- Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 11, 2025 · IPR2023-01055 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claim 12 unpatentable over Grotmol and Hickman and denied the motion to amend because proposed substitute claims 21–29 were unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“Director Review and remanding for further proceedings. Paper 49 (“Acting Director’s Decision” or “DR Dec.”). That Decision states agreement “that the Board’s analysis of claim 12 did not make separate factual findings.” DR Dec. 2. The Decision instructs us on remand “to consider Patent Owner’s arguments as to claim 12 and as to proposed substitute claim 21” and “[r]egardless of the Board’s disposition on remand, the Board should explain more fully its findings as to claim 12 and proposed substitute claim 21.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Written Decision regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally DR Req. Upon consideration of the full record including the arguments in Patent Owner’s Request for Director Review, we maintain that determination here. More specifically, considering the subject matter of the ’344 patent, the background technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for an ordinary level of skill, except we decline to adopt “at least” as that language is vague and open-ended. See 2024 Final Dec. 10–11. Accordingly, with that exception, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable
“the differences as compared to claim 1, including those findings and determinations set forth in a section of the 2024 Final Written Decision titled “Overview—Claims 6, 11, and 12” (id. at 65–67) and in the sections titled “Claim 12” and “Conclusion—Claims 6, 11, and 12” (id. at 83–86). Further, based on the complete record now before us, including Patent Owner’s Request for Director Review, for the reasons given in our 2024 Final Written Decision and our additional reasons given herein, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Grotmol and Hickman combination teaches the limitations of claim 12.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“Director Review and remanding for further proceedings. Paper 49 (“Acting Director’s Decision” or “DR Dec.”). That Decision states agreement “that the Board’s analysis of claim 12 did not make separate factual findings.” DR Dec. 2. The Decision instructs us on remand “to consider Patent Owner’s arguments as to claim 12 and as to proposed substitute claim 21” and “[r]egardless of the Board’s disposition on remand, the Board should explain more fully its findings as to claim 12 and proposed substitute claim 21.” Id.” slip op. at 3
Patent outcomesUS 11,238,344 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,238,344 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Mullen Industries LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 31, 2025 · IPR2024-01472 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–39, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that much work remains in the district court case as it relates to invalidity because discovery is in its early stages and a Markman hearing has not yet occurred. We also agree with Petitioner, that Petitioner’s diligence in filing its Petition (a) less than five months after receiving Patent Owner’s infringement contentions and (b) prior to the parties briefing claim construction issues weighs against exercising discretionary denial.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the unpatentability of claims 1–39 of the ’633 patent. Accordingly, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 25–29). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s statement as our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached
“to resolve the issues in the Petition. Pet. 8. In contrast, Patent Owner contends that the claim term “said first event and said second event,” and the claim term “said device includes motion sensing operable to distinguish between a plurality of different types of motion” require express construction. Prelim. Resp. 5–14. We do not need to resolve this dispute, because even under Patent Owner’s narrower constructions, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of success that at least one claim is unpatentable, as discussed below. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,190,633 - PTAB · Jan 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01090 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 21, 29–31, 42–44, 54, and 62–65 based on the §103 combination of Blumenberg, Bhumkar, and Griffin.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an inter partes review, the petitioner must show with particularity why each challenged claim is unpatentable. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). The burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Patent Owner may bear a burden of production, however, to show that the Challenged Claims are entitled to the benefit of an earlier filing date. Id. at 1379–80.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“On this record, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that the claim limitations amount to a combination of known elements that a POSITA could have combined to achieve predictable results. See Intel, 21 F.4th at 799–800 (determining that a showing of the obviousness in predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions requires only a showing that the combination be a suitable option). Among other reasons, the preliminary record supports Petitioner’s arguments that combining the teachings of Blumenberg, Bhumkar, and Griffin amounts to applying known solutions in the field of computer interfaces with predictable outcomes. See Pet. 12–18. As noted above, we encourage the parties to address the scope and meaning of the “when” limitations as a matter of claim interpretation, but we do not currently understand the plain language of Limitation [1.o] to require that the “portion of the second web page” or “menu” is displayed only after expiration of the “second user-configurable predefined duration,” termed by Patent Owner the “Alternative Modification.” Again, we encourage the parties to fully address this issue as a matter of claim construction. We additionally note that, even if we were to interpret the claims to require that the recited functions of Limitation [1.o] occur only the “prerequisite elements” are satisfied, we are still preliminarily persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that combined teachings of the prior art satisfy the claim elements as a mere combination of known elements combined according to their known functions with predictable results.” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“scenarios. Pet. 1 (characterizing three claimed scenarios as (i) an “inadvertent” contact, (ii) a “tap” contact, and (iii) a “hold” contact), 4 (“Independent Claims 1 and 42 outline three scenarios regarding a user’s contact with a touch screen device”); Prelim. Resp. 3 (“With respect to claim 1, these three scenarios include: . . . .”); see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 28 (“As recited in claim 1, the three different claimed functionalities are executed ‘when’ the prerequisite elements are met (described as three scenarios by Dr. Cockburn.”) (citing Ex. 1001, 102:50–103:55; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 33–35), 29–32 (describing the first, second, and third scenarios). In substance, the parties’ dispute appears to concern whether the plain language of the claims requires that a recited function must be performed only after or in response to expiration of a threshold (and other prerequisites), as opposed to requiring a function that begins before and continues after expiration of a threshold. Notably, dependent claim 3 recites: “The electronic device of claim 1, wherein the electronic device is configured such that the first feedback that is perceptible by touch is output prior to the display of the menu.” Ex. 1001, 104:1–4 (emphasis added). Given that independent claim 1 is necessarily broad enough to include claim 3, it seems on this record that the functions recited in Limitation [1.o] necessarily can happen at different times, as opposed to, for example, only responses that are triggered by the so-called “prerequisite elements.” We encourage the parties to address this issue as a matter of claim interpretation in future briefing. Based on the current record, however, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,725,581 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 3, 2025 · IPR2023-01173 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 10, 11, 25, 27, and 30 are unpatentable under § 103 over Grotmol, Grotmol and Hickman, or Grotmol and Hoffman.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with two to three years of work experience in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with a focus in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 41). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Jason Janet. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner “adopts” Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 5. We also adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“C. Claim Construction In an inter partes review proceeding, a patent claim is construed using the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 5; PO Resp. 9. We determine that no claim terms require an express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability. See Sections II.D–II.F.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s arguments are unavailing. Grotmol teaches that a user may train a robot to learn “simple” and “complex” tasks. Ex. 1005, 24:17– 23. The evidence of record indicates that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to use different trainers “to train behaviors involving different levels of complexity in order to take advantage of the varying skills and knowledge of trainers.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 341. Thus, based on Grotmol’s teaching that a robot can learn both simple and complex tasks, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a specific reason for different users to train Grotmol’s robot for different behaviors, namely, to benefit from the users’ varying skills and knowledge. Pet. 25; Ex. 1003 ¶ 341; Ex. 1005, 24:17–23. Grotmol also teaches that a user may train a robot “using a gamepad (or other input device . . . ).” Ex. 1005, 26:9–13; see id. at 33:18–21. The evidence of record indicates that “switching users would be as simple as handing off a gamepad or other remote device used for controlling the robot from one user to another.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 73. Neither Patent Owner nor its declarant, Dr. Eli Saber, explains specifically why handing Grotmol’s gamepad to a different user would have created “complexities of combining the mixed knowledge into a single knowledgebase” or required “identifying each user to store particular learned operations and preferences in portions of the knowledgebase for user-specific autonomous operations.” See PO Resp. 14–15; PO Sur-reply 9; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 128–130. Thus, based on Grotmol’s teaching of using a gamepad to train a robot, it would have been simple and straightforward for different users to train Grotmol’s robot for different behaviors. Ex. 1005, 26:9–13, 33:18–21; Ex. 1010 ¶ 73.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“4. Reason to Combine Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the cited teachings of Grotmol and Hickman. Pet. 27–30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 159–166). We agree with Petitioner’s rationale. Specifically, it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Grotmol and Hickman so that Grotmol’s robots share training sets using Hickman’s shared robot knowledgebase. Id. at 30; Ex. 1003 ¶ 166. Doing so would have been obvious because Grotmol teaches sharing training sets between robots, and Hickman’s shared robot knowledgebase would facilitate wider and faster sharing of Grotmol’s training sets. Pet. 27–29; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 160–161, 164; Ex. 1005, 33:27–32; Ex. 1007, 1:38–41, 5:41–46, 11:31–41. In addition, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in using Hickman’s shared robot knowledgebase with Grotmol’s robot because Hickman’s shared robot knowledgebase would “not interfere” with Grotmol’s robot. Pet. 30; Ex. 1003 ¶ 166.” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,055,583 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,055,583 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 3, 2025 · IPR2023-01172 · APJ Robert J Weinschenk · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9, 11–14, 16–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–34 are unpatentable as anticipated by Grotmol; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable because Grotmol does not disclose its required sequence.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with two to three years of work experience in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with a focus in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning.” Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 41). Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Jason Janet. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. Patent Owner “adopts” Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 4–5. We also adopt Petitioner’s description for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties appear to agree that the term “connection” refers to a relationship, but dispute whether it includes a link. PO Resp. 7; Pet. Reply 23. We need not resolve this claim construction issue in order to resolve the parties’ disputes about the asserted ground of unpatentability. Specifically, as discussed below, even if we assume for the purposes of this Decision that the term “connection” means a “relationship that includes a link,” the asserted prior art still discloses the disputed claim limitation. See Section II.D.23.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that claim 15 requires modifying the first instruction set before determining the modified first instruction set based on an at least partial match between the new digital picture and the first digital picture. Claim 15 recites “modifying: the first one or more instruction sets” and “determining the modified the first one or more instruction sets . . . based on the at least partial match between the new one or more digital pictures and the first one or more digital pictures.” Ex. 1001, 162:65–163:15 (emphasis added). The phrase “the modified . . . instruction sets” in the determining limitation indicates an order because it refers back to the instruction sets modified in the modifying limitation. Id. Further, the phrase “based on the at least partial match” indicates that a partial match between the new picture and the first picture returns the modified first instruction set. Id. In order for a partial match to return the modified first instruction set, it is logical that the first instruction set previously was modified and correlated to the first picture. Id. Thus, claim 15 indicates that the modifying limitation is performed before the determining limitation. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“First, we look to the claim language to determine if, as a matter of logic or grammar, [the recited steps] must be performed in the order written.”).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“3. Means-plus-function limitations Petitioner contends that the corresponding structure for the “means for receiving or generating a first one or more digital pictures,” the “means for receiving or generating a first one or more instruction sets for operating the first device,” and the “means for learning the first one or more digital pictures correlated with the first one or more instruction sets for operating the first device” in claim 34 is “one or more processor circuits.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 16:8–60). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed construction. PO Resp. 11. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction for purposes of this Decision. D. Anticipation of Claims 1–9, 11–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–34 by Grotmol Petitioner argues that claims 1–9, 11–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–34 are” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 11,055,583 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 11,055,583 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2023-01055 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 6–8, and 10–18 are unpatentable; cancellation of claims 4, 5, and 9 is granted, and proposed substitute claims 21–29 are unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyOther
“Accordingly, we maintain our determination at the institution stage” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“f) Conclusion—Proposed Substitute Claim 21 For the reasons given, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a” slip op. at 111
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“g) Conclusion—Disclaimed Claim 1 For the reasons given above and the reasons presented by Petitioner,” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“4. Claim 6 Claim 6 depends from claim 3 and recites the following:” slip op. at 73
Patent outcomesUS 11,238,344 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,238,344 - PTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00814 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, and 4–20 for all petitioned challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the arguments presented, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least one of claims 1, 2 and 4– 20 of the ’244 patent as unpatentable under the challenges presented in the Petition. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review as to these claims of the ’244 patent.2” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”) at the time of the invention of the ’244 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or closely related field, with at least two-to-four years’ experience in cloud services for settings customization” and that “[a]dditional education (e.g., Master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent) could substitute for professional experience and vice-versa.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 82). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art at this preliminary stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as it is reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“According to Petitioner, “[n]o terms of the patent need construction for the purposes of IPR because the claims read on the prior art below under any construction consistent with Phillips.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner contends that “the Petition abuses and distorts the plain language of the claims to arrive at its conclusory ‘read on the prior art’ argument.” Prelim. Resp. 32. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner disregards “server” limitations recited in the challenged claims. Id. at 32– 35. Patent Owner, however, does not proffer construction of any claim terms. Id. We do not need to construe any terms expressly to reach our decision. See Realtime Data LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportNot reached
