• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00246 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15–29 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations; the contingent motion to amend claims 30–41 is denied for lack of written-description support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name its corporate parent, ResMed Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 39. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 42. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 43. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 51.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.10 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as “POSITA”) would have had: at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience working with diagnostic sensor systems and network data systems, such as networked PAP machines. Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 44); PO Resp. 4. 9 Patent Owner does not assert any objective indicia of nonobviousness. See generally PO Resp. 10 For purposes of this Decision, we apply a priority date of November 4, 2005. See supra n.4. Because the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner does not persuade us to construe the term as “a value [or calculated value] that indicates how dire a patient’s symptoms are.” Patent Owner points to nothing in the intrinsic record that purportedly supports this construction, and we agree with Petitioner that “the patent specification’s disclosures regarding determining a level of symptom severity are broad, establishing that it can generally be derived from any sensor data and/or breathing events.” Pet. Reply 3–4; see also Ex. 1001, 3:44–46 (“Signals from the[] sensors are then analyzed to determine the level of severity of the symptoms of the subject’s sleep disorder.”). Patent Owner relies only on expert declarations to support its construction. But as indicated by the Federal Circuit, extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This is especially applicable here, where neither Dr. D’Ambrosio’s nor Dr. Schwartz’s declaration was prepared for this proceeding, and neither declarant was subject to cross examination on their opinions. Moreover, neither of the declarants was opining on claim construction; rather, they were addressing indefiniteness and/or written description issues. See Ex. 1058 at 7 (heading addressing definiteness); Ex. 2026 at 18 (heading addressing written description). Further, Dr. Schwartz appears to have been making an argument about certain patent claims (not the challenged ’333 patent) based on Patent Owner’s own statements made during prosecution of a separate patent application. See Ex. 2026 ¶ 47 (“[T]he similar term used in the ’284 patent claims (‘data of severity of sleep disorder symptoms’) does not find written description support in the specification by a disclosure of the same statistics disclosed in Wright, because CleveMed argued those statistics are not related to severity of sleep disorder symptoms.” (emphasis added)). Patent Owner has not persuaded us that Dr. Schwartz’s testimony has direct applicability to the claim term at issue here. Dr. Borkholder’s testimony is likewise unpersuasive. Aside from citing Dr. D’Ambrosio’s and Dr. Schwartz’s declarations, Dr. Borkholder cites Exhibits 2027 and 2016. These exhibits discuss indices such as AHI and RDI that are used to assess the severity of a patient’s symptoms, but Patent Owner has not adequately explained how they bear on construction of the claim term at issue here, which is not addressed in these exhibits. Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 32–33. Accordingly, we accord Dr. Borkholder’s claim construction opinions little weight, because they are unsupported by reference to objective, corroborating evidence of record. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual determinations . . . may render the testimony of little probative value in a validity determination.”); Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, IPR2022-00624, Paper 9, 15 (PTAB 2023) (precedential) (explaining that declaration testimony that “is conclusory and unsupported” and which “adds little to the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support . . . is entitled to little weight”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find that Petitioner has the better argument. Tidal volume refers to “the volume of air that is inspired or expired during a respiratory cycle.” Ex. 2028, 13–14; PO Resp. 10. “[H]ypopnea events are defined as a reduction of ≥50 % or 74 % in tidal volume from baseline and apnea events as absence of tidal volume for at least 10s.” Ex. 2028, 13–14 (emphasis omitted). Toge teaches that a control unit analyzes collected data (e.g., the flow rate) and calculates tidal volume. Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶¶ 34–38. The calculated tidal volume is “a quantified level of severity data based on the subject’s sleep apnea symptoms during the therapy” because it represents, e.g., the “level of airway obstruction the patient experiences during the sleep apnea treatment using the PAP device.” Pet. 15. As Dr. Chatterjee explains: Toge discloses that tidal volume Fp is a quantified level of data because Toge discloses that Fp is monitored with respect to threshold values (id., [0051]) and because Fp is a function of Ft, Fa, and Fb, which are quantitative values. Toge discloses that tidal volume Fp is severity data because Toge discloses that tidal volume is indicative of whether the patient’s breathing warrants “emergency measures” (id., [0039]) and whether to “send an alert” in “an emergency where the patient’s breathing has drastically weakened” (id., [0055]). . . . . Because Toge discloses determining tidal volume (determine a quantified level of severity data) based on Ft, Fa, and Fb (id., [0035]), which corresponds to the subject’s condition (subject’s sleep apnea symptoms) while using the device (during the therapy) (id., [0036], [0037]), Toge discloses determin[ing] a quantified level of severity data based on the subject’s sleep apnea symptoms during the therapy. Ex. 1005 (Chatterjee Decl.) ¶¶ 122–125. Patent Owner’s attempt to dismiss tidal volume as a mere “breathing metric” is unavailing. First, Petitioner correctly “notes that in the paragraph PO cites to in Dr. Schwartz’s declaration, he indicates that breathing metrics are a level of severity data.” Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 2026 ¶ 46 (“standard sleep disordered breathing metrics” [ ] were well validated indicators of the type and severity of sleep disordered breathing”)). Second, Dr. Kirkness explains that tidal volume represents the level of airway obstruction, e.g., apnea “is the most severe form of reduction in airflow [and] the absence of airflow results in quantified tidal volume of zero milliliters per breath.” Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶¶ 157, 159; see also PO Resp. 10–11 (Patent Owner recognizing that an apnea is defined as absence of tidal volume for at least 10 seconds). The calculated tidal volume thus indicates severity because it is used to adjust the PAP system, e.g., in the case of decreasing tidal volume, a medical professional can change the airflow settings “to counter/treat the more severe level of airway obstruction observed from the decreasing tidal volume.” Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶ 158; Pet. 15–16; Ex. 1044 (Toge) ¶ 39.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 11,857,333 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,857,333
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Wallen and Berggren because the combined teachings render the claimed subject matter obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree that Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction is wholly unsupported by, and inconsistent with, the language of independent claims 1, 7, and 13, and the aims of the ’670 Patent Specification. See Ex. 1001, 2:3– 25, 9:32–10:5, 12:51–67, 18:54–19:6, 19:26–42, 20:12–26. Moreover, the cited extrinsic evidence––testimony by Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Lomp–– does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is internally inconsistent and also undermined by Dr. Lomp’s inconsistent deposition testimony. See Ex. 1036, 11:6–17, 12:9–12; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 40, 48. Similarly, the extrinsic evidence cited by Petitioner (e.g., Exs. 1037, 1038, 2009) undermines Patent Owner’s position emphasizing the intended recipient devices of SIB1. In summary, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because it is unsupported by the claim language, the ’670 Patent Specification, and the cited extrinsic evidence. with the ordinary and customary meaning which does not include limiting SIB1 to an ordinary legacy SIB and excluding MTC specific SIBs or SIBs intended for MTC devices. In addition, we need not construe explicitly any other claim term or phrase. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. 868 F.3d at 1017 (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We find that “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill in the art is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the prior art of record. slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “filing date. As explained above, the burden of production shifted to Patent Owner to show that Wallen is not prior art because the ’670 Patent is entitled to the earlier January 20, 2012, filing date of foreign priority application GB1201000. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing a system information block 1, Patent Owner’s arguments do not substantively address how GB1201000 provides written description support for any other limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 43, 57. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in foreign priority application GB1201000, the burden of production did not shift back to Petitioner, and,” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “primary synchronization signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a physical broadcast channel (PBCH) including a master information block (MIB).” See Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–75; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 76, 77, 83–84). Petitioner implicitly acknowledges that Wallen does not expressly disclose a physical broadcast channel (PBCH), but relies on Berggren for confirming that the LTE standard specifies that a PBCH carries the MIB. See Pet. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 74; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 73–75). According to Petitioner, “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to transmit Wallen’s MIB using a PBCH as taught by Berggren.” Pet. 43 (citing Pet. 33–38). In particular, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated for Wallen’s LTE system to utilize the LTE standard implementation details taught by Berggren,” and “it would have been predictable and beneficial for Wallen’s user equipment to receive the MIB in the [PBCH], as was standard in LTE.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58), 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). According to Petitioner, “the combination is nothing more than ‘the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.’” Pet. 38 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Wallen’s broadcast MIB with Berggren’s teachings of using a PBCH for transmitting broadcast MIBs. See Pet. 33–38; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,206,670 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,206,670
