- Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Sitnet LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jul 2, 2026 · IPR2026-00112 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
Institution was denied for claims 1–12 because the petition did not show that the cited search results taught the claimed “data feed.”
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Although Petitioner asserts that the ’463 patent “does not limit the form of a data feed,” Petitioner does not explain what the ordinary and customary meaning of “data feed” was at the time of the claimed invention or otherwise propose an express construction of “data feed.” Pet. 6–7, 23. Nor does Petitioner point to any prosecution history that bears on the meaning of “data feed.” Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.100. Accordingly, Petitioner does not provide sufficient evidence showing that Kraft’s or Wong’s disclosure of search results in response to a user-entered search query teaches a “data feed,” as recited in each challenged claim of the ’463 patent. As such, Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing at least one claim is unpatentable, as 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) requires.” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“I agree with Patent Owner. Neither Kraft nor Wong uses the term “data feed” or characterizes its listing of Web pages (Kraft) or nodes (Wong) provided in response to a user-provided query as a “data feed.” See Ex. 1005, 5:8–12, 6:52–59, 16:52–59, 18:31–54, 18:61–19:23; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 22, 28, 35. Petitioner points to a disclosure in the ’463 patent of a user requesting a personal information aggregator (PIA) to “receive a data feed.” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 12:52–64). But Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how this disclosure provides support for broadly construing “browsing a data feed” to encompass a user entering criteria for a search (and not specifically requesting a “data feed”) and receiving a listing of Web pages or nodes in response. See Pet. 23, 58–59; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 102, 201–202; Ex. 1005, 6:57–59 (describing users searching a data store for models that match “user-specified criteria”), 18:41–54 (describing a user submitting a query); Ex. 1007 ¶ 28 (describing “searching and selecting from keyword identifiers or other search terms”). Petitioner’s reliance on a separate disclosure in the ’463 patent of the PIA “searching . . . the network for information about the situation or event” also is not persuasive, because the ’463 patent does not describe that embodiment as involving a data feed or browsing a data feed. See Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 20:46–51) (emphasis omitted); Ex. 1001, 20:46–51.” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 12,256,463 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00222 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8–11, 13, and 14 are unpatentable over Yu and Miyazaki; claims 15, 16, and 19 were not shown unpatentable over Matsushima.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “at, and before, the earliest claimed priority date of the ’158 patent . . . would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” adding that “[l]ess experience may be sufficient with additional education, and likewise, less education may be sufficient with additional work experience.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–18). Patent Owner does not offer a competing definition or dispute Petitioner's articulation. Based on the entire record, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art because that characterization, we find, is consistent with the ’158 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“We determine that the claims require a per-channel determination of integration time—that is, an integration time arrived at for each sensor or channel individually—and cannot be satisfied by a single global value merely applied uniformly across the sensors. We do not, however, read the independent claims to require that the per-channel integration times differ from one another.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“We adopt the definition clearly and unambiguously set forth in the specification, which was likewise adopted by the Court in the related litigation. See Pet. 7–8, 55; Pet. Reply 1–2 (district court construing the term to mean “the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene”). The specification states that the integrated photo-charge “is directly related to the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene,” and that “[t]his is known as integration time.” Ex. 1001, 4:4–7. Accordingly, the ’158 patent demonstrates that the inventors indisputably acted as a lexicographer for the term “integration time.”” