• W-W Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Jager Pro, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 16, 2022 · IPR2020-01470 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–28 are unpatentable as obvious over the listed combinations of TB1, TB2, Jeong, and, where applicable, Vorhies, Silsby, and Kimura.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “1 A combined oral hearing was held for this proceeding and related proceeding IPR2020-01471. 2 Petitioner served and then filed, at our request, a list of objections to Patent Owner’s demonstrative exhibits. Paper 34; see Tr. 6:3–26 (discussing Petitioner’s objections). As we explained at the oral hearing, “although the demonstratives are a useful aide during the oral hearing, we do not rely on them when rendering a final written decision. We rely on the arguments raised in the briefing and the evidence submitted in each case.” Tr. 6:11–15. Thus, we have noted Petitioner’s objections, but we dismiss them as moot because demonstrative exhibits are not evidence and we do not rely on them in rendering this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 2

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “Challenged Claims. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). To prevail, Petitioner must prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). Having reviewed the arguments and the supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Challenged Claims of the ’228 patent are unpatentable.” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “by Petitioner. In particular, Petitioner “substitut[es] the triggering mechanism and methodology of Jeong for the tripwire triggering mechanism known from the TexasBoars Combination” and asserts that such substitution “would yield predic[t]able results with a reasonable expectation of success.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 110). The success identified by Petitioner is making the modifications proposed—substituting or adding the teachings of Jeong to TB1/TB2 to create a remotely controlled, detected corral trap. Nothing about these modifications has anything to do with trap-shyness or conditioning of the animals as Patent Owner contends. Rather, the success has to do with whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the combination. And, Petitioner’s arguments are supported by Dr. Ditchkoff’s testimony (Ex. 1002 ¶ 110) as well as Jeong itself because Jeong effectively takes a trap and adds the same features and method (remote control and detection) that Petitioner proposes to add to TB1 and TB2 (see Pet. 32 (relying on Jeong and the stated benefits therein)). Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established sufficiently that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason with rational underpinning to make the modifications proposed and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in so doing.” slip op. at 70

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the only claim for which we consider the question of nexus is claim 1.59” slip op. at 128

  Patent outcomesUS 9,814,228 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,814,228
• Ecofasten Solar, LLC / Wencon Development, Inc. D/B/A Quickmount PV Corporation et al. v. Unirac, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · Feb 8, 2022 · IPR2021-01379 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR for claims 3–7, 9, 10, 13, and 15–23 under § 325(d), finding the same or substantially the same art or arguments had previously been presented to the Office.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

    “and Nobuyuki[] are the same or substantially the same as art previously considered by the Office, in either original prosecution or during reexamination.” Prelim. Resp. 30. Patent Owner asserts that the first part of the Advanced Bionics two-part framework for determining if denial of institution under § 325(d) is proper is satisfied. We agree, based on our analysis above. Specifically, we determine that under Becton, Dickinson factors (a), (b), and (d), the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. Turning to the second part of the Advanced Bionics framework, Petitioner also argues that the “Examiner erred in a manner material to patentability by adopting a narrow construction of ‘one or more clamps variably positionable on the dual track rail and footing grid’ that is inconsistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 19. We disagree. We discussed the Board’s appeal decision in the previous section of this Decision. The Board affirmed the entirety of the RAN decision by the Reexamination Examiner, including construction of the phrase Petitioner argues was construed in error. We are not persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden to show error. Thus, under Becton, Dickinson factors (c), (e), and (f), Petitioner has not demonstrated a material error by the Office.” slip op. at 41

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied

    “Accordingly, based on our analysis of the Becton, Dickinson factors and the guidelines in Advanced Bionics, we exercise our discretion and deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. III. CONCLUSION Taking into consideration the arguments in the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we exercise our discretion and deny institution of an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).” slip op. at 42

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner also argues that the “Examiner erred in a manner material to patentability by adopting a narrow construction of ‘one or more clamps variably positionable on the dual track rail and footing grid’ that is inconsistent with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 19. We disagree. We discussed the Board’s appeal decision in the previous section of this Decision. The Board affirmed the entirety of the RAN decision by the Reexamination Examiner, including construction of the phrase Petitioner argues was construed in error. We are not persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden to show error. Thus, under Becton, Dickinson factors (c), (e), and (f), Petitioner has not demonstrated a material error by the Office.” slip op. at 41

