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  • PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00044 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–16, 18–20, and 23–30 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 17 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish expected Fab binding.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “Petitioner contends that based on Patent Owner’s implicit construction in the district court litigation “that the term ‘the ligand comprising at least two polypeptides’ refers to a multimeric ligand (such as a tetramer) comprised of multiple polypeptides, each of which is a monomer.” Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 41, 50, 58, 62, 74, 87).” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, and C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number—five (5)—SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation, but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that [s]tructural relationships may provide the requisite motivation or suggestion to modify known compounds to obtain new compounds. For example, a prior art compound may suggest its homologs because homologs often have similar properties and therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate making them to try to obtain compounds with improved properties. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 37

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “Neither claim 1 nor claim 14 recite a need to bind the Fab region of an antibody or that the target molecule is Fab. All that is required by these claims is that they adsorb a target molecule and that you can elute the target molecule from the matrix. The target molecule, therefore, can reasonably encompass IgG. Petitioner’s articulated rationale is that there was an expectation that the composition binds antibodies, including monoclonal antibodies, and therefore, would be useful in a process of for isolating antibodies. Petitioner contends that: A POSA would have also reasonably expected such a combination to achieve a process for isolating one or more target compounds using the recited affinity chromatography matrix given the well-known fact that each individual SPA domain, including the C domain, has affinity for antibodies (Ex. 1004, [1]) as well as Abrahmsén’s confirmation that a G29A mutation on SPA “would not interfere with folding [of SPA] or binding to [antibodies]” (Ex. 1005, 5:13-16). (Ex. 1002 ¶131.) Pet. 25; Reply 8 (“‘A POSA would not have been motivated only by Fab-binding ability, as even Dr. Bracewell agreed that ‘a POSA would have understood that it was desirable to purify monoclonal antibodies for therapeutic use in 2006.’(Ex. 1057, 75:17-76:4, 113:23-114:11, 157:24- 158:9; Ex. 1061 ¶29)”). The law does not require that the teachings of the reference be combined for the reason or advantage contemplated by the inventor, as long as some suggestion to combine the elements is provided by the prior art as a whole. In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1304 (CCPA 1976); see In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430” slip op. at 44

    Patent outcomesUS 10,343,142 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,343,142
  • PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00041 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 5–7, 10–16, 18–20, and 23–30 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4 and 17 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish expected Fab binding.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “According to the Specification, “the present invention . . . relates to a multimeric chromatography ligand (also denoted a ‘multimer’) comprised of at least two Domain C units, or a functional fragments or variants thereof.” Ex. 1001, 7:27–30. The Specification additionally recites that a multimer containing only domain C units can, however, include linkers. Id. 7:39–41. In addition, the Specification describes that “the multimer comprises one or more additional units, which are different from Domain C.” Id. 7: 44–45. Based on these disclosures in the Specification, a multimer is composed of at least two or more monomers. Because Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the ’142 patent’s express construction of the term, and because Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s construction, we apply it here.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, and C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number—five (5)—SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation, but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that” slip op. at 37

    • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesUnpatentable

      “Here, the teachings of Linhult, Abrahmsén, and Hober suggest mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine in any one of the IgG binding domains of E, D, A, B, or C of SPA in order to avoid protein degradation. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 5:4–9. We, therefore, agree with Petitioner that the art expressly suggests that the glycine codon can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 99–111). Attaching any one of SPA mutated IgG binding domains E D A B or C to a matrix using “known ligand-construction methods to yield a predictable result[] (e.g., the claimed affinity chromatography matrix)” would have been obvious. Pet. 25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 130). As the Federal Circuit has explained, “[w]here a skilled artisan merely pursues ‘known options’ from ‘a finite number of identified, predictable solutions,’ the resulting invention is obvious under Section 103.” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Linhult Abrahmsén, and Hober expressly suggests mutating the glycine codon for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 99–111). We also agree that the cited art teaches using these mutant SPA domains in column chromatography for the isolation of antibodies.” slip op. at 36

