 1006, 64–72, 122–106. The mapped-to prior art mesh material was described during prosecution as an “interwoven fabric” with “a pattern” printed on a first side and “a dark color coating” on a second side. Ex. 1006, 64; see also id. at 122. And the mapped-to prior art mesh material (i.e., which included not only the interwoven fabric but also the printed pattern and the dark color coating) had a “net-like structure” with an array of uniformly spaced “net holes” that are “not closed.” Ex. 2021, 4:1–5, see also id. at 2:58–3:6, 4:34–45, Figs. 1, 2a. Thus, we understand that claimed panel(s) of mesh material must have” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “However, Patent Owner does not bear the burden of proving Strength’s camouflage material 10 does not have holes. Rather, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does have holes. And Petitioner’s arguments that undermine Patent Owner’s position that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does not have holes, concurrently undermine Petitioner’s position that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does have holes. Per Petitioner, “Strength is silent on whether visible holes exist in the fabric” (Pet. Reply 8) and “the Strength reference doesn’t discuss anything about holes” (Tr. 14). Petitioner’s expert testified that it was his “understanding that Strength is silent” on “whether or not there are holes.” Ex. 2038, 44. Petitioner contends that Strength’s silence about the presence/ absence of holes hinders Patent Owner from proving that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does not have holes. See Pet. Reply 8. We agree. But this same silence likewise hinders Petitioner from proving that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does have holes.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 11,399,535 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,399,535
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,129,825
• Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,202
• Microsoft Corporation / Affirmed Networks, Inc. v. Lemko CorporationNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 30, 2024 · IPR2023-00529 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8, 11–16, and 21 were not proven unpatentable over Mauer and Waylett because the asserted combinations did not teach key claim limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL Petitioner defines the person of ordinary skill in the art as follows: As of February 2006, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have been a person with a degree in 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the challenged claims of the ’414 patent have an effective filing date before the effective date of the applicable AIA amendments, we refer to the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103 throughout this Decision. 2 Mauer et al., U.S. Patent No. 7,395,085 B1, issued July 1, 2008 (Ex. 1005, “Mauer”). 3 Waylett et al., U.S. Patent No. 8,184,603 B2, issued May 22, 2012 (Ex. 1006, “Waylett”). computer science, electrical or computer engineering, physics, or a similar discipline . . . [and] would also have at least two years of relevant experience including, for example, work related to telecommunications networks. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 54). The institution decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art. Dec. on Inst. 11–12. Patent Owner applied this definition for its response. Resp. 19. Petitioner’s undisputed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the prior art and ’414 patent specification. Based on the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner does not submit constructions for any claim terms. According to Petitioner, “[t]he Board construes claims under the same standard used in civil actions in federal district court. The district court for the related litigation has not yet construed the claim terms.” Pet. 7. The parties provided briefing regarding construction of “distributed mobile architecture (DMA).” Resp. 19–34; Pet. Reply 1–3; PO Sur-reply 11–14. But we do not need to construe “distributed mobile architecture (DMA)” to resolve this inter partes review. We thus do not construe this claim term. We also do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We discuss the meaning of ’414 patent claims to the extent necessary to resolve the issues we address below. Id.