- PTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01205 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–10, 18, and 20 based on the asserted § 102 and § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Here, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 11–17 of the ’417 patent. Prelim. Resp. 1–2; Ex. 2019. Based on our review of Exhibit 2019, we determine that a disclaimer of claims 11–17 of the ’417 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) has been filed with the Office as of October 5, 2022. Based on the information in the public record, we find that the disclaimer complies with the above-listed requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Because claims 11–17 have been disclaimed under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a), in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), we do not reach challenges to claims 11–17. As a result, the remaining challenged claims are claims 1–10, 18, and 20 (“the challenged claims”).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“in situations where a district court trial date is set to occur before the issuance of the Board’s final written decision. The facts and reasoning of Fintiv are, at a minimum, only applicable to cases in which the district court has actually set a trial date in a copending litigation. But here, as will be discussed below, the parties agree that no trial date has been set, and the 14 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_ memo_20220621_.pdf. District Court has stayed the litigation. Prelim. Reply 8; Prelim. Sur-Reply 6 (“There has never been a trial date). Furthermore, that stay will continue until our final determination should we decide to institute trial. Without a trial date, we see no need to engage in a full analysis of the Fintiv factors,15 as there is no basis for Patent Owner’s argument for discretionary denial.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons above, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenged claims 1–10, 18, and 20 of the ’417 patent. At this juncture in the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims, or with respect to claim construction. V. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–10, 18, and 20 of the ’417 patent is hereby instituted with respect to the ground of unpatentability set forth in the Petition; and FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; the trial will commence on the entry date of this Decision.” slip op. at 44
- Skill levelOther
“would have at least a Ph.D. degree in chemistry, or a bachelor’s or master’s degree plus experience involving the use and design of fluorescent probes or dyes.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 14–18). Patent Owner agrees that a POSITA may have a Ph.D. degree or master’s degree in chemistry, but asserts that a POSITA would also have “some experience with fluorescence” in addition to a Ph.D. degree in chemistry and that the experience of a POSITA with a master’s degree in chemistry is alternatively “industry experience in the field of biological detection systems.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 7). For purposes of this Decision, we need not resolve these differences between the parties’ definitions, because any differences do not affect our analysis.13 If either party believes that adopting its preferred definition of the level of ordinary skill would have a material effect on the outcome of this proceeding, the party should address this issue during the instituted trial. slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,955,417 - PTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01207 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–14, 18, and 19 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. Thus, we hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–14, 18, and 19 of the ’620 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“be lifted for each patent for which the petition is denied. As noted above, there are six related petitions at the Board involving the patents before the court. The district court stayed the litigation “pending resolution of the IPR proceedings that have been instituted on the patents at issue in this case.” Ex. 2006, 2. Regarding the length of the stay, the district court explicitly ordered the parties not to use continuance of the fact discovery to October 28, 2022 “as grounds for . . . opposing institution of any post-grant proceeding.” Ex. 2007, 2. Regarding when the stay will be lifted, the order merely gives Patent Owner the opportunity to “seek to lift the stay as to any patents that are not instituted for review.” Ex. 2006, 2 (emphasis added). But we decline to speculate whether the district court would grant such a motion directed only to one of the six patents. Among the reasons warranting a stay of the litigation, the district court found “IPR has the potential to streamline issues for trial” and “the resources the parties will need to expend for experts could be significantly impacted by the outcome of any instituted IPR proceedings.” Id. Thus, the litigation is stayed pending the outcome of the six related proceedings, not merely the outcome of this institution decision, and the district court stayed the litigation for the explicit purpose of gaining efficiency and avoiding duplication of efforts by letting this inter partes review proceed to its conclusion first.14 See Prelim. Reply. 4–5. While Patent Owner may seek to lift the stay as to any patent for which institution is denied, the grant of any such request is uncertain. Accordingly, this factor strongly weighs against discretionary denial of institution.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have at least a Ph.D. degree in chemistry, or a bachelor’s or master’s degree plus experience involving the use and design of fluorescent probes or dyes.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 14–18). Patent Owner agrees that a POSITA may have a Ph.D. degree or master’s degree in chemistry, but asserts that a POSITA would also have “some experience with fluorescence” in addition to a degree in chemistry and that the experience of a POSITA with a master’s degree in chemistry is alternatively “industry experience in the field of biological detection systems.” Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 7). For purposes of this Decision, we need not choose between the parties’ proposed levels of one of ordinary skill in the art, which are quite similar, as neither party asserts that the anticipation or obviousness analyses in this case would turn on which definition is adopted. See Prelim. Resp. 10 (Patent Owner stating that its arguments and conclusions “would not change” if Petitioner’s definition were applied).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for patent owner