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 7,434,362
• Intel Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 21, 2022 · IPR2020-01302 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, 7, and 9–11 were not determined unpatentable because the asserted Larson and Larson–Butler grounds did not teach sampling.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Neither party contends that the differences in proposals affect the outcome of this proceeding and we do not find that they do. Nonetheless, on the full record before us, we find that our identification of the level of ordinary skill in art from the Institution Decision as well as Patent Owner’s option (b) are supported by the prior art of record, the ’474 patent, and the opinions of Drs. Subramanian and Steer (which, as discussed above, recognize that additional work experience can compensate for the lack of a formal degree). Accordingly, we modify our preliminary finding to include the specifics from option (b) of Patent Owner’s proposal. Thus, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of RF circuit design, or at least five years of work experience and training in the design and development of RF circuits and/or systems. We also find that less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Because the parties agree that the claims remaining in the trial require “sampling” and also agree that the prior art asserted in this case does not teach “sampling” (as discussed further below), we need not construe these terms expressly to resolve the controversy before us. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803. sampling Although claim 1 does not recite “sampling” expressly, the post- institution briefs make clear that the parties agree that claim 1 and its dependent claims require sampling. In particular, Patent Owner contends, (1) “the ’474 patent pertains to a technique called sampling, which involves the use of a ‘switch’” (PO Resp. 2); (2) “all of the challenged claims are directed to a sampling system and, in particular, an energy sampling system (also known as an energy transfer system)” (id.); and (3) “[t]he challenged claims only cover energy sampling and the use of switches” (id. at 20). In its Reply, although Petitioner disagrees with Patent Owner’s interpretation of the claims as limited to energy sampling (i.e., energy transfer systems) (Pet. Reply 3–7), Petitioner contends that based on its “subsequent analysis of [Patent Owner’s] foundational ’551 patent—one of the multiple patents which the ’474 patent incorporates by reference—[Petitioner] now agrees with [Patent Owner] that the claims cover only systems that down-convert by sampling.” Pet. Reply 2. Thus, at a minimum, the parties agree that the claims at issue in this proceeding require sampling.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Discussion As discussed above, the parties now agree that (1) the claims at issue in this proceeding require “sampling” and (2) Larson alone or in combination with Butler do not disclose “sampling” and do not otherwise render the claims unpatentable. See Pet. Reply 2 (stating Petitioner agrees that “the claims cover only systems that down-convert by sampling”), 13 (stating that Larson and Butler do not disclose “down-conversion by sampling” and therefore agreeing that “Larson and Butler do not invalidate those claims”); see Ex. 2031, 6:20–22 (Patent Owner explaining, that “as the Board is aware, both parties agree that sampling is in the claims, and the claims are not invalid in view of all the cited prior art” (capitalization altered)). As such, based on Petitioner’s explicit admissions, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Larson anticipates claims 1, 3, 4, and 9–11 or (2) the combination of Larson and Butler would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1, 3, 4, 7, and 9–11 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Discussion As discussed above, the parties now agree that (1) the claims at issue in this proceeding require “sampling” and (2) Larson alone or in combination with Butler do not disclose “sampling” and do not otherwise render the claims unpatentable. See Pet. Reply 2 (stating Petitioner agrees that “the claims cover only systems that down-convert by sampling”), 13 (stating that Larson and Butler do not disclose “down-conversion by sampling” and therefore agreeing that “Larson and Butler do not invalidate those claims”); see Ex. 2031, 6:20–22 (Patent Owner explaining, that “as the Board is aware, both parties agree that sampling is in the claims, and the claims are not invalid in view of all the cited prior art” (capitalization altered)). As such, based on Petitioner’s explicit admissions, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Larson anticipates claims 1, 3, 4, and 9–11 or (2) the combination of Larson and Butler would have rendered the subject matter of claims 1, 3, 4, 7, and 9–11 obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 7,539,474 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,539,474
• Intel Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 21, 2022 · IPR2020-01265 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 3 is unpatentable under §103 over Tayloe and the TI Datasheet; the Board did not reach the Tayloe and Kawada ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “outcome of this proceeding and we do not find that they do. Nonetheless, on the full record before us, we find that our identification of the level of ordinary skill in art in the Institution Decision as well as Patent Owner’s option (b) are supported by the prior art of record, the ’444 patent, and the opinions of Drs. Subramanian and Steer (which, as discussed above, recognize that additional work experience can compensate for the lack of a formal degree). Accordingly, we modify our preliminary finding to include option (b) from Patent Owner’s proposal. Thus, we find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two or more years of experience in the field of RF circuit design, or at least five years of work experience and training in the design and development of RF circuits and/or systems. We also find that less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther

    “proposes that it be construed to mean “an element that stores a nonnegligible amount of energy from an input electromagnetic (EM) signal.” Pet. Reply 10. Petitioner contends that its proposed construction expressly tracks the definition provided in the ’551 patent for “storage element,” which the parties agree is synonymous with “storage module.” Id.; see id. at 10 n.2. In particular, Petitioner asserts that the ’551 patent states: “Storage modules . . . refer to systems that store non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal.” Id. (quoting Ex. 2007, 66:65–67). Petitioner notes that the ’551 patent also states that “the ‘goal of the storage modules’ is ‘to store non-negligible amounts of energy transferred from the EM signal’” and that the patent “specifically distinguishes storage elements from holding elements on this basis.” Id. at 10–11 (quoting Ex. 2007, 66:59–67 (“Holding modules . . . identify systems that store negligible amounts of energy from an under-sampled input EM signal with the intent of ‘holding’ a voltage value. Storage modules . . . on the other hand, refer to systems that store non-negligible amounts of energy from an input EM signal.”)). Thus, Petitioner contends “‘storage element’ should be construed accordingly.” Id. at 11 (citation omitted).” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “Owner fails to “establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220. In particular, neither Patent Owner nor Dr. Steer makes any attempt to establish nexus with the elements recited in claim 3 based on a presumption of co-extensiveness or otherwise. Each instance in which Dr. Steer mentions claim 3, he only ties the discussion to energy transfer systems or energy sampling in general, which is based on Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction that we do not adopt. See, e.g., Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 229 (“energy transfer (energy sampling) system – of claim 3”), 230 (“energy sampling as set forth in claim 3”), 233 (“[u]sing energy sampling . . . as set forth in claim 3”), 234 (“energy sampling as set forth in claim 3”), 235 (same), 236 (same), 237 (“using the energy transfer (energy sampling) system of claim 3”), 238 (same), 239 (“energy sampling system as set forth in claim 3”). Thus, we find that Patent Owner fails to establish that a presumption of nexus is warranted and similarly fails to establish nexus absent the presumption. Accordingly, for the reasons above, Patent Owner has not satisfied its burden to establish nexus. See WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (patent owner “bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists”).” slip op. at 64

  Patent outcomesUS 7,110,444 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,110,444
• SAP SE v. Teradata US, Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 17, 2021 · IPR2021-00855 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution

  Instituted IPR of claims 1–7, 26–33, and 52–57 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Deshpande ’98 and Shim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’357 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–7, 26–33, and 52–57 of the ’357 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “privy.”). Accordingly, we determine that this factor does not weigh either for or against exercising our discretion to deny institution in this case.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

    “would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Deshpande ’98 and Shim for a variety of reasons, most notably because Deshpande ’98 explicitly states that in-cache aggregation is the next logical step in multi-dimensional cache development, and Shim advantageously provides an implementation of that aggregation suggested by Deshpande ’98. Pet. 38. Thus, Petitioner contends, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been explicitly directed to look for opportunities to improve on Deshpande ’98’s system via in-cache aggregation,” and that direction would have naturally led to Shim. Id. at 39 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 98). Relying on Dr. Lehner’s testimony for support, Petitioner contends that “[a]ccessing data from cache memory is well known to be significantly faster than accessing data from a database,” “[i]n-cache aggregation [as taught in Shim] increases the amount of cached data that is eligible for answering a current query,” “[m]ore eligible cache data . . . results in more cache hits,” and “a greater number of cache hits results in faster average performance.” Id. at 39–40 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 99–100). Petitioner also notes that Shim cites to Deshpande ’98. Id. at 41 (citing Ex. 1003, 10). Finally, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in implementing the combination of Shim and Deshpande ’98 in view of Shim’s example descriptions and pseudocode algorithms. Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 102).” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 16. Patent Owner agrees that most terms do not require construction, but disagrees as to the term “active cache,” recited in independent claims 1, 26, and 28. Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner proposes construing that term to mean a “cache that can not only answer queries that match data stored in the cache, but can also answer queries that require aggregation or other computation of the data stored in the cache,” in accordance with the ’357 patent’s description of an “active cache.” Id. at 10; see Ex. 1001, 3:1–5. As Patent Owner points out, the Petition acknowledges that description of an “active cache” in the ’357 patent and appears to apply such a construction in its unpatentability analysis. Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Pet. 35, 72). In view of the ’357 patent’s description of an “active cache,” at this stage of the proceeding we adopt the proposed construction of “active cache” as a “cache that can not only answer queries that match data stored in the cache, but can also answer queries that require aggregation or other computation of the data stored in the cache.” During trial, if appropriate, the parties may further address the construction of this term.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,763,357
• SAP SE v. Teradata US Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 15, 2021 · IPR2021-00863 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution

  Instituted review of claims 1–3, 5–9, 11–13, 15, and 17–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “1. “Data Temperature” Petitioner argues that the term “data temperature” in claims 2–3, 8–9, and 12–13 “includes any value representing the number or frequency of accesses of particular data in storage, either in absolute or relative terms.” Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:44–47, 15:37–42, 18:24–27; Ex. 1003 ¶ 34). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 17. At this stage of the proceeding, and based on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction of this term.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “At this stage of the proceeding, and based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner’s three proposed constructions of “persistent data temperature” are reasonable and, as discussed further below, that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that “persistent data temperature” is disclosed or suggested by the prior art under any of the three constructions. For purposes of institution, we need not determine which of these three proposed constructions is correct; however, the parties may address this issue further if appropriate during the trial. 3. Other Terms We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science and two years of industry experience or research working with database and related storage management technologies,” and that “[a]dditional education, such as an M.S. in computer science, could substitute for the industry experience.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30). According to Petitioner, the person of ordinary skill would have been familiar with “DRAM cache, flash or other solid-state storage device[s], tape, optical media, and other well-known storage types,” “[c]oncepts of data ‘temperature,’” “[m]ulti-level storage tiers and managing data storage between volatile devices (e.g., cache) and non-volatile devices (e.g., disk) based on temperature,” and “[w]ell-known concepts such as volatile storage, non-volatile storage, and data persistency.” Id. at 9–10 (citing Ex. 1005, 2:23–38, 5:65–6:3, 21:33–43, 25:21–62; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 3–4; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 18– 52; Ex. 1001, 8:7–13). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 17. At this stage of the proceeding, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’623 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “sufficiently established that Morris inherently discloses this element based on the evidence of record. Petitioner does not point to specific portions of Morris that expressly state that storage information associated with storage of data in the disk drive (such as temperature values 420 in Figure 4) are provided to the cache, or that indicate that this step is necessarily present in Morris’s system. For example, it appears that there might be other places for storing temperature information or other ways of providing that information to the cache. Additionally, Dr. Long does not explain why one of ordinary skill would have “necessarily” understood that Morris’s process would have checked data HEADER 410 in Figure 4 to see if it contained a temperature value, and then used this temperature value as part of the Figure 2 steps, rather than obtaining the temperature value from another source. However, we determine that, for purposes of institution, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that element 1.3 would have been obvious over Morris. Petitioner’s obvious argument is supported by Dr. Long’s testimony that, when using data temperature to determine whether data should be stored in the cache (as reflected in Figure 2), it would have been obvious to “check[] the data ‘HEADER’ (410 in FIG. 4) to see if it contained a ‘temperature value’ (420 in FIG. 4), and then us[e] this temperature value as part of the FIG. 2 steps.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 51. As Dr. Long explains, data objects 400 with headers 410 and temperature values 420 in Figure 4 are “stored on a disk drive.” Id. ¶ 46. Dr. Long further testifies that one of ordinary skill “would have recognized the expressly disclosed ‘temperature value’ variable” 420 stored on the disk “as the best measure of a given data object’s temperature and the first place to check for whether a disk-stored data object had an associated temperature.” Id. “Given the express disclosure of this [temperature value] variable” 420, Dr. Long continues, it “would have been a natural choice” for the person of ordinary skill in the art to use it “when evaluating whether to cache data being read from the disk,” and one of ordinary skill would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Id. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, this testimony provides logical reasons why one of ordinary skill would have provided the temperature value from the disk to the cache, and is not merely “conclusory.” We reach a similar determination as to Petitioner’s obviousness argument based on the process for determining whether data should be deleted from the cache in Morris’s Figure 3. Petitioner’s argument is supported by Morris’s statement that “[t]he data temperature is stored with the data object in the cache,” and Dr. Long’s testimony that it would have been obvious to have “this data temperature in the cache originate[] from the ‘temperature value’ retrieved from the disk when originally storing the data in the cache.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 53; Ex. 1003 ¶ 54. Dr. Long further explains that “it would have been obvious to implement the Morris system in this way because the temperature maintained on the disk was the most natural source for the value of the data temperature stored in the cache,” and one of ordinary skill “would have used that approach with a reasonable expectation of success.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 54. “In fact,” according to Dr. Long, “given that the temperature value was persistently stored with the data on the disk,” the disk “was the only logical source for a reliable temperature value when deciding whether to load the data into the cache,” because “[a]ny other source would have risked being inaccurate or out of date and would have needlessly and redundantly stored the temperature in another location.” Id. This testimony provides logical reasons why one of ordinary skill would have provided the temperature value on the disk to the cache.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,720,623