    Patent outcomesUS 10,343,142 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,343,142
  • PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00045 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 12–14, 16–28, 30–32, and 34–37 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11 and 29 were not shown unpatentable because the art did not establish expected Fab binding.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here. C.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “support, the ligand capable of binding the one or more target compound(s) and comprising at least two polypeptides.” Ex. 1001, 15:46–49; 17:28–31. Petitioner argues that “‘the ligand comprising at least two polypeptides’ refers to a multimeric ligand (such as a tetramer) comprised of multiple polypeptides, each of which is a monomer.” Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 43–45). Petitioner argues that this construction is consistent with Patent Owner’s implicit construction in the Delaware litigation between the parties. Id. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s claim construction. See generally PO Resp. According to the Specification, “the present invention . . . relates to a multimeric chromatography ligand (also denoted a ‘multimer’) comprised of at least two domain C units, or a functional fragments [sic] or variants thereof.” Ex. 1001, 7:35–38. The Specification additionally recites that a multimer containing only domain C units can, however, include linkers. Id. at 7:39–41. In addition, the Specification describes that “the multimer comprises one or more additional units, which are different from Domain C.” Id. at 7:52–53. Based on these disclosures in the Specification, a multimer is composed of at least two or more monomers. Because Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the ’007 patent’s express construction of the term, we apply that construction for the purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “Petitioner’s articulated obviousness ground is premised on the knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, or C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number – five (5) – SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that” slip op. at 38

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “(c) No Teaching Away We are also not persuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that the art teaches away from the G29A substitution because it interferes with Fab binding. See PO Resp. 39–42; Sur-reply 9; Ex. 2009 at 2; Ex. 2010 at 25; Ex. 2012 at 25–26; Ex. 2029 at 7. None of claims 1, 2, or 20 recite a need to bind the Fab region of an antibody or that the target molecule is Fab. All that is required by these claims is that they adsorb a target molecule and that you can elute the target molecule from the matrix. The target molecule, therefore, can reasonably encompass IgG.” slip op. at 44

    Patent outcomesUS 10,875,007 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,875,007
  • PTAB · May 18, 2023 · IPR2022-00042 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–10, 12–14, 16–28, 30–32, and 34–37 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 11 and 29 were not shown unpatentable because Fab binding was not predictable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had (1) at least an advanced degree (e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D.) in biochemistry, process chemistry, protein chemistry, chemical engineering, molecular and structural biology, biochemical engineering, or similar disciplines; (2) several years of post-graduate training or related experience (including industry experience) in one or more of these areas; and (3) an understanding of the various factors involved in purifying proteins using chromatography.[] Such a person would have had multiple years of experience with affinity ligand design and protein purification. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–14). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is unopposed and appears consistent with the Specification and art of record, we apply it here. C.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “According to the Specification, “the present invention . . . relates to a multimeric chromatography ligand (also denoted a ‘multimer’) comprised of at least two domain C units, or a functional fragments [sic] or variants thereof.” Ex. 1001, 7:35–38. The Specification additionally recites that a multimer containing only domain C units can, however, include linkers. Id. at 7:39–41. In addition, the Specification describes that “the multimer comprises one or more additional units, which are different from Domain C.” Id. at 7:52–53. Based on these disclosures in the Specification, a multimer is composed of at least two or more monomers. Because Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the ’007 patent’s express construction of the term, we apply that construction for the purposes of this decision. Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, we determine that the express construction of any other claim term is unnecessary to resolve the disputed issues in this matter. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

      “Petitioner’s articulated obviousness ground is premised on the knowledge that any one of the five SPA IgG binding domains are known to bind IgG and can function as a ligand for the purification of antibodies. Linhult and Abrahmsén both expressly suggest that the glycine codon at position 29 can be mutated for an alanine codon in any one of the SPA IgG binding domains E, D, A, B, or C. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, 2:32–37. Here, the SPA IgG binding domains comprise a short list of 5 members: E, D, A, B, or C. Of these 5 members, the glycine at position 29 in domain B has already been mutated to an alanine to create a domain Z which has been shown to retain IgG binding activity. Ex. 1004, 6 (Fig. 3). Figure 1A of Linhult is reproduced below. Linhult’s Figure 1A, reproduced above, shows the amino acid alignments of the Z, Z(F30A) and the five homologous domains (E, D, A, B, and C). The three boxes show the α-helices. Ex. 1004, 2; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2. Here, Linhult and Abrahmsén show that the IgG binding domains of SPA – E, D, A, B, or C share many structural similarities. See Ex. 1004, 2 (Fig. 1(a) (reproduced above)); Ex. 1005, 3:25–35. As discussed in our Institution Decision (Dec. 30–31), there are a finite number – five (5) – SPA IgG binding domains and each possesses the dipeptide sequence Asp-Gly known to a be a target for alkaline protein degradation. Therefore, the solution of mutating the glycine at position 29 for an alanine to remove the alkaline sensitive sequence is not a product of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. See Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421). It is well established that [s]tructural relationships may provide the requisite motivation or suggestion to modify known compounds to obtain new compounds. For example, a prior art compound may suggest its homologs because homologs often have similar properties and therefore chemists of ordinary skill would ordinarily contemplate making them to try to obtain compounds with improved properties. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 38