“The express language of claim 1 requires no solubility threshold, and dependent claim 10 demonstrates that where a solubility threshold was intended by the inventors of the ’620 patent they knew how to expressly set forth that threshold in the claims. Compare Ex. 1005, 213:26–27 (“capable of imparting solubility in water”), with id. at 218:12–14 (“The method according to claim 1, wherein each R is a non-ionic side group capable of imparting solubility in water in excess of 10 mg/mL.”). Thus, the claim language does not support applying a particular solubility threshold in claim 1. As noted by Patent Owner, the written description of the ’620 patent explains that “[i]n some embodiments, each R is independently a non-ionic side group capable of imparting solubility in water in excess of 10 mg/mL.” Id. at 54:2–10; Prelim. Resp. 12–13. This solubility threshold, however, is not in claim 1, and we decline to import such a limitation from the written description into claim 1 absent compelling reasons for doing so. See SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that “reading a limitation from the written description into the claims” is “one of the cardinal sins of patent law”); see also Thorner v. Sony Comp. Entm’t Am., LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is likewise not enough that the only embodiments, or all of the embodiments, contain a particular limitation. We do not read limitations from the specification into claims; we do not redefine words.”). In view of the foregoing, we construe the term “non-ionic side group capable of imparting solubility in water” to not include any particular numeric solubility threshold.13” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,288,620 - PTAB · Jan 6, 2023 · IPR2022-01203 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10, 12–14, and 17–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. Patent Owner has not persuaded us that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–10, 12–14, and 17–19 of the ’989 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“in situations where a district court trial date is set to occur before the issuance of the Board’s final written decision. The facts and reasoning of Fintiv are, at a minimum, only applicable to cases in which the district court has actually set a trial date in a copending litigation. But here, as will be discussed below, the parties agree that no trial date has been set, and the District Court has stayed the litigation. Prelim. Reply 8; Prelim. Sur-Reply 6 (“There has never been a trial date.”). Furthermore, that stay will continue until our final determination should we decide to institute trial. Without a trial date, we see no need to engage in a full analysis of the Fintiv factors,14 as there is no basis for Patent Owner’s argument for discretionary denial.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“numerical solubility limit into the claims, noting that the ’989 patent expressly defines “non-ionic side groups capable of imparting solubility in water” as simply “side groups which are not charged and allow the resulting polymer to be soluble in water or aqueous solution with no visible particulates.” Prelim. Reply 1 (citing Ex. 1001, 54:9–13). Petitioner notes that this definition contains no numerical limit, and that it is followed by a statement that in some embodiments, the R group is capable of imparting solubility in excess of 10 mg/mL. Id. at 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 54:13–16). Petitioner contends that reading a limitation from “some embodiments” into the claims would be “one of the cardinal sins of patent law.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320; Polaris Innovations Ltd. v. Brent, 48 F.4th 1365, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). Petitioner also directs our attention to related patents that expressly claim a solubility in excess of 10 mg/mL, arguing that when Patent Owner sought to claim such polymers, it knew how to do so. Id. (citing Ex. 1005, 218:11–12; Ex. 1006, 239:43–45, 252:51–52, 254:39–40, 262:56–57, 269:31–35).” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“proposed claim construction on solubility above, which we declined to do on the present record. For this reason, we find them unpersuasive. In addition, we note that Xue expressly discloses that its glycopolymers utilizing PEG-tethered spacers (Polymers B and C) “are highly water-soluble due to their long, flexible, hydrophilic spacers.” Ex. 1010, Abstract, 2289–90. Petitioner sufficiently sets forth why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered the PEG side chains of Xue to impart solubility in water, which is all we have construed the claims to require.” slip op. at 35
