PTAB
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  • PTAB · Dec 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00994 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and 9–14 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Onishi-based obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

      “inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework in determining whether to exercise its discretion under § 325(d), specifically: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially 4 For purposes of this Decision, we assume the challenged claims have an effective filing date prior to March 16, 2013, the effective date of the relevant aspects of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112- 29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), and we apply the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 103. the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of [the] first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. The art or arguments presented in the Petition are not “substantially the same” as those previously presented to the Office when there are differences between them that are material to the Office’s prior consideration of the art and arguments. Wolfspeed, Inc. v. Trs. of Purdue Univ., IPR2022-00761, Paper 13 at 7–8 (Vidal Mar. 30, 2023).” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’696 patent. Further, we decline to discretionarily deny inter partes review. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’696 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. However, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Mercier, opines that [A]t the time of the ’696 Patent, a POSITA would have a working knowledge of wireless charging and inductive charging. The person would have gained this knowledge through an undergraduate Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, with at least two years of experience working in the field of wireless or inductive charging device design, or testing of such wireless or inductive charging device testing, or 5 The parties have not directed our attention to any objective evidence of obviousness or non-obviousness. an equivalent combination of academic study and work experience. More education (e.g., a Master’s degree) or work experience any relevant field may compensate for a deficit in one of the relevant qualifications stated above. Ex. 2001 ¶ 26. We observe that, in Dr. Mercier’s definition, the undergraduate degree categories are a bit broader and the experience possibly a bit more specific than in Petitioner’s definition. However, at this stage and absent argument to the contrary by the parties, we discern no material difference between the parties’ definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Dr. Mercier’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

      “near-linear region—consistent with the quoted applicant’s use of the term “near-linear”—rather than a linear or non-linear region, which seemingly would encompass the entire curve. As to the second part, we understand Patent Owner to be referring to the purported benefit of linear control, and we determine that Patent Owner has not explained adequately why such a benefit should be read into the claim term “substantially different,” particularly where the quoted Specification support does not explicitly mention linear regulation.7 See Ex. 1001, 21:61–63 (“The induced voltage 7 To the extent that Patent Owner relies on its declarant’s testimony as an explanation of Patent Owner’s claim construction position, we remind Patent Owner about the prohibition on incorporation by reference. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, November 2019, 35–36 can be increased by reducing the transmission frequency and can be reduced by increasing the transmission frequency.”). On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that— consistent with the Specification’s description of the frequency that is “[p]referably . . . selected” and applicant’s argument regarding the same during prosecution—“a transmission frequency substantially different from said characteristic resonant frequency of said inductive couple” encompasses frequencies that lie within one of the near-linear regions of a frequency-amplitude graph associated with the inductive couple. See Ex. 1001, 21:20– 24; Ex. 1002, 70. At this time and for purposes of this Decision, we need not and do not reach the issue of the outer bounds of the scope of “substantially different.” We also note that independent claim 1 is an apparatus claim and the subject limitation 1.7 further defines the “driving circuit” recited in limitations 1.5 and 1.6. Specifically, limitation 1.7 requires a driving circuit that is “configured and operable to produce said oscillating driving voltage at a transmission frequency” that is “substantially different” from the inductive couple’s resonant frequency. Ex. 1001, 28:43–46. In future briefing, the parties’ arguments regarding the prior art references should focus on that recited structure, i.e., a circuit that is configured and operable to produce the recited frequency.” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,048,696
  • PTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · PGR2024-00034 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · PGR · Institution