    Patent outcomesUS 10,875,007 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,875,007
  • PTAB · Mar 27, 2023 · IPR2019-01094 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board held claim 22 not unpatentable over Imtra 2011 and Imtra 2007, alone or with Gifford, because Petitioner did not prove the obviousness grounds by a preponderance of the evidence.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “Petitioner bears the burden of proving unpatentability of the challenged claims, a burden that never shifts to Patent Owner. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner must establish the facts supporting its challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). In view of Petitioner’s failure to direct us to evidence sufficient to establish a person of ordinary skill in the art could have and would have installed the marine recessed lighting system disclosed in Imtra 2011 in a building, we find Petitioner fails to show obviousness of claim 22 over the combination of Imtra 2011 and Imtra 2007 by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “D. Ground 3: Obviousness over Imtra 2011, Imtra 2007, and Gifford Petitioner fails to show that the Imtra references render claim 22 obvious. In the Final Decision we noted that Petitioner challenged several claims, including claim 22, as obvious over the combination of Imtra 2011, Imtra 2007, and Gifford, and determined that Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify the Imtra references in view of Gifford’s teaching. Id. at 48–49. The Federal Circuit affirmed our determination, which we maintain here. For these reasons, Petitioner fails to show obviousness of claim 22 over the combination of Imtra 2011, Imtra 2007, and Gifford by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 9

    Patent outcomesUS 9,964,266 mixed
    § 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,964,266
  • PTAB · Feb 6, 2023 · IPR2022-00686 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 7, and 15–20 are unpatentable: claims 15, 19, and 20 as obvious over Hildebrand and Van Ostrand; claims 1–3, 7, 16, and 17 over those references and Rosen; and claim 18 over those …

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “the art would have combined the relevant teachings of Hildebrand and Van Ostrand with a reasonable expectation of success. As discussed above, Hildebrand is directed to a system for monitoring the efficiency of an HVAC system to determine when there is a fault. See Section II.E.1, supra; Ex. 1002 ¶ 60. Using much of the same data as Hildebrand, Van Ostrand teaches a method to determine which stage in a multiple stage HVAC system failed. See Section II.E.2; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60–61. Van Ostrand further teaches that the “[typical] HVAC system include[s] multiple stages of heating and/or cooling capacity.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 4. Because Hildebrand is silent as to which stage of the typical system—which has multiple stages— has failed, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have turned to Van Ostrand for that determination. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 61–62. This modification would allow the Hildebrand system to detect which specific stage has failed. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 29–33. And because Van Ostrand represents a known method of detecting fault, it would have been obvious to use it to improve Hildebrand in a predictable way with a reasonable expectation of success. Ex. 1002 ¶ 63; see also KSR, 550 U.S. 398, 416–21. Petitioner has also sufficiently shown that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have added Rosen’s use of internet weather to the Hildebrand-Van Ostrand combination. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 115 (“Hildebrand and Van Ostrand are applied as I describe above with respect to Ground 1, with outside temperature over the Internet from a weather data provider. In my opinion, it would have been obvious to obtain outside temperature measurements from the Internet, thus replacing Hildebrand’s use of outside temperature sensors.”). Specifically, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have seen an advantage in avoiding the expense of obtaining, wiring and servicing an extra outside temperature sensor by obtaining weather information from the Internet as taught by Rosen. Ex. 1002 ¶ 120; see also Section II.F.1 (describing Rosen). Because it is undisputed that Rosen teaches using computer programming and network communications that were well-known and established at the relevant time period, there was a reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 120–121.” slip op. at 35