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“We construe “during a frame” to mean the period during which data for a single frame of an image is captured. The limitation is satisfied where the per-channel integration time is effectuated during the frame; it does not require that the integration time be re-determined mid-frame, nor does it require actuation of a “charge integration switch.” The specification’s only use of the phrase confirms this reading: “each camera channel is controlled during a frame under an independent integration time.” Ex. 1001, 3:45–50. Consistent with that usage, the specification describes selecting an integration time for each channel and then integrating the photo-signal “within a single frame of data,” and describes placing the charge-integration switch in a state to allow charge to accumulate for the selected period and then transferring the accumulated charge upon completion of the integration period. Id. at 4:51–54, 11:3–18. We decline Patent Owner’s proposal to require in-frame actuation of a charge-integration switch, for the same reason we decline to import that structure into “integration time.” We also decline to read the phrase to require mid-frame re-determination of the integration time, because the patent’s own embodiment selects an integration time and then integrates charge during the frame under that selected time. Ex. 1001, 4:51–54, 11:3– 18. So construed, “during a frame” is not redundant of the independentclaim limitation: it adds that the per-channel control occurs within a single frame (intrascene), as distinct from adjustment from one frame to the next (interscene).” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 9,232,158 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,232,158 - Google LLC v. Brodti Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2026 · IPR2025-00472 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error, with Yasnovsky added for claims 7, 8, 16, 17, and 20.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art are substantially similar. In light of the record before us, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’898 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Patent Owner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’898 patent and the prior art, particularly experience pertaining to Internet/web interfaces and web-based media. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Neither party argues, nor do we determine, that the outcome of our Decision depends on which party’s definition is selected.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“includ[e] a server and one or more webpages that may be provided by the server for display in a web browser.” Pet. Reply 5 (citing Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 13–15). Petitioner argues, and we agree, that the Specification strongly supports this construction (requiring a server and webpage(s)) by describing a “website” as synonymous with a server computer system: “The WWW [(World Wide Web)] service allows a server computer system (i.e., Web server or Web site) to send graphical Web pages or screens of information such as the advertising materials to a remote client computer system 10.” Ex. 1001, 3:66–4:2 (emphases added); see id. at Fig. 1 (depicting a service engine and webpages as a web server, i.e., website), 3:15–18 (describing Figure 1 as showing “a server of the website” (emphasis added)); Pet. Reply 5; see Ex. 1026 ¶ 13. Petitioner also submits a supporting (and persuasive) contemporaneous technical dictionary definition of “website,” which highlights the distinction between a lay person’s understanding of the term versus that of the relevant artisan. Pet. Reply 5–6. This definition explains that the “common but technically inaccurate” usage of “website” is to mean “Web page,” but the technically correct usage of “website” is to mean “one or more computers that are associated with a fully qualified domain name and make content available on the Web.” Id. (citing Ex. 1028, 402). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Crovella, likewise testifies that “[a] website cannot exist without the server or computer that provides its webpages.” Ex. 1026 ¶ 15; see Ex. 1027, 36:8–20 (Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Myler, agreeing that “it has to be some machine somewhere that’s providing the webpages for the website.”). The limitations of claim 1 also support Petitioner’s position that “website” includes a server and webpage(s). Reply 5. For example, claim 1 recites advertising material for “populat[ing] on one or more websites,” and selected “advertising buy options comprise at least one website of the respective websites.” Ex. 1001, 10:29–51 (emphases added). We find these limitations make the most technical sense where “website” implicates an Internet domain or domain name, such as brodti.com, which itself is a computer system (server) and associated webpage(s) reached via that domain name. This interpretation aligns with testimony of Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Myler, in which he states that a “website” describes “a group of webpages at a particular domain (e.g., www.espn.com, www.espn.com/nba, www.espn.com/nfl, www.espn.com/nhl).” Ex. 2009 ¶ 68 (emphasis in italics added). In other words, brodti.com and espn.com are two different websites, with each website having one or more webpages (e.g., www.espn.com/nba, www.espn.com/nfl), and such websites include a server giving life to such webpage(s). slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner proffers that placing advertising material “within” web property content means “inserting” an advertisement into particular content. PO Resp. 12. Petitioner responds that “placing . . . within” means what it says, and notes that “[t]he words ‘insert’ or ‘inserting’ appear nowhere in the [Specification].” Pet. Reply 7–8; see id. at 8 (Petitioner arguing that Patent Owner’s expert “admitted that the claim does not specify details regarding how advertising material needs to be placed within web property content.” (citing Ex. 1027, 29:18–24)). Patent Owner replies that the relevant artisan allegedly “would have understood ‘placing . . . within’ to mean ‘inserting into,’” but then submits that whether “placing . . . within” versus “inserting into” is used does not matter because Petitioner allegedly has not demonstrated the obviousness of either. PO Sur-reply 17. As Petitioner observes, “[i]t is unclear if Patent Owner intended any difference in meaning between these two terms.” Pet. Reply 8. Accordingly, based on the complete record before us, we determine that no further construction of this limitation is needed, and “placing A within B” means what it says—“placing A within B.”” slip op. at 20
