- PTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00924 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and all grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 9 is unpatentable over Watanabe.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“1. § 314(a) Petitioner has provided Patent Owner with a so-called Sotera2 stipulation, stating “if IPR Nos. IPR202400923–00925, & 01046 are instituted, Sony will not pursue ‘any ground that [Sony] raised or reasonable could have raised’ during the IPRS in the related district court proceeding, Optimum Imaging Technologies LLC v. Sony Corporation, 4:23-cv-00928 (EDTX).” Ex. 2015. Per the Director’s guidance, “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022) (“Fintiv Memo”), 3.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“The Board has set forth a two-part framework to consider whether to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 325(d): (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GMBH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). The” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As noted above, the ’805 patent describes a system for digital optical image collection, processing, and organization, which applies to “any imaging system that includes interactions between optics, digital image sensors, post-capture integrated circuits and digital storage components.” Ex. 1001, 1:21–24. Artisans and inventors in such fields are not limited to electrical engineers. They include physicists and others with sufficient knowledge of the physics of optical, electronic, and opto-electronic devices. Indeed, many of the pioneering inventions needed to understand the operation of a digital camera were made by physicists, including the inventions of the transistor,4 the integrated circuit (IC),5 the digital computer,6 and the charge-coupled device (CCD).7 For at least these reasons, we find Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art to be reasonable and commensurate with the problems and solutions disclosed in the prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, we adopt as our own Petitioner’s description of a person skilled in the art. We further find” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownOther
“Petitioner argues the following terms or phrases require construction: “using,” “succession,” and “wherein the system software is organized to identify specific optical aberrations and to access the database to identify specific corrections to the aberrations” (the “identifying aberrations” limitation). Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner argues that we should use the plain meaning of these terms and phrases and that they need not be construed because no patentability arguments rely on their precise meaning. Prelim. Resp. 8–10. Petitioner’s proposed terms and phrases because their precise meaning is not needed to resolve the parties’ disputes. We discuss below the meaning of other terms whose meanings are inherently disputed by the parties’ competing patentability contentions in the context of those competing contentions.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,612,805 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2023-01054 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4 and 11 are unpatentable over Grotmol and Hickman; claims 5 and 7 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 21 and 24–26 are unpatentable; claims 22 and 23 are not reached.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art, 3 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness in this proceeding. would have [had] at least: (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with two to three years of work experience in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, systems engineering, or equivalent course work with a focus in computer vision, image/video processing, and/or machine learning. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 40–42). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. Considering the subject matter of the ’974 patent, the background technical field, and the asserted prior art, we agree with Petitioner’s proposed qualifications for the person of ordinary skill in the art, except we decline to adopt “at least,” as that language is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the specification of the ’974 patent and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, except as noted above, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“1. “connection” Claim 7 recites, in pertinent part, that “a first connection is generated” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMixed
“c) Conclusion—Claim 7 After consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record, we” slip op. at 52
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“7 We recognize that our conclusion here differs from the preliminary determination made in our Preliminary Guidance. After considering the full trial record, including Patent Owner’s MTA Reply, Petitioner’s MTA Sur-reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-sur-reply, and the arguments made at the oral hearing, we find that Petitioner has satisfied its burden of showing that this claim limitation would have been obvious over the Grotmol-Hickman combination. When issuing our Preliminary Guidance, we emphasized that the views expressed therein were “preliminary,” “subject to change upon consideration of the complete record,” and “not binding on the Board when reaching a final written decision.” See Prelim. Guid. 3.” slip op. at 99
Patent outcomesUS 10,452,974 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,452,974 - Tesla, Inc. v. Autonomous Devices, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2023-01055 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 6–8, and 10–18 are unpatentable; cancellation of claims 4, 5, and 9 is granted, and proposed substitute claims 21–29 are unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyOther
“Accordingly, we maintain our determination at the institution stage” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“f) Conclusion—Proposed Substitute Claim 21 For the reasons given, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates by a” slip op. at 111
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“g) Conclusion—Disclaimed Claim 1 For the reasons given above and the reasons presented by Petitioner,” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“4. Claim 6 Claim 6 depends from claim 3 and recites the following:” slip op. at 73