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

      “There is also no dispute that ym is the output from a computer model. See Pet. 69; PO Resp. 32. Again, that is consistent with Spalink, which defines item 310—which generates ym—as a reference model. Ex. 1008 Fig. 3; ¶ 75 (describing ym as the output of the refence model). Thus, there is no meaningful dispute that the comparison shown in Figure 3—which the Petition relies on—is a comparison between a first HVAC system and a model, not a second HVAC system as recited in claim 8. Accordingly, that comparison does not teach or suggest “compar[ing] the relative efficiency of the first HVAC system and the second HVAC system” as recited in claim 8. Petitioner’s arguments that the data in the reference model comes from other buildings is inapposite. Although Petitioner accurately describes how reference model 310 is based on “data 367 collected from different buildings” (Ex. 1008 ¶ 77), Petitioner has not shown that a computer model is a second HVAC system. Therefore, comparing the output of a building to a model based on buildings does not teach or suggest the necessary comparison between the first HVAC system and the second HVAC system recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 57

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “claims 5 and 6. See Pet. 7 (listing of grounds), 45 (Ground 2 heading). However, the “Claim Mapping” section only discusses claims 1–3, 7, 15–17, and 20. Pet. 49–50. We noted this lack of mapping in the Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 20. In its Reply, Petitioner argues as follows: The Institution Decision states “that the Petition omits any particular mapping for claim 5, 6, and 19” in the context of this Ground. (See Institution Decision, 20). Petitioner respectfully submits that the Petition makes clear that the claim mapping for these dependent claims is the same as in Ground 1, “with the exception that the outside temperature measurements, first recited in claim elements [1c] and [15c], come from an Internet weather data source.” (See Pet., 49). Pet. Reply 21–22 n.3. However, the Petition does not support that argument. Instead, page 49 of the Petition—which is all Petitioner cites to—does not mention claims 5 and 6. Instead, the page Petitioner cites shows that Petitioner misleadingly cropped the quotation. The full quotation below shows that page 49 of the Petition does not list claims 5 and 6: CLAIMS 1, 7, 15 AND 20 Independent claims 1 and 15, and their respective dependent claims 7 and 20, are obvious in the same manner discussed in Ground 1, with the exception that the outside temperature measurements, first recited in claim elements [1c] and [15c], come from an Internet weather data source. Pet. 49 (bold in original) (italics added to emphasize cropped language). Our rules require that “[t]he petition must specify where each element of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed publications relied upon.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Petitioner did not do that with respect to” slip op. at 39

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “b) Our Analysis We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Hildebrand teaches or suggests limitation [1c]. The gravamen of Petitioner’s argument is that Hildebrand’s HVAC system is limited to HVAC system 12—the heating system, cooling system, and fan. See Pet. 12 (“The HVAC system is ‘HVAC system 12’ . . . .”); Ex. 1004, 4:1–10 (describing HVAC system 12). Although nominally supported by Mr. Shah’s testimony, that testimony is conclusory, parrots the Petition, and provides no corroborating evidence to show that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an HVAC system was limited to the heating and cooling systems. We give Mr. Shah’s testimony on that point no weight. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); Verlander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Board has discretion to accord little weight to broad conclusory statements from expert witness); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Moreover, Petitioner’s argument is inconsistent with Mr. Shahs’ direct testimony that clearly states that the HVAC system is broader then just the heating and cooling system and fan and includes other elements, such as thermostats and HVAC control systems. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 65 (“HVAC communications, and software, were widely known and understood.”). Applying Mr. Shah’s definition, the HVAC system as recited in claim 1 includes more than Hildebrand’s heating and cooling systems. Indeed, when discussing dependent claim 5, Petitioner argues that Hildebrand’s HVAC system also includes a thermostat. See Pet. 39. We do not find the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) finding in an ITC proceeding involving a different record (and different patent) to be persuasive. Although the ALJ considered Hildebrand, there is nothing in the excerpt of the opinion to conclude that he considered Mr. Shah’s definition of an HVAC system. See Ex. 1010, 475–76. Nor is it clear from the record that the ALJ considered contrary testimony from Patent Owner’s expert. Id. Hildebrand Figure 1 shows an HVAC system including heating and” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 8,019,567 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,019,567
  • PTAB · Feb 6, 2023 · IPR2021-01218 · APJ Scott B Howard · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 7, and 15–20 are unpatentable on specified §103 grounds; claims 4–6 and 8–14 were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “The ’567 patent is directed to a using a thermostat to detect faults in the HVAC system. See Ex. 1001, code (57). That aligns more closely with and HVAC control systems—than the one proposed by Petitioner—which focuses on energy controls. Compare Ex. 2002 ¶ 27, with Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31– 33. Accordingly, we adopt Patent Owner’s propose definition. However, we consider the parties’ positions to be substantially similar, and note that neither party argues that the level of skill is determinative to the outcome of the case. Accordingly, we would have reached the same factual findings and conclusions of law had we adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “We decline to find Dr. Palmer less credible based solely on his experience. In judging the credibility of experts, we focus on whether the witness offers corroboration for his opinions, provides opinions that are consistent with the prior art, and the witness’ cross-examination testimony. Moreover, we note that Mr. Shah and Dr. Palmer substantially parrot the Petition and Patent Owner Response, respectively. Such testimony is generally unhelpful. Testimony which goes into more detail and expands on the points made in the papers (but not going beyond the points made in the papers) is more helpful and, as a general matter, given more weight so long as it is consistent with, and supported by, the other evidence in the record.” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Because no express construction is needed for our decision, we do not construe any of the claim limitations. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

    • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

      “that Hildebrand teaches or suggests limitation [1c]. The gravamen of Petitioner’s argument is that Hildebrand’s HVAC system is limited to HVAC system 12—the heating system, cooling system, and fan. See Pet. 12 (“The HVAC system is ‘HVAC system 12’ . . . .”); Ex. 1004, 4:1–10 (describing HVAC system 12). Although nominally supported by Mr. Shah’s testimony, that testimony is conclusory, parrots the Petition, and provides no corroborating evidence to show that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that an HVAC system was limited to the heating and cooling systems. We give Mr. Shah’s testimony on that point no weight. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); Verlander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Board has discretion to accord little weight to broad conclusory statements from expert witness); 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 18

    Patent outcomesUS 8,019,567 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,019,567
  • PTAB · Jan 9, 2023 · IPR2021-01232 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1 and 4–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 3 was not shown unpatentable because Petitioner presented no evidence under the adopted construction.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “of battery charging systems.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner states that it adopts this definition for purposes of its Response. PO Resp. 4. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’653 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’653 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). It is also consistent with the level of skill in the art adopted in the 777 IPR, which also involves the ’653 patent. IPR2021-00777, Paper 7 at 6–7.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “construction “contradicts the technical disclosure of the ’653 patent” and that “[t]he proper construction of this term is ‘switching circuit under control of the microcontroller that selectively conducts power supply or power outage for the load.’” Pet. Suppl. Br. 3.10 In particular, Petitioner contends that claim 3, through claim 1, only recites one connection between the microcontroller and the first battery, such that the connections in claim 3 do not allow the power supply from the first battery to pass through the microcontroller to the load. Pet. Suppl. Br. 4–5. Claim 1, however, recites “an automobile charger, comprising . . .” which is an open-ended term, meaning that claim 1 is not limited to only the connections expressly recited therein. Petitioner’s arguments do not address this open-ended aspect of the plain language of the claims. Petitioner also argues that the language of claim 3 is consistent with its construction because claim 3 “places the switching circuit between the second pole of the first battery . . . and the second lead of the load.” Pet. Suppl. Br. 5. Although Petitioner’s interpretation may be consistent with the language in claim 3, we discern nothing in claim 3 that expressly limits the placement of the switching circuit, especially considering the open-ended “comprising” language used in claims 1 and 3.” slip op. at 11

    • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

      “Specifically, Dr. Kirtley testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that connections between components depicted as single lines in Yu’s figures “may comprise multiple connections, such as multiple signal connections, and common power and ground connections for sensors and microprocessors.” Ex. 1020 ¶ 84 (citing Ex. 1021 (US 7,973,534 B2)). We credit Dr. Kirtley’s testimony, as Patent Owner does not dispute the substance of Dr. Kirtley’s testimony or the supporting exhibit. Instead, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner is attempting to “sneak in new evidence that is improper in a reply” and create a new ground. Sur-reply 13–15. We disagree, as Petitioner and Dr. Kirtley offer this evidence to demonstrate what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood in considering Yu—not as a new ground. Moreover, Petitioner properly offered this exhibit and Dr. Kirtley’s testimony in response to Patent Owner’s arguments that claim 1 requires negative side switching, which Yu does not disclose. In its Reply, Petitioner is entitled to “respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). A party also may submit rebuttal evidence in support of its reply. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1077–78 (Fed. Cir. 2015).” slip op. at 26

