- PTAB · Sep 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00763 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Remand
Instituted review of claims 7 and 11 on the § 103 ground over Park and IEEE 802.16-2004.
RulingsRemand decision- Director reviewDirector review, grantedGranted
“considering the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential only as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”), and expanded upon in Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (“Valve”). Paper 17 (“Decision”). Petitioner requested Director Review of the Decision, which was granted. Papers 18, 19. On March 22, 2024, the Director issued a Decision Vacating the Decision as an improper extension of the “significant relationship,” as set forth in General Plastic and Valve, and remanding to the Board to issue a decision on institution that addresses the merits of the Petition. Paper 28 (“Director’s Decision”).” slip op. at 2
- RemandOther
“considering the factors set forth in General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017) (precedential only as to Section II.B.4.i) (“General Plastic”), and expanded upon in Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting Products, Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential) (“Valve”). Paper 17 (“Decision”). Petitioner requested Director Review of the Decision, which was granted. Papers 18, 19. On March 22, 2024, the Director issued a Decision Vacating the Decision as an improper extension of the “significant relationship,” as set forth in General Plastic and Valve, and remanding to the Board to issue a decision on institution that addresses the merits of the Petition. Paper 28 (“Director’s Decision”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,447,450 - PTAB · Sep 3, 2024 · IPR2023-00797 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Remand
The Board denied institution because Honda did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 23, 24, 26, or 27 were obvious over either asserted combination.
RulingsRemand decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to any of challenged claims 23, 24, 26, and 27 of the ’302 patent. Accordingly, constrained by the record before us, we deny institution of an inter partes review of the ’302 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive, and the above testimony of its technical expert, Mr. Alberth, even more so. Based on the foregoing and the record before us, we find Petitioner fails to sufficiently show that the ’586 Provisional lacks written description support for the feature of a transmitter configured to form and transmit, in response to a received request, “the probing signal with a code sequence modulated in the frequency domain,” as recited in independent claim 23. Although not its burden, we find Patent Owner sufficiently evidences that the disclosure of the ’586 Provisional would have reasonably conveyed to skilled artisans that the inventor possessed the features of the subject limitation. 5. Conclusion For the reasons expressed above, and based on the record before us, we determine Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Koo is prior art to the Challenged Claims. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that any of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable as obvious over the combination of 802.16a-2003, 802.16-2001, and Koo.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“But in doing so, Petitioner ignores the context in which the skilled artisan would have read Kitroser: where IEEE, the governing body issuing the Call for Contributions, itself explicitly questioned “if [implementing 802.16a in a mobile systems environment] is technically feasible and, if so, at what level” (Ex. 2007, 1 (emphasis added)), and where, as noted above, Kitroser provides no explanation, support, or other commentary for its “no changes” statements, and admits such statements are “subject to change in form and content after further study” and subject to amendment and withdrawal entirely (Ex. 1007, 1–4 (emphasis added)). Based on the foregoing, although Petitioner may have identified a “reason” that the skilled artisan allegedly would have combined 802.16a with Kitroser, we are not persuaded that it is a rational reason, i.e., a reason sufficiently shown to have a rational underpinning at the time of the invention of the Challenged Claims. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (To support the legal conclusion of obviousness, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning” for combining elements in the manner claimed. (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988)).” slip op. at 29
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’302 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Buehrer (Ex. 1003 ¶ 23), except that we omit the two instances of “at least” to remove the unbounded nature of the definition.” slip op. at 13
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,771,302 - PTAB · Jun 30, 2022 · IPR2021-00361 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 14, and 17 are unpatentable as anticipated by Dukach and obvious over Dukach, alone or with Dunsmuir.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of the invention of the ’613 patent, “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, and two years of work experience in operating systems, file systems, networks, and/or client-server applications, though additional education or work experience can make up for more or less formal education.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 31). Patent Owner does not present an alternative definition of the skilled artisan, and does not dispute Petitioner’s definition thereof. See generally PO Resp.