- Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,129,825 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202 - Apple Inc. v. Ald Social, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01399 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against ALD Social, LLC on claims 1–16 of the ’158 patent and terminated IPR2023-01399 after finding Patent Owner unequivocally abandoned the contest.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, and abandonment of the contest is construed by the Board to be a request for adverse judgment. See IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)). Our orders also stated: Under the specific circumstances of this case, we determine Patent Owner’s failure to file long-overdue mandatory notices required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) to demonstrate Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c), in the particular circumstances of this case, and in the interests of justice, we set a deadline for Patent Owner to file mandatory notices pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) no later than June 10, 2024. IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4 (emphasis in original); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4 (emphasis in original). Our orders further explained that we “would view, in the particular circumstances of this case, Patent Owner’s filing of mandatory notices by the deadline as an indication that Patent Owner had not abandoned the contest.” IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4; IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 9,402,158 - Apple Inc. v. Ald Social, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01398 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against ALD Social, LLC on claims 1–14 of the ’054 patent and terminated IPR2023-01398 after finding unequivocal abandonment.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, and abandonment of the contest is construed by the Board to be a request for adverse judgment. See IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 3 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)). Our orders also stated: Under the specific circumstances of this case, we determine Patent Owner’s failure to file long-overdue mandatory notices required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) to demonstrate Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest. Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.5(c), in the particular circumstances of this case, and in the interests of justice, we set a deadline for Patent Owner to file mandatory notices pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(a)(2) no later than June 10, 2024. IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4 (emphasis in original); IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4 (emphasis in original). Our orders further explained that we “would view, in the particular circumstances of this case, Patent Owner’s filing of mandatory notices by the deadline as an indication that Patent Owner had not abandoned the contest.” IPR2023-01398, Paper 8, 4; IPR2023-01399, Paper 7, 4.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 9,198,054 - Intuit Inc. v. Samesurf, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2023-00342 · APJ Phillip A Bennett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Lebrun and Wang and over Prajapat and Wang; the contingent motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied
“3. May Not Enlarge the Claim Scope An amendment may not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the” slip op. at 87
- Strike new argumentDenied
“comprise briefs filed by Petitioner in support of a motion to dismiss for lack of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in the parallel district court litigation involving the challenged patents. The exhibits were submitted together with Patent Owner’s Sur-reply (Paper 33). We have not relied on Exhibit 2006 or Exhibit 2007 in our analysis. Accordingly, we deny the motion as moot.” slip op. at 9
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibits 2005–” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining compatible embodiments, and we credit Dr. Lieberman’s testimony because he supports his testimony with a passage from Lebrun that is consistent with his conclusion. Id. (stating “Lebrun describes several ‘variations on the group-surfing session,’ which includes a subsection of ‘multiple group surfing channels.’ Ex. 1005, 37:19, 43:5 (emphasis in original).”). Consistent with Lebrun’s description, Dr. Lieberman opines, and we agree, that “[a] POSITA would understand ‘multiple group surfing channels’ would be one example/scenario of the ‘variations on the group-surfing session,’ and the latter encompasses the former and the two embodiments are compatible and combinable.” Ex. 1034 ¶ 18.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 8,527,591 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,527,591 - Intuit Inc. v. Samesurf, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2023-00339 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Lebrun and Wang; the Board did not reach the separate Prajapat and Wang challenge.