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 4 is unpatentable as obvious in view of Yu and Thomason. As discussed above, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments regarding negative pole switching, and find that Petitioner presents persuasive evidence that Yu teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 1. Petitioner also presents undisputed evidence that Yu and Thomason teach or suggest the additional limitations in claim 4. Pet. 52–54. Additionally, Petitioner directs us to a disclosure in Thomason itself regarding a protection mechanism to prevent the jump starter from self-destructing, and presents testimony from Dr. Kirtley that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered Thomason’s teaching in order to avoid damage to Yu’s internal battery, and would have been able to implement Thomason’s teachings. Pet. 52–54; Reply 20–21; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 189–192. Patent Owner and Mr. McAlexander do not challenge or otherwise refute this testimony. PO Resp. 9–10. Thus, contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, Petitioner does direct us to evidence in the asserted prior-art references themselves that provide a reason to combine their teachings, and does not rely solely on conclusory statements regarding the similarities of Yu and Thomason to support its obviousness challenge. In view of Petitioner’s persuasive evidence demonstrating where the prior-art references teach or suggest each limitation in the challenged claims, and explaining why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the prior-art references with a reasonable expectation of success, we find Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 4 is unpatentable as obvious in view of Yu and Thomason.” slip op. at 33

    Patent outcomesUS 10,046,653 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,046,653
  • Google LLC v. Ecofactor Inc.Some claims unpatentable
    PTAB · Nov 17, 2022 · IPR2021-00982 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–7 and 10–19 are unpatentable: claims 1–7 and 11–19 as obvious over Wedekind and Ehlers, and claim 10 as obvious over Wedekind, Ehlers, and Jenkins; claims 20–30 were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We note that the parties agree on the educational background of a person of ordinary skill in the art. And although the parties offer different levels of experience for a person of ordinary skill in the art, there is some overlap, as both parties require experience with HVAC systems. Pet. 15 (requiring experience with “building energy management”); PO Resp. 5–6 (requiring experience with HVAC controls, and acknowledging that “building energy management” includes controlling HVAC systems). Accordingly, we do not consider the difference between the parties’ proposals to be material. Moreover, neither party asserts that its positions or the outcome depends on which definition we apply in this proceeding.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “B. Claim Construction In an inter partes review, we construe claim terms according to the standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Under Phillips, claim terms are afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id.” slip op. at 11

    • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

      “Reply ignore the express statement in the Petition characterizing sensors 36 in Wedekind as “a source external to the building.” Sur-reply 2 (quoting Pet. 28), 3. Patent Owner also argues this is a new argument that we should disregard. Sur-Reply 2. We disagree. Although Patent Owner is correct that Petitioner contends Wedekind’s outside air temperature sensors 36 are a source external to the building, that is not the only argument Petitioner presents. In the Petition, Petitioner contends more generally that Wedekind’s outside air temperature sensors 36 “measure the outside air temperature.” Pet. 28. Petitioner also argues that Ehlers provides weather data including outside temperatures, and that the source of the data is a weather service provider that is external to the building. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1008, 9:53–54, 35:13–17). Petitioner further argues that it would have been obvious “to replace Wedekind’s outside temperature sensors 36 with receiving outside temperature data from a network connection,” as Ehlers teaches. Pet. 32. In view of this, we agree with, and are persuaded by, Petitioner’s argument that it does not rely only on Wedekind to meet the limitation that “the second data from the network connection is collected from a source external to the building.” Reply 10. Additionally, the presence of these arguments in the Petition undermines Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner is attempting to present new arguments in the Reply. Similarly, Petitioner acknowledges in the Petition that Wedekind does not expressly teach the second data is received from a network connection, and, therefore, relies on Ehlers’ disclosure of receiving data from a network connection. Pet. 30; Reply 11. Patent Owner does not dispute that Ehlers discloses receiving weather data from a network connection. See PO Resp. 15–28; Sur-reply 3–8. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has demonstrated persuasively that the combined disclosures of Wedekind and Ehlers teach or suggest “the one or more processors further configured to receive a second data from a network connection, wherein the second data from the network connection is collected from a source external to the building” claim 1 requires.” slip op. at 20