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“determining” of impression validity feature of limitation 1[h] by disclosing “a ‘single-pixel’ image technique for determining that an impression is valid,” e.g., by using “cookies.” Pet. 42–45. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Crovella, testifies that this “single-pixel” impression tracking technique would have been a “well-known” technique to the relevant artisan, and as described by Error, operates as follows: [A] URL link for a single pixel (or transparent) image file is embedded onto a webpage that is delivered to a web browser. The image is not meant to be viewed and will likely not be visible to the user. After the user’s browser receives the webpage, it uses the embedded URL link to request the single-pixel image from a server. The receipt of that request by the server provides an indication that the user’s web browser actually received and presented the web page to the user. Ex. 1002 ¶ 133 (citing Ex. 1007, 1:36–54, 2:6–21); see id. at ¶¶ 132–139. slip op. at 43
Patent outcomesUS 11,416,898 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,416,898 - Luxottica Of America, Inc. v. E-Vision Smart Optics, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-01512 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, cancelled claims 1–27, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during an inter partes review proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under these circumstances, entry of judgment adverse to the Patent Owner is appropriate as to claims 1–27 of the ’612 patent. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner's request for adverse judgment.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
NonePatents in suitUS 11,971,612 - Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00247 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 were not shown unpatentable under any of six obviousness grounds because Truitt did not teach or suggest the claimed severity calculation and index, and the Mumford combinations lacked the required sensor disclosures.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name its corporate parent, Resmed Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 29. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 31. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 32. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 40.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“disorder symptoms” require a “quantitative” calculation or use of an algorithm, we also disagree. See PO Resp. 14–16. First, nothing in the language of the claims themselves describes or requires a “quantitative” calculation or an algorithm. See generally Ex. 1001, 23:6–26:59. To be sure, the ’029 patent discloses embodiments that use known algorithms to “quantify the level of severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms.” See, e.g., id. at 20:16–19. But the Specification does not require an algorithm. The Specification also indicates that quantification is merely “preferable” (i.e., not required), and is merely one embodiment. See, e.g., id. at 19:8–12 (“The signals from the one or more sensors used in various embodiments of the present invention are preferably analyzed using a processor and software that can quantitatively estimate or determine the severity of the subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms.”) (emphasis added), 4:51–59 (“Finally, in still another embodiment, the present invention includes a sleeping disorder treatment system comprising a device for diagnosing and creating a quantitative output of a level of severity of a subject’s sleeping disorder or symptoms . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Reply 5–6 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:3–59 and 19:8–12 and stating that the ’029 patent lists “numerous embodiments where only one of seven include a quantitative assessment”). Elsewhere, the Specification more generally states that signals from sensors are “analyzed to determine the level of severity of the symptoms,” without specifying that such analysis must be “quantitative” or performed by an algorithm. See Ex. 1001, 3:41–44. In view of these disclosures, Patent Owner does not persuade us to adopt its narrowing claim construction. Indeed, our reviewing court has “repeatedly warned against confining the claims” to specific embodiments disclosed in the Specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Patent Owner’s reliance on a prior Board decision in PGR2024- 00012, which related to the parent of the ’029 patent, is unavailing. See PO Resp. 15–16. We agree with Petitioner that in the cited case, “[t]he Board made no findings about the meaning of the term calculating ‘the data of a severity of the sleep disorder symptoms of the subject’ for claim construction.” Reply 8. Indeed, neither party offered any claim construction, and the Board determined that no claim construction was necessary for purposes of that decision. See ResMed Corp., PGR2024- 00012, Paper 7 at 8. The page of the decision Patent Owner cites addresses written description support in the specification for the claims challenged in that PGR, not claim construction. See id. at 16. In any event, the cited decision is a decision on institution. The Board’s statements there are, by nature, preliminary findings and conclusions based on a preliminary record, and are not binding here. For at least the above reasons, Patent Owner does not persuade us to adopt its narrowing claim construction and we find that the term “data of a severity” does not need construction because the words of the term are clear on their face.” slip op. at 31