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of the parties, we found that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering, or a similar field, and (2) at least two years of work experience in software development and/or web-based software,” which reflected Petitioner’s proposal. Dec. 11–12; see Dec. 9–12 (discussing the respective proposals and level of ordinary skill reflected in the challenged patent and asserted prior art). Patent Owner accepts this level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 42. Accordingly, we apply this determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“information related to a shared web browsing interaction” is interchangeable with “web browsing interaction data” and, as a result, this portion of the specification should limit the claim term. PO Resp. 18–19 (quoting Ex. 2004 ¶ 40). The quoted portion of Mr. Friedman’s testimony, however, addresses other terms in the specification and not “information related to a shared web browsing interaction.” PO Resp. 18–19 (quoting Ex. 2004 ¶ 40). As such, the testimony cited by Patent Owner does not support Patent Owner’s position. Accordingly, we determine that the patentee has not acted as a lexicographer to set forth a definition of “web browsing interaction data” in the written description. c. Plain and Ordinary Meaning Because the patentee has not acted as a lexicographer to set forth a definition of “web browsing interaction data,” we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. See Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., from the ordinary meaning will be adopted “when the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pet. Reply 5 (Petitioner arguing that “web browsing interaction data” should be afforded its plain and ordinary meaning) (citing Ex. 1034 ¶ 13). Notably, both Dr. Lieberman and Mr. Friedman agree that the plain and ordinary meaning of “web browsing interaction data” is sufficient to inform how one of ordinary skill would have understood the term. Ex. 1034 ¶ 13 (Dr. Lieberman testifying: “The plain meaning of ‘web browsing interaction data’ is data related to web browsing interactions. No additional definition or limitation is required in my opinion, nor is there any special or specific meaning given to the term in the specification of the ’145 patent.”); Ex. 1033, 171:5–16 (Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Friedman, testifying that “the plain and ordinary meaning is sufficient.”). According to Petitioner, the plain and ordinary meaning is “data related to web browsing interactions.” Pet. Reply 5 (citing Ex. 1034 ¶ 13); Ex. 1034 ¶ 13 (“The plain meaning of ‘web browsing interaction data’ is data related to web browsing interactions.”). Patent Owner’s expert declined to opine on what the plain and ordinary meaning of “web browsing interaction data” other than it excludes webpages and partially filled webpages related to a web browsing interaction. See Ex. 1033, 171:5–16. slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Accordingly, we conclude that the plain language of the claims does not require “web browsing interaction data” to be limited to data describing interaction performed on a website by a host device. We turn to the specification because the meaning of “web browsing interaction data” is informed “not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. The written description does not provide a definition or clear meaning for “web browsing interaction data.” Patent Owner acknowledges the term is not expressly used in the written description. PO Resp. 17. Patent Owner, however, identifies “information related to a shared web browsing interaction” as a term that is interchangeable with “web browsing interaction data.” PO Resp. 18, 29. We recognize the specification term “information related to a shared web browsing interaction” is substantially similar10 to Petitioner’s proposed plain and ordinary meaning of “web browsing interaction data” as “data related to web browsing interactions.” 11 Patent Owner identifies three passages that each describe the present invention as receiving information related to a shared web browsing interaction performed by a host device and performing the shared web browsing interaction based on the received information. PO Resp. 17–18 (block quoting Ex. 1001, Abstract, 3:10–24). The identified passages, however, do not show intention to manifestly limit “web browsing interaction data” to data describing interactions” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“forth by Petitioner (Pet. 22–34) discloses or suggests all limitations recited by claim 1, we consider Petitioner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to combine Lebrun and Wang in the manner proposed to arrive at the claimed invention. See Pet. 19–22. (i) Articulated Reasoning To demonstrate obviousness, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine Wang’s activating a session invitation with Lebrun’s invitation to join a group-surfing session. Pet. 28. Specifically, Petitioner contends that “activating an invitation via a designated URL address would further enable” Lebrun’s group-surfing server “to coordinate and manage the group-surfing session, which would further Lebrun’s objective of providing an ‘improved technique for group access to web sites.’” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:1). We agree with Petitioner that activating an invitation via a designated URL address would be a technique that helps coordinate a group-surfing session and would enable multiple related users being able to access “substantially the same” slip op. at 63