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “a) Combination of Mauer and Waylett In support of both Ground 1 and Ground 2, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Mauer’s and Waylett’s disclosures, “using Waylett’s Network-in-a-box 224 in each of Mauer’s WWAN 14 and WLAN 12, resulting in at least two DMA systems.” Pet. 11–13. Asserting that “Mauer teaches providing sufficient network coverage by use of different kinds of networks, network interfaces, and protocols,” Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that “Waylett discloses an inexpensive way to implement the same networks used in Mauer’s WWAN 14 and WLAN 12.” Id. Citing similarities in Mauer’s and Waylett’s systems, Petitioner argues that “a POSITA would have been able to modify Mauer’s WWAN 14 and WLAN 12 networks so that each network uses Waylett’s NIB 224.” Id. at 14. According to Petitioner, the combination would have included a number of beneficial features from Mauer. Id. at 14–15. Petitioner further advances three reasons that a person of ordinary skill would have had to combine the references’ teaching. Id. at 15–16. First, asserting that Waylett discloses cost benefits and Mauer discloses “an improved method and system for notifying mobile stations,” Petitioner contends the “references each provide reasoning” to combine their disclosures. Id. at 15. Second, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “improve Mauer’s distributed wireless network system by consolidating it into a single box, making it compact in design allowing for faster deployment.” Id. at 16. “Third, Waylett’s NIB would help mitigate the shared concern of Mauer—that is, reaching a mobile station as it roams or moves outside of the service or coverage area.” Id.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not establish that Mauer sends calls to voicemail based on the two determinations claim 1 recites. Resp. 55–56. In particular, as we explain above, claim 1 requires making use of the DPR after first determining the second mobile subscriber is not located within a first wireless coverage area based on HLR and VLR information and also determining that the second mobile subscriber is not located within a second wireless coverage area based on certain CLR information. The Petition, at best, attempts to establish that Mauer directs to voicemail when a “communication session cannot be established over the first or second wireless network.” Pet. 37. But a general determination that a “communication session cannot be established” does not teach or suggest claim 1’s specific requirements that first, the DPR is utilized in the specific circumstance that the second mobile subscriber is not located within the first wireless coverage area (with this determination being made based on HLR and VLR information), and second, that the DPR is also not located within the second wireless coverage area (with this determination being made based on CLR information). See PO Sur-Reply 8–9; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 111–113. For the reasons above, Petitioner does not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined art teaches or suggests the final “when” recitation of claim 1.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 7,653,414 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,653,414
• Intuit Inc. v. Samesurf, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2023-00341 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 were not shown unpatentable over Lebrun and Wang or over Prajapat and Wang because the combinations did not teach key invitation and webpage retrieval limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “of the parties, we found that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, 7 Patent Owner has not offered objective evidence of non-obviousness. See generally PO Resp.; PO Sur-reply; see also Pet. 21 (indicating Petitioner is not aware of any evidence of secondary considerations). least two years of work experience in software development and/or web-based software,” which reflected Petitioner’s proposal. Dec. 12; see Dec. 10–12 (discussing the respective proposals and level of ordinary skill reflected in the challenged patent and asserted prior art). Patent Owner accepts this level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 37. Accordingly, we apply this determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner’s citations in this regard to Dr. Lieberman’s declaration do not adequately support Petitioner’s “forwarding” contention. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37, 149); Ex. 1003 ¶ 37 (indicating the challenged patent describes the invitation as being sent by email, instant message, or social network communication); Ex. 1003 ¶ 149 (describing the group-surfing server receiving the session-creation message, creating the group-surfing session, and “inform[ing] the participants in the group-surfing session”). Petitioner does not identify any testimony from Dr. Lieberman that supports Petitioner’s Reply position that Lebrun’s group-surfing server “forwards” the session-creation message to the group-surfing session participants, nor are we aware of any such testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 149 (The group-surfing server “responds to the group session request ‘by (1) creating a group-surfing session, and (2) informing the participants [web clients] in the group-surfing session.”); see generally Ex. 1034. Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 29