Patent outcomesUS 11,238,344 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,238,344 - PTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00963 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–21 on all asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on each challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Patent Owner contends we should exercise discretion to deny institution because the court has not considered a motion to stay (Factor 1), jury selection in the District Court Litigation is scheduled to begin on February 17, 2026 (Factor 2), the parties have invested substantially in discovery by exchanging a high volume of documents and conducting extensive source code reviews (Factor 3), there is a high overlap between the challenged claims and those involved in the District Court Litigation (Factor 4), the parties are the same (Factor 5), and Petitioner’s arguments are meritless (Factor 6). Prelim. Resp. 35–36. Patent Owner acknowledges that jury selection in the District Court Litigation will not begin until two months after a Final Written Decision is scheduled to issue in this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 35. On October 17, 2024, Petitioner offered the following Sotera Stipulation: “VusionGroup will not pursue an invalidity defense in Hanshow Tech. Co., Ltd. et al. v. SES-imagotag SA et al., Case No. 2:23-cv-00617 (E.D. Tex.) that the patent claims subject to the instituted IPR are invalid based on the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Ex. 1031. In view of all the circumstances, including the scheduled trial date and Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“XI. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will succeed on each of its challenges to patentability and we institute inter partes review. XII. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) an inter partes review of the ’321 Patent is hereby instituted, commencing on the entry date of this Order, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial. FURTHER ORDERED that the trial is authorized on all grounds set forth in the Petition; and.” slip op. at 39
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for patent owner
“1999)); see also Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Petitioner asserts that “[n]o formal claim constructions are necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 6. Nevertheless, Petitioner also proposes constructions of certain “system” limitations, should the Board determine that the claims recite “means plus function” limitations, and argues that interpreted this way, such claims would be indefinite because they lack disclosure of sufficient algorithms for the claimed functions. Pet. 6–7. Petitioner acknowledges that, because the claims do not use the term “means,” there is a presumption against their being interpreted as means plus function limitations and that purported indefiniteness does not preclude the Board from addressing the patent patentability of the claims on sections 102 and 103 grounds. Id. (citing Sony Elecs. Inc. v. Jawbone Innovations, LLC, IPR2023-01352, Paper 7, 47 (PTAB Mar. 6, 2024); Ex. 1003 Houh Decl. ¶¶ 51–52); see also Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Patent Owner argues the claims do not recite means plus function limitations and agrees with Petitioner that no claim construction is required. Prelim. Resp. 7–8. The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by person of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. Williamson F.3d at 1349, Dyfan LLC v Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365–1366 (Fed. Cir. 2022); see also Zeroclick LLC v. Apple Inc., 819 F.3d 1003, 1008–1009 (Fed. Cir 2018). Having reviewed the claims and the Specification, for purposes of institution, we determine that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood the subject matter that is claimed to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure so additional claim construction is required.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“VIII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner describes a person of ordinary skill (“POSITA” or “ordinarily skilled artisan”) as having “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and two or more years of work experience or research related to computer vision, image analytics or automated object recognition methods and systems. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003, Houh Decl. ¶¶ 18–19). Petitioner also states that “[a]dditional education in a relevant field or relevant industry experience may compensate for a deficit in one of the other aspects of the requirements stated above.” Id. For purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Prelim. Resp. 7. 5 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the ’321 patent issued from an application filed after March 16, 2013, we apply the AIA statutory basis for unpatentability. 6 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2012/0195363 (Ex. 1005) 7 U.S. Patent No. 8,139,817 (Ex. 1006) 8 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2011/0113461 (Ex. 1007) 9 U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2014/0044348 (Ex. 1009) 10 U.S. Patent No. 8,634,601 (Ex. 1008) references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s undisputed description of the level of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the scope of the subject matters claimed and the references, we apply Petitioner’s description in this proceeding.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,701,321 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00865 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–22 and all asserted grounds; the Petition showed a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv factors. See Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. Notably, the Director stated that “the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board (‘PTAB’)] will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any ground that could have been reasonably raised before the PTAB.” Id. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because Wiz filed a Sotera stipulation. Ex. 1083.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“The parties do not dispute that Veselov is the only reference that serves as the basis of Wiz’s asserted obviousness grounds that was considered by the Examiner during prosecution of the ’685 patent. See Ex. 1004, 57, 104. The Examiner, however, did not meaningfully address Veselov during prosecution of the ’685 patent. Stated differently, with respect to factor (a), the Examiner did not apply the teachings of Veselov to teach or suggest the limitations of the originally presented claims of the ’685 patent, nor did the Examiner apply the teachings of Veselov to account for language that was added via amendment during prosecution. It is undisputed that the other four references that serve as the basis of Wiz’s asserted obviousness grounds (i.e., Hufsmith, Chari, Price, and Huseinović) were not considered by the Examiner during prosecution of the ’685 patent. Nor did the Examiner have the benefit of Dr. Stavrou’s testimony regarding the teachings of all five references. Orca’s arguments do not appear to implicate factors (b) and (d), so we decline to engage in a substantive analysis of these two factors based on the record before us. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Orca’s arguments that the Petition presents substantially the same art and arguments that were considered previously by the Examiner during prosecution of the ’685 patent.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“Based on the preliminary record, the only claim term that requires construction is “[analyze/analyzing] the at least one snapshot,” and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy between the parties. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We understand Wiz to propose a construction for the claim term “[analyze/analyzing] the at least one snapshot” that encompasses the following two alternative approaches: (1) “direct analysis of the snapshot data”; and (2) “analysis of a VM instantiated from the snapshot.” See Pet. 10–11. Orca disputes the latter approach, but not the former approach. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11. With this in mind, and for purposes of institution, we preliminarily agree that the claim term “[analyze/analyzing] the at least one snapshot” encompasses “direct analysis of the snapshot data.” This construction finds support in the specification of the ’685 patent.6 See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:19–20 (“The snapshot is parsed and analyzed by the security system 140 to detect vulnerabilities.”), 5:36–39 (“Further, the security system 140 may be configured to match the application files, either directly (using binary comparison) or by computing a cryptographic hash against [a] database of files in vulnerable applications.”). Because, as we explain below, Wiz’s obviousness analysis is sufficient under this first approach, we take no position on the second alternative approach in Wiz’s proposed construction. 6 At this stage of the proceeding, we do not make a finding of lexicography or disclaimer. Nor do we determine that “[analyze/analyzing] at least one snapshot” is necessarily limited to “direct analysis of the snapshot data.”” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“We do not discern a material difference between the assessments of the level of skill in the art advanced by either party, nor does either party premise its arguments exclusively on its own assessment. For purposes of institution, we adopt Wiz’s assessment, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the appropriate level of education. The qualifier expands the range without an upper bound (i.e., encompassing a Ph.D. degree and beyond), and does not meaningfully indicate the level of skill in the art. Wiz’s assessment—without the qualifier—is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stavrou and it is consistent with the ’685 patent and the asserted prior art. We note, however, that our obviousness analysis would be the same under each party’s assessment.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,693,685 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00864 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–25, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–11 and 13–25 would have been obvious over Veselov and Hufsmith, and claim 12 over those references and Hutchins.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“shows that ‘efficiency, fairness, and the merits support the exercise of authority to deny institution.’” Prelim. Resp. 45 (quoting Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (Order Authorizing Supplemental Briefing on Discretionary Denial) (precedential). After Patent Owner filed its Preliminary Response, however, Petitioner filed a stipulation consistent with the stipulation filed in Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (Decision Granting Institution) (precedential as to § II.A) (“Sotera”). Ex. 1083. On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv factors. See Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. Notably, the Director stated that “the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board (‘PTAB’)] will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any ground that could have been reasonably raised before the PTAB.” Id. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner filed a Sotera stipulation. Ex. 1083.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“In evaluating arguments under § 325(d), we use a two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“snapshot.” Petitioner proposes we construe this term to encompasses two alternative approaches: (1) “direct analysis of the snapshot data”; and (2) “analysis of a VM instantiated from the snapshot.” See Pet. 10. Patent Owner disputes the second approach, but not the former. See Prelim. Resp. 9–11. For purposes of institution, we agree with Petitioner’s first alternative approach “analyz[ing] the snapshot” encompasses “direct analysis of the snapshot data.” This construction finds support in the specification of the ’032 patent. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:20–21 (“The snapshot is parsed and analyzed by the security system 140 to detect vulnerabilities.”), 5:37–40 (“[T]he security system 140 may be configured to match the application files, either directly (using binary comparison) or by computing a cryptographic hash against [a] database of files in vulnerable applications.”). Because, as we explain below, Petitioner’s obviousness analysis is sufficient under this first approach, we take no position on Petitioner’s second alternative approach, which Patent Owner disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Although Petitioner submits an additional term for construction, see Pet. 8–9, we do not need to further construe the claims to determine whether to institute IPR. See Nidec Motor Corp. 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We do not discern a material difference between the assessments of the level of skill in the art advanced by either party, nor does either party premise its arguments exclusively on its own assessment. For purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the appropriate level of education. The qualifier expands the range without an upper bound (i.e., encompassing a Ph.D. degree and beyond), and does not meaningfully indicate the level of skill in the art. Petitioner’s assessment—without the qualifier—is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stavrou and it is consistent with the ’032 patent and the asserted prior art. We note, however, that our obviousness analysis would be the same under each party’s assessment.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,663,032 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00863 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3–9, and 11–16 are obvious over Veselov and Price, with additional grounds for claims 2, 10, 6, and 14.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDenied
“On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv factors. See Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. Notably, the Director stated that “the [Patent Trial and Appeal Board (‘PTAB’)] will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any ground that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Id. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner filed a Sotera stipulation. Ex. 1083.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“B. Claim Construction Independent claims 1, 9, and 16 each require “analyz[ing] the at least one snapshot.” Petitioner proposes we construe this term to encompasses two alternative approaches: (1) “direct analysis of the snapshot data”; and (2) “analysis of a VM instantiated from the snapshot.” See Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner disputes the second approach, but not the former. See Prelim. Resp. 12–14. For purposes of institution, we agree with Petitioner’s first alternative approach—“analyz[ing] the at least one snapshot” encompasses “direct analysis of the snapshot data.” This construction finds support in the specification of the ’031 patent. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:17–18 (“The snapshot is parsed and analyzed by the security system 140 to detect vulnerabilities.”), 6:23–24 (“[T]he security system 140 may be configured to match the application files, either directly using binary comparison or by computing a cryptographic hash against [a] database of files in vulnerable applications.”). Because, as we explain below, Petitioner’s obviousness analysis is sufficient under this first approach, we take no position on Petitioner’s second alternative approach, which Patent Owner disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We do not discern a material difference between the assessments of the level of skill in the art advanced by either party, nor does either party premise its arguments exclusively on its own assessment. For purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment, except that we delete the qualifier “at least” to eliminate vagueness as to the appropriate level of education. The qualifier expands the range without an upper bound (i.e., encompassing a Ph.D. degree and beyond), and does not meaningfully indicate the level of skill in the art. Petitioner’s assessment—without the qualifier—is supported by the testimony of Dr. Stavrou and it is consistent with the ’031 patent and the asserted prior art. We note, however, that our obviousness analysis would be the same under each party’s assessment.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“As noted above, Petitioner explains that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Veselov’s virtual computing security assessment system with Price’s inactive/at rest security assessments “to provide the well-known security benefit of preventing further damage that might otherwise be caused if a potentially compromised VM actively runs (e.g., a vulnerability could be exploited, or suspected malware could contaminate other resources).” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1048 ¶ 14; Ex. 1002 ¶ 105). With this rationale, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that its proffered combination would have been obvious to one skilled in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Patent Owner’s argument highlighting mere differences between Veselov and Price—i.e., Veselov’s active VMs versus Price’s inactive ones—does not undermine Petitioner’s proffered rationale and does not suggest that Price’s inactive security assessments are incompatible with Veselov’s general security-assessment structure. In addition, Petitioner presents sufficient arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that a skilled artisan would have a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination. Specifically, Petitioner explains, with relevant support from its declarant, Dr. Stavrou, and the prior art, that “[o]ffline snapshotting and offline analysis were routine and predictable.” Pet. 25 (citing Exs. 1002, 1073, 1081). “Moreover,” Petitioner explains, “most of Veselov’s snapshot-generation and analysis techniques require no interaction with the original VM and, as a result, the state of the original VM can be inactive or at rest when the snapshot is taken and while the snapshot analysis is being performed.” Id. (citing Exs. 1002, 1007). Patent Owner’s arguments that “[n]othing in Veselov discloses or suggests” either no-interaction snapshots or that the original VM can be inactive when the snapshot is taken, see Prelim. Resp. 31, does not undermine that one skilled in the art would have a reasonable expectation of success in taking and analyzing snapshots of inactive VMs.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,663,031 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00816 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 9–13, 16, 23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan because claim 23 showed a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“We determine that the first General Plastic factor does not favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. This is Petitioner’s first petition challenging the ’330 patent. Pet. 73. Patent Owner argues that “Apple’s use of prior petitions as a roadmap ‘implicitly create[s] such a relationship’” as set forth in Valve. Prelim. Resp. 54. According to Patent Owner, “Apple’s admitted attempt to improve over issues ‘that have plagued prior invalidity challenges’ ties its interests to the prior Petitioner’s aims.” Id. Under the circumstances in this case, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has any significant relationship with Lenovo or Samsung—for example, that Petitioner is a co-defendant with either of them or was accused of infringing the ’330 patent based on the same product. See Valve at 9–10. That Petitioner apparently may have reviewed and considered strategies undertaken by prior petitioners on similar issues does not, in and of itself, create a significant relationship with any of the prior petitioners. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“That Behbahani and Tan appeared in an initialed IDS is sufficient to satisfy the first Advanced Bionics prong. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 7–8 (“Previously presented art includes art made of record by the Examiner, and art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent”). Leete was not previously presented to the Office, but we need not decide whether the reference to Leete in Behbahani (see Section II.F.1 below) or Petitioner’s obviousness arguments concerning Behbahani and Leete suffice to satisfy the first Advanced Bionics prong for purposes of this Decision. As discussed below, even if we assume that the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is satisfied, Petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims in the second part of the framework.