- Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00697 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8 were not proven unpatentable: Rauhala does not disclose the required simultaneous signal-strength determinations, and Masaaki does not cure the deficiency for claim 4.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Following institution, Patent Owner maintained the same level of ordinary skill proposed in its preliminary response and did not address our discussion of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision. PO Resp. 24–25; see also Prelim. Resp. 24. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision, we adopt and apply for this Decision the level of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. See Dec. 8–10. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’825 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27– 31. Our decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the desired signal and interferer signal must be received at the same time. The plain language of the claim requires the wireless transceiver to “receiv[e] a wireless signal having a desired signal and an interferer signal,” the determining of a signal strength of the interferer signal and the determining of a signal strength of the desired signal must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. The specification supports this understanding. “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:20–22; see also id. at 5:31–33 (“FIGS. 2A and 2B illustrate examples of desired signals, interferers, and noise that may be received by one of the various circuits in a” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner that Rauhala does not state that the signal strengths are measured simultaneously or at the same time. Indeed, as discussed above, Rauhala indicates unequivocally in the same paragraph the opposite—that detector DET provides to control unit 42 “an indication about either the receive channel signal strength RSS or the strength of any signal on the reception band.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 17. Rauhala describes that “control unit 42 provides two one-bit control signals cA and cM” based on indications received from detector DET. Id. Importantly, Rauhala indicates that “at the same time as” describes how the control unit 42 uses the received inputs RSS and RSSn shown in Figure 4, which are described earlier in paragraph 17 as indications of either RSS or RSSn from detector DET. Id. (“Signal cA is 0 when signal RSS is greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the 11 Dr. Baker’s reply declaration correctly quotes Rauhala paragraph 17 but cites to paragraph 18. We deem this harmless error. same time smaller than Sn. . . . Signal cM is 1 when signal RSS is not greater than S4 and signal RSSn is at the same time at least Sn. Otherwise, signal cM is 0.”). The burden remains on Petitioner to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Rauhala discloses the disputed limitations as arranged or combined in the claim. Petitioner does not persuasively reconcile these “either/or” statements regarding the functioning of detector DET with the “at the same time as” statements regarding control signals output by control unit 42 in paragraph 17. We do not find persuasive Petitioner counsel’s position expressed at the hearing that Rauhala’s “either/or” statements are “simply an imprecise description” (Tr. 16:22–24). We do not see a lack of precision in Rauhala’s “either/or” statements.” slip op. at 30
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“When asked at his deposition to explain Rauhala’s use of the word “or” regarding the functioning of detector DET, Dr. Baker asserted that “[detectors] can be designed to determine RSS or RSSn.” Ex. 2016, 85:5– 12. We find Dr. Baker’s testimony that “it’s reasonable that if you can design . . . the detector to detect one or the other, you can also design it to detect both” to be without factual support. Id. at 85:13–16. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence to support that would have led one of ordinary skill to design such a detector or to support that one of ordinary skill would have understood Rauhala’s detector to be so designed. Furthermore, Dr. Baker recognizes that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. We give little weight to Dr. Baker’s unsupported testimony that one could design a detector to detect both RSS and RSSn from the same wireless signal. See 37 C.F.R. 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., No. IPR2022-00624, 2022 WL 3648989, at *6 (PTAB 2022) (precedential) (Director affirming because “the cited declaration testimony is conclusory and unsupported, adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support, and is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,129,825 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Theta IP, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00698 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–11, 13, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because Rauhala does not disclose simultaneous desired and interferer signal-strength determinations, defeating anticipation and the obviousness combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The two proposals are materially similar in the education requirement, but differ marginally in professional experience required (three versus five years). See supra. While we were persuaded, on the preliminary record, that both Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposals were consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’202 patent and the prior art of record, on balance, we determined that Petitioner’s proposal was a better reflection of the level of skill in the prior art, and we therefore adopted it for our Institution Decision. See Institution Dec. 12–13. For this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used previously in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’202 patent, the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker. See Baker I Decl. ¶¶ 28–32. Our Decision would not change, however, if we had applied Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“85:13–16. He admits that “Rauhala doesn’t teach the details of what’s in the detector.” Id. at 91:6–7. He points to no textbook or other independent evidence that would have led a person of ordinary skill to design such a detector. Our Trial Practice Guide cautions against crediting such unsupported testimony: The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, the testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data. Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (Nov. 2019).7 We therefore give Dr, Baker’s unsupported testimony on this issue little weight.” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Having considered the positions of the parties, we find that for the purpose of this decision, we do not need to construe these terms to resolve a dispute.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“requirement.” Pet. Reply 5. We do not agree with Petitioner. We find that the language of the claims supports Patent Owner’s argument that the desired signal and the interferer signal are received together. As discussed infra, claim limitations 7.7 and 7.8 recite determining a signal strength of the interferer signal and determining a signal strength of the desired signal. These determinations must be performed at the same time; otherwise, the determinations of signal strengths would not be of the same wireless signal. See Larson II Decl. ¶ 70; Baker II Decl. ¶¶ 48–49 (explaining that consideration of signal strengths detected at the same time would be “essential”). The specification of the ’202 patent further supports this finding: “When a receiver is actively receiving a desired signal, each block in the signal path has at its input the desired signal as well as noise and possibly interfering signals.” Ex. 1001, 5:22–24; see also Figs. 2A, 2B (showing interferer signals and desired signals together).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,524,202 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,524,202 - PTAB · Oct 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00766 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim obvious over the asserted prior-art grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious over the prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“However, each of these asserted modifications is based on a teaching that is not present in Brown. Brown does not teach “a projection that provides resistance against ‘handle’ movement” or that “opening Brown’s ‘cover’ requires bending Brown’s ‘port,’” as asserted by Petitioner. See PO Resp. 22. As repeatedly noted, the identified “projection” appears to be nothing more than a portion of cover 14 the accessory/hose port. Petitioner’s arguments regarding a projection that provides resistance and a bendable port in Brown, appear to be nothing more than an effort to create the limitations of the claims in the prior art based on improper hindsight. For at least the above reasons, the Petition does not show how Brown teaches or suggests all of the limitations of the independent claims.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable
“Petitioner argues that when cleaning tool 10 (i.e. accessory) is in position on the vacuum, end wall 26 cannot open and, thus, that end wall is inhibited from opening. Pet. 45–46 (citing Ex. 1005, ¶ 37, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 143–145 (similar statements from Petitioner’s declarant)). Petitioner then asserts that the catch is therefore inhibited from moving to the disengaged position. Id. at 46. The combination of Dimbylow and Howes does not teach this limitation and Petitioner’s assertions are not persuasive. As can be seen from the above annotated Figure, nothing inhibits Dimbylow’s catch 42 from moving to a disengaged position. See also Prelim. Resp 11–14. Rather, any time Howe’s button is pressed, thereby moving the push-rod (to the right in the Figure), catch 42 would disengage, whether the door opened or not. Though cleaning tool 10 (i.e. accessory) inhibits end wall 26 from opening, it has no impact on movement of catch 42 (i.e. lock engaging member) from the engaged to disengaged position as required by the claim. Thus, the lock engaging member of Petitioner’s combination, i.e., the catch, is not inhibited from moving to a disengaged position when the accessory, i.e., the cleaning” slip op. at 17
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSA”). Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner’s declarant asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and 2-3 years of experience in machine design, such as vacuum cleaners. Additional education could offset less experience and vice versa, and a POSA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means. Ex. 1002 ¶ 42; see also Pet. 22 (making the same assertion without citation to declarant). Patent Owner does not contest the level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 2. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s (and its declarant’s) proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’477 patent and prior art of record. We adopt the above definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,568,477 - PTAB · Oct 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00734 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 3, 15, 17, and 19–21, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 15, 17, and 19–21 in the ’518 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have been someone”: (1) “knowledgeable with the computer networking techniques available at the time”; and (2) “who had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of experience working with computer networks, including network security.” Pet. 7. Petitioner also asserts that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Dr. Crovella’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertions. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–16. Based on the current record and for purposes of this decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’518 patent as well as the asserted references. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 16.