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“skilled artisan would have incorporated only portions of Mumford’s algorithm into Truitt’s PAP (i.e., only those portions related to “the detection of sleep disordered events” and not the portions of the algorithm related to “determin[ing] sleep stage”) comes too late because this argument was not in the Petition. See, e.g., Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (rejecting petitioner’s “attempts to cure the petition’s deficiencies in its subsequent briefing to the Board”). The Petition does not discuss modifying Mumford’s sleep efficacy algorithm before incorporating it into Truitt’s PAP device or incorporating only certain features of the algorithm. Indeed, the Petition and Dr. Kirkness rely on Mumford’s ability to detect sleep arousals when mapping Mumford to the claimed “data of a severity” and “index.” See Pet. 69–70; Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶¶ 323–325. Mumford discloses that the mask electrodes detect arousals. See Ex. 1009 (Mumford) 2:4–10, 11:39–48. The same lack of disclosure plagues Petitioner’s belated Reply argument that Truitt’s ports 74 and 76 can incorporate electric sensing elements that would have functioned similar to Mumford’s electrodes. See Reply 22. The Petition did not mention ports 74 and 76 or otherwise suggest that a skilled artisan would have added functionality similar to Mumford’s electrodes to Truitt’s PAP, and we find that it is too late on Reply for Petitioner to posit this modification.” slip op. at 40
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This is especially applicable to Dr. Jafari’s opinions. His declaration was not prepared for this proceeding and thus Dr. Jafari was not subject to cross examination in this proceeding. See Reply 6 n.3. Moreover, Dr. Jafari was not opining on claim construction; rather, he was addressing the alleged indefiniteness. See Ex. 2020 (Jafari Decl.) 12 (heading addressing definiteness), ¶¶ 41–42, 46. Additionally, paragraphs 41–42 of Dr. Jafari’s declaration discuss claim terms phrases in a different patent (US 11,375,921), which explicitly include the terms “quantified” and “quantitative.” See Reply 6–7; Ex. 2020 (Jafari Decl.) ¶ 34. For at least these reasons, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that Dr. Jafari’s testimony is applicable here. Further, regarding the portion of Patent Owner’s proposed construction reciting “the degree of deviation from the baseline characteristics of a patient without sleep disorder symptoms,” Dr. Borkholder does not do his own analysis, but instead simply states that he “agree[s] with the litigation claim construction opinions of Dr. Jafari.” Ex. 2019 (Borkholder Decl.) ¶ 53. This is insufficient, and thus we do not credit Dr. Borkholder’s testimony regarding claim construction. We instead credit Dr. Kirkness’s statement that “[s]everity data is frequently calculated as the deviation from baseline characteristics of the patient himself, not a generic person ‘without sleep disorder symptoms.’” Ex. 1071 (Kirkness Reply Decl.) ¶ 13; Reply 9. As Dr. Kirkness explains, and Patent Owner does not dispute (see generally Sur-reply), “[t]he ‘baseline characteristics of a [generic] patient without sleep disorder symptoms’ would be irrelevant to any particular patient with their own unique breathing patterns and sleep disorder symptoms.” Ex. 1071 (Kirkness Reply Decl.) ¶ 13 (second alteration in original). For at least these reasons, we reject Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,872,029 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,872,029 - Apple, Inc. v. Wecrevention, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2026 · IPR2026-00243 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied Apple’s petitions and instituted no trial, exercising discretion based on the complete record and Petitioner’s unexplained inconsistent claim-construction positions.
RulingsDirector review decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 12,154,652 - Apple, Inc. v. Wecrevention, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2026 · IPR2026-00242 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied the petitions and instituted no trial, exercising discretion based on Petitioner’s unexplained inconsistent claim-construction positions before the Board and district court.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,894,098 - Apple, Inc. v. Wecrevention, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2026 · IPR2026-00240 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied Apple’s petitions and instituted no trial, exercising discretion based on Apple’s unexplained inconsistent claim-construction positions before the Board and district court.
