- Adc Solutions Auto LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00577 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 32, 38, 39, 47, 52, and 54 are unpatentable as obvious over Richardson and Zhao and over Yu and Paparrizos.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, as of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and at least two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience with DC power supply or battery charger design[;] . . . [l]ess work experience could be compensated for by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–42; Ex. 1014, 10–11). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’023 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’023 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits there are no formal claim constructions necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 23. Patent Owner “does not propose any terms need to be construed.” PO Resp. 18. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary to decide whether to institute, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that the skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teachings of Richardson and Zhao to achieve the subject matter of claim 1. For example, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Richardson’s system to include the USB input circuit of Zhao to avoid the need to supply a proprietary charger or other type of AC ‘power brick’ that would be less ubiquitous or less standardized,” increase flexibility and convenience, and cater to consumer demand for USB technology. Pet 45–46 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88– 89). Petitioner further alleges that the addition of a USB input circuit would provide for an alternative where traditional charging methods are lost, damaged. or otherwise unavailable. Id. at 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 88). Thus, Petitioner has provided sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the teachings of the applied references. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We acknowledge, but are not convinced by, Patent Owner’s arguments that the nature of Richardson requires the ability to charge a high capacity battery and rapid recharging and therefore would not have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to include Zhao’s USB charging circuit in Richardson. See PO Resp. 25–31. In particular, we are not persuaded that Richardson is limited to high capacity, rapid recharging of batteries as Patent Owner suggests. Instead, Richardson broadly describes “an apparatus and method for temporarily delivering supplemental power to the electrical system of a vehicle” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 6) where “[t]he jump starter 10 may be configured for 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42 or 48 volts” (id. ¶ 34). According to Richardson, this may be achieved by using “two or more batteries of the same or different voltage levels . . . to achieve the voltage requirements of the vehicle to be started.” Id. By way of example, Richardson states that “if the batteries 23 are both 12-volt batteries, the system may be configured for 12- or 24-volt operation” and “[i]f the batteries 23 are 12-volt batteries and a battery 25 is a 6-volt battery, 18- or 30-volt configurations may be provided.” Id. Neither Richardson’s claims nor its specification require any particular charging capacity or charging time. See generally Ex. 1005. While a single, near-final paragraph of Richardson introduces the concept of rapid charging of the jump starter batteries to charge a fleet of vehicles, Richardson characterization is permissive or optional. For example, Richardson states The charging system of the vehicle may be used to charge the capacitors 21 and jump starter batteries 22. . . . This allows the capacitors 21 and jump starter batteries 22 to be fully recharged in about 1 to 5 minutes and can therefore start many vehicles in a row without becoming discharged. Id. ¶ 55 (emphasis added). We do not view this singular occurrence as supplanting the breadth of Richardson’s complete disclosure. Furthermore, the crux of Patent Owner’s argument is that because of Richardson’s goal of charging high capacity batteries a USB charger would require significant charging time. PO Resp. 29; Sur-reply 2–14 But, nowhere does Patent Owner allege that a USB charger would not work given sufficient time.11 See generally PO Resp. and Sur-reply. And, when faced with no alternative, the person of ordinary skill in the art must balance the trade-offs and consider charging slowly, or not at all. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”); see also Winner 11 Petitioner in its Reply presents some evidence of charging times using a USB input charger. Pet. Reply 4–7; Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 6–12, Appendix A. Patent Owner disputes the accuracy of Petitioner’s calculations. Sur-reply 2–11. But, whether Petitioner’s calculations are accurate or not, Petitioner’s proposed alternative modification does not remove the faster charging path and instead adds the convenience and flexibility of a secondary charging method where the primary and faster charging path is unavailable. Ex. 1044 ¶ 12.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,447,023 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,447,023 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00631 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, and 15–22 on all five asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’027 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims (i.e., 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, and 15–22) of the ’027 patent, based on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “possessed an undergraduate degree in chemistry, polymers, materials science, chemical engineering (or related field) and one to two years of experience with constructing and manufacturing tires, tire patches, tire decals/stickers and/or the like.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–11). According to Petitioner, “Additional education could compensate for less practical experience. Conversely, additional practical experience could compensate for less education.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide an alternate definition, but, “Patent Owner does not acquiesce to, and reserves the right to address, [Petitioner’s] definition of a POSA.” Prelim. Resp. 6 n.6. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’027 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s contentions that these disclosures indicate that Wilson’s patch would not meet the construction of “barrier material composition.” None of these disclosures even suggests that the base of Wilson’s patch is rigid as Patent Owner suggests. To begin with, the fact that the housing is “more rigid” provides no information about the absolute rigidness of the patch. See Ex. 1009, 9:16–21. As for the disclosure that the patch is contoured (id. at 3:35–67), Patent Owner provides only attorney argument to support its contention that the contour demonstrates that Wilson’s patch must be so rigid that it cannot be meet the claim limitation. In contrast, Petitioner demonstrates that Wilson discloses using the exact same materials described in the challenged patent (see Ex. 1001, 6:33–58 (noting “[e]lastomeric materials useful for forming the intermediate layer 24 include but are not limited to gum rubber, vulcanized natural rubber SBR . . . or comparable materials”); Ex. 1009, 3:49–55 (noting the patch may be constructed from natural rubber (NR), a preferred mixture of chlorobutyl rubber and natural rubber (CR/NR), or a preferred mixture of SBR and natural rubber (SBR/NR)), and provides detailed testimony from its expert to support its contentions (see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–119). On the current record, we find Petitioner’s reasoning and evidence to be persuasive, and find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Willson discloses or teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,124,027 - Air Products And Chemicals, Inc. v. Evonik Operations GmbH And Evonik CorporationNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00611 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–23 were not shown unpatentable: the Ungerank Patent was not established as prior art, and Scholz did not establish the claimed recycle range or motivation to modify its systems.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ . . . and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(e)). Here, Petitioner asserts that (1) the combined teachings of the Ungerank Patent and Scholz disclose or suggest all of the limitations of claims 1–5, 7, 9, and 11–23 of the ’380 patent, and (2) the Ungerank Patent qualifies as prior art because the portions cited in the Corrected Petition and the Baker Declaration were published in the Ungerank Application.7 slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner ultimately has the burden of persuasion, based on all the evidence, on both these assertions. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378. After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the portions of the Ungerank Patent relied on in the Corrected Petition and the Baker Declaration qualify as prior art. There is nothing in the Initial Petition or the exhibits filed in support thereof that indicates Petitioner’s intention to rely on the Ungerank Application as prior art in this proceeding. The Initial Petition defines “Ungerank” as the Ungerank Patent, and all citations to “Ungerank” in support of Petitioner’s allegations are to the Ungerank Patent. Initial Pet. 3, 12–14, 17–42. The Initial Petition does not refer to the Ungerank Application, and the Ungerank Application was not submitted as an exhibit with the Initial Petition. Id. at iii–v (Exhibit List). And Petitioner’s expert declarant, Dr. Baker, did not consider the Ungerank Application when formulating his opinions in support of the Initial Petition. Ex. 1003 ¶ 51 (identifying materials considered). Although the Corrected Petition redefines “Ungerank” as the Ungerank Application, the Corrected Petition retains its citations to the Ungerank Patent.8 Corrected Pet. 3, 12–15, 18–43. In that regard, Petitioner generally asserts that the Ungerank Application’s “specification and figures 8 At the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel stated that they left the citations to the Ungerank Patent in the Corrected Petition because they “didn’t want to make tons and tons of changes,” and the Ungerank Patent citations “are much more specific.” Tr. 12:10–13; see also Pet. Reply 10 (“Moreover, by citing AP-1006’s column and line numbers instead of AP-1038’s paragraph numbers, Petitioner provided more specific citations in support of its arguments.”). are identical to the” Ungerank Patent, but does not direct us to where the specific portions of the Ungerank Patent that it asserts to be prior art can be found in the Ungerank Application. See id. at 3. We are also not directed to any evidence in the record that indicates that Dr. Baker compared the portions of the Ungerank Patent on which he relies to the disclosures in the Ungerank Application, or even considered the Ungerank Application at all. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 51; Ex. 1041 ¶ 4; Ex. 2009, 44:10–45:18; Ex. 2018, 12:18– 23. We decline to perform an analysis that is missing from the Corrected Petition and Dr. Baker’s testimony. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 866–67 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A brief must make all arguments accessible to the judges, rather than ask them to play archaeologist with the record.”). Accordingly, Petitioner does not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cited portions of the Ungerank Patent were published in the Ungerank Application.” slip op. at 17
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Our rules provide that a petitioner must include “[a] full statement of the reasons for the relief requested, including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence including material facts, and the governing laws, rules, and precedent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a). Our rules also state that “[a] reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” Id. § 42.23(b). “‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” CTPG 74. Our Trial Practice Guide explains that “Petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g., to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id. at 73; see also id. at 74 (“Examples of indications that a new issue has been raised in a reply include new evidence necessary to make out a prima facie case for the patentability or unpatentability of an original or proposed substitute claim, such as newly raised rationale to combine the prior art references that was not expressed in the petition.”). In the Reply, Petitioner argues that “POSITAs ‘might have already figured out’” that, in Comparative Example 1, the surface area of the membrane in stage 2 was larger than that of the membrane is stage 1, and Scholz’s Figure 7 systems with larger stage 2 membrane areas than stage 1 were “consistent with POSITAs’ likely intuition about [Comparative Example 1’s] stage 2 and stage 1 areas.” Pet. Reply 19. As Petitioner concedes, this “an additional reason POSITAs would have found it appropriate to look to Scholz’s Figure 7 to better understand [Comparative Example 1’s] relative surface areas.” Id. (citing Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 31–32) (emphasis added). The case presented in the Corrected Petition is that a POSITA would have looked to Scholz because Comparative Example 1 does not provide details on the area of the membranes or their ratios. Corrected Pet. 18–19. Petitioner’s admitted “additional reason” to combine the Ungerank Patent and Scholz in the Reply is a newly raised rationale to combine the prior art references necessary to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability. See CTPG 74. Accordingly, Petitioner’s untimely new argument is waived, and we do not consider it here.