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Based on the current record, Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of institution that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reasons, i.e., as articulated by Dr. Crovella, to combine the teachings of Gai, Yip, and Kwan in the way Petitioner proposes. See Pet. 14–21, 27, 29–31, 38; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 51–58, 62–72, 91–92, 98, 101, 121. Based on the current record, Petitioner also establishes sufficiently that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of the references. See Pet. 16–17, 22, 38; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 59–60, 73–74, 121. (f) Preliminary Conclusion About Alleged Obviousness As discussed above, Petitioner’s analysis addresses how the combined disclosures in Gai, Yip, and Kwan teach claim 1’s subject matter. See supra §§ III.D.4(a)–(d). Additionally, Petitioner provides reasons with rational underpinnings as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Gai, Yip, and Kwan in the way Petitioner proposes and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See supra § III.D.4(e). Hence, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of proving that claim 1 is unpatentable under § 103(a) because the claim would have been obvious over Gai, Yip, and Kwan.” slip op. at 34
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,623,518 - PTAB · Oct 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00733 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success based on anticipation by Liddell and obviousness over Simpson and Liddell.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“preamble term “hand carriable” does not limit the claimed apparatuses. “[A] preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Catalina Marketing, 289 F.3d at 808 (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). This rule against giving effect to intended-use language in the preamble “reflects a longstanding substantive aspect of the patent statue—specifically, the ‘well settled’ fundamental principle ‘that the recitation of a new intended use for an old product does not make a claim to that old product patentable.’” Arctic Cat Inc. v. GEP Power Products, Inc., 919 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In this case, we view the phrase “hand carriable,” as it appears in the preamble, to be indicative of an intended use of the claimed apparatuses, rather than a structural limitation, and as such, we do not see it to be limiting based on the current record. Patent Owner does not point to any particular structural limitation required by the preamble term “hand carriable.” See Prelim. Resp. 2–10. Although the independent claims each recite “a handle,” the claims do not explicitly tie this limitation to the “hand carriable” language in the preambles. In any case, to the extent the handle recited in the claims may be used for carrying the claimed apparatus, the claims need not rely on the preamble term “hand carriable” for antecedent basis, as the handle limitation is introduced in the body of the claims. In other words, with respect to the functionality of carrying the apparatus by hand, the claim bodies recite “a structurally complete invention.” Catalina Marketing, 289 F.3d at 808.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Reference is prior artInstituted
“reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in challenging the patentability of independent claim 1. In our view, Petitioner’s analysis, on this record, adequately identifies where all the elements of claim 1 are found in Liddell.” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“On the current record, we find that the Petition provides sufficient rationale to modify Simpson in view of Liddell. See Pet. 57–61 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 250–267). For example, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to incorporate Liddell’s cyclonic separating apparatus into Simpson’s vacuum cleaner in order to reap “the benefits of cyclonic separation, including maintaining steady suction as the separator fills with dirt.” Id. at 59 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 256– 259). Petitioner explains that Organ establishes that “bagless vacuums like ‘cyclonic’ vacuums were ‘becoming increasingly popular’” in the prior art because they are able “to maintain a consistently high level of suction, even as the collecting chamber fills with dirt” (id. (citing Ex. 1006, 1:8–13)), and relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Giachetti, argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “would have been motivated to substitute Simpson’s dust separation system with a bagless cyclonic separator for the same reason” (id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 281)).” slip op. at 38
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,327,607 - Cimbria Srl v. 3u Vision SrlInstitutedPTAB · Sep 20, 2024 · PGR2024-00018 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–15 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 6, and 10 are obvious over ElMasry.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’947 patent is eligible for post-grant review, and has shown it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’947 patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’947 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering, Physics, Chemistry, or an equivalent field, and at least 2-3 years of academic or industry experience in engineering related to optical sorting systems.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 21). Patent Owner did not file a Preliminary Response to the Petition and, therefore, at this point, does not contest Petitioner’s definition for one of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’947 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms for the purposes of rendering a decision to institute trial. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). At this stage, we find it unnecessary to resolve whether “electronic control unit” and “processing module” should be construed as mean plus function limitations under § 112(f), because it is possible to address the obviousness grounds presented whether or not these limitations are so construed, and even if the claims were indefinite in the manner Petitioner contends. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 813 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (noting indefiniteness of a means-plus-function limitation does not always render it impossible to adjudicate a prior-art challenge). We direct the parties to address the construction of these claim terms and Petitioner’s interpretation during trial.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“We have reviewed Petitioner evidence and citations and, on the current record, we find that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that ElMasry teaches all the limitations of claim 1, without need for any modification. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown that it is more likely than not that claim 1 would have been unpatentable as obvious over ElMasry.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,666,947 - PTAB · Sep 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00690 · APJ Matthew S Meyers · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–28 on all asserted grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood that Peter and Neroni render at least claim 1 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims on all asserted grounds pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–1360 (2018) (requiring institution on all claims, if any); see also Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 64 (Nov. 2019) (“Trial Practice Guide”) (providing guidance in view of SAS).1” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. Moreover, these factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Further, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and 2–3 years of experience in fluid dynamics and/or machine design for devices related to fluid dynamics, such as vacuum cleaners. Additional education could offset less experience and vice versa, and a POSA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means. Pet. 11. At this stage of the proceeding, “Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioners’ proposed definition of a POSITA,” but “reserves the right to provide an alternative definition of a POSITA if IPR is instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 3. On the current record, we determine that Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the scope and content of the ’550 patent and the asserted prior art, and, at this stage, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Under that standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17). Petitioner “do[es] not believe any claim construction is necessary to resolve the parties’ controversy in this Petition, and the claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning for purposes of this IPR.” Pet. 11. “Patent Owner does not submit any terms for construction,” but “reserves the right to subsequently submit claim terms for construction should the Board institute IPR.” Prelim. Resp. 3. We agree with the parties that, at this stage, no terms require explicit construction to resolve the issues presented by the arguments and evidence of record to reach a decision on institution. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“On the current record, we find that the Petition provides sufficient rationale to modify Peter in view of Neroni. See Pet. 68–73 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 278–287). For example, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to incorporate Neroni’s teachings of a power cleaning tool adaptor into Peter’s cleaning tool in order to “improve cleaning . . . by agitating the surface being cleaned.” Pet. 71–72 (citing Ex. 1007, 1–2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 285). Petitioner explains that Neroni establishes that “powered cleaning tools were common” in the prior art (id. at 72 (citing Ex. 1011, 1:17–49; Ex. 1002 ¶ 285)), and relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Giachetti, argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “understood the well-known benefits of a powered floor tool and would’ve been motivated to incorporate Neroni’s electrical system into Peter to achieve these benefits” (id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 286). Patent Owner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine the vacuums taught by Peter and Neroni because they “are directed to different types of vacuum cleaners” and “each [is concerned with] solving different problems with their respective vacuum cleaners.” Prelim. Resp. 19. However, other than pointing out that the vacuum cleaners in Peter and Neroni are different, Patent Owner itself provides conclusory statements, and fails to adequately explain what these differences are, or why they would deter one of ordinary skill in the art from combining the two references with a reasonable expectation of success. Patent Owner does not argue, and we see no reason to believe, that incorporating Neroni’s teachings of a power cleaning tool adaptor into Peter’s cleaning tool is not within the ability of one of skill in the art. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Accordingly, on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has provided sufficient arguments and evidence to support its assertion that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Peter and Neroni. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,117,550 - Fervo Energy Co. v. Ormat Technologies Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00665 · APJ Josiah C Cocks · IPR · Institution
