- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd / Micron Technology, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 1, 2024 · IPR2022-01427 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Kim, Rajan, and Wyman; the Board did not reach the alternative Riho, Rajan, and Riho2 ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s assertions regarding non-DRAM devices. The obviousness inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) requires us to determine if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. As Patent Owner confirmed during oral argument, the term “array dies” in the claims encompasses non-DRAMs. Tr. 53:4–7. Because the subject matter pertains to configurations involving non-DRAM devices, the “person having ordinary skill in the art,” by definition under the statute, would have had knowledge of non-DRAM devices. To the extent Petitioner’s proposed skill level, on which the parties agree, does not make that clear, we do. Thus, we accept the uncontested assessment offered by Petitioner with the exception of the qualifier “at least,” which introduces vagueness as to the amount of experience. We also determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been familiar with designs and operations of non-DRAM devices for the reasons discussed above.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“litigation, a district court construed this term based on the following argument made by the applicant during prosecution of the ’060 patent regarding U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2008/0025137 A1 (Ex. 1011 (“Rajan137”)): “Rajan[137] does not disclose ‘a plurality of stacked array dies.’ Rajan[137] merely stacks DRAM circuits 206A–D, which are different from array dies.” Ex. 2004, 31–32 (quoting Ex. 1002 (’060 patent prosecution history), 465 (January 13, 2014 Amendment at 10)). The district court found that Patent Owner “did not explain the structural difference between array dies and DRAM circuits, or even how they might be stacked differently” but, nonetheless, found that Patent Owner “structurally distinguished ‘stacked DRAM circuits’ from ‘stacked array dies’ to obtain the patent.” Ex. 2004, 32. Based on this prosecution history, the district court adopted the defendants’ proposed construction that “array die” means “array die that is different from a DRAM circuit.” Ex. 2004, 32. Samsung is a defendant in that litigation. Patent Owner argues that it “agreed to be bound by this construction and proceeded with the jury trial on that construction.” PO Resp. 17 (citing Exs. 2010, 2011). Yet, during the trial in this proceeding, Patent Owner qualifies the district court’s construction to suggest that the term “array dies” means dies that are different from a particular kind of DRAM circuit. See, e.g., PO Resp. 47 (“[T]he Petition contains no analysis on how or why Kim’s memory chips are different from Rajan137’s DRAM circuits.”); see also Inst. Dec. 10–11 (addressing similar pre-institution arguments); Tr. 58:11–15 (Patent Owner’s counsel’s assertion that Rajan137 “describes, for instance, monolithic memory circuits may take the form of, and then it lists an example. And it lists DRAM as an example of a monolithic memory circuit. So, we take DRAM circuit to be a monolithic memory circuit that holds state while powered.”). The district court’s construction, which Patent Owner asserts it adopted, does not contain any such qualification. In our analysis below, we apply the district court’s construction, and we find that the combination of Kim, Rajan, and Wyman teaches array dies that are not DRAMs and, therefore, are “different from a DRAM circuit.” Therefore, we need not address any further qualifications of the district court’s construction or construe the term “DRAM circuit” to determine what Patent Owner actually disclaimed, if anything. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[P]rosecution disclaimer promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and protects the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution.”); see also Genuine Enabling Tech. LLC v. Nintendo Co., 29 F.4th 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“If the challenged statements are ambiguous or amenable to multiple reasonable interpretations, prosecution disclaimer is not established.”). Based on our findings as to non-DRAM dies, we also need not determine whether the term “array die” should be construed to also encompass DRAM circuits.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that Kim and Rajan are analogous art. Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–151). Patent Owner does not dispute that Kim and Rajan are analogous art to the ’160 patent. See PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner that Kim and Rajan are analogous art because they are both in the same field of endeavor as the ’160 patent—memory packages and in particular those involving stacked memory. Ex. 1001, 1:20–21 (“The present disclosure relates to memory devices and memory modules.”), claim 1 (“memory package” with “stacked array dies”); Ex. 1014 ¶ 3 (“Various embodiments of the present disclosure generally relate to a semiconductor memory apparatus . . . .”), Fig. 5 (stacked memory chips); Ex. 1015, 1:14–16 (“This invention relates generally to digital memory such as used in computers[], and more specifically to organization and design of memory modules such as DIMMs [(dual in-line memory modules)].”), Figs. 2–6 (stacked memories).