    Instituted PGR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds after finding at least one claim more likely than not unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review. See 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute a post-grant review, we must determine that “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “We note that the identification of a Ph.D. as an example of “more formal education” creates a vast range of education relative to a bachelor’s degree. Thus, we treat the identification of a Ph.D. just as it is—an example—and not a requirement. In this case, “more formal education” can be satisfied by a level of education less than a Ph.D (but greater than a bachelor’s degree). Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, definition, limited as discussed above, for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “would have understood Unger’s disclosure to “suggest the use of a torsion spring to facilitate attachment and detachment, because torsion springs are designed to impart this functionality.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 118). Petitioner also asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “understood that there were a limited number of ways to impart the referenced resilient or flexible ‘manipulation,’” and “would have been motivated to look to various known solutions to impart the suggested functionality, including the torsional spring mechanism of Smith that is used in a similar hearing protection device application for a similar purpose as Unger’s mounting arms (to apply a clamping force).” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 120–121).” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,736,855
  • PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00861 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 11, 13, and 15–17 because Abbott showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 15–17 are unpatentable over Aspel and Gutekunst.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “(xii) Conclusion for Claims 1 and 15–17 Petitioner has shown sufficiently why a skilled artisan would have known to combine Aspel and Gutekunst with a reasonable expectation of success, and how that combination discloses or suggests each limitation of claims 1 and 15–17. Accordingly, we determine that the Petition establishes there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing that claims 1 and 15–17 of the ’541 patent are unpatentable in view of Aspel and Gutekunst.” slip op. at 25

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “Because Aspel and Gutekunst are both directed to systems for “remote monitoring of health parameters,” Petitioner contends that a skilled artisan “would have recognized Gutekunst discloses devices for monitoring and gathering a ‘user’s medical information’ that would complement the Aspel system” and would have had a reasonable expectation of success integrating Gutekunst’s disclosed device into Aspel’s monitoring system “to provide physiological parameters.” Id. at 31–32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 94–100; Ex. 1005 ¶ 188; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 85, 91, 93, 112–113, 189). Integrating Gutekunst into Aspel, Petitioner contends, “would have involved combining prior art elements (i.e., a glucose monitor sensor and mobile application on a user device) according to known methods to yield predictable results (i.e., receiving glucose data as taught in Gutekunst and providing it to the Aspel system, e.g., the Data Center). Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 101). Patent Owner notes that “in describing its Aspel-Gutekunst combination, [Petitioner] does not describe any modification to Aspel’s “server system” or “remote monitor” other than to work with Gutekunst’s glucose sensor and receiver to allow remote monitoring of Gutekunst’s glucose monitor.” Prelim. Resp. 16. Other than observing that Petitioner’s proposed modification involves a bodily incorporation of Gutekunst’s disclosed glucose monitoring device into Aspel’s monitoring system, Patent Owner does not appear to dispute a skilled artisan would have known to combine Aspel and Gutekunst in the manner proposed. See generally Prelim. Resp 14–18. After studying the evidence and arguments from both parties, we find Petitioner’s contention for why a skilled artisan would have known to combine Aspel and Gutekunst in the manner proposed sufficient for this stage of the proceeding.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesInstituted

      “After studying the evidence and arguments from both parties, we find Petitioner has carried its burden for this stage of the proceeding to establish that a skilled artisan would have recognized that the system Aspel discloses allows the wireless mobile remote monitor to send a user acknowledgment prior to the user accessing at least some of the analyte concentration sensor data associated with the alert being acknowledged. Patent Owner’s contrary position is unavailing because it rests solely on attorney argument that, at this stage of the proceeding, has no evidentiary support. Patent Owner offers no evidence from either an expert or the cited references to support the underlying premise––namely, absent an express statement by Aspel that a user accesses data for an alert after deciding to remove it from the report, a skilled artisan would not have found it obvious for Aspel’s disclosed system to have that functionality. However, Patent Owner does not dispute: (1) Aspel discloses a remote monitor that provides an acknowledgment of a received alert associated with analyte concentration sensor data of a host; and (2) Aspel discloses the remote monitor accessing that host data associated with the alert from the server system. See Prelim. Resp. 36–37. Again, recognizing that a skilled artisan is of “ordinary creativity” and “not an automaton,” Petitioner’s contention and cited evidence demonstrates sufficiently at this stage of the proceeding that allowing a remote user of Aspel’s system to access the data associated with an alert after deciding to remove the alert from the report is simply an arrangement of old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.” slip op. at 21