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted in part

    “surfing server as forwarding the session-creation message to the invited web client. PO Sur-reply 12. Although Lebrun describes the group-surfing server as “informing the participants in the group-surfing server session” after receiving the session-creation message and creating the group-surfing session, Lebrun does not describe forwarding or otherwise sending the session-creation message to the participants. Ex. 1005, 32:26–28, 44:12–14. Petitioner’s citations in this regard to Dr. Lieberman’s declaration do not adequately support Petitioner’s “forwarding” contention. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37, 149); Ex. 1003 ¶ 37 (indicating the challenged patent describes the invitation as being sent by email, instant message, or social network communication); Ex. 1003 ¶ 149 (describing the group-surfing server receiving the session-creation message, creating the group-surfing session, and “inform[ing] the participants in the group-surfing session”). Petitioner does not identify any testimony from Dr. Lieberman that supports Petitioner’s Reply position that Lebrun’s group-surfing server “forwards” the session-creation message to the group-surfing session participants, nor are we aware of any such testimony. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 149 (The group-surfing server “responds to the group session request ‘by (1) creating a group-surfing session, and (2) informing the participants [web clients] in the group-surfing session.”); see generally Ex. 1034. Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “receive webpage content from the website server in particular ways as identified in limitations [1e] and [1g]. Similarly, claim 1 requires the invitee device to retrieve data from the website server in response to receiving “the information related to the shared web browsing interaction from the synchronization server” (limitation [1f.iii]). For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence its combination of Lebrun and Wang does so. For the required website server interaction, in its Petition, Petitioner relies on Lebrun’s description of an alternative embodiment applicable only when no cookies or other identity information are involved (Ex. 1005, 35:17–19). See, e.g., Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1005, 35:17–19). As Patent Owner indicates, this alternative is not relevant to the subject matter recited in claim 1 which requires identity information. PO Resp. 45. Petitioner does not address this shortcoming in its Reply. See generally Pet. Reply. Rather, in its Reply, for website server interaction, Petitioner relies on Lebrun’s functionality of sending a web page from the web server to the web client as shown in Lebrun’s Figure 1. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1005, 32:21–24, 31:27–30, Fig. 1). Specifically, Petitioner contends that Lebrun discloses that (i) a URL for the initial web page is included in session-creation message 151 (Ex. 1005, 32:21–24), (ii) the web site sends a web page directly to the web client (Fig. 1), and (iii) the web site delivers information 132 to web clients or the group-surfing server 140 “in response Pet. Reply 11. Although this shows the web site sending a web page directly to a web client, the prior art of Lebrun does not do so in the manner required by the claims (limitations [1e], [1f.i], [1f.iii], [1g]).” slip op. at 46

  Patent outcomesUS 9,483,448 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,483,448
• Edwards Lifesciences Corporation / Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Aortic Innovations, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 25, 2023 · IPR2022-00556 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references did not teach or suggest the limitation requiring no outer graft covering between the fibers and outer frame.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “As the plain language of the claim term suggests, an “outer graft covering” must cover some, or all, of the metallic outer frame of the prosthetic heart valve. Consequently, and according to the plain and ordinary meaning, we understand an “outer graft covering” to be a structure, 29 such as a cloth, fabric or other material, that covers all, or part of, the metallic outer frame. Importantly, because an outer graft covering must cover the external surface of the outer frame, and specifically “between the first portion of fibers and the outer frame,” we understand this claim term to mean that the cover must extend over (i.e., “cover”) not only the struts and members of the metallic outer frame, but must also cover the open spaces, or interstices, in the spaces between those struts and members. Consequently, the ordinary and customary meaning of the limitation “free of an outer graft covering between the fibers and the outer frame” is that there can be no such outer graft covering present anywhere between the outwardly extending fibers and the metallic outer frame.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As an initial matter, there is little disagreement between the parties and their experts that PET can be a graft covering. However, the disputed limitation requires something more. Specifically, it requires that “the outer seal is free of an outer graft covering between the fibers and the outer frame.” We are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence of record, that Levi, Spenser II, or Walther, upon which Petitioner relies, teaches or suggests the incorporated limitation of claim 1 reciting “wherein the valve assembly is free of an outer graft covering between the first portion of fibers and the outer frame.” In our analysis, we must first determine what is meant by the claim term “outer graft covering.”” slip op. at 29

