- Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sitnet LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jul 15, 2026 · IPR2026-00100 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted adverse judgment against SitNet after its disclaimer left no challenged claims remaining in the instituted trial.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“judgment include: . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, Patent Owner’s disclaimer of all claims of the ’290 patent leaves no claims remaining in the trial. Although Patent Owner argues that “it was filed to conserve the limited resources of the Board and the Parties in light of the fact that the ’290 Patent is no longer involved in any copending litigation” (Ex. 3001), we deem such argument not a persuasive reason as to why we should not apply § 42.73(b)(2), or why termination is more appropriate. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2), we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer of all claims at trial as a request for adverse judgment, which we grant.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,117,290 - Google LLC / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Headwater Research LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00943 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–23, 26, 41–60, 63, 64, 91–152, and 155–171 are unpatentable; Rao anticipates some claims, and the stated Rao combinations render the remaining claims obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to computer software development and/or computer networking.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Petitioner further argues that “[w]ork experience can substitute for education, and additional education can substitute for work experience.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’541 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner (see PO Resp.), we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner states “[n]o terms require construction to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions. See PO Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“preponderance of the evidence that claim 3 was anticipated by Rao.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,589,541 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,589,541 - Google LLC / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Headwater Research LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00942 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2–23, 26, 41–60, 63, 64, 91–152, and 155–171 are unpatentable; Rao anticipates some claims, and Rao-based combinations render the others obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related to computer software development and/or computer networking.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Petitioner further argues that “[w]ork experience can substitute for education, and additional education can substitute for work experience.” Id. at 2–3 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 50–52). Because Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the field of the invention of the ’541 patent and not disputed by Patent Owner (see PO Resp.), we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the person having ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states “[n]o terms require construction to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not propose any claim constructions. See PO Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyOther
“157, and 171 are anticipated by Rao. Pet. 1, 19–39, 42. Petitioner’s arguments are supported by citations to the prior art and the testimony of Dr. Wolfe. See id. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, agree with them, and, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as our own.” slip op. at 26
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“anticipated by Rao. Pet. 1, 30–31, 33–42. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments for each of those dependent claims. See Pet. 30–31, 33–42. For each of those dependent claims, the Petition appears to only argue a theory of obvious. That is, the Petition never states that the additional limitation is disclosed by Rao. See id. For example, claim 26 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the policy is based on a background service class.” Ex. 1001, 112:49–52. We reproduce Petitioner’s arguments directed to claim 26 below: Rao’s policies 520 may “define prioritization” for network packets “based on whether an application is running in the foreground or the background.” [Ex. 1002] ¶ 182; id. ¶¶ 38–43, 180, 182, 188–89, 193, Figs. 5A, 5B. Each packet “may be placed and arranged in a priority order respective to all other . . . packets to provide a packet by packet prioritization across all applications 338a-338n and . . . network packets.” Id. ¶ 191. It would have been obvious to determine and apply a policy assigning a specific priority to packets associated with background applications, supra [1e]-[1f], and Rao thus discloses or renders obvious assigning a priority to network communications based on whether they are characterized as background services (class of services associated with application(s) running in the background of client 105), EX-1015 ¶¶195-96; supra [1e], [1f]. Pet. 33–34. Although the Petition sets forth why the claim limitation would have been obvious, there is no discussion as to how the additional limitation of claim 26—policy based on background class—is disclosed in Rao. See id. Similar arguments are presented for the other claims. See Pet. 30–31, 35–42. Because the Petition does not sufficiently show how the additional limitations recited in claims 20, 26, 58, 64, 165, and 169 were disclosed by Rao, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 20, 26, 58, 64, 165, and 169 were anticipated by Rao.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 8,589,541 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,589,541 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sitnet LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00529 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 10–19 are cancelled by adverse judgment after Patent Owner’s request.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a bachelor’s degree in Computer or Electrical Engineering or equivalent discipline, and approximately two years’ experience in telecommunications or computer networking,” adding that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 45–46).