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. / Cisco Systems, Inc. et al. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2022-01151 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1, 24, and 25 unpatentable as obvious over Buruganahalli; the copying evidence did not outweigh the strong obviousness showing.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Scope on Remand On remand, the panel here will not address issues outside the scope of the Federal Circuit’s mandate. See Hayward Indus., Inc. v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa, Inc., 814 F. App’x 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The Board is bound by the terms of a mandate issued by an appellate court. Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 121 F.3d 726, 1997 WL 413329, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ‘Unless remanded by [an appellate] court, all issues within the scope of the appealed judgment are deemed incorporated within the mandate and thus are precluded from further adjudication.’ Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).”). The sole issue on remand is whether “the evidence of copying” is sufficient to overcome the obviousness ground of unpatentability over Buruganahalli. Centripetal Networks, 19–20. We restate portions of the former Final Written Decision, as an aid to the reader, but substantially incorporate the analysis of the prior Decision below. C.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › CopyingObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “given to the Eastern District of Virginia court’s opinion because it was later vacated. The district court considered all of the Read factors (applying Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-827 (Fed. Cir. 1992)), of which only the first factor is directed to deliberate copying, although factors 2 and 9 bear indirectly on the issue of copying. The district court determined that “[t]he fact that Cisco released products with Centripetal’s functionality within a year of these meetings goes beyond mere coincidence. Therefore, the fact that Cisco’s system mirrors the functionality of the Centripetal patents is compelling evidence that damages should be enhanced for copying.” Ex. 1027, 157. Without more, it is difficult to evaluate the processes that the district court employed to reach its determination. As the Federal Circuit instructed, we need “not [] go searching throughout the entire litigation record to find the evidence of copying, but [we have] an obligation to consider the specific evidence that was put before” us. Centripetal Networks, 19. We continue to determine that the vacated finding of the district court should be provided little weight, especially in view of the strong case of obviousness discussed above.” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersObjective indicia outweighedDecided for petitioner

    “need and industry recognition for the technology claimed in the ‘856 Patent because it describes the problem of detecting threats in encrypted traffic as ‘unsolvable.’” PO Resp. 68 (citing Ex. 1027, 64). Given that this is a press release by a company announcing that company’s new commercial product, however, we 8 The concurrence reevaluates Patent Owner’s evidence of industry praise and nexus, but we deem such considerations outside the remit of the Federal Circuit’s remand. are reluctant to give the “unsolvable” characterization much weight, as it may amount to puffery. But beyond that, it appears that the problem identified as “unsolvable” in the press release––“detect[ing] known attack signatures even in encrypted traffic”––had, in fact, already been solved in Buruganahalli, using the very same hello message, flow correlation, and man-in-the-middle techniques described in the ‘856 Patent. We thus cannot say that the press release identifies a long-felt need that was actually unsolved. See ZUP, 896 F.3d at 1374 (explaining that “[w]here the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention are . . . minimal . . . it cannot be said that any long-felt need was unsolved”) (quoting Geo. M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (first alteration in original)).” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “The District Court did not provide an element-by-element analysis of how the claims of the ‘856 Patent cover this description. See Ex. 1027, 41. However, from the description, we understand the Court to have concluded that the system receives rules, identifies a set of packets as part of a flow using the NetFlow logs, “determines” that encrypted packets in the flow match known malicious signatures based on unencrypted data in other packets (e.g., data in the SNI), and then filters the flow based in a URI (e.g., that from the SNI), routing it to the null interface. The Court does not describe how the system “determines” that encrypted packets match known malicious signatures based on information in unencrypted packets, but we assume that is done as in the ‘856 Patent, by correlation, i.e., an encrypted packet is “determined” to match a threat indicator if it is in the same flow as a packet with unencrypted information that matches the threat indicator.10 With that understanding, we conclude that the allegedly infringing system operates, as least at the level described in the court’s decision, in the same way Buruganahalli’s system operates, filtering encrypted packets due to their presence in a flow that includes packets with unencrypted data, such as in a handshaking packet. It follows that Patent Owner is unable to establish a nexus, because “[w]here the offered secondary consideration actually results from something other than what is both claimed and novel in the claim, there is no nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.” Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1330 10 See Ex. 1001, 9:3–10 (explaining that, at step 17, rule gate 120 may “determine . . . that the packets comprise data corresponding to the network-threat indicators, for example, by correlating the packets with one or more packets previously determined . . . to comprise data corresponding to the network-threat indicators based on data stored in [the] logs”).” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 9,917,856 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,917,856