Institution denied because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable under the proposed obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A. Principles of Law A petition must show how the construed claims are unpatentable under the statutory grounds it identifies. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4). Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim for a petition to be granted. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner contends the following assessment in connection with a person of ordinary skill in the art: The Challenged Claims pertain to a method of recovering geothermal heat. However, “[m]any of the techniques are derived from oil and gas industry.” EX1001 at 4:23-24. Accordingly, here, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) is a person with a Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree, and/or Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering, Petroleum Engineering, Energy Resource Engineering, or the like, or at least five years of experience engineering, drilling, and constructing wells. Furthermore, a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could also have met the relevant standard for a POSITA. Pet. 16–17 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 34–36). Patent Owner does not offer its own assessment of a POSITA. For purpose of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesOther
“own for any claim term. Patent Owner does, however, note that “claim element 9c[13] includes the terms ‘means for,’ which are presumed to invoke 13 The referenced “claim element 9c” reads in-part “Means for producing a water density difference and a pressure difference between said first means-plus-function treatment under Section 112.” Prelim. Resp. 17 (citing Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Power2B Inc., IPR2022-01378, Paper 12 at 11 (PTAB Mar. 15, 2023) (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part))). Patent Owner further submits that “[u]nder Rule 104(b)(3),[14] Petitioner had an obligation to provide a construction of claim element 9c that includes both the claimed function and the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” Id. We agree with Patent Owner that the term “means for” when appearing in a claim triggers a rebuttable presumption that treatment under § 112 applies. On the record before us, however, Petitioner has not explained why the noted presumption has been rebutted or does not apply, and has not provided a construction of the pertinent “means for” term in the Petition in contradiction to the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 104(b)(3).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“While it is certainly the case that “a prior art reference is relevant for all that it teaches to those of ordinary skill in the art,” see In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (Fed. Cir. 1992), it is incumbent on a petitioner, in advancing a permissible theory of obviousness, to explain why a skilled artisan would recognize to pick and choose certain aspects of a reference and combine them with other aspects of the reference, particularly so where the reference itself does not suggest such combination. See In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“It is impermissible within the framework of section 103 to pick and choose from any one reference only so much of it as will support a given position, to the exclusion of other parts necessary to the full appreciation of what such reference fairly suggests” ) (citation and inner quotes omitted). Here, Petitioner’s oscillation between different embodiments of Rinaldi in an attempt to reach the requirements of claim 1 is not adequately explained, and more closely resembles impermissible hindsight. See Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). (“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.”). In sum, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its assertion that claim 1 is unpatentable as a part of Petitioner’s proposed Ground 1.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,320,221 - Orthocision, Inc. v. PTL Opco LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 18, 2024 · IPR2023-00625 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 9, and 10 were not shown unpatentable under any asserted § 103 ground because Petitioner did not adequately explain how or why the prior art would be combined.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not specifically address Petitioner’s proposed definition. See generally Resp. Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Bovinet, uses a slightly different, but not materially so, definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan than Petitioner. See Ex. 2005 ¶ 13. Thus, the parties appear to agree on who the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been in terms of education and field of work experience. We accept and adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art (or ordinarily skilled artisan), which appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’129 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[]” evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). B.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“3. Summary on Claim Construction We maintain our earlier constructions of “open tip” and “releasing means . . . .” See DI 16–24. We determine that no other express construction of any claim term is necessary for purposes of rendering this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. Although we maintain here our constructions of “open tip” and “releasing means . . . ,” we do so only for the sake of completeness. These claim constructions, ultimately, are not determinative of the outcome of this proceeding because, regardless of the meaning of any claim term, including these disputed terms, we find that Petitioner fails to adequately explain why any claim would have been obvious under the asserted grounds. We explain this in detail below. C.” slip op. at 29