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“In view of the foregoing, we find that Rajan does not disclose the particular structure in which the shared data busses in Figure 4 are implemented. In other words, Rajan’s disclosure is agnostic as to the particular interconnect technology by which the memories that share data busses are connected to the buffer chip. Dr. Brogioli also testifies that a “data bus can be shared without sharing interconnects, especially in Rajan,” “because Rajan uses wire bonds for connecting its DRAM circuits to the data busses.” Ex. 2023 ¶ 143 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 50). As discussed above, we do not credit Dr. Brogioli’s opinion that Rajan uses wire bonds because it is based on a different reference. Furthermore, the fact that a data bus can be shared without sharing interconnects is irrelevant because Petitioner’s proposed combination is to share interconnects (Kim’s TSVs). See Pet. 30. Rajan’s Figure 4 discloses a stack of memory circuits, as discussed above (see Ex. 1015, 2:6–7, 4:51–55), and Kim discloses using TSVs in stacks of memory chips, as also discussed above (see Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 48, 50, Fig. 5). Thus, Petitioner’s combination is a straightforward one – “implement a shared data bus for multiple memory chips as taught by Rajan . . . using, e.g., Kim’s TSV interconnects.” Pet. 30 (discussed above). At oral argument, Patent Owner’s counsel argued that the “TSV is the individual data wire going down to the bus that’s shared.” Tr. 65:12–13. According to Patent Owner’s counsel, Rajan talks about [two chips] sharing a data bus. So, I don’t see how, from Rajan, you would get the idea of a shared TSV when Rajan speaks solely about sharing data buses. And the data bus, under JEDEC standard, involves individual data wires coming from each of the chips.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 9,318,160 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,318,160 - PTAB · Mar 29, 2024 · IPR2023-01439 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 9–11, 24–26, 28, 29, 35, and 36 on all asserted §103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon considering the argument and evidence presented in the Petition, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims of the ’803 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of the invention (“POSITA”) would have had “a bachelor’s degree and two or more years of experience or a master’s degree in organic synthesis or chemical engineering, with education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 15–16). We adopt Petitioner’s definition as it appears to be consistent with the prior art’s demonstration of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Conventional terms ('about', 'substantially', 'a'/'an', 'configured to')Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding—and without a substantive response from Patent Owner—we determine Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the plain ordinary meaning of “about” and the intrinsic evidence. The claim recites that the carbon chain length of the bio-alkene is “about 5 to about 20 carbons atoms.” Ex. 1001, claim 1 (emphasis added). We agree with respect to the claimed range. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters. Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“When ‘about’ is used as part of a numeric range, the use of the word ‘about,’ avoids a strict numeric boundary to the specified parameter.”) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, the claim term “about 5 to about 20 carbon atoms” does not require precisely 5 to 20 carbon atoms. Moreover, we agree that a carbon atom in a compound is not divisible. Keeping these principles in mind, we find “about 5” at the lower end of the range encompasses a carbon chain length of 4 carbon atoms, and “about 20” at the upper end of the range encompasses a carbon chain length of 21. We also agree with Petitioner that the prosecution history of the related ’902 Application—which also claims the benefit of the ’985 Provisional and shares a virtually identical specification as the ’803 Patent— supports construing “about” to encompass one additional carbon atom, as evidenced by the amendment after allowance amending the term “carbon chain length of about 8 to about 20” to “carbon chain length of 7 to 20.” See Ex. 1006, 335 see also id. at 16, 23–63. Thus, the intrinsic evidence supports Petitioner’s construction and the plain ordinary meaning of “about.”” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,882,803 - PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00181 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–29 and granted Inari’s contingent motion to join the Bayer 1038 IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petition, and has not otherwise addressed Inari’s contentions. Inasmuch as Patent Owner raised counterarguments to the grounds in the preliminary response that it filed in the Bayer 1038 IPR, we addressed those arguments in our Institution Decision in that proceeding. Bayer 1038 IPR, Paper 12. From our review of the preliminary record, we are persuaded that Inari’s Petition challenges the same claims of the ’745 patent, based on the same grounds and substantially the same evidence, compared to the challenge in the Bayer 1038 IPR.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Furthermore, a motion for joinder should (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Inari addresses these considerations in its Motion, and we generally agree with Petitioner’s assertions in favor of joinder. Mot. 3–10. We discuss below.” slip op. at 7