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“proposed constructions, and determined that “event node” does not need construction. Ex. 2007, 5. In the Institution Decision, we agreed with the District Court that “event node” does not need construction, and we continue to do so here. See Inst. Dec. 8. Independent claim 1 recites “creating, by an event node server, an event node in a multi-dimensional personal information network, the event node corresponding to a situation,” “transmitting an invitation to establish a link with the event node server to the devices corresponding to each node in the projection formed in step (b),” “receiving a response from at least one of the devices from step (c) accepting the invitation to establish a link with the event node server,” and “establishing a link with each device accepting the invitation.” Ex. 1001, 33:21–35; see also PO Resp. 3 (emphasizing claim 1’s recitations that the “event node” is “in a multi-dimensional personal information network” and “correspond[s] to a situation.”). Claim 20 includes similar recitations related to the “event node.” Ex. 1001, 34:45–64. In view of this, we determine that the claim language itself provides sufficient meaning for the term “event node” and further construction is not necessary.9” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“event node.” Petitioner persuades us that Amidon’s architecture provides a social network (the recited “situational network”) and the social network conference within the social network is the event node. In particular, the evidence demonstrates that Amidon separately teaches a social network and a social network conference. For example, as Petitioner notes, Amidon suggests that a conference may include a subset of the users in its social network, such as “all users currently listening to the same song” or “a subset of a social network circuit related to a game when the subset includes three or more people.” Ex. 1005, 13:6514:3, 14:22–27; Pet. 20–22; see also Ex. 1005, 13:57–14:29. Therefore, Patent Owner’s argument that the social network conference is the social network (see Sur-reply 6–8), rather than the event node, does not persuasively address Petitioner’s contentions.10 Patent Owner’s argument that Amidon’s social network conference merely comprises a group of individuals communicating with each other so it cannot be an event node does not take into account that Amidon’s social network conference is also defined by a data structure, such as the data structure shown in Figure 3. See PO Resp. 7–10; Pet. 19–20; Reply 7–8. The parties do not dispute that Amidon’s social network conference is defined by a data structure. PO Resp. 11–13 (e.g., “Fig. 3 shows a database entry for a conference.”); Reply 7. We find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that “the conference itself (as defined by the stored data and accessible via window 200) is the claimed event node.” Reply 7. slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Weighing the Parties’ arguments and evidence, Petitioner persuades us that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had motivation to configure Wong’s social network with an ad-hoc communication network like Gogic’s, as well as a reasonable expectation of success. As Petitioner argues, Gogic’s disclosure that the ad-hoc communication network “may allow emergency services to be more efficiently or more appropriately deployed” would have motivated adding such an ad-hoc communication network to Wong’s system. Pet. 48; Ex. 1007, 4:20–24. Additionally, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Petitioner’s evidence demonstrates technical compatibility of the references’ disclosures. As Petitioner notes, Gogic discloses using its approach with a wide range of technologies, including “portable or desktop computers.” Ex. 1007, 4:46– 49; Pet. 48. Wong likewise discloses implementing its social network with a wide range of technologies, such as “laptops, desktops, handheld, personal digital assistants, personal digital assistants, [or] mobile telephones.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 17; Pet. 49. These disclosures show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success implementing Gogic’s method in Wong’s social network using, for example, desktop computers.11 Patent Owner recognizes that Gogic discloses implementing its system with desktop computers. PO Resp. 22. But Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have known how to implement Gogic’s invention, such as its location determination, using desktop computers. Id. This argument does not recognize that, as a prior art patent, Gogic is presumed enabled, including its disclosure of using desktop computers to implement its system. Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 861 F. App’x 443, 450 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (nonprecedential; inter partes review context); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence do not rebut this presumption. For example, Dr. Rubin’s testimony that “from the descriptions and figures provided in Gogic it would suggest that location is determined via technologies specific to wireless networks and telecommunications” does not persuade us that Gogic fails to enable 11 Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument about the difficulties of modifying Gogic to use Wong’s social network are inapposite. PO Resp. 24. implementing its approach with desktop computers, such as those used in Wong. Ex. 2009 ¶ 87 (emphasis added). To the extent Gogic suggested wireless technologies as a way to determine location, that does not detract from Gogic’s disclosure of using other technologies, including desktop computers, to implement its invention.” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 8,332,454 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,332,454 - Ford Motor Company / General Motors LLC et al. v. Neo Wireless LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 3, 2025 · IPR2023-00763 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7 and 11 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Park and IEEE 802.16-2004 because the combination did not teach a claimed mobile device.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“In summary, the extrinsic record shows that, in the context of wireless network communications using the IEEE 802.16 standard, a “mobile device” is distinct from and excludes a device that is “fixed” or “portable,” where a “mobile” device is described as a device that is mobile during wireless network communications, and a “fixed” or “portable” device is described as a device that is fixed or slowly moving during wireless network communications. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 11; Ex. 1025, 24, 34, 38, 45; Ex. 2025, 71. This understanding of a “mobile device” from the extrinsic record is consistent with the language of claim 7 which recites a mobile device configured for wireless network communications (e.g., receiving an identifier and a signal from a base station), and consistent with the ’450 Patent disclosure that repeatedly and consistently utilizes the term “mobile device.” Accordingly, based on the record, we construe “mobile device” as a device that is mobile during wireless network communications, and is not fixed or slowly moving during wireless network communications.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We do not agree with Petitioner’s arguments because, as explained above in Section III.B., we construe “mobile device” as a device that is mobile during wireless network communications, and is not fixed or slowly moving during wireless network communications. Thus, after having considered both parties’ arguments and the cited supporting evidence, we are not persuaded that the combination of Park and IEEE 802.16-2004, including the application of Park to WiBro’s teaching of stationary or slowly moving devices communicating using band AMC, teaches or suggests a “mobile device,” as properly construed, that is configured to perform the limitations recited in the body of claim 7.” slip op. at 36
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a), a party may file a motion to submit supplemental information if the following requirements are met: (1) a request for authorization to file such motion must be made within one month of the date the trial was instituted; and (2) the supplemental information must be relevant to a claim for which trial has been instituted. In addition to these requirements, the Board considers the motion in light of its mandate under 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b), i.e., “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.”” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 10,447,450 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,447,450 - Ford Motor Company / General Motors LLC et al. v. Neo Wireless LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 3, 2025 · IPR2023-00962 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7 and 11 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Park and IEEE 802.16-2004 because the combination did not teach a mobile device as construed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“Ford requested Director Review of the Institution Denial Decision, which was granted. Papers 18, 19. On March 22, 2024, the Director issued a Decision Vacating the Ford Institution Denial Decision as an improper extension of the “significant relationship,” as set forth in General Plastic and Valve, and remanding to the Board to issue a decision on institution that addresses the merits of the Petition. Paper 28 (“Director’s Decision”). In addition, the Director sua sponte granted Director Review of the GM and Nissan Institution Denial Decision and, on March 22, 2024, vacated and remanded the GM and Nissan Institution Denial Decision for the same reasons as those set forth in the Director’s Decision. GM and Nissan IPR, Papers 12, 16.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“On November 9, 2023, we denied institution under § 314(a), after considering the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential only as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”), and expanded upon in Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (“Valve”). Paper 17 (“Ford Institution Denial Decision”). General Motors LLC and Nissan North America Inc. (“GM and Nissan”) filed a petition requesting inter partes review of claims 7 and 11 of the ’450 Patent and a motion for joinder with this proceeding. IPR2023- 00962 (“GM and Nissan IPR”), Papers 3, 4. On December 6, 2023, we denied institution under § 314(a) based on the petition filed in the GM and Nissan IPR after consideration of the factors set forth in General Plastic and Valve and denied the Motion for Joinder as moot on the basis of the Ford Institution Denial Decision. See GM and Nissan IPR, Paper 11 (“GM and Nissan Institution Denial Decision”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Subsequently, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted trial on September 11, 2024, as to all of the challenged claims and all of the grounds raised in the Petition. Paper 30 (“Institution Decision,” “Dec. on Inst.”). We also instituted trial and granted the Motion for Joinder in IPR2023- 00962. See GM and Nissan IPR, Paper 18.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Subsequently, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, we instituted trial on September 11, 2024, as to all of the challenged claims and all of the grounds raised in the Petition. Paper 30 (“Institution Decision,” “Dec. on Inst.”). We also instituted trial and granted the Motion for Joinder in IPR2023- 00962. See GM and Nissan IPR, Paper 18.” slip op. at 3
Patent outcomesUS 10,447,450 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,447,450 - PTAB · Jun 18, 2025 · IPR2025-00426 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 11–15 over Jarvinen and Fox under § 103 and granted Samsung’s motion to join the T-Mobile IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the issues presented in the instant Petition are identical to those in the T-Mobile IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the T-Mobile IPR. See IPR2024-01468, Paper 17.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Petitioner’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 1–8. According to Petitioner, its “[P]etition challenges the validity of the same claims of the ’868 patent on identical grounds to those in the T-Mobile IPR,” “[t]here are no substantive differences between [Petitioner’s] and the T-Mobile IPR Petitioners’ Petition,” and “[Petitioner] also relies on the same supporting evidence.” Id. at 4–5. Petitioner argues that its “petition will not raise any new issues of unpatentability and will not impose any additional burden on the Board or Patent Owner, or add additional complexity to the case,” and that joinder will not unduly burden or negatively impact the trial schedule. Id. at 6. Further, Petitioner agrees to take an “understudy” role, and “[u]nless and until the current Petitioners in [the T-Mobile IPR] cease to participate in the T-Mobile IPR, [Petitioner] will not assume an active role.” Id. at 7–8. Thus, according to Petitioner, Patent Owner will not suffer prejudice if the two proceedings are joined. Id. at 8. Patent Owner has not disputed the above contentions by Petitioner and does not point to any particular prejudice relating to joining the two proceedings. In light of these considerations, Petitioner has shown that joinder to the T-Mobile IPR is appropriate in this case. Therefore, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 8