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. / Cisco Systems, Inc. et al. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2022-01199 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1, 24, and 25 unpatentable as obvious over Buruganahalli; the copying evidence did not outweigh the strong obviousness showing.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Scope on Remand On remand, the panel here will not address issues outside the scope of the Federal Circuit’s mandate. See Hayward Indus., Inc. v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa, Inc., 814 F. App’x 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The Board is bound by the terms of a mandate issued by an appellate court. Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 121 F.3d 726, 1997 WL 413329, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ‘Unless remanded by [an appellate] court, all issues within the scope of the appealed judgment are deemed incorporated within the mandate and thus are precluded from further adjudication.’ Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).”). The sole issue on remand is whether “the evidence of copying” is sufficient to overcome the obviousness ground of unpatentability over Buruganahalli. Centripetal Networks, 19–20. We restate portions of the former Final Written Decision, as an aid to the reader, but substantially incorporate the analysis of the prior Decision below. C.” slip op. at 4

  • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

    “not object to a new panel of APJs hearing this case if remanded.” Id. at 20. As such, Patent Owner requested Director Review (Paper 74), asking that the Director “de-institute,” based on an abuse of discretion. The Director (Paper 75) denied the request and directed the Board to assign a new panel on remand (see Papers 76, 77). B.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelOther

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in The Art We adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the prior Decision. See Decision 25. F.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “This argument is unpersuasive because Buruganahalli uses rules/policies to filter encrypted packets by correlating them with handshaking packets that have unencrypted data, in the same way that is done in the ‘856 Patent. The only “filtering step” in the patent that “use[s] rules to filter encrypted packets without decryption” (PO Resp. 20) is the hello message approach used, for example, at steps 19 and 23 (see id.), which is clearly disclosed in Buruganahalli.7 As explained above, the ‘856 Patent does not describe applying rules to encrypted packets. Instead, it describes (a) filtering encrypted packets by correlating them with unencrypted data in other packets and (b) by decrypting the packets and applying the rules that are recited in the claims to unencrypted data. As also explained above, the amendment added the rules of step 22, which are applied to decrypted data, to a claim that was drafted to cover filtering of encrypted packets. However, among the criteria used in the filtering performed at step 22 is a “uniform resource identifier (URI),” which, we conclude, covers Buruganahalli’s “domain name.” Thus, despite the error made during prosecution, the claims that issued cover Buruganahalli’s method of determining that a session should be filtered based on a domain name in unencrypted handshake data.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 9,917,856 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,917,856
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. / Cisco Systems, Inc. et al. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2022-00182 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1, 24, and 25 are unpatentable under § 103 over Buruganahalli; the evidence of copying does not outweigh the strong obviousness showing.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Scope on Remand On remand, the panel here will not address issues outside the scope of the Federal Circuit’s mandate. See Hayward Indus., Inc. v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa, Inc., 814 F. App’x 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The Board is bound by the terms of a mandate issued by an appellate court. Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 121 F.3d 726, 1997 WL 413329, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ‘Unless remanded by [an appellate] court, all issues within the scope of the appealed judgment are deemed incorporated within the mandate and thus are precluded from further adjudication.’ Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).”). The sole issue on remand is whether “the evidence of copying” is sufficient to overcome the obviousness ground of unpatentability over Buruganahalli. Centripetal Networks, 19–20. We restate portions of the former Final Written Decision, as an aid to the reader, but substantially incorporate the analysis of the prior Decision below. C.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › CopyingObjective indicia outweighedNot shown unpatentable