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We find Petitioner’s arguments to be persuasive. Petitioner presents undisputed evidence, based on the disclosure of Wedekind and Ehlers, that obtaining outside temperatures either from local sensors or over a network was known in the art. Pet. 28–32; Ex. 1006, 4:45–47; Ex. 1008, 9:50–63. Petitioner also directs us to evidence, including in Ehlers itself, supporting Petitioner’s reasoning that replacing Wedekind’s outside air temperature sensors with a network-based weather data service would have saved the cost and effort of installing multiple sensors. Pet. 32; Ex. 1002 ¶ 103; Ex. 1008, 39:54–57; Reply 13. As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner does not directly challenge Petitioner’s argument and evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to modify Wedekind in view of Ehlers to avoid the cost and effort of installing multiple sensors. Reply 13.5 Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges that Wedekind “expressly indicates that there must be multiple sensors of outdoor temperature for sufficient accuracy in Wedekind’s complex computational model.” PO Resp. 26; Ex. 1006, 3:62–67. The need for multiple sensors in Wedekind 5 We recognize Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to connect Wedekind’s outside air temperature sensors 36 to a network because it would “increase costs.” PO Resp. 23–24. Patent Owner, however, presents this argument before it addresses Petitioner’s proposed combination of Wedekind and Ehlers. See PO Resp. 23–24 (referring to cost increases first, and addressing the proposed combination of Wedekind and Ehlers in the next paragraph). Thus, Patent Owner’s cost argument does not appear to address Petitioner’s assertion regarding cost savings in view of the proposed combination. Nor does Patent Owner present evidence regarding, or explain adequately, what costs it is referring to, or how those costs would increase. PO Resp. 23–24; Ex. 2005 ¶ 61. By way of contrast, Petitioner’s arguments regarding cost savings are supported by the disclosure of Ehlers itself. Ex. 1008, 39:54–57. strengthens Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art, in view of Ehlers’ teaching regarding avoiding the cost and effort of installing multiple sensors, would have had reason to modify Wedekind in view of Ehlers. Additionally, Patent Owner’s own declarant characterized Ehlers’ discussion of “lowering the cost of installation and ongoing maintenance” as “teach[ing] away from external sensors.” Ex. 1023, 58:7–18. These arguments and evidence undermine Patent Owner’s assertion that Petitioner failed to provide any analysis as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Wedekind in view of Ehlers. Sur-reply 3–4; PO Resp. 25–28. Petitioner also argues, and provides evidence in the form of testimony from Dr. Shah demonstrating, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to modify Wedekind’s system by connecting Wedekind’s processing means to a network connection such as Ehlers’ phone input or communications link, and would have obtained predictable results. Pet. 33; Ex. 1002 ¶ 104. Patent Owner does not dispute this evidence. To the contrary, Patent Owner appears to concede that the proposed combination would work, although not as reliably as Wedekind’s hardwired system. PO Resp. 25–26. As a result, and in the absence of any evidence or argument suggesting otherwise, we credit Dr. Shah’s testimony. Furthermore, Ehlers teaches, in connection with providing data obtained from a weather service provider over a network, that “[t]he data may be provided at regular intervals and be sufficiently localized for acceptable accuracy.” Ex. 1008, 9:58–60. This statement from Ehlers itself undermines Patent Owner’s arguments regarding alleged problems with transmitting data over networks and insufficient accuracy, including Patent Owner’s argument that Wedekind teaches away from the approach used by Ehlers. PO Resp. 25–28. Nevertheless, even if we were to give Patent Owner the full credit of its arguments regarding unreliable transmission of data over networks and data obtained from weather service providers being less useful than data obtained from sensors at a specific structure, obviousness “does not require that the motivation be the best option, only that it be a suitable option from which the prior art did not teach away.” PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197-98 (Fed. Cir. 2014). As discussed above, Petitioner’s evidence and arguments demonstrate that using Ehlers’ network to transmit temperature data was at least a suitable option. For all of the foregoing reasons, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated persuasively that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to modify Wedekind in view of Ehlers, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. iii.” slip op. at 25