NonePatents in suitUS 9,094,868 - Google LLC v. Security First Innovations, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 16, 2025 · IPR2024-00215 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Foster and Hayhurst; the Board did not reach the anticipation and obviousness grounds based on Orsini.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with three years of experience in the area of securing data from unauthorized access or use.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38). Petitioner also asserts that a “higher level of education may substitute for less experience.” Id. 2 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated. Patent Owner submitted the Declaration of Dr. Rubin in support of its Response, and in that Declaration, Dr. Rubin accepted Petitioner’s definition. Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 20–21. For the reasons given, we apply the same level of ordinary skill in the art that we did in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 4.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“See Section II.C.3.a.ii supra. Although Dr. Rubin calls Hayhurst’s security benefits “ancillary” (Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 108–109, quoted in PO Resp. 40), this does not align with Hayhurst (see Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 2, 7, 8, 21). For example, Hayhurst describes the security measures in the Technical Field section (id. ¶ 2) and the Summary of the Invention section (id. ¶¶ 7, 8). Hayhurst also discusses piracy deterrence in both the Summary of the Invention section (id. ¶ 8) and the invention’s detailed description (id. ¶ 21). Because Dr. Rubin does not give sufficient weight to Hayhurst’s discussion of piracy deterrence and security, we do not credit Dr. Rubin’s testimony on this issue. See Ex. 2033 ¶¶ 108–109. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that Hayhurst is reasonably pertinent to the network-security problem that the inventors were trying to solve. See Reply 5–6.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Neither party explicitly proposed constructions during trial, and we do not see the need for construing any terms in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“3. Claim 1 a. Analogous Art “To be considered within the prior art for purposes of the obviousness analysis, a reference must be analogous.” Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Wang Lab. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland Gmbh v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 10,452,854 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,452,854 - Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sitnet, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Apr 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00528 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, canceled claims 1–11, 22, and 23, and terminated the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A patent owner may request judgment against itself “at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include cancellation of patent claims such that a party has no remaining claim in the trial. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Patent Owner’s request to cancel claims 1–11, 22, and 23 of the ’932 patent leaves no claims remaining in the trial. Accordingly, entry of adverse judgment to Patent Owner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) is appropriate. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment (Paper 22) is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that claims 1–11, 22, and 23 of the ’932 patent shall be cancelled;1 FURTHER ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–11, 22, and 23 of the ’932 patent pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2);” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 8,249,932 - Simpson Strong-Tie Company Inc. v. Columbia Insurance CompanySome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 28, 2025 · PGR2023-00047 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–37, 39–90, and 92–105 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 38 and 91 were not shown unpatentable because the cited art did not teach flanges physically touching along a juncture.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of these cases would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’626 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and undisputed definition of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which is consistent with the testimony of Mr. Fennell (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 12–15).” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“But Patent Owner then urges us to narrow the meaning of “portion” itself such that “channel-shaped portion” requires “all portions of the hanger which directly bound the channel that receives the structural component.” PO Resp. 19 (emphases added). Patent Owner argues the Specification makes this “clear.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:28–31). Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments (PO Resp. 19), we find no support in claim 1 to further narrow the interpretation of “portion” in “channel-shaped portion” to mean every portion of the hanger which directly bounds the channel that receives the structural component. See Ex. 1001, 12:14–36 (claim 1). We, like Petitioner, similarly find no support in the Specification or limited prosecution history (see Pet. 5–6), and Patent Owner does not direct us to any, showing that the inventor acted as its own lexicographer or disavowed any claim scope to allot this narrowed interpretation to the subject limitation. See Pet. Reply 3 (“Nowhere does the ’626 patent specification describe that all portions of the hanger directly bounding channel 52 constitute the channel-shaped portion.” (citing Ex. 1046 ¶¶ 16–18; Ex. 1001, 4:39–47)); PO Resp. 19. Further, as argued by Petitioner (Pet. Reply 4–5), Patent Owner’s proposed construction limiting “portion” to “all portions” of the hanger that “directly bound the channel that receives the structural component” could cause the “channel-shaped portion” on the same physical hanger to change depending on which type of structural component an installer were to choose to use in construction: Patent Owner’s claim construction improperly focuses on the wall assembly intended to be used with the recited hanger. The claims, however, are directed to a hanger, not a wall assembly. When assessing what part of a hanger constitutes a “channel-shaped portion” and an “extension portion,” [the skilled artisan] would consider the physical features of the hanger itself and the natural divisions between those features. [The skilled artisan] would not assess the claim language and its application to the prior art by speculating how an installer might later install the hanger with a joist or an entire wall assembly, which may differ from installation to installation. Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1046 ¶ 19). We find this defect further supports a broader interpretation of “channel-shaped portion” as discussed above. Accordingly, based on the complete record before us, we determine” slip op. at 34
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues, inter alia, that Yamaguchi teaches a joist hanger with an extension portion defining a space between its back flange and channel-shaped portion, and Bundy teaches to size a space created by an extension portion of its joist hanger to receive two layers of ⅝-inch-thick drywall between its back flange plane and channel-shaped portion. Pet. 16–18 (citing 1003 ¶¶ 75–78; Ex. 1007, 5:16–18, Fig. 1; Ex. 1041 (“Perspective View”; “Usage View”)); see id. at 17–18 (discussing “advantages” of two layers of 5/8" drywall as “fire resistance in a fire separation wall”). Petitioner argues the skilled artisan “would have been motivated to receive drywall between Yamaguchi’s back flange and channel-shaped portion to provide a shielded fire resistant wooden frame wall.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 78–79; Ex. 1007, 2:10–24); see id. ([“The skilled artisan] would have optimized the size of the spacing between Yamaguchi’s back flange and channel-shaped portion to accommodate two layers of 5/8”-thick-drywall according to the size preference described by Bundy for optimal fire protection and wall integrity.” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 80; Ex. 1007, 5:10–22)). Petitioner concludes: This modification to Yamaguchi would have been nothing more than applying a known technique (Bundy’s spacing a hanger seat from a wall frame by distance sufficient to accommodate two 5/8”-thick-drywall sheets for fire resistance) to a similar device (Yamaguchi’s hanger having a spacing of indeterminate length) to obtain the predictable result of a firewall hanger having a space between its channel-shaped portion and a wall frame large enough for receiving drywall therebetween, thereby “protect[ing] the structural members of a building.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1007, 5:18–20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 80). Petitioner argues the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in modifying Yamaguchi as discussed above, “because doing so would still allow Yamaguchi’s hanger to perform its intended function of securing a joist to a wall.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1041, 1; Ex. 1003 ¶ 81). Petitioner argues, “[r]ecognizing that Yamaguchi’s and Bundy’s hangers are constructed from sheet metal,” the skilled artisan “would have understood how to modify the size of Yamaguchi’s extension portions to accommodate two layers of 5/8”-thick-drywall while still allowing Yamaguchi’s hanger to secure a joist’s end to a frame wall.” Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81–83; Ex. 1007, 4:47–51); see id. at 19–20 (discussing that although “Yamaguchi’s described setting is a sill plate,” the skilled artisan “would have been motivated to use Yamaguchi’s hanger on a wood frame wall in particular so that sheathing could be installed in the space behind the joist as taught by Bundy” (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 81–82)). Based on the foregoing and the complete record before us, we find” slip op. at 46
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“artisan would have interpreted or understood the teachings of Yamaguchi and Bundy, as well as of the combination of those references, are unsupported attorney-arguments. See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (“Attorney’s argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence.”). Patent Owner cites no evidence of how the skilled artisan would have understood the combined teachings of Yamaguchi and Bundy, or how such an understanding would support Patent Owner’s attorney arguments. Indeed, Patent Owner did not file any expert testimony in any of the three subject cases, despite that we must resolve the legal question of obviousness on the basis of underlying factual determinations, particularly the scope and content of the prior art and any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art from the vantage point of the skilled artisan. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18; see Pet. Reply 2 (“As a threshold matter, the Board’s findings in its Institution Decision should be carried forward to its final written decision because Patent Owner did not submit an expert declaration in support of its arguments.”); but see PO Sur-reply 1–4 (“[T]here is no requirement that a party rely exclusively on expert testimony in Post Grant Review proceedings or that attorney argument must be disregarded.”). To the contrary, Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Fennell, persuasively testifies in detail how and why the skilled artisan would have combined the teachings and suggestions of Yamaguchi and Bundy to achieve the invention of claim 1, including the features of limitation 1.3.B. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73–83, 96; Ex. 1046 ¶¶ 30–40. We find Mr. Fennell’s testimony credible (and uncontroverted).” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 11,649,626 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,649,626
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.