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’541 patent and the asserted prior art, but we set the level to two years of experience because the qualifier “or more” is unnecessary. Otherwise, we accept and will use Petitioner’s proposed level for this Decision.” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,801,541
  • PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00840 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 5, 11–13, 16–20, 24–26, 28, 34–36, and 39–43 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “DexCom, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) timely filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 7 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “35 U.S.C. § 282(b) “including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). When applying that standard, we interpret the claim language as it would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification. Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Thus, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party identifies any claim language requiring express interpretation, and we currently discern no such claim language. The parties are free to expressly address the meaning of any claim language during the trial. B. Legal Standards” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “likelihood of proving that Brauker describes the subject matter recited in the preamble of claim 1 and limitation 1a. 10 We do not consider the issue of whether Brauker “expressly state[s]” that its predetermined threshold is non user settable to be dispositive of whether Brauker describes step 1b in an anticipation context. Rather, we seek to determine at trial what Brauker describes to an ordinarily skilled artisan. “An anticipating reference must describe the patented subject matter with sufficient clarity and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “claim 1 except for the requirement in limitation 1b that the second function determines whether a “predicted glucose value” meets a criterion that is not set by a user. Pet. 60–66. For this aspect of limitation 1b, Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to incorporate Brauker’s function of determining whether a predicted glucose level meets a threshold into the STS Guide’s second function comparing a glucose level to non user settable criteria. Id. at 62–65. Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have known the advantages of using a predicted low glucose alarm in addition to a real time low glucose alarm, because a predicted low glucose alarm in advance of potential hypoglycemia helps prevent hypoglycemia by giving the user more time to act, for example, by eating sugar.” Id. at 63 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 146; Ex. 1007, 1149; Ex. 1011, 932). Petitioner also contends that prior art establishes the advantages of using alarms based on both real time and predicted glucose values. Id. at 64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 11, 15; Ex. 1010, 68). Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been particularly motivated to add a predicted, non user settable low glucose alarm because [an ordinarily skilled artisan] would have known that non user settable criteria tied to hypoglycemia often relate to clinical danger, [Ex. 1013, 725] (“The user should never go below 50 mg / dL at any time without an alarm.”), and that it is particularly beneficial to have an advance warning of a clinical danger. [Ex. 1003 ¶ 147.] Pet. 64 (internal footnote omitted). Petitioner argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to successfully modify the system described in the STS Guide as proposed because the STS Guide and Brauker both relate to alerts to reduce the severity of hypoglycemia and delivering alarms due to low predicted glucose levels was well known before the alleged invention of claim 1. Id. at 65 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 149; Ex. 1005 ¶ 15; Ex. 1010, 68; Ex. 1007, 1150; Ex. 1020; Ex. 1021).” slip op. at 22

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,119,528
  • PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00797 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 14–16 and 18–20 on both asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We conclude that the record demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to challenged claims 14–16 and 18–20 for the following reasons.” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that A POSITA as of the claimed priority date would have had a Bachelor’s degree in biomedical engineering, electrical or computer engineering, computer science, or a related or equivalent field and two or more years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating (or supervising the same) in wireless communication related to medical devices or equivalent experience. A person with less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard. The prior art also evidences the level of skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “We determine that “authentication” and “identification” are well- understood and widely used terms in communications (including wireless), and these terms do not require any specialized constructions for this proceeding. The ordinary and customary meaning of “authentication” is verifying the identity of communicating devices or users, or, in other words, determining that a device or user is what or who they represent themselves to be. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 30, 32; Ex. 2002, 175.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that “Yarger and Love are analogous art because they are both related to aspects of securely communicating analyte measurements over wireless links in CGM systems.” Id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1005, code (57); Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1003 ¶ 69; In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325–27 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions that Yarger and Love are analogous, and that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine them with a reasonable expectation of success. See generally Prelim. Resp. We determine that Petitioner shows sufficiently that Yarger and Love are analogous and that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine them with a reasonable expectation of success. Specifically, Yarger and Love are directed to similar glucose monitoring systems and are thus in the same field of endeavor and address the same problems. See, e.g., Pet. 20– 21; Ex. 1005, codes (54, 57), ¶ 1; Ex. 1006, codes (54, 57), ¶ 2. Since Yarger already monitors and displays glucose levels, including clinically significant conditions such as hypoglycemia or hyperglycemia, adding Love’s teaching to generate alarms and notifications for such conditions would improve Yarger’s similar system in the same way as taught by Love. See, e.g., Pet. 19–21; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 3, 17; Ex. 1006, codes (54, 57), ¶¶ 70, 78. Since this modification merely requires “routine programming” adding logic to compare glucose levels and generate an alarm when a clinically significant threshold is exceeded, a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the modification. See, e.g., Pet. 20; Ex. 1003 ¶ 73. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,375,222
  • PTAB · Nov 19, 2024 · IPR2024-00853 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims, finding a reasonable likelihood that Abbott would show claims 1 and 12 unpatentable over Gawlick and Valdes.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “known to combine Gawlick and Valdes with a reasonable expectation of success, and how that combination discloses or suggests each limitation of claims 1 and 12. Accordingly, we determine that the Petition establishes there is a reasonable likelihood Petitioner would prevail in showing that claims 1 and 12 of the ’204 patent are unpatentable in view of Gawlick and Valdes.” slip op. at 33