- Other 314aOther
“prevailing, as it is substantively identical to the successful petition upon which we instituted the Bayer 1038 IPR. However, institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (authorizing institution of an inter partes review under particular circumstances, but not requiring institution under any circumstances); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. 261, 273 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). I would exercise that discretion here and deny the Petition. The Bayer 1038 IPR is governed by the petition filed by Bayer. See Facebook, Inc. v. Windy City Innovations, LLC, 973 F.3d 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The already-instituted IPR to which a person may join as a party is governed by its own petition and is confined to the claims and grounds challenged in that petition.”). However, “[t]he instant Petition is substantively identical to the petition filed by Bayer, challenging the same claims of the ’745 patent on the same grounds and relying on substantively identical expert testimony.” Pet. 3. Thus, institution based on the instant Petition creates a second inter partes review that is duplicative of the Bayer 1038 IPR. As we are already granting Inari’s request to join the Bayer 1038 IPR as a petitioner, I see no benefit to granting Inari’s Petition to institute a second inter partes review. I would deny Inari’s Petition.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,299,745 - PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00180 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–29 based on a reasonable likelihood of success and granted Inari’s motion to join the Bayer 1037 IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petition, and has not otherwise addressed Inari’s contentions. Inasmuch as Patent Owner raised counterarguments to the grounds in the preliminary response that it filed in the Bayer 1037 IPR, we addressed those arguments in our Institution Decision in that proceeding. Bayer 1037 IPR, Paper 12. From our review of the preliminary record, we are persuaded that Inari’s Petition challenges the same claims of the ’283 patent, based on the same grounds and substantially the same evidence, compared to the challenge in the Bayer 1037 IPR.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Furthermore, a motion for joinder should (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Inari addresses these considerations in its Motion, and we generally agree with Petitioner’s assertions in favor of joinder. Mot. 3–10. We discuss below.” slip op. at 7
NonePatents in suitUS 11,149,283 - PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00179 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–34 on all four asserted grounds and granted Inari’s motion to join the Bayer 1036 IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petition, and has not otherwise addressed Inari’s contentions. Inasmuch as Patent Owner raised counterarguments to the grounds in the preliminary response that it filed in the Bayer 1036 IPR, we addressed those arguments in our Institution Decision in that proceeding. Bayer 1036 IPR, Paper 11. From our review of the preliminary record, we are persuaded that Inari’s Petition challenges the same claims of the ’555 patent, based on the same grounds and substantially the same evidence, compared to the challenge in the Bayer 1036 IPR.” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Inari addresses these considerations in its Motion, and we generally agree with Petitioner’s assertions in favor of joinder. Mot. 3–10. We discuss below.” slip op. at 7
NonePatents in suitUS 10,947,555 - PTAB · Mar 8, 2024 · IPR2023-01271 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1 and 2 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Lemay alone or with Alfke renders the claims unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“under 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2023). Applying that standard, we institute an inter partes review of all the challenged claims of the ’839 patent for the reasons explained below. This is a preliminary decision, and we will base our final written decision on the full trial record.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party suggests that any claim term departs from its ordinary and customary meaning, and we are aware of no evidence at this stage to suggest otherwise. And for our decision, we do not need to construe any of the terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We discuss the claim terms below in the context of the prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“limitations 1.e(i)–(ix) in view of Alfke. LG sufficiently demonstrates the motivation to combine Lemay with Alfke because Lemay specifically teaches that Alfke’s message-processing disclosures are applicable to the embodiments in Lemay. Ex. 1005, 11:33–41; Pet. 5 n.2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 57. Alfke likewise specifically teaches that its disclosures are applicable to Lemay’s user interface. Ex. 1006, 11:4–12. Pantech also argues that LG’s obviousness arguments based on Lemay are deficient because they are conclusory, provide insufficient rationale, and incorporate material by reference from Dr. Madisetti’s declaration. Prelim. Resp. 28–30. We disagree that LG’s arguments are deficient in this respect because, to the extent (if any) that Alfke is not incorporated by reference into Lemay, the motivation to combine the references appears to be set forth in the references themselves.