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Having considered the complete trial record, we determine that Petitioner fails to sufficiently demonstrate that the combination of the Ungerank Patent and Scholz teaches limitation [1.f.ii] because Petitioner fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a POSITA would have been motivated to look to the relative sizes of the membranes in the stages of Scholz’s Figure 7 to determine the relative sizes of the membranes in the stages of Comparative Example 1.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 10,471,380 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,471,380 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00560 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–29 and every asserted ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Chang and Fang.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 18. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.13” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because binding. We wish to have the record developed before rendering any binding determination, finding, or conclusion. 14 The citation to Ex. 1005, 2290 appears to be an error. We do not find the cited claim construction at this location. we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ultiple reasons would have prompted a POSITA to implement a diaphragm pump in Chang’s breast pump device in accordance with Fang’s suggestions.” Id. at 21–24. Based on the record before us, we agree that Fang discloses a diaphragm, as recited in clause 1[a][1]. We also agree, based on the record before us, that a person of ordinary skill would have had multiple reasons to use Fang’s diaphragm pump in Chang’s device with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,813,381 - Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalInstitutedPTAB · Jul 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00371 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–25 based on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that POSCO would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–25 of the ’227 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’227 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions. Pet. 3. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Takagi and Cornette, citing the Declaration of Dr. Miles for support. Pet. 1, 6–49 (citing Ex. 1003) (Petitioner’s Ground 1A). a. Claim 1 Petitioner argues that Takagi and Cornette teach or suggest each recitation of claim 1. Pet. 6–31. Petitioner argues, for example, that the preamble of claim 1 is not limiting or, alternatively, imparts no structural distinction from Takagi. Id. at 20–23 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 48). Petitioner further argues that Takagi and Cornette teach forming or hot stamping to arrive at their products. Id. at 23 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1016 ¶ 36 (Takagi referring to “form[ing]” its products shape); Ex. 1014, 9–11 (Cornette referring to “hot stamping”); Ex. 1003 ¶ 48. Petitioner argues that Takagi teaches a strip of base steel having a first and second side. Id. at 23–24 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 49; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 13, 36. Petitioner argues that Takagi teaches a coating that is a “diffusion layer” having five phases as depicted by Takagi Figure 2A and explained by Takagi Table 1 (Takagi Fig. 4). Id. at 24–30 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–59; Ex. 1016 ¶ 20, Fig. 2A). Petitioner argues that Takagi alone or as modified by Cornette teaches a coating thickness greater than than 30 µm. Id. at 30–31; Ex. 1014, 9; Ex. 1016 ¶ 35; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–61. Petitioner explains why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine teachings of Takagi and Cornette with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 11–20 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31–47; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 19–37, 47; Ex. 1014, 9; Ex. 1025, 5:17–20; Ex. 1026, 7; Ex. 1034 ¶ 13; Ex. 1055 ¶¶ 2, 7, 14–15, 18, Fig. 3). Based on our review and consideration of the current record, we determine that the information presented sufficiently supports, for purposes of institution, Petitioner’s assertions that Takagi and Cornette teach or suggest each limitation of claim 1. See Pet. 6–31. We therefore determine Petitioner has met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 would have been obvious over Takagi and Cornette.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,326,227 - Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalInstitutedPTAB · Jul 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00370 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–30 on all twelve asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that POSCO would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–30 of the ’602 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’602 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions. Pet. 3. We do not discern a need to construe any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200” slip op. at 9
- BurdenInstituted
“determine that the information presented sufficiently supports, for purposes of institution, Petitioner’s assertions that Takagi and Cornette teach or suggest each limitation of claim 1. See Pet. 6–33. We therefore determine Petitioner has met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is obvious over Takagi and Cornette.” slip op. at 12