Patent outcomesUS 9,185,145 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,185,145 - PTAB · Oct 11, 2023 · IPR2023-00830 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds and granted T-Mobile’s motion to join the CommScope IPR, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“challenged claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. CommScope IPR, Paper 18 (institution decision); see also CommScope IPR, Paper 1 (the “CommScope petition”). Petitioner here challenges the same claims and asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as those on which we instituted the CommScope IPR. Compare Pet. 3, with CommScope petition, 4; see also Mot. 1 (asserting that “[t]his Petition and supporting declaration are substantively identical to the petition and declaration submitted in the CommScope IPR”; “Petitioner here asserts that the same claims are obvious over the same prior art based on the same arguments presented by the same expert as in the CommScope IPR”). As indicated, Petitioner also relies on the same declarant as in the CommScope IPR. Mot. 1; compare Ex. 1003 (Declaration of Anthony Acampora, Ph.D.) with CommScope IPR, Ex. 1003 (same). Because the grounds of unpatentability in the instant Petition are identical to those in the CommScope IPR and for the same reasons stated in our Decision to Institute in the CommScope IPR, we institute inter partes review in this proceeding on the grounds presented in the Petition. See CommScope IPR, Paper 18, 19–41 (analyzing challenges in the CommScope petition).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition is substantially identical to the CommScope petition, contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and relies on the same declaration of Anthony Acampora, Ph.D. (Ex. 1003). Mot. 1, 4–5. Petitioner represents that joinder will not impact the CommScope IPR schedule. Id. at 5. Petitioner also represents that it “agrees to take an ‘understudy’ role in the joined proceeding, so long as CommScope remains an active party.” Id.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 10,334,499 - PTAB · Aug 14, 2023 · IPR2023-00818 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all petitioned grounds and granted AT&T’s motion to join the Ericsson IPR, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView, LLC, IPR2013- 00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is substantially identical to the Ericsson petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) relies on the same declaration of Henry Houh, Ph.D. (Ex. 1012). Mot. 1, 4–5. Petitioner represents that joinder will not impact the Ericsson IPR schedule. Id. at 5 (listing reasons as to why “joinder will not impact any schedule that may issue or otherwise prejudice the Patent Owner.”). Petitioner also represents that it “will maintain only an ‘understudy’ role in the proceeding, if joined.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 10,334,499 - PTAB · Jun 30, 2023 · IPR2023-00646 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 over all petition grounds and granted AT&T’s motion to join IPR2022-01212, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be authorized unless the information in the Petition and any preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’338 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented. We also grant Petitioner’s Motion.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView, LLC, IPR2013- 00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013). We determine that Petitioner has met its burden of showing that joinder is appropriate because, as set forth above, the Petition (1) is substantially identical to the Ericsson petition, (2) contains the same grounds based on the same evidence, and (3) relies on the same declaration of Henry Houh, Ph.D. (Ex. 1003). Mot. 1, 4–5. Petitioner also represents that joinder will not impact the Ericsson IPR schedule. See, e.g., Mot. 6 (“[A]llowing [Petitioner] to assume an understudy role to Ericsson, will also have little, if any, impact on the Ericsson IPR because no new grounds will be added, the schedule will not be affected, no additional briefing or discovery will be required, and no additional burdens will be placed on Patent Owner.”).” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 8,682,338 - LG Electronics Inc. / LG Electronics USA, Inc. v. Image Processing Technologies, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 11, 2023 · IPR2023-00104 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claim 1, finding the petition presented the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously considered by the Office.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny institution of an inter partes review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (The Director delegated her authority to determine whether trial should be instituted to the Board.). Section 325(d) of Title 35 of the United States Code states, in relevant part: “In determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” We use a two-part framework for evaluating arguments under § 325(d): (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” slip op. at 12
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“applied the construction of “the [at least two] calculation units being configured to form a histogram representative of the parameter” (the “common parameter” limitation) as meaning “the histogram calculation units being configured to each form a histogram representative of at least one common parameter.” Ex. 1005 (IPR 336 Final Written Decision), 12– 14; see Ex. 1006 (IPR 1189 Decision Denying Institution), 9; Ex. 1007 (Reexam 056 Decision finding claim 1 patentable), 8.” slip op. at 11
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,959,293
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.