    “given to the Eastern District of Virginia court’s opinion because it was later vacated. The district court considered all of the Read factors (applying Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-827 (Fed. Cir. 1992)), of which only the first factor is directed to deliberate copying, although factors 2 and 9 bear indirectly on the issue of copying. The district court determined that “[t]he fact that Cisco released products with Centripetal’s functionality within a year of these meetings goes beyond mere coincidence. Therefore, the fact that Cisco’s system mirrors the functionality of the Centripetal patents is compelling evidence that damages should be enhanced for copying.” Ex. 1027, 157. Without more, it is difficult to evaluate the processes that the district court employed to reach its determination. As the Federal Circuit instructed, we need “not [] go searching throughout the entire litigation record to find the evidence of copying, but [we have] an obligation to consider the specific evidence that was put before” us. Centripetal Networks, 19. We continue to determine that the vacated finding of the district court should be provided little weight, especially in view of the strong case of obviousness discussed above. Examination of Aaron Striegel We also do not find the Aaron Striegel’s testimony to be particularly persuasive. The testimony provides statements such as “I found evidence that it could be plausible,” “[s]o we can see the timeline is very plausible,” and “I found it very plausible that indeed that this technology could have made its way into these respective accused products.” Ex. 1029, 31:12–32:3. This testimony suggests the possibility of copying but does not demonstrate actual evidence of copying. At most, this testimony indicates that further consideration of the underlying evidence is warranted, but does little to support an ultimate finding of copying. Again, even taking this testimony as evidence of copying, it still must stand up against the strong case of obviousness discussed above.” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “The District Court did not provide an element-by-element analysis of how the claims of the ‘856 Patent cover this description. See Ex. 1027, 41. However, from the description, we understand the Court to have concluded that the system receives rules, identifies a set of packets as part of a flow using the NetFlow logs, “determines” that encrypted packets in the flow match known malicious signatures based on unencrypted data in other packets (e.g., data in the SNI), and then filters the flow based in a URI (e.g., that from the SNI), routing it to the null interface. The Court does not describe how the system “determines” that encrypted packets match known malicious signatures based on information in unencrypted packets, but we assume that is done as in the ‘856 Patent, by correlation, i.e., an encrypted packet is “determined” to match a threat indicator if it is in the same flow as a packet with unencrypted information that matches the threat indicator.10 With that understanding, we conclude that the allegedly infringing system operates, as least at the level described in the court’s decision, in the same way Buruganahalli’s system operates, filtering encrypted packets due to their presence in a flow that includes packets with unencrypted data, such as in a handshaking packet. It follows that Patent Owner is unable to establish a nexus, because “[w]here the offered secondary consideration actually results from something other than what is both claimed and novel in the claim, there is no nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.” Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1330” slip op. at 38

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for petitioner

    “need and industry recognition for the technology claimed in the ‘856 Patent because it describes the problem of detecting threats in encrypted traffic as ‘unsolvable.’” PO Resp. 68 (citing Ex. 1027, 64). Given that this is a press release by a company announcing that company’s new commercial product, however, we 8 The concurrence reevaluates Patent Owner’s evidence of industry praise and nexus, but we deem such considerations outside the remit of the Federal Circuit’s remand. are reluctant to give the “unsolvable” characterization much weight, as it may amount to puffery. But beyond that, it appears that the problem identified as “unsolvable” in the press release––“detect[ing] known attack signatures even in encrypted traffic”––had, in fact, already been solved in Buruganahalli, using the very same hello message, flow correlation, and man-in-the-middle techniques described in the ‘856 Patent. We thus cannot say that the press release identifies a long-felt need that was actually unsolved. See ZUP, 896 F.3d at 1374 (explaining that “[w]here the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention are . . . minimal . . . it cannot be said that any long-felt need was unsolved”) (quoting Geo. M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (first alteration in original)).” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 9,917,856 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,917,856