Claim constructioncites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,961,602 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00359 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4 and 7–17 on all petition grounds and granted Samsung’s unopposed motion for joinder in IPR2024-01013.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We instituted review of claims 1–4 and 7–18 of the ’483 patent in IPR2024- 01013 after a review of all arguments and evidence presented by the parties, including Patent Owner’s arguments in its preliminary response. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision in IPR2024-01013, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of showing at least one claim of the ’483 patent is unpatentable. Thus, we find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Upon consideration of Petitioner’s arguments, we are persuaded that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the proceeding in IPR2024-01013. Petitioner’s agreement to accept an “understudy” role and to not actively participate in IPR2024-01013 unless the current petitioner ceases to participate will limit any potential impact on the trial schedule and will avoid increasing the costs or complexity of the proceeding. Therefore, joinder of Petitioner to IPR2025-00359 will further the goals of a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of Petitioner’s challenge. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).” slip op. at 10
Nonecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,153,483 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00358 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–16 on all petition grounds and granted Samsung’s motion to join IPR2024-01012 as an understudy petitioner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Whether the Petition Warrants Institution As we note above, the Petition challenges the same claims on the same grounds of unpatentability, and relies on the same evidence, including the same declarant testimony, as presented in the 1012 IPR. Pet. 1; Mot. 6– 7. In other words, the Petition is virtually identical to the petition filed in the 1012 IPR. We incorporate our analysis from the 1012 IPR regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and determine that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) that institution of an inter partes review is warranted under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, we determine Petitioner has established good cause for joining the 1012 IPR. Specifically, we find that joining Petitioner to the 1012 IPR is unlikely to require any delay or modification to the scheduling order already in place for the 1012 IPR. We also determine that Patent Owner will not be prejudiced unduly by the joinder of this proceeding. Thus, we determine that granting the Motion for Joinder under these circumstances would help “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” of these proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). For the above reasons, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner as a party to the 1012 IPR.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 10,608,282 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00355 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–23 on the petition’s grounds and granted Samsung’s motion to join the LGES IPR in an understudy role.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Whether the Petition Warrants Institution As we note above, the Petition challenges the same claims on the same grounds of unpatentability, and relies on the same evidence, including the same declarant testimony, as presented in the 1005 IPR. Pet. 1; Mot. 5. In other words, the Petition is virtually identical to the petition filed in the 1005 IPR. We incorporate our analysis from the 1005 IPR regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and determine that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) that institution of an inter partes review is warranted under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, we determine Petitioner has established good cause for joining the 1005 IPR. Specifically, we find that joining Petitioner to the 1005 IPR is unlikely to require any delay or modification to the scheduling order already in place for the 1005 IPR. We also determine that Patent Owner will not be prejudiced unduly by the joinder of this proceeding. Thus, we determine that granting the Motion for Joinder under these circumstances would help “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” of these proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). For the above reasons, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner as a party to the 1005 IPR.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 9,636,649 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00356 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–8 on all petition grounds and granted Samsung’s unopposed motion to join IPR2024-01006.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We agree with the parties that the Samsung Petition “involves the same patent, challenges the same claims, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art.” Id. (Patent Owner’s admission); see Mot. 3 (Petitioner, averring that the Samsung Petition and the Petition filed in IPR1006 are “substantively identical”). Under these circumstances, our reasons for instituting review based on LG Energy Solution’s Petition apply with equal force to the “substantively identical” Samsung Petition. Id. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in the Institution Decision filed in IPR1006, we institute review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Samsung Petition. See generally IPR1006, Paper 8 (Institution Decision in IPR1006).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“(1) the Motion for Joinder is timely, having been “filed within one month of the institution decision” in IPR1006; (2) the Samsung Petition “is substantially identical to the” Petition filed in IPR1006; (3) “joinder will have minimal, if any, impact on the trial schedule, as all issues are substantively identical”; (4) Petitioner agrees to “accept an ‘understudy role’” in the joined proceeding, unless LG Energy Solution, Ltd. “is terminated from” IPR1006; and (4) joinder will simplify “briefing and discovery” as all issues will be resolved “in a single proceeding.” Mot. 3–4. Patent Owner contests none of those facts. To the contrary, Patent Owner does “not oppose” the Motion for Joinder and “fully expects this proceeding to be joined with” IPR1006. Waiver 1. Having considered Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder, as well as Patent Owner’s Waiver, we determine that joinder of the instant proceeding with IPR1006 is appropriate. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s unopposed Motion for Joinder, subject to the requirements set forth in the Order below.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 8,808,909
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.