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,458,989 - PTAB · Dec 14, 2022 · IPR2022-01009 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 29 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Littleworth-Linder-Middlebrook obviousness challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Patent Owner has not persuaded us that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution of trial. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“when there is an early trial date in related litigation as part of assessing all relevant circumstances, including the merits, to balance considerations such as system efficiency, fairness, and patent quality. See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv Order”); NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 at 19–20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential). The Board evaluates six factors when making this assessment. See Fintiv Order, at 5–6. Further, “the Board takes a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Petitioner proposes constructions for two terms, “pitch” and “oblique perspective view.” 1. “Pitch” Petitioner argues that the term “pitch” should be construed to mean either “pitch” or “slope.” Pet. 8. Petitioner asserts that, during prosecution, the applicant stated that “prior versions of the claims ‘use[d] the word “pitch” while other places use the word “slope” and that ‘[t]hese words have the same meaning in the context of these claims, however to avoid confusion, the term “slope” [was] removed and replaced with the word “pitch” throughout to maintain consistency.’” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002, 76– 77). Petitioner further argues that its construction is “supported by the ’961 patent itself which treats the terms interchangeably.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 1:52–67, 3:11–19, 4:19–30, 6:5–17, claims 1, 10, 16, 21–22, 24). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed construction of “pitch” in its Preliminary Response. See Prelim. Resp. Based on the present record, we agree with Petitioner that “pitch” should be construed to encompass “pitch” and “slope.”” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“At the institution stage, the relevant issue is whether the record includes “evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, Paper 29 at 13. As Hulu explains, the reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Id. Hulu additionally observes that, after institution, certain limited opportunities are available for a petitioner to present new evidence in support of its position, including in a motion to file supplemental information under 37 C.F.R. § 42.123. Hulu at 14–16. Based on the present record, we find that there is a reasonable likelihood that Littleworth was publicly accessible before the critical date of the ’961 patent. Petitioner introduces the testimony of Ms. Munford that “I have reviewed Exhibit NEARMAP-1005, “Three-Dimensional Mapping and As-Built Computer Modelling by Analytical Photogrammetry” by R.M Littleworth, D.M. Stirling and J.H. Chandler as published in International Archives of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing: ISPRS 17th Congress, Washington, D.C., 1992, Volume B5.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 6. This statement suggests that Ms. Munford reviewed information indicating that Exhibit NEARMAP-1005 was published in the International Archives of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing: ISPRS 17th Congress, Washington, D.C., 1992, Volume B5, and is sufficient for purposes of institution. As for Patent Owner’s argument that the 008 field does not show the date when Littleworth was cataloged by the Rochester Institute of Technology library, Petitioner introduces testimony from Ms. Munford that “the 008 field of the MARC record is reserved for denoting the date of creation of the library record itself.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 4. Ms. Munford further testifies that because the date of creation “typically occurs during the process of preparing materials for public access, it is my experience that an item’s MARC record indicates the date of an item’s public availability.” Id. Additionally, Ms. Munford states that because the 008 field “is the only date reflecting the inclusion of said materials within the library’s collection, it is my experience that an item’s 008 field accurately indicates the date of an item’s public availability.” Id. ¶ 5. Patent Owner does not introduce any expert testimony to the contrary, but rather relies on attorney argument about the nature of the 008 and 040 fields of a MARC record. Prelim. Resp. 38– 42. Based on the present record, we determine that the testimony of Ms. Munford provides sufficient evidence for purposes of institution that the 008 field of the MARC record for Littleworth indicates the date that Littleworth was cataloged and made publicly available.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,670,961 - PTAB · Nov 2, 2022 · IPR2022-00735 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Patent Owner has not persuaded us that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution of trial. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“not yet set a date for the claim construction hearing, and the scheduling order indicates that it will not set a trial date until 14 days after its claim construction ruling.” Pet. 51 (citing Ex. 1013). Patent Owner does not dispute this. Prelim. Resp. 40. Therefore, the district court trial will likely occur after our final written decision in this proceeding, and factor 2 (timing of trial) weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution. The litigation also is in a relatively early stage because, the parties appear to have just completed exchanging infringement and invalidity contentions and no claim construction hearing has occurred. Pet. 52–53; Prelim. Resp. 40–41. Therefore, factor 3 (investment in the district court litigation) also weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution. Additionally, because this case is in a relatively early phase, the district court will have the ability to determine whether to stay the District Court Litigation in favor of this IPR (factor 1). Pet. 51–52. Further, because our final written decision will likely occur before trial in the District Court Litigation, the overlap in parties (factor 5) and any overlap in issues (factor 4) does not weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution.. Finally, we determine that the sixth Fintiv factor (other circumstances) is neutral. Accordingly, after considering all the factors, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“in this proceeding. Pet. 5. Patent Owner also does not include a section addressing claim construction. See Prelim. Resp. However, in the course of its argument, Patent Owner points to Dr. Forsyth’s statement that “[t]he ’518 patent describes that the oblique images ‘match the perspectives’ from which they ‘were captured,’” and that “[m]atching the perspectives ‘means that image pixels are not aligned on a rectangular grid [on the ground] but are aligned to the perspective that matches the perspective the camera has captured.’” Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15) (emphasis omitted). At this stage, Patent Owner does not appear to dispute Dr. Forsyth’s statement. Id. at 19–22. For purposes of this decision, we adopt the understanding set forth by Dr. Forsyth, and interpret the language requiring that oblique images “match the perspectives from which” they “were captured” to mean that “image pixels are not aligned on a rectangular grid on the ground but are aligned to the perspective that matches the perspective the camera has captured.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 15 (brackets omitted). We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 13