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,283,839 - PTAB · Mar 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00073 · APJ John F Horvath · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–22 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Upon consideration of the Petition, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim, and we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims on all grounds raised.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[T]he level of skill in the art is a prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the Board views the prior art and the claimed invention.” Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). At this stage of the proceeding, we find Petitioner’s assessment of the level of skill in the art to be reasonable and commensurate with the problems and solutions disclosed in the prior art. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description as our own.3 slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under this standard, a claim is construed “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Only claim terms which are in controversy need to be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. However, “[t]he Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“configured to draw the peak current through its LEDs at a duty cycle substantially corresponding to a duty cycle of the PWM brightness control signal applied to it but out of phase with the other current set circuits. Ex. 1001, 6:48–54. At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner reasonably demonstrates how Thomas’s current set circuits meet this limitation. Pet. 30–32 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:24–63, 4:66–5:20, Figs. 1, 3). Figure 3 of Thomas illustrates that each of the PWM control signals E–H generated by Thomas’s PWM controller (PWM generator 17 and delay means 16) has the same duty signals E–H is coupled to a different current set circuit (resistor 3) through a respective one of switches 5–8, such that each current set circuit draws current through a respective LED group 9–12 at the same duty cycle, but out of phase with the other current set circuits. Ex. 1005, Figs. 1, 3. At this stage of the proceeding, for the reasons discussed above, we find Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing all the limitations of claim 1 are taught by Thomas and that claim 1 is anticipated by Thomas. Claim 14 is substantially similar to claim 1, reciting a method for driving a plurality of LEDs in a plurality of parallel paths that is substantially similar to the method the LED driver of claim 1 is configured to perform. Compare Ex. 1001, 7:51–8:8, with id. at 6:35–54. Petitioner’s analysis of claim 14 refers back to its analysis of claim 1. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of showing claim 14 is anticipated by Thomas.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 7,843,148 - Opticis Co., Ltd. v. Inneos LLCInstitutedPTAB · Feb 2, 2024 · IPR2023-01256 · APJ Terry J Owens · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 on all five §103 grounds in the petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” A decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (implemented as a result of SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018)). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Ground 1 is based upon obviousness, not anticipation. Patent Owner’s argument is not well taken because it does not address what fixing Kurita’s single optical fiber (40) in place.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedInstituted
“The purpose of requiring reasonable diligence by the first to conceive the invention but second to reduce to practice is to assure that the invention was not abandoned or unreasonably delayed by the first inventor during the period after the second inventor entered the field.” Brown v. Barbacid, 436 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “A patent owner need not prove the inventor continuously exercised reasonable diligence throughout the critical period; it must show there was reasonably continuous diligence.” Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[T]here need not necessarily be evidence of activity on every single day if a satisfactory explanation is evidenced.” Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 261 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, Patent Owner must provide an explanation that is satisfactory to indicate that the relied-upon computer modeling and prior art search update show reasonably continuous diligence from November 10, 2003 to January 15, 2004. Patent Owner has provided some evidence to show diligence from November 10, 2003 to January 15, 2004, but Patent Owner has not explained why, under the facts of this case, the evidence is sufficient to establish reasonably continuous diligence for the period before Bhandarkar’s effective filing date to the date of constructive reduction to practice. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions as to how Bhandarkar teaches the subject matter of the claims, and we find them sufficiently persuasive at this stage. Based upon the above-discussed evidence and that the optical combiner claimed in claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art over Bhandarkar. slip op. at 26