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Ex. 1001, 6:28–38 (emphasis added). However, the language of claim 1 is very clear on the functionality of the “open tip,” expressly reciting that “the open tip cuts bone tissue away from the sacrum or the ilium.” Id. at 13:19– 20. Thus, the claim language itself provides the required functionality of the “open tip,” and we do not agree with Petitioner that additional functionality relating to where bone tissue might go once cut, as discussed in the Specification, should be read into the claims as a limitation. Patent Owner’s newly proposed interpretation is similar to Petitioner’s in that it requests addition of functionality discussed as an example in the Specification, but not recited in the claim’s expressly recited functional language relating to the “open tip.” We disagree with Patent Owner that the concept of dislodged tissue entering a void defined by the open tip is necessary to understanding the claim element. And, once more, Patent Owner reads too much structure from the written description into the claim language as a limitation because it is not apparent that the recited “open tip” language requires that we further clarify that any interior void defined by the open tip is on the interior of the abrading head, and behind the exterior abrading surfaces, or between interior surfaces of a first pair of opposing sides, as proposed by Patent Owner. “[W]hile it is true that claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification . . . , it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the claims. . . . [T]he claims define the invention.” Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581–82 (Fed. Cir. 1988).” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“A claim limitation is presumed to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (or pre- AIA § 112 ¶ 6) if, as here, it explicitly uses the term “means” and includes functional language; this presumption is overcome if the limitation further includes the structure, material, or acts necessary to perform the recited function. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). Here, the word “means” is recited, followed by functional language, and the claim recites no structure associated with the means or function. Moreover, the parties agree that this is a means plus function limitation. See Pet. 19–20; Resp. 9. We find “releasing means” is a means plus function limitation and, based on the plain language of the claim, the recited “releasing means” is a part of the also recited “slide hammer assembly,” as the above-quoted claim language defines. Ex. 1001, 13:10–17. Construing a claim term under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) involves two steps: (1) identifying the claimed function; and then (2) determining what structure, if any, disclosed in the Specification corresponds to the claimed function. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351. In conducting this analysis, we may not incorporate structure from the written description beyond that which is necessary to perform the claimed function. See Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 11,020,129 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,020,129 - PTAB · Sep 18, 2024 · IPR2024-00670 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–25 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious over the prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 6
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSA”). Id. at 13, 17. Petitioner’s declarant asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and 2-3 years of experience in machine design, including machines that include fluid dynamics or fluid paths, such as vacuum cleaners. Additional education could offset less experience and vice versa, and a POSA could have also obtained similar knowledge and experience through other means. Ex. 1002 ¶ 41; see also Pet. 12 (making the same assertion without citation to declarant). Patent Owner does not contest the level of skill. Prelim. Resp. 3. We are persuaded, on the present record, that the proposal of Petitioner’s declarant is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’407 patent and prior art of record. We adopt the above definition of the level of skill for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner asserts that no terms require express construction. Pet. 12– 13. Likewise, Patent Owner states that no terms require express construction. Prelim. Resp. 3. Patent Owner does provide a definition from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary of the word “door.” Id. at 12n.1 (citing Ex. 2002). Viewing this definition, Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner seeks to construe the term “door.” Paper 8, 1. Patent Owner responds that a construction of the term “door” is unnecessary to resolve the issues at this stage. Paper 9, 1–2. We agree that no terms need to be construed. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner’s first reason why one of skill in art would combine Conrad335’s “cyclone separator” with IPVG’s stick or hand vacuum, is Conrad335’s explicit teaching that it is directed to “a ‘stick’ or ‘hand vacuum.’” Pet. 26 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 376), 27–28, 29–30; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 144, 149–153. Specifically, Conrad335 states that “the cyclonic embodiments described herein may be used in conjunction with . . . a stick vacuum cleaner, . . . a hand vacuum, . . . or any other type of vacuum cleaner.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 376. Conrad335’s explicit teaching provides a motivation to combine the teachings of Conrad335’s cyclonic embodiments with IPVG’s stick or hand vacuum. KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 418–419 (teaching in the art can show combination is obvious). Petitioner also argues that: A POSA would have understood that cyclonic filtration had certain advantages over dust-bag filtration, including (1) no bag needs to be replaced, reducing recurring costs; (2) unlike cyclonic cleaners, dustbag cleaners lose suction as they fill; and (3) cyclonic cleaners give the user a visual indication of how full the container is and when to empty. Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 150–53). This argument is supported by Petitioner’s declarant, and by citations to and a discussion of two prior art references, in addition to the teachings of Conrad335. Pet. 30–31 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 150–53; Ex. 1010, 1; Ex. 1016, 1:5–10; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 2, 112. In view of the above and the evidence of record, we find Petitioner’s arguments sufficiently supported to show a reasonable likelihood that this claim limitation is unpatentable.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,607,407
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.