    Patent outcomesUS 10,612,983 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,612,983
  • PTAB · Oct 6, 2022 · IPR2021-00967 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 4, 7, and 9–20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have possessed “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field as well as at least four years of experience in high-frequency circuit engineering and development.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–27). For purposes of the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal (Inst. Dec. 17–18), and neither party addresses the level of ordinary skill in the post-institution briefs (see generally PO Resp.; Reply; Sur-reply). In this Decision, we again adopt the level of ordinary skill proposed by Petitioner. This level of skill is consistent with the Specification of the ’269 patent and the asserted prior art, and it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Choi. Accord Inst. Dec. 17–18.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “on an integrated circuit package substrate for connecting with a printed circuit board.” PO Resp. 9–12; Sur-reply 1–2. Petitioner disagrees. Reply 6. But, because we find that Petitioner has shown that Chin suggests implementing its invention in an IC9 package substrate as Patent Owner’s proposed construction would require (infra § III.D.2.), we need not resolve this dispute. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). However, if we needed to substantively address this dispute, we would reject Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Patent Owner advocates limiting the scope of this claim term to include only the contact pads in a particular location (i.e., the PCB-side of the IC package substrate),10 but the intrinsic record does not support importing such a limitation into the claim. Patent Owner identifies (and we perceive) no passage in the intrinsic record that redefines the term “contact pads” or disavows part of its scope. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that a term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning unless a patentee acted as his own lexicographer or disavowed claim scope). Rather, Patent Owner’s argument is that the term should be limited because the Specification only discusses “contact pads” in that location and does not apply its invention to other pads” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “We agree with Patent Owner’s ultimate assertion that the plain language of the claim is informative of its proper meaning, such that “vias connecting the contact pads with one of the electrically conductive layers” means that vias are used to connect the recited contact pads with an electrically conductive layer. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. After considering the parties’ arguments, we determine that no other claim terms require an express construction. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “we agree with Petitioner that Chin explains that its “concepts apply equally to an integrated circuit package substrate.” Pet. 22. In particular, we find that Chin discloses an IC package substrate. See Ex. 1004, 1:61–62 (referring to “a substrate used inside a BGA package”); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28–30 (Dr. Choi explaining that a BGA is a type of IC package). We credit Dr. Choi’s testimony on this point because it is logical and supported by cited evidence. See, e.g., Ex. 1014, 45;12 Ex. 1016, 5–7. We are also persuaded that Chin expressly suggests implementing its invention in an IC package substrate. Chin begins its description by stating that “[t]he present invention relates generally to the design and fabrication of printed circuits and multi-layered substrates.” Ex. 1004, 1:7–8 (emphasis added). Chin also states that its invention “is illustrated by way of example, and not by way of limitation,” in its figures. Ex. 1004, 3:26–27. Similarly, Chin’s final paragraph states that alternative implementations “will be apparent to those skilled in the art,” and it states that “semiconductor implementations . . . are contemplated as within the scope of the present invention” as they use “similar layered printed circuit routing techniques.” Ex. 1004, 5:54–6:10. Moreover, as background for its invention, Chin addresses problems encountered as signal speed increases and explains that “excess parasitics that limit the bandwidth” are caused by an impedance mismatch between landing pads and their associated interconnect conductors. Ex. 1004, 1:35–56. Chin then states: One example is the use of a ball-grid-array (BGA) package in a multi-gigahertz printed circuit board. The landing pads of current state of the art BGAs are typically 25–30 mils in 12 Unless otherwise noted, our citations refer to page numbers added to an exhibit by Petitioner or Patent Owner rather than the document’s native page numbers. diameter, which is significantly larger than the typically 5 mil microstrips used in interconnecting conductors. Another example is a substrate used inside a BGA package. Typical solder ball landing pad sizes for current technology BGA substrates are on the order of 20–25 mil, significantly larger than the typically 3 mil traces used in microstrip interconnects. Ex. 1004, 1:56–65 (emphasis added). Accordingly, given the context provided by Chin (see Ex. 1004, 1:7–8, 5:54–6:10), we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood this passage (see Ex. 1004, 1:61–65) to suggest applying Chin’s disclosure to an IC package substrate. Accord Inst. Dec. 23–24.” slip op. at 19

    Patent outcomesUS 8,288,269 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,288,269
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