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. Given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, we do not see a material difference in the proposals, and thus adopt Patent Owner’s version for the purposes of this Decision. If the parties believe that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis, they may address that during trial.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,010,330 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00819 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would show at least one claim unpatentable over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“We determine that the first General Plastic factor does not favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. This is Petitioner’s first petition challenging the ’164 patent. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has any significant relationship with Lenovo or Samsung—for example, that Petitioner is a co-defendant with either of them or was accused of infringing the ’164 patent or any related patents dbased on the same product. See Valve at 9–10. That Petitioner apparently may have reviewed and considered strategies undertaken by prior petitioners on similar issues does not, in and of itself, create a significant relationship with any of the prior petitioners. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“an inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses a two-part framework when determining whether to exercise its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if so, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”).” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther
“of the alleged invention would have had “a master’s degree in electrical engineering or the equivalent, and two or more years of experience with wireless communication devices.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–29). Petitioner further states that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Id. Relying on Dr. Larson, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill “would have at least a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical or Electronics Engineering, along with ‘approximately five years of relevant experience in the design of transceiver architecture, RF systems and components, and analog and mixed signal circuits, as well as experience in control algorithms for such systems and familiarity with wireless standards.” Prelim. Resp. 27– 28 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 50). Patent Owner further states that “[a]dditional education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Id.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,564,164 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00818 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, and 4–23, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 7 is unpatentable over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan under § 103(a).
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Based on the present record, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing as to this limitation for purposes of institution.11 Petitioner has sufficiently shown, and Patent Owner does not appear to dispute, that Behbahani switches from its high-power filter to its low-power filter in response to signal strength measurements, and that this “filter swap” varies the impedance and/or bias current in the receiver. The only disputed issues appear to be: (1) whether the claim language excludes Behbahani’s filter” slip op. at 40
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“We determine that the first General Plastic factor does not favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. This is Petitioner’s first petition challenging the ’202 patent. Pet. 75. Patent Owner argues that “Apple’s use of prior petitions as a roadmap ‘implicitly create[s] such a relationship’” as set forth in Valve. Prelim. Resp. 55. According to Patent Owner, “Apple’s admitted attempt to improve over issues ‘that have plagued prior invalidity challenges’ ties its interests to the prior Petitioner’s aims.” Id. Under the circumstances in this case, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has any significant relationship with Lenovo or Samsung—for example, that Petitioner is a co-defendant with either of them or was accused of infringing the ’202 patent based on the same product. See Valve at 9–10. That Petitioner apparently may have reviewed and considered strategies undertaken by prior petitioners on similar issues does not, in and of itself, create a significant relationship with any of the prior petitioners. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We find that Becton, Dickinson factor (c)––the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination––does not favor denying the Petition under Section 325(d) because the Examiner did not cite Behbahani or Tan in any rejection and did not specifically address either reference in any correspondence, other than initialing them in an IDS. Nor did the Examiner address Leete. For factors (e) and (f), we find that Petitioner has explained sufficiently how the Examiner allegedly erred in evaluating Behbahani and Tan, by pointing to the Proposed Grounds, which detail how the challenged claims read on these references over the combination of Behbahani, Leete, and Tan. See Pet. 18–72. We find this sufficient to identify the “specific teachings” that were overlooked, as contemplated in Advanced Bionics, and we agree with Petitioner that the facts and discussion of Behbahani, Leete, and Tan presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the challenged claims in view of those references. We thus find that Petitioner has satisfied the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework by demonstrating that the Examiner may have erred by not appreciating that Behbahani, Leete, and Tan teach or suggest the features of the claimed invention. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Based on the parties’ application of the prior art to the claims, it appears that there may be some disagreement concerning the meaning of “signal path” in this proceeding; however, neither party proposes an express construction of the term for this case. See Pet. 8–10; Prelim. Resp. 28–32. We will discuss the term “signal path” below in the context of the parties’ arguments applying this language to the asserted prior art. See § III.F.4.c, infra. The parties may further address the meaning of the term “signal path” during the trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.