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because the factors identified in Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”), weigh in favor of denying institution in view of the district court litigation (Prelim. Resp. 68–69). A Memorandum from Director Vidal titled Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (USPTO June 21, 2022) (“Interim Procedure”)2 provides that “the PTAB will not deny institution of an IPR or PGR under Fintiv . . . where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition” (Interim Procedure 9). Petitioner has submitted such a stipulation (Paper 11). Thus, we do not exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,198,416 - PTAB · Jan 31, 2024 · IPR2024-00298 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–30 of the ’572 patent on all asserted grounds and granted Biocon’s motion to join IPR2023-00884.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We explained in our Institution Decision in IPR’884 why we conclude that Samsung demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial in showing that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See generally IPR’884 DI. The present Petition advances identical arguments, challenging the same claims over the same combinations of prior art. We consequently adopt the same reasoning here as in our IPR’884 Institution Decision, and conclude that Petitioner is likely to prevail in demonstrating the unpatentability of the same challenged claims. Id. We incorporate our previous analysis regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial with respect to at least one claim of the ’572 patent challenged in the Petition for the same reasons as in IPR’884. See id. Therefore, we determine that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“joinder is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122. We determine whether to grant joinder on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular facts of each case, substantive and procedural issues, and other considerations. When exercising that discretion, we are mindful that patent trial regulations, including the rules for joinder, must be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); see also, USPTO, America Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions,” available at: uspto.gov/patents/laws/americainvents-act-aia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked#type-inter-partesreview_3244 (last visited February 2, 2022). B.” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 11,253,572 - PTAB · Jan 30, 2024 · IPR2024-00260 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–30 on all asserted grounds and granted Celltrion’s motion to join IPR2023-00884.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We explained in our Institution Decision in IPR’884 why we conclude that Samsung demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial in showing that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See generally IPR’884 DI. The present Petition advances identical arguments, challenging the same claims over the same combinations of prior art. We consequently adopt the same reasoning here as in our IPR’884 Institution Decision, and conclude that Petitioner is similarly likely to prevail in demonstrating the unpatentability of the same challenged claims. Id. We incorporate our previous analysis regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial with respect to at least one claim of the ’572 patent challenged in the Petition for the same reasons as in IPR’884. See id. Based on the record before us, we determine that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Petitioner certifies and we agree that the Petition is substantively identical to that of IPR’884, where we found Samsung had met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail at trial in establishing at least one challenged claim unpatentable under the asserted grounds. Mot. 5; see generally IPR’884 DI. Petitioner also certifies, and we agree, that it relies on the same evidence here as in IPR’884. Mot. 5. Patent Owner waives its right to file a preliminary response in this proceeding, for the sake of efficiency. See Paper 7, 2. Petitioner also certifies that it will be a “silent understudy” to Samsung in IPR’884 if the proceedings are joined, thus, there will be no impact to the schedule of that instituted trial. Mot. 5–6. Moreover, Petitioner asserts that, structured in this way, the joined proceeding will simplify briefing and discovery (i.e., they will be singular, rather than occurring in two proceedings). Id. at 6–7.” slip op. at 12
NonePatents in suitUS 11,253,572
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.