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of the alleged invention would have had “at least a Bachelor’s Degree in an academic area emphasizing the design of electrical, computer, or software technologies, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience related to computerized image analysis and three-dimensional modeling.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 16). Petitioner further asserts that “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience and vice-versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill at this stage of the proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,593,518 - PTAB · Nov 1, 2022 · IPR2022-00734 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16, 17, 25, 26, and 34 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“occur after our final written decision in this proceeding, and factor 2 (timing of trial) weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution. The litigation also is in a relatively early stage because, the parties appear to have just completed exchanging infringement and invalidity contentions and no claim construction hearing has occurred. Pet. 71–72; Prelim. Resp. 23–24. Therefore, factor 3 (investment in the district court litigation) also weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution. Additionally, because this case is in a relatively early phase, the district court will have the ability to determine whether to stay the District Court Litigation in favor of this IPR (factor 1). Pet. 69–70. Further, because our final written decision will likely occur before trial in the District Court Litigation, the overlap in parties (factor 5) and any overlap in issues (factor 4) do not weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution. Finally, we determine that the sixth Fintiv factor (other circumstances) is neutral. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“considerations conclusion in a previous case. In IPR2016-00592, the petitioner failed to rebut a presumption of nexus that arose because Patent Owner’s products were found by the panel to be coextensive with the challenged claims based on the evidence and arguments presented there. Ex. 1010, 27–34. Here, even if Patent Owner is correct that none of the information establishing nexus has changed, Petitioner should be afforded an opportunity to present its own evidence and argument to rebut that presumption at trial. In addition, the Board weighs secondary considerations against the scope and content of the asserted prior art and any differences between the asserted art and the challenged claims. See WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that “the strength of each of the Graham factors must be weighed in every case and must be weighted en route to the final determination of obviousness or non-obviousness”). In IPR2016-00592, after considering the asserted prior art, the Board noted that it found “certain aspects of” the petitioner’s “obviousness allegations to be at best a close call.” Ex. 1010, 34. Although the panel concluded that there, secondary considerations were “decisive,” it did so only as after weighing petitioner’s obviousness challenge in that case. Id. at 34–35. Here, Petitioner challenges the ’737 patent based on references and supporting evidence that are different from the references and supporting evidence in the previous case. Compare Pet. 2, with Ex. 1010, 5. Because this case involves different patentability challenges than those in IPR2016-00592, we decline to deny the Petition based on the Board’s secondary-considerations analysis in that case.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In sum, Petitioner provides a detailed analysis corresponding each challenged claim element to relevant disclosures in Heller and Quam. See id. at 19–55. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s substantive analysis in its Preliminary Response. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and the underlying evidence cited in support and are persuaded that, at this stage, Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates that the challenged claims would have been obvious over the asserted prior art. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we have determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. We therefore institute trial as to all challenged claims on all grounds stated in the Petition. We decline also to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“and Quam, to the ’737 patent’s claimed computer-implemented, roof-estimation system. See Pet. 19–50. Petitioner describes its proposed combination as “Heller’s ‘RADIUS Testbed System’ (RTS) . . . implemented using the advantageous implementation details and other information about the ‘RADIUS Common Development Environment (RCDE)’ described by Quam, providing a beneficial implementation environment for the site modeling operations described in Heller.” Id. at 16. According to Petitioner, a skilled artisan “would have been motivated and found it obvious to implement Heller’s ‘RADIUS Testbed System (RTS)’ using the implementation details and other information about the ‘RADIUS Common Development Environment (RCDE)’ described by Quam,” because “Heller and Quam both describe portions of the ‘RADIUS’ site modeling platform.” Id. at 17. Further, Patent Owner explains, Quam provides “practical implementation details of the [RADIUS] system” that are not specified in Heller. Id. Petitioner’s second asserted grounds mirror its first, except that Petitioner adds Deaton for its explicit teaching of producing a roof estimate report. See id. at 50–51. According to Petitioner, one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine Deaton with the Heller-Quam system because “including the production of such a report . . . would advantageously enable the site models described in Heller and Quam to be utilized to plan and execute maintenance, repair, and new construction projects, thereby increasing the utility of the combined system.” Id. at 51. In sum, Petitioner provides a detailed analysis corresponding each challenged claim element to relevant disclosures in Heller and Quam. See id. at 19–55. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s substantive analysis in its Preliminary Response. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and the underlying evidence cited in support and are persuaded that, at this stage, Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates that the challenged claims would have been obvious over the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,135,737 - Metacluster LT, Uab v. Bright Data Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 7, 2022 · IPR2022-00687 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1–14, 16, 17, 20–24, and 26–32 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability under § 103.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine, based on the record before us, there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be an individual who, as of October 8, 2009, the filing date of the provisional application to which the ‘622 Patent claims priority, had a Master’s Degree or higher in the field of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science or as of that time had a Bachelor’s Degree in the same fields and two or more years of experience in Internet Communications. Prelim. Resp. 19–20 (citing Ex. 2011 ¶ 18). According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner’s proposed qualifications of a [person of ordinary skill in the art] (Petition at 12) are not materially different at least in terms of affecting an institution decision in this IPR.” Prelim. Resp. 20. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’622 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art, and does not materially differ from Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“claim construction standard as that applied in federal courts in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), which is generally referred to as the Phillips standard. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under the Phillips standard, “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Petitioner offers a discussion of claim constructions for the following terms and phrases: “client device,” “first server,” “selecting, in response to the receiving of the [first/second] URL,” the first server “sending . . . to the [first/second] web server using the selected IP address,” and “using the selected IP address as a source address.” See Pet. 18–21 (citing Ex. 1001, 16:21–22, claims 3–4; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 54–55; Ex. 1005, 8; Ex. 1010, 3–4, 10–12; Ex. 1011, 5, 11–15; Ex. 1012, 2; Ex. 1013, 2–5, 7–12; Ex. 1014, 6). Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s contentions regarding the claim constructions for “client device,” “first server,” and “source address.” See PO Resp. 20–21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 3; Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 35–74; Pet. 20, 33, 48, 64, 76). As demonstrated in the analysis below, at this stage of the proceeding, we need not construe these claim terms and phrases. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“For the purpose of institution and based on Petitioner’s citations to Kocherlakota, RFC 1122, and Dr. Olivier’s testimony (Ex. 1002), we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to RFC 1122 when maintaining the TCP sessions [] disclosed by Kocherlakota.” Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 151); see KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have recognized the benefits of Kocherlakota’ proxy servers exchanging TCP keep-alives with each other.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 151–152). Petitioner asserts that TCP keep-alives help detect when a client crashes or aborts a connection during a network failure and prevents server applications from indefinite hanging and unnecessary resource consumption. See id. at 52–53 (quoting Ex. 1006, 102; citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 152). Petitioner asserts that, in Kocherlakota’s system, following the establishment of sessions between proxy 17 and the client computer 11, proxy 19 and/or proxy 21, one of client computer 11, proxy 19, or proxy 21 could crash. See id. at 53 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 152; Pet. 22–28, 52). According to Petitioner, “without TCP keep-alives, client computer 11, proxy 19, or proxy 21 would unnecessarily expend resources keeping the TCP connection open.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 152). Petitioner further contends that a person or ordinary skill in the art would have known that TCP keep-alives could also prevent periods of inactivity between client devices from causing the TCP connection between them to terminate. See id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 152). Petitioner acknowledges that RFC 1122 identifies potential disadvantages of TCP keep-alives, but Petitioner asserts that a person or ordinary skill in the art “would have recognized these disadvantages are outweighed” by the aforementioned benefits. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 153; Winner Int’l Royalty Co. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 & 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,190,622 - Major Data Uab v. Bright Data Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 15, 2022 · IPR2022-00916 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, 6–11, 13, and 15–24 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing and compelling evidence of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 2. Patent Owner expresses concern, however, that “Major Data was formed as a ‘back-up’ option to continue these IPRs,” and represents that Patent Owner “has not sued Major Data for infringement of any patents and Patent Owner is not aware of any services offered by Major Data.” Prelim. Resp. 3. In its Preliminary Reply, however, Petitioner points out that shortly before Patent Owner filed the Preliminary Response, Petitioner had advised Patent Owner and “confirmed, inter alia, that it is not affiliated with any of the Code200 parties and did not discuss the preparation or filing of IPRs with anyone apart from privileged communications with its own attorneys.” Pet. Prelim. Reply 3. Petitioner avers that “it did not file its IPRs at any another party’s behest.” Id. In its Preliminary Sur-reply, Patent Owner does not directly challenge Petitioner’s representations, but instead “reserves all rights including, e.g., vacatur and sanctions, if any contradictions to Petitioner’s representations should arise.” PO Prelim. Sur-reply 4. Based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has established compliance with the statutory requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) to identify all real parties in interest. C. The ’510 Patent” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Neither party addresses, however, another directive of the Memorandum, which states that “the PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Memorandum 2. The Memorandum explains that “where the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” Memorandum, 4–5 (emphasis added). The Memorandum further explains that “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Memorandum 4. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner’s invalidity grounds, if unrebutted at trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence. See infra Sections IV.D–I. Instituting inter partes review under these circumstances “strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Memorandum 5. Accordingly, based upon our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, and pursuant to the directive in the Memorandum concerning compelling, meritorious challenges, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review as Patent Owner requests.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’510 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or related field (or equivalent experience), and two or more years’ experience working with and programming networked computer systems as of the Priority Date.” Pet. 16. Petitioner further asserts that a person of ordinary skill would be familiar with “the underlying principles of Web, Internet, or network communication, data transfer, and content sharing across networks, including the HTTP and TCP/IP protocols.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 25–27). Patent Owner submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “had a Master’s Degree or higher in the field of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science or as of that time had a Bachelor’s Degree in the same fields and two or more years of experience in Internet Communications.” Prelim. Resp. 29–30 (citing Ex. 2025 ¶ 18). Patent Owner acknowledges that the parties’ respective proposed qualifications “are not materially different, at least in terms of affecting an institution decision in this IPR.” Id. at 30. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’510 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,484,510 - Major Data Uab v. Bright Data Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Sep 15, 2022 · IPR2022-00915 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 12, 14, 15, 17–19, and 21–29 on all asserted grounds, based on compelling evidence that the challenged claims would be unpatentable if unrebutted.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)InstitutedDenied
“Memorandum, which states that “the PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Memorandum 2. The Memorandum explains that “where the PTAB determines that the information presented at the institution stage presents a compelling unpatentability challenge, that determination alone demonstrates that the PTAB should not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” Memorandum, 4–5 (emphasis added). The Memorandum further explains that “[c]ompelling, meritorious challenges are those in which the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Memorandum 4. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner’s invalidity grounds, if unrebutted at trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that the challenged claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence. See infra Sections IV.E–J. Instituting inter partes review under these circumstances “strikes a balance among the competing concerns of avoiding potentially conflicting outcomes, avoiding overburdening patent owners, and strengthening the patent system by eliminating patents that are not robust and reliable.” Memorandum 5. Accordingly, based upon our consideration of the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, and pursuant to the directive in the Memorandum concerning compelling, meritorious challenges, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review as Patent Owner requests.