RulingsDirector review decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notOther
“that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to their ordinary and customary meaning,” and that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Paper 2, 4 (emphasis added). Petitioner also states, as part of its analysis of the challenged claims, that “Petitioner does not concede that the preambles of the Challenged Claims are limiting.” Id. at 9 n.5 (emphasis added). In district court, however, Petitioner tells a different story, arguing there that the preamble is limiting. Ex. 2016, 6, 7, 9, 12. Indeed, Petitioner specifically denotes that “[r]eview of ‘the entirety of the patent’ makes clear that the preamble phrase ‘high speed memory chip module’ contains the core of what the inventors ‘actually invented and intended to encompass by the claims,’ . . . and so the preamble should be limiting.” Id. at 7 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Other
“IPR2026-00243 are similarly problematic. In its Petitions, Petitioner identifies “input/output unit” as a means-plus-function limitation and identifies the corresponding structure as input/output unit 106 in the challenged patent. See, e.g., IPR2026-00241, Paper 2, 4. Petitioner also asserts “the applied prior art anticipates or renders obvious the Challenged Claims, regardless of whether ‘input/output unit’ is construed as a §112(f) means-plus-function limitation,” and that “Petitioner is not conceding . . . that the ’017 Patent provides adequate structure for the ‘input/output unit.’” Id. at 5 (emphasis added). In District Court, however, Petitioner once again takes a different position, arguing that the claim term “input/output unit” should be construed as a means-plus-function limitation, identifying the function as “performing input and/or output functions with respect to memory,” and asserting that the challenged patent “[l]acks sufficient structure (indefinite).” IPR2026-00241, Ex. 2016, 12. According to Petitioner, “[t]he specification fails to disclose sufficient corresponding structure for performing input and output operations with respect to memory, much less for performing those operations within any particular voltage range.” Id. at 19. Petitioner fails to adequately explain its different positions here before the Board and those it propounds in district court. See, e.g., IPR2026-00241, Paper 9. Patent Owner well states the issue; that “[t]o the extent § 112(f) governs, then either input/output unit 106 is sufficient corresponding structure (in which case [Petitioner’s] district-court indefiniteness argument fails), or it is not (in which case [Petitioner’s] IPR mapping relies on a structure [Petitioner] itself maintains is inadequate).” IPR2026-00241, Paper 8, 8–9. I agree. Petitioner’s statement that it does not concede the challenged patent provides adequate structure for the “input/output unit” thus only compounds the problem.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,201,834 - Apple, Inc. v. Wecrevention, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2026 · IPR2026-00239 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review
The Director denied the petitions and instituted no trial, exercising discretion based on Petitioner's unexplained inconsistent claim-construction positions before the Board and district court.
RulingsDirector review decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“As I have indicated previously, petitioners should be presenting a single construction and applying that construction consistently. See Infineon Techs. Americas Corp. v. Mosaid Techs. Corp., IPR2025-01456, Paper 27 at 3–4 (Director Mar. 17, 2026). Failure to do so, without adequate explanation, is problematic and raises concerns of strategic litigation behavior spill-over into the PTAB inconsistent with Congress’s intent to provide a quick and cost-effective alternative to district court litigation. Id.; Revvo, Paper 20 at 3–4; see H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 at 48 (2011). Here, Petitioner offers no explanation for its divergent positions.” slip op. at 3
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,164,942 - Pgr2026-00022Institution deniedPTAB · Jun 23, 2026 · PGR2026-00022 · APJ John A Squires · PGR · Institution
Institution of post-grant review was denied because the petitioner did not show it was more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a) and 324(a), after review of discretionary considerations, the following proceedings will be reviewed for merits and non-discretionary considerations: IPR2026-00233 PGR2026-00026 PGR2026-00027 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), after review of the merits, the petitioner has failed to show it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable. Accordingly, institution of post-grant review is denied in the following proceeding:” slip op. at 1
NonePatents in suitUS 12,274,481
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.