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner asserts that A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as of December 2012 would have had a Bachelor’s degree in biomedical engineering, chemical engineering, mathematics, statistics, or computer science (or a related or equivalent field), and two or more years of experience researching, developing, designing and/or evaluating (or supervising the same) systems for measuring and monitoring (including remote monitoring) of a host’s analyte data, or similar data, or equivalent experience. A person with less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard. Each of these POSITAs may be part of an interdisciplinary team with others having the relevant experience set forth above and/or with clinicians involved in diagnosing, treating, monitoring, and managing patients using medical devices.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner has carried its burden for this stage of the proceeding to establish that a skilled artisan would have considered it obvious to integrate Valdes’s disclosed system and method for communicating glucose concentration information between devices into Gawlick’s disclosed system and method for adjusting an alert rule used to indicate a status of a patient. Petitioner’s evidence supports sufficiently that the proposed Gawlick and Valdes combination is simply an arrangement of old elements with each functioning as intended and yields no more than would have been expect from such an arrangement. Petitioner’s cited evidence shows: (1) Gawlick teaches a medical alert system 100 that includes a patient monitor system 106, which broadly covers one or more electronic devices that continuously, periodically, and/or upon request monitor the physiological characteristics of patients; (2) Gawlick teaches a medical alert system 100 that uses the patient monitor system to monitor blood glucose physiological characteristics and allows for adjustable alert rules to be established to indicate the status of a patient’s blood glucose; and (3) Valdes teaches a system for communicating glucose concentration information between devices using a receiver designed to transfer information related a patient’s blood glucose physiological characteristics continuously monitored by a sensor to a network system. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–109; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1, 20, 21, 37, 39, 112–113, Figs. 16, 17, 26, 27; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 4, 20, 39, 59, 92–93, 97, 110, 118, 177. Recognizing that a skilled artisan is of “ordinary creativity” and “not an automaton” (KSR, 550 U.S. at 421), Petitioner’s cited evidence demonstrates that Valdes’s disclosed system is an example of a patient monitor system that Gawlick suggests integrating into its disclosed medical alert system. As such, we are persuaded Valdes and Gawlick provide sufficient support for Petitioner’s contention that integrating Valdes’s system into Gawlick’s system is nothing more than combining known elements in a known way, which would produce predictable results (i.e., allowing Gawlick’s system to receive and monitor data associated with the physiological characteristics of a patient’s blood glucose).” slip op. at 18

    § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,213,204
  • PTAB · Nov 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00851 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution on all claims 1–7 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented does not show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of challenged claims 1–7. We thus deny institution of inter partes review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) (“At any” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner

      “claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112[(f)] applies” and that “the failure to use the word ‘means’ also creates a rebuttable presumption—this time that § 112[(f)] does not apply.”12 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part) (internal citations omitted). Because the “sealing means” limitation includes the word “means,” we start from the rebuttable presumption that § 112(f) applies. Petitioner does not address the applicability of § 112(f) and does not rebut the presumption. We continue the analysis, however, and, for the reasons below, we agree with Patent Owner that § 112(f) applies to the “sealing means” limitation.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “3. “fits behind” In wherein clause (vi), claim 1 recites: “the outwardly pointing outer flange of the first connecting device fits behind the inner flange of the nut unit.” Ex. 1001, 9:4–5 (emphasis added). In the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner discusses the term “fits behind” in this claim language. See Prelim. Resp. 41–45. We need not construe explicitly this language or any other claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,851,030
  • PTAB · Nov 14, 2024 · PGR2024-00026 · APJ Hyun J Jung · PGR · Institution