“At this stage, we do not need to resolve this dispute. Petitioner has met its initial burden of production to show that its references are prior art. See Pet. 3 (identifying filing and publication dates as well as bases). As such, the burden of production shifted to Patent Owner to refute Petitioner's argument by either showing the prior art does not actually qualify as prior art. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380. Because Patent Owner did not do so, we are satisfied that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that its asserted references qualify as prior art. Nevertheless, the parties are invited to further develop this record after institution if needed.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,396,244 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00444 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that Saey or Gross taught the claimed composite SNR metric for a service group of cable modems.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“A. Legal Standard Petitioner has the burden of proof. Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.”).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (a skilled artisan) would have had a degree in computer or electrical engineering, computer science, information systems, or a similar discipline, along with at least three-to-four years of experience with the design and/or implementation of network-based content delivery systems, such as video-on-demand cable systems and Internet video streaming. Additional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–43). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’682 patent specification and the prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We interpret the challenged claims using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner states that “[a]ll claim terms herein should be given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner does not suggest otherwise. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we determine that no claim term requires express construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“D. Petitioner Has Not Established Sufficiently That the Prior Art Discloses or Suggests Each and Every Limitation Recited by Independent Claims 1 and 10 Limitations [1D] and [10D] of challenged independent claims 1 and 10 recite “generating, by said CMTS for each one of said plurality of service groups, a composite SNR-related metric based at least in part on a worst-case SNR profile of said SNR related metrics corresponding to said one of said plurality of service groups.” Ex. 1001, 8:10–15 (Limitation [1D]), 9:22–26 (Limitation [10D]). And each ground in this Petition, directly or indirectly, depends on the sufficiency of Petitioner’s contention that either Saey or Gross disclose or suggest that limitation. See Pet. 19–23, 28–31, 52–54, 57–59, 75. After studying the submissions of both parties and the evidence of record, however, we determine there is insufficient support for that contention to satisfy Petitioner’s burden for instituting inter partes review. And because this deficiency is dispositive of the Petition, we focus our discussion below accordingly, after we first provide an overview of Saey and Gross.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,135,682 - Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00578 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all grounds because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–4, 6, 8, and 9 were obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in a petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, and accompanying exhibits and evidence, we determine Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim in the inter partes review. Therefore, we deny institution of an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’826 patent on all challenges in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends as follows: The ’826 Patent describes and claims aspects and functionality of cable and satellite television signal processing and communication systems. As of the alleged September 8, 2011 priority date, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) of the ’826 Patent would have had at least: i) a Bachelor of Science in electrical engineering or an equivalent subject and three or more years of experience working in the field of cable and/or satellite signal processing and communication systems; ii) a Master’s in electrical engineering or an equivalent subject and one or more years of experience working in the field of cable and/or satellite television signal processing and communication systems; or iii) a Ph.D. in electrical engineering or an equivalent subject and at least some experience working in the field of cable and/or satellite television signal processing and/or communication systems. Additional education may substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience may substitute for formal education. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30–31) (internal citation omitted). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the prior art references asserted by Petitioner. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Accordingly, we agree with and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties indicate that the district court in the Charter case (2:22-cv-00125) construed “network management messages” in the claims of the ’826 patent to mean “messages which report on the network based on the measured characteristics.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1009, 29); Prelim. Resp. 10. Petitioner contends this construction is consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim language. Pet. 25. Patent Owner asserts that, in the Cox case (2:23-cv-01049), the parties agreed that “network management messages” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001, 2). Patent Owner asserts that its arguments “do not turn on the construction of ‘network management messages’ so there is no need to construe that, or any other, term of the ’826 Patent claims at this stage of the proceeding.” Id. As there is no controversy between the parties regarding any claim language that we would need to resolve in order to render our decision in this case, we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms without specific construction. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 10
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“While Petitioner mentions portions of Renken that it considers relevant to limitation 1h, Petitioner does not explain how it reads each aspect of limitation 1h on Renken. For example, Petitioner does not identify what in Renken corresponds to the “network management messages,” what corresponds to the “measured characteristic of the received signal” that “is different than said network management messages,” and what discloses that the “measured characteristic” is the basis for “controlling transmission of the network management messages” from the “receiver” “back to the headend.” b) Conclusion for Claim 1 Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood to prevail in demonstrating that Renken in view of the general knowledge of a POSITA discloses limitations 1a and 1h of claim 1.7 Thus, we do not reach the parties’ contentions concerning other claim limitations or Renken’s priority date.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,825,826
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.