• SAP SE v. Teradata US Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Nov 15, 2021 · IPR2021-00861 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 and all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the present record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed construction supported by the intrinsic evidence. The ordinary meaning of “manage the storage of data in the volatile storage” does not require limiting the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage, and Patent Owner does not argue to the contrary. Turning to the language of the other claims, we note that claim 5, which depends from claim 1, specifically includes additional language stating that the data is stored “only in one of two portions of the volatile storage,” but claim 1 does not include such language. The use of this additional limitation in dependent claim 5 suggests that the inventors did not intend it to be included within claim 1’s broader language reciting “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage.” See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“the presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim”). Turning to the ’923 patent specification, the portions of the specification Patent Owner relies on appear to discuss a preferred embodiment of the invention, rather than limiting the invention itself. The portions of columns 14 and 15 upon which Patent Owner relies discuss Figure 3 which, the specification explains, “depicts a volatile storage 300 that uses a persistent temperature-based storage management technique as well as a conventional storage management technique in accordance with one embodiment.” Ex. 1001, 14:48–51 (emphasis added); see id. at 5:5–8 (also describing Figure 3 as being “in accordance with one embodiment” of the invention). Interpreting claim 1 to require maintaining only a single copy of a data portion in either the first portion or second portion, where that language does not exist in claim 1, would be tantamount to reading a limitation from a preferred embodiment into the claims, which would be improper. See Philips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”). Patent Owner does not identify any portions of the specification suggesting that limiting the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage is a necessary part of the invention, or that the inventors intended to expressly or impliedly define “manage the storage of data in the volatile storage” to include this requirement. Consequently, at this stage of the proceeding, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction requiring that “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage” requires “coordinating placement of data into and out of the volatile storage so as to limit the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage.” The parties may further address the meaning of this claim phrase during the trial, if appropriate.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “3. Other Terms We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention would have had “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science and two years of industry experience or research working 2 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. with database and related storage management technologies,” and that “[a]dditional education, such as an M.S. in computer science, could substitute for the industry experience as it typically involves at least two years of additional study focused exclusively on computer science, as well as a thesis or project spanning several terms to implement a substantial project.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). According to Petitioner, the person of ordinary skill would have “understood the advantages of partitioning a volatile memory into multiple different sections (e.g., buffer pools) and applying multiple different storage management (e.g., cache replacement) policies to those different sections, and known how to implement such designs.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 14. For purposes of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’923 patent and the asserted prior art of record.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “At this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Lee discloses this claim element. Paragraph 17 of Lee discloses the use of a temperature-based storage management technique and a non-temperature-based storage management technique (the LRU replacement policy), and that both “may be used to manage a cache.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Based on the present record, Petitioner sufficiently shows that Lee’s disclosure of using these techniques “to manage a cache” involves “manag[ing] the storage of data in” the cache, because both techniques operate in order to control what data is stored in the cache. We do not find Patent Owner’s argument persuasive because it is based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “manag[ing] the storage of data in the volatile storage” to require “limit[ing] the number of copies of the data in the volatile storage,” which we do not adopt. See § II.A.2, supra. Consequently, we determine that, on the record before us, Petitioner’s cited evidence sufficiently supports its contentions regarding this limitation.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,851,923
• Netflix Inc. / Hulu, LLC v. Divx, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 9, 2021 · IPR2020-00646 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 5, 8, 9, 13–15, 18, and 21–23 were not shown unpatentable because Kaku was not established as analogous art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot shown unpatentableNon analogous artNot shown unpatentable