    Instituted PGR on claims 1–7 and all grounds because Petitioner showed it was more likely than not that at least one challenged claim lacks written-description support.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “At this stage, Petitioner’s arguments, cited portions of the Specification, and supporting testimonial evidence demonstrate that it is more likely than not that claims 1–7 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 20

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDecided for petitioner

      “patent describes that “angular position transducer 78 is placed on top of swing leg pivot shaft 24” and that “pivot shaft 24 is rotationally fixed to the connector plate and duplicates the angular movements of swing leg 20 about the pivot shaft.” Ex. 1001, 12:15–16, 12:20–22, Figs. 5, 7. The ’723 patent also describes that “[a]ngular position transducer 78 is mounted inside . . . protective can 90 . . . which is bolted to hinge bracket 28 via an upright holding arm 92” and that “trigger pin 94 projects upwardly from the top surface of pivot shaft 24 and cooperates with angular position transducer 78 to generate an angular position signal.” Id. at 12:28–33, Fig. 5. These descriptions expressly convey that angular position transducer 78 is on pivot shaft 24 and mounted inside protective can 90 that is bolted to hinge bracket 28. Id. at 12:15–16, 12:20–22, 12:28–30, Figs. 5, 7; see also Prelim. Resp. 17 (describing the same embodiment shown in Figs. 5 and 7). According to Petitioner, the ’723 patent describes the pivot shaft as part of the hinge bracket, not the modular frame or swing leg. Pet. 109–110 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:42–46, 12:17–22). On the preliminary record, we agree because the cited portions of the Specification describe that a “hinge bracket is interposed between each swing leg and an associated surface of the bolsters and includes a fixed, upright pivot shaft that pivotally engages the swing leg for pivotal movements” and “pivot shaft 24 is rotationally fixed to the connector plate.” Ex. 1001, 7:42–45, 12:20–21. We also agree that “even if one were to find that the hinge bracket is part of either the modular frame or swing leg (contrary to the claims and specification treating these all as separate components), the specification would only provide written description for one of the claimed alternatives.” Pet. 110 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 199).” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “At this preliminary stage, we determine that express claim interpretation is not necessary to determine whether it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 16

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “We will also not use our discretion under § 325(d) to deny the Petition based on arguments previously presented in IPR2021-00135, because Petitioner relies on a Board determination regarding claim 8 from IPR2021- 00136, not arguments previously made for claim 1 in IPR2021-00135. Pet. 111–115, 119; Prelim. Resp. 8–9; Prelim. Sur-reply 5. Furthermore, we determined the effective filing date of claim 8 of the ’571 patent without deciding, that other challenged claims, such as claim 1, were entitled to their earliest possible effective filing date. See Godberson-Smith, Paper 61 at 11, 12.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,772,723
  • PTAB · Nov 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00835 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would be unpatentable over CIII and Rio.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “Advanced Bionics stated that: If, after review of factors (a), (b), and (d), it is determined that the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office, then factors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Factor (c) focuses on the record developed by the Office in previously reviewing the art or arguments. It informs, therefore, the petitioner’s showing under factors (e) and (f), which focus on the petitioner’s evidence of previous Office error regardless of the context in which the same or substantially the same art or arguments were previously presented. For example, if the record of the Office’s previous consideration of the art is not well developed or silent, then a petitioner may show the Office erred by overlooking something persuasive under factors (e) and (f). On the other hand, if the alleged error is a disagreement with a specific finding of record by the Office, then ordinarily the petitioner’s required showing of material error must overcome persuasively that specific finding of record. That is, although Becton, Dickinson factor (c) evaluates “the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection,” the focus should be on the record when determining whether the Office erred in evaluating such art or arguments.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “d) Petitioner Shows a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing Based on the preliminary record, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge that CIII and Rio teach, suggest, or would have been understood to disclose the limitations of claim 1 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 28