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“skilled artisan to have its “ordinary and customary meaning[],” allegedly “a stream of data bytes that can be read and written (among other common operations).” PO Resp. 3. But as noted by Petitioner (Pet. Reply 3–4), the only intrinsic evidence cited by Patent Owner does not support its proposed construction in the context of the ’613 patent; rather, such evidence favors Petitioner. See PO Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:35–45 (a “‘file is accessed via the file descriptor’”), 2:46–3:7 (“‘the system calls that access files via file descriptors do not distinguish between a file on media and a communication channel’”)); see also PO Resp. 7 (“It is undisputed that file descriptors were conventionally ‘associated with’ files stored on media, communication channels, and even hardware devices.” (emphasis added)). Patent Owner also cites extrinsic evidence, namely, Dunsmuir (Ex. 1007), to support its proposed construction: “Conceptually, a file consists of a stream of data bytes followed by a logical end-of-file. … Because UNIX file I/O is performed through a uniform file interface, a program that can read and write files can read and write anything.” PO Resp. 4 (quoting Ex. 1007, 22). But as noted by Petitioner (Pet. Reply 4–6), Patent Owner does not explain why this “conceptual” meaning set forth in the generic context of programming interfaces in a UNIX operating system would apply in the specific context of the ’613 patent. See Pet. Reply 4 (“[Patent Owner’s] proposed construction is problematic because it is inconsistent with the specification of the ’613 patent.”). Patent Owner also does not explain what “among other common operations” means in the context of its own proposed construction. For the foregoing reasons, and those discussed below, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed construction of “file.” First, the claims of the ’613 patent support Petitioner’s proposed construction. For example, claim 1 recites that a “file” is accessed via a file descriptor. Ex. 1001, 14:55. Claim 5 recites a file descriptor being associated with “a communication channel” and determining with what file type the file descriptor is associated. Ex. 1001, 15:44–57. Together, these limitations show that a “file” is an entity assessed via a file descriptor, and such an entity includes, for example, a communication channel (i.e., per these claims, a communication channel is a type of file associated with a file descriptor). We find nothing in the claims, and Patent Owner does not direct us to anything in the claims, that supports limiting the term “file” only to a “stream of data bytes that can be read and written.”” slip op. at 20
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“in the abstract, discloses the claimed “indicator,” but rather the inclusion (or storage or presence) of that number in a list of monitored file descriptors discloses such a stored “indicator.” See, e.g., Pet. 49 (“[The skilled artisan] would have understood that, before the listen( ) call or the accept( ) call attempts to access a file using a file descriptor, it examines the file descriptor to determine if it is on the list of monitored file descriptors—the ‘indicators’ of a file type associated with the control pipe for services to be performed by the front end server.” (emphasis added)); Pet. 37–38 (“Dukach utilizes the presence or absence of a file descriptor’s number stored in a list of monitored file descriptors to indicate the file type associated with the file descriptor, which is how the ’613 patent describes indicating a file type by the indicator’s presence or absence in an indicator table.”); see also Pet. Reply 13 (“Petitioner contended in the Petition and maintains that it is the presence of a file descriptor’s number on the list of monitored file descriptors, not the file descriptor’s number itself, that teaches the claimed indicator.” (bold omitted)); cf. PO Resp. 9 (“[A]n ‘indicator’ . . . must reflect . . . an indication that such file descriptor is associated with a communication channel.”). Patent Owner also variously argues “Dukach does not disclose or” slip op. at 34
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we credited the foregoing and related testimony of Dr. Greenspun (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 96–98), and noted that Patent Owner at that stage of the proceeding had not offered any evidence to rebut Dr. Greenspun’s testimony. Dec. 30–31. Despite that, as highlighted by Petitioner, Patent Owner still offers no evidence to rebut Dr. Greenspun’s testimony in this regard. See Pet. Reply 16 (“But in arguing all these [above arguments], [Petitioner] presents no rebuttal evidence—neither a deposition testimony of Dr. Greenspun, nor a rebuttal testimony by its own expert, nor any other evidence.”); see generally PO Resp. Instead, Patent Owner merely declares Dr. Greenspun’s testimony “conclusory” and tainted by “vague leap[s]” (see, e.g., PO Resp. 14), but yet makes such accusations against a technical declarant with nothing but attorney-argument. Regardless, for the same reasons given by Petitioner (see Pet. Reply 16–18), we disagree with Patent Owner and continue to credit Dr. Greenspun’s technical testimony as to the subject limitation. See Pet. Reply 16–18 (Petitioner explaining why “[Patent Owner’s] attorney argument is wrong”.). As noted above, Patent Owner variously argues Dukach does not disclose “storing” of the indicator at issue in this limitation. See generally PO Resp. 7–17. To summarize, we disagree with Patent Owner, and as explained above, are persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence, including the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Greenspun, that Dukach discloses storing information that points to a file type associated with a file descriptor. First, we are persuaded that, in Dukach, the presence or absence of a file descriptor’s number in the list of monitored file descriptors constitutes information that points to a file type associated with the file descriptor. See Pet. 37–40 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1005, 11:5–40; Ex. 1002 ¶ 96; Ex. 1001, 11:12–42). Second, we also are persuaded that, in Dukach, the list of monitored file descriptors “needs to be maintained in memory such that it can be used by software to check an at-issue file descriptor’s presence or absence in the list,” which constitutes storing the indicator. Pet. Reply 16– 17 (quoting Ex. 1002 ¶ 97); see Pet. 40 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 97). Finally, even if Patent Owner were correct that Dukach does not disclose a particular embodiment in the ’613 patent (see, e.g., PO Resp. 15 (discussing an embodiment “only applicable for binary file types”)), the issue before us is not whether Dukach indeed discloses such an embodiment, but rather whether Dukach discloses the invention recited, for example, in claim 1, given the breadth (scope) of the limitations defining that invention.” slip op. at 37
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,560,613
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.