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Furthermore, our understanding of an outer graft covering as a material or structure that covers at least a portion of the outer surface of the prosthetic heart valve, such that both the struts and members of the metallic outer frame, as well as the interstices between those struts and members, is covered by the outer graft covering, reinforces our prior conclusion that the outer skirt of Levi constitutes an outer graft covering that is prohibited by challenged claim 1. We consequently conclude that Petitioner has not met 35 its burden with respect to demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Levi teaches or suggests the limitation reciting “wherein the outer seal is free of an outer graft covering between the fibers and the outer frame.”” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 10,987,236 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,987,236
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Power2b Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 26, 2023 · IPR2022-00325 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 were not shown unpatentable: the Keely–Geva combinations lacked sufficient reasoning to combine, and did not teach claimed movement in the third dimension.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Testimony cannot take the place of disclosure in a prior art reference, when that disclosure is required as part of the unpatentability analysis. See CTPG at 36. More specifically, the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide sets forth the following: Expert testimony, however, cannot take the place of a disclosure in a prior art reference, when that disclosure is required as part of the unpatentability analysis. For example, because “[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the 8 For exhibits 1004 and 2025, we use the pagination added by the submitting party. 9 Although not relied on for independent claim 1, Kameyama also was cited in that Information Disclosure Statement that was initialed by the Examiner. Id. single prior art reference,” Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987), a petitioner asserting anticipation cannot rely on its expert to supply disclosure of a claim element that is not expressly or inherently present in the reference. Similarly, in an obviousness analysis, conclusory assertions from a third party about general knowledge in the art cannot, without supporting evidence of record, supply a limitation that is not evidently and indisputably within the common knowledge of those skilled in the art. K/S Himpp v. Hear-Wear Techs., LLC, 751 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Furthermore, because an inter partes review may only be requested “on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications,” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), expert testimony cannot take the place of disclosure from patents or printed publications. In other words, expert testimony may explain “patents and printed publications,” but is not a substitute for disclosure in a prior art reference itself. CTPG at 36. We, therefore, find that Dr. Bederson’s testimony (Ex. 1002 ¶ 92) does not remedy the deficiency in Geva’s disclosures. Petitioner has not shown that Geva teaches element 1[G].” slip op. at 49

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the complete record now before us, we maintain our determination in the Institution Decision (Inst. Dec. 8) that Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the 3 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness based on the complete record now before us. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art, except without the “at least” phrase. Our analysis and determinations herein, however, do not turn on which level of skill we adopt.” slip op. at 8

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Importantly, to prevail in its challenge to Patent Owner’s claims, Petitioner must demonstrate that the claims are unpatentable, and that burden never shifts to the patentee. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012)); see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“It is of the utmost importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3))). includes argument and evidence indicating clear reliance on Keely’s teachings of determining pen position, consistent with Patent Owner’s contentions. We further find that the Petition does not include Petitioner’s Reply arguments regarding Geva’s planar element. We conclude that the Petition does not set forth Petitioner’s proposed combination of Keely and Geva argued in the Reply and, therefore, the Reply includes improper, new argument. With respect to Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner’s Reply and Reply declaration should be disregarded (Sur-reply 3; Paper 33, 1), we need not reach that decision because, as discussed below (see §§ III.D.3.b–c) even upon consideration of Petitioner’s new Reply arguments, Petitioner does not demonstrate that claim 1 is unpatentable. To the extent Patent Owner has not fully explained its opposition to the Petition in its Patent Owner Response, Petitioner must demonstrate that the claims are unpatentable, and that burden never shifts to the patentee. Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378. We had cautioned Patent Owner that arguments not raised in its Patent Owner Response “may be deemed waived.” Paper 8, 9. We determine that any such waiver is not appropriate here because the Petition does not include Petitioner’s newly raised, improper Reply arguments.” slip op. at 23

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “CTPG at 36. We, therefore, find that Dr. Bederson’s testimony (Ex. 1002 ¶ 92) does not remedy the deficiency in Geva’s disclosures. Petitioner has not shown that Geva teaches element 1[G]. For the reasons given, after consideration of the assertions and the evidence based on the complete record now before us, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that its combination of Keely and Geva teaches element 1[G] of claim 1.” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 9,946,369 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,946,369

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.