    “A reference is considered analogous prior art: (1) if the reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed subject matter, or (2) if “the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved,” even though the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. The field of endeavor test asks if the structure and function of the prior art is such that it would be considered by a person of ordinary skill in the art because of the similarity to the structure and function of the claimed invention. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325–27. A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem. In re Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner proposes constructions for three claim terms, including the term “trick play functionality.” Pet. 22–23. Patent Owner argues for construction of the related claim term “the first and second indexes enabling trick play functionality.” See PO Resp. 41–49. We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any of those claim terms because construction of the proposed terms does not impact our determination that Petitioner has not shown that one of the prior art references is analogous to the claimed invention. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 9

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedNot reached

    “Under the particular circumstances in this case, we need not assess the merits of Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude. As discussed above, we have determined that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance that Kaku is analogous prior art to the ’792 patent and do not reach Petitioner’s arguments on the motivation to combine Kaku with Zetts or Seo. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 34

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedGranted

    “As discussed above (supra § III.E.4.a), Petitioner’s papers fail to link Dr. Reader’s declaration testimony on the level of ordinary skill in the art to the analogous art inquiry and fail to identify a field of endeavor for the ’792 patent. We therefore agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s demonstrative slide 53 presents improper new arguments that have not been previously made. See Paper 38, 2 (“The parties may only rely upon evidence that has been previously submitted in the proceeding and may only present arguments that have been previously made in the submitted papers. No new evidence or arguments may be presented at the hearing.”), 5 (“Demonstratives are not a mechanism for making new arguments.”). We therefore sustain Patent Owner’s objections. We note, however, that demonstratives are not evidence. See id. at 5 (“Demonstrative exhibits used at the hearing are not evidence, nor will they be relied upon as evidence. Rather, demonstratives are visual aids to a party’s oral presentation regarding arguments and evidence previously presented and discussed in the papers”); CTPG 84 (“Demonstrative exhibits used at the final hearing are aids to oral argument and not evidence.”). In this Final Written Decision, we rely solely on the arguments properly presented in the parties’ briefs and the evidence of record, not on the demonstratives.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,472,792 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,472,792
• Platform Science, Inc. v. Omnitracs, LLCRehearing granted
  PTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on all petition grounds for claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 44

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.6 Petitioner 6 As noted above, Petitioner raises a second claim construction issue in its Rehearing Request. See Req. Reh’g 12–15 (asserting that the claims require only one instance of copying information from a formatted message to a response message based on which formatted message was received). Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Petition, Patent Owner has not had an contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 2–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “VI. ANALYSIS Legal Standards – Anticipation “[A] claim is anticipated ‘if each and every limitation is found expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Anticipation is a question of fact, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009), assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, see Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,925,308
• Intel Corporation v. VLSI Technology LLCRehearing denied
  PTAB · Feb 19, 2021 · IPR2020-00527 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied Intel’s rehearing requests and left in place its § 314(a) denial of institution in both proceedings based on the Fintiv factors.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for patent owner

    “Petitioner has not shown that this change in circumstance warrants modifying (1) the determination that Fintiv factor 4 weighs in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution or (2) the determination, after weighing all factors and taking a holistic view of the relevant circumstances, to exercise discretion to deny institution. Several of the claims challenged in each Petition are still at issue in the parallel proceeding, and the combinations of references asserted by Petitioner in the district court largely overlap with the combinations of references asserted in the Petitions. Petitioner has not identified any differences among the claims that have been dropped and the claims that remain as a reason to modify our Decision. See Fintiv, Paper 11 at 13 (“if a petition involves the same prior art challenges but challenges claims in addition to those that are challenged in the district court, it may still be inefficient to proceed because the district court may resolve validity of enough overlapping claims to resolve key issues in the petition”).” slip op. at 5

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 6,633,187

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.