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner identifies Major Data UAB as the real party-in-interest. Pet. 2. Patent Owner expresses concern, however, that “Major Data was formed as a ‘back-up’ option to continue these IPRs,” and represents that Patent Owner “has not sued Major Data for infringement of any patents and Patent Owner is not aware of any services offered by Major Data.” Prelim. Resp. 3. In its Preliminary Reply, however, Petitioner points out that shortly before Patent Owner filed the Preliminary Response, Petitioner had advised Patent Owner and “confirmed, inter alia, that it is not affiliated with any of the Code200 parties and did not discuss the preparation or filing of IPRs with anyone apart from privileged communications with its own attorneys.” Pet. Prelim. Reply 3. Petitioner avers that “it did not file its IPRs at any another party’s behest.” Id. In its Preliminary Sur-reply, Patent Owner does not directly challenge Petitioner’s representations, but instead “reserves all rights including, e.g., vacatur and sanctions, if any contradictions to Petitioner’s representations should arise.” PO Prelim. Sur-reply 4. Based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science or related field (or equivalent experience), and two or more years’ experience working with and programming networked computer systems as of the Priority Date.” Pet. 16. Petitioner continues that “[s]uch a person would be familiar with the underlying principles of Web, Internet, or network communication, data transfer, and content sharing across networks, including the HTTP and TCP/IP protocols.” Id. at 16–17 (citing Teruya Decl. ¶¶ 25–27). Patent Owner submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Master’s Degree or higher in the field of Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science or as of that time had a Bachelor’s Degree in the same fields and two or more years of experience in Internet Communications.” Prelim. Resp. 29–30. We regard Petitioner’s more specific definition as consistent with the ’319 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Therefore, for the purpose of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 14
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“device” as a “consumer computer” was previously considered, and rejected, by the district court in the Teso Litigation. See, e.g., Ex. 1017, 10–12. In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner takes issue with the evidence and the reasoning used by the district court to reject Patent Owner’s previously proposed construction. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 34–36. We have considered Patent Owner’s evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response that the district court’s construction of the claim term “client device” as a “communication device that is operating in the role of a client” is incorrect. See Prelim. Resp. 31–49. For purposes of this decision, however, we concur with the district court’s reasoning and agree with its construction of the claim term “client device” as a “communication device that is operating in the role of a client.” This construction is consistent with, and supported by, the intrinsic evidence of the specification.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,257,319 - PTAB · Sep 14, 2022 · IPR2022-00673 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 under § 103 based on WO684 and NO366, finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“prior situations, how the New Hampshire District Court would rule should a stay be requested in the New Hampshire litigation. See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“A judge determines whether to grant a stay based on the facts of each specific case as presented in the briefs by the parties. We decline to infer, based on actions taken in different cases with different facts, how the District Court would rule should a stay be requested by the parties in the parallel case here.”). We view this factor as neutral because neither of the parties in the New Hampshire litigation has requested a stay thus far. See id. at 12 (determining that Factor 1 is neutral when neither party has requested a stay and the issue has not been ruled on by the district court).” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“We agree with Patent Owner that both WO684 and NO366 were at least considered by the Examiner, even if the Examiner never discussed the references or relied on them in any manner. See Ex. 1001, code (56) (listing both WO684 and NO366 among the references cited). Under these circumstances, we find the first part of the Advanced Bionics satisfied because the prior art before the Examiner and the prior art relied on in the Petition include the same prior art references.” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelOther
“person having ordinary skill in the art “has a Master’s degree in Mechanical Engineering or Robotics and at least three to four years of experience working as an engineer in the field of AS/RS [Automated Storage and Retrieval Systems].” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 62). Petitioner argues in the alternative that one of ordinary skill in the art “has at least a Bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, and at least four to five years of experience working as an engineer in the field of AS/RS.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). Patent Owner argues that “the level of ordinary skill in the art is ‘at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, and at least two to three years’ experience working in the field of the design of robotic vehicles for material handling system[s].” Prelim. Resp. 29 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 50). Patent Owner contends that the parties agreed that this level of skill applies to WO684 in a related ITC proceeding, and should be adopted here. Id. at 29–30 (citing Ex. 2007, 19–20). We note that the parties’ respective proposals overlap considerably, with Petitioner’s alternative proposal nearly identical to Patent Owner’s proposal. We need not resolve which proposal most closely aligns with the level of ordinary skill in the art here, however, because even if we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal we would come to the same ultimate conclusion that Petitioner satisfies its burden of showing a reasonable likelihood of establishing the unpatentability of any of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose any constructions for any claim terms, and “Patent Owner also believes no claim term requires construction and submits that the Petition is defective under any reasonable claim construction.” Prelim. Resp. 30. Based on our review of the current record, we need not formally construe any claim terms to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,961,051
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.