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “track” that “is configured to rotate . . . relative to the jacking column,” Petitioner proposes modifying CIII in view of Rio “by positioning Rio’s rotary actuator 44 between the jacking column and crawler track, and using that rotary actuator to rotate CIII’s crawler track relative to the entire jacking column, rather than just its outer cylinder.” Pet. 45 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 89) (emphasis added); see also id. at 47 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 92; Ex. 1006, 5:8–11, 6:2–6). Petitioner argues such a modification would have been a design choice, one of a finite number of alternatives, obvious to try, and a known design that provides maneuverability. Id. at 29–31 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 61–67; Ex. 1006, 5:8–11; Ex. 1007, 5:14–59, Figs. 4–5; Ex. 1008, 7:35– 53, Figs. 7, 20; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 5, 19–20, Fig. 2; Ex. 1011, 4:7–16, Fig. 3; Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 41, 44–45). At this stage, Petitioner’s arguments and cited evidence sufficiently support for institution that the modification would have been made so that the proposed combination would have had “a crawler track” that “is configured to rotate . . . relative to the jacking column.” Regarding claim 1’s “slew drive,” as discussed above, Petitioner proposes modifying CIII so that rotary actuator 44, the asserted slew drive, would be between the jacking column and crawler track. See Pet. 29–31. Petitioner also argues that, in the proposed combination, “actuating the rotary actuator causes the crawler track to rotate relative to the entire jacking column.” Id. at 47 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 92). The present record supports Petitioner’s argument that Rio’s worm gear actuator would have been understood to disclose a slew drive with support from the ’318 patent itself, the opinion of its declarant, and deposition testimony of Patent Owner’s expert in related litigation. Id. at 46–47 (citing Ex. 1001, 11:40–61; Ex. 1002 ¶ 91; Ex. 1006, 4:61–5:3; Ex. 1032, 84:12–86:17). At this stage, the cited evidence sufficiently supports for purposes of institution Petitioner’s argument that the proposed combination would have included the recited “slew drive.”” slip op. at 28

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “had at least a four-year degree in mechanical engineering or a closely related field and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or operating heavy machinery, including their components and control systems.” Pet. 8– 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 22–24). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree, and an advanced degree could substitute for experience.” Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 22–25). Petitioner states that “[t]he Board adopted this definition of the level of ordinary skill for the related ’749 patent.” Id. (citing Godberson-Smith Const. Co. v. Guntert & Zimmerman Const. Div., Inc., IPR2020-01698, Paper 80, 21–24 (PTAB Apr. 12, 2022) (Final Written Decision)). For purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 13 (quoting Pet. 8–9). Based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. Pet. 8–9; Godberson-Smith, Paper 80 at 21–24 (determining level of ordinary skill after considering the parties’ competing proposals and evidence).” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,535,318
  • PTAB · Nov 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00744 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any challenged claim under the asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and at least one year of experience in sensor/detector design or RF communications (RFIDs)” and “would have a working knowledge of tire pressure management systems and, as most POSA would also be automobile owners, would have had personal experience with tire pressure management systems which have been required in all new cars, trucks, and SUVs in the United States since 2007.” Pet. 17. Petitioner adds that “[e]ducation may substitute for experience and vice versa.” Id.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner contends that all claim terms should be given their ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 17. Petitioner notes that, in the tire pressure detecting field, terms such as “detector,” “sensor,” and “monitor” relate to the same device and can be used interchangeably. Id. at 17–18. Patent Owner contends that no claim term needs construction to resolve the grounds asserted in the Petition. Prelim. Resp. 16. On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s unsupported assertion that tire pressure sensors typically are programmed with only the ID as part of the factory installation is insufficient to establish obviousness in this instance. Petitioner does not provide adequate reasoning or evidence to 11 Petitioner relies on the same analysis of this claim 26 limitation for the substantially similar limitation of claim 27. Pet. 66. Accordingly, our analysis of the claim 26 limitation applies equally to the corresponding limitation of claim 27. art would have known that tire pressure sensors typically are programmed at the factory with a single ID. Furthermore, even if assuming for the sake of argument that Petitioner’s assertion is correct, the Petition fails to explain adequately how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the combination of Tang and Lemense to store only the old identification in the old tire pressure detector.” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,031,064

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.