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00114 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Wieselthaler’s Declaration (Exhibit 1041), portions of Mr. Crosby’s Reply Declaration (Exhibit 1042), portions of the deposition transcript of Dr. Wieselthaler (Exhibit 2028), and the exhibits “upon which that testimony is based” (Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050). Mot. 1. According to Patent Owner, the Motion was made “to preserve objections previously made in the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Patent Owner did not timely move to strike any of the evidence at issue as being outside the scope of reply evidence. Patent Owner asserts that because an inter partes review must be based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), the testimony of Mr. Crosby and Dr. Wieselthaler concerning “various physical devices allegedly known” to a person of ordinary skill in the art is inadmissible, along with all of the exhibits (consisting of printed materials such a journal abstracts, press releases, and papers) related to those physical devices. Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Reply 1–4 (arguing that “devices that Petitioner’s witnesses assert were the basis of an inter partes review”). According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wieselthaler was unable to “link two of these physical devices to the printed prior art asserted in this [inter partes review], but those attempts fell apart during his cross examination.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner further reasons that because the evidence “cannot be the basis” of an inter partes review, it “has no tendency to make any fact of consequence in this trial more or less probable,” “is irrelevant and not admissible,” “presents substantial danger of confusing the issues, causing undue delay, and wasting time in this trial,” and “are not ‘based on sufficient facts[,] the product of reliable principles and methods[, or] ‘a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” Id. at 7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401–403, 702) (modification in original). With regard to Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that Patent Owner identifies no plausible legal theory for their inadmissibility based on the contention that they discuss physical devices. See Mot. Resp. 3. We also agree with Petitioner that the exhibits are not “the basis for any ground” asserted in this proceeding, and may be properly relied upon by Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby as support for their rebuttal testimony directed to Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the prior art relied upon in the instituted grounds. See id. at 3–4. In regard to the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and” slip op. at 77

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “1. “magneto coupling” Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “a second magnetic device . . . positioned to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Ex. 1001, 5:34–37. Claim 11 recites, in relevant part, “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor so as to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor relative to the one or more walls via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Id. at 6:42–48. Petitioner argues that “magneto coupling” means “a transfer of torque from one rotating permanent magnetic component to another rotating permanent magnetic component via a magnetic field.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 68–87). According to Petitioner, this construction is consistent with the ’879 patent, which describes “a coupling between two rotating ‘bar magnets’—a drive wheel rotates one bar magnet which causes another bar magnet (connected to a rotor) to rotate.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55 (analyzing Ex. 1001, 2:28–52, 4:44–64, Fig. 2)). Patent Owner argues that “magneto coupling” should be afforded “its plain and ordinary meaning, which would encompass a magnetic coupling through both rotating magnets and the use of a rotating magnetic Owner directs us to the testimony of Mr. Leschinsky, who explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’879 patent to use “magneto coupling” to generally describe “a way to couple the rotor to a drive element while sealing the two from one another and avoiding use of a direct mechanical coupling.” Ex. 2015 ¶ 67. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner provides no recognizable basis for limiting the plain meaning of magnetic coupling to one type of magnet and excluding another type of magnet.” PO Resp. 6–7 (citing Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc., v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989–992 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not provide a sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’879 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 13 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 7; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)).” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableUnpatentable

    “reasons discussed above. See supra Section III.D.3. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s contentions are premised on an unsupported claim construction that we reject, Petitioner fails to show how Wampler teaches or suggests “a magnetically driven rotor . . . axially adjacent to a first magnet device,” as required by claims 1 and 11, as well as by claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14– 16, and 18–20, which depend from either claim 1 or claim 11. In its Reply, Petitioner suggests that “[u]nder [Patent Owner’s] construction from the [Patent Owner Response], Wampler also teaches or suggests this limitation,” because Patent Owner “concedes [that] ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 11,572,879 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,572,879
• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–12 were held unpatentable over Wannamaker alone or with Avellan; claims 1–6 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not teach the claimed screen-capture sequence and assembly.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 17. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 18. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Yet paragraph 122 of Mr. Lipoff’s declaration merely repeats the Petition’s argument almost verbatim. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶ 122, with Pet. 28. Mr. Lipoff does not add any citation to Avellan or any other source that supports his testimony. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 122. Nor does Mr. Lipoff offer any additional technical reasoning than what is stated in the Petition. Testimony may be entitled to little weight if it merely restates the petition’s unsupported, conclusory assertions without adding supporting evidence or technical reasoning. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). That is the case here.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that claim 1 is not obvious over Avellan because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 21–23. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. PO Sur-reply 20. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 20.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,002 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,002
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00189 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 19 is unpatentable as obvious over Kim and over Nam; the challenge based on Lee and Park fails for lack of a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “B. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 17 and 20 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 17 and 20 of the ’666 patent. See Ex. 2005. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 17 and 20 as having never been part of the ’666 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because inter partes review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, we do not consider claims 17 and 20 to be within the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claim 19, the challenged claim that has not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) 3D memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37). Petitioner further contends that the “POSITA would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D memory’s structure, its component parts, and how it operates.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “evidence from the complete record now before us, we determine that the claim term “curved side surface” encompasses any outer surface of the structure with curvature. See Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1338–1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that it is acceptable for the Board to adopt its own claim construction where the parties “had notice of the contested claim construction and an opportunity to be heard”). We do not adopt Patent Owner’s position that “curved side surface” requires the side surface to be curved along a direction perpendicular to the top surface of the structure (e.g., the z-axis).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “curved side surface” are premised on its proposed claim construction which, as set forth above, we decline to adopt. Instead, we determined that “curved side surface” as used in the challenged claim encompasses any outer surface of the structure with curvature, which does not need to be curved in any specific direction. See § II.B.1, supra. Kim states: Embodiments of the inventive concepts in which the protrusion pad PAD_P has a rectangular parallel[] shape is illustrated, but the protrusion pad PAD_P is not limited thereto and, in some embodiments, may have a shape including a curved surface based on a virtual rectangular parallel[] shape, a cylindrical shape, or any shape. Ex. 1005, 8:29–34 (emphases added). Dr. Lee testifies that “[a] POSITA would have recognized that this includes configurations where the sides of the protrusion pads are curved, particularly to optimize electrical connectivity and mitigate stress at material interfaces.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 201. Dr. Lee further testifies that a POSITA would have understood Kim’s disclosure “teaches a variety of different protrusion pad PAD_P shapes” including “pads with curved sides when viewed in cross-section or pads with curved sides when viewed from above.” Id. ¶ 202. Accordingly, we determine that Kim discloses a cylindrically-shaped PAD_P that has a “curved side surface” as required by the challenged claim. slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,145,666 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,145,666
• Rocket Media, LLC D/B/A Launch Labs v. Fullthrottle Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00148 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Doughty and Van Boucq, and over Doughty, Van Boucq, and Maginnis.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art in June 2021 would have had “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field plus at least one year of experience working on computer networking, or (2) at least 3 years of experience working on computer networking, even without a formal degree.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 44–47). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered definition. PO Resp. 23. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’947 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We determine that no terms require express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes in this case, but address certain claim construction arguments made by the parties in the analysis below. See id.; Inst. Dec. 11 (determining that “no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms”); PO Resp. 23 (agreeing that “no express constructions are necessary to resolve this IPR”). slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner has shown that the combination of Doughty and Van Boucq accounts for these limitations. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that claim 1 somehow excludes, what Patent Owner calls, the “Unique Identifier/Tracker Embodiment.” See PO Resp. 27, 31. Beginning with the language of the claims, the claims are silent as to where the “location data” recited in limitation 1[c] is stored. See Tr. 21:7– 16 (Patent Owner agreeing that “the stored location data does not actually have a required location at all” in the claim, and need not be stored in a database). Nor does Patent Owner direct us to any claim language that would specifically exclude “location data” stored on the user’s device. See Sur-reply 2–3. “The patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning unless the patentee clearly redefines the term (lexicography) or disavows claim scope (claim disavowal).” Aortic Innovations LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 159 F.4th 1, 8 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Patent Owner directs us to statements in the Specification, stating “[f]or example, the computing device may access a database or other storage location that maintains a mapping of unique identifier to a browser session, a user computing device, and/or location data.” Ex. 1001, 9:52–55; see also id. at 39:26–30 (same), 43:55– 59 (same). But none of those passages amounts to lexicography or disavowal of claim scope. Indeed, when read in their full context, these passages support a broad reading, not a narrow reading, of the claims. The full passage of the Specification states: The computing device may determine, at 406, whether there is a unique identifier that is associated with the user (e.g., the user computing device, the browser, and/or the browser session) stored on the computing device. For example, the script may inform the computing device that there is no unique identifier for the user computing device. The computing device may determine that there is no unique identifier associated with the user computing device when there is no location data stored for the user computing device. For example, the computing device may access a database or other storage location that maintains a mapping of unique identifier to a browser session, a user computing device, and/or location data. Additionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine whether there is a unique identifier for associated with the user based on presence of a location tracker (e.g., cookie) installed in the browser application on the user computing device. Ex. 1001, 9:43–59. The passage above is full of language that indicates that the patentee did not intend to limit the claims to a single embodiment. Indeed, the specific portion of the passage cited by Patent Owner begins with “[f]or example” and further states “[a]dditionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine whether there is a unique identifier for associated with the user based on presence of a location tracker (e.g., cookie) installed in the browser application on the user computing device.” Id. at 9:52–59 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Specification states “[a]dditionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine the location data using the tracker installed in the browser application on the user computing device.” Id. at 10:2–5. The Specification also explains that the tracker may “maintain data related to the user and/or user computing device.” Id. at 12:62–63. Based on these disclosures, we find that the Specification supports a reading where the location data are stored in the user computing” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive Petitioner’s reasoning that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Doughty, based on Doughty’s own teachings regarding cookies and similar files, and would have recognized that the techniques of Van Boucq would have offered an efficient and commonly used way to determine whether the user already has been assigned a unique identifier. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 153. Patent Owner’s arguments about the precise contents of Van Boucq’s connection cookie attack Van Boucq individually and ignore the combination and modifications that Petitioner proposes. In the combination, Petitioner proposes incorporating the unique identifier from Doughty into Van Boucq’s connection cookie. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1008, 16:59–17:33; Ex. 1007 ¶ 153). As for Patent Owner’s contention that “[n]othing in the record suggests that Van Boucq’s connection cookie could contain any information about either Doughty’s table 105 Profile ID or Doughty’s hashed email address,” PO Resp. 33, as Dr. Gottesman testifies, “[a] cookie is a small piece of data (text file).” Ex. 2012 ¶ 55. We fail to see why a skilled artisan at the time of the invention would have any difficulty incorporating Doughty’s alphanumeric unique identifier into a text file. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 153, 166. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown a motivation to combine Doughty and Van Boucq for these limitations.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,556,947 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,556,947
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co. Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00257 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–15 are unpatentable because Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted § 103 grounds render them unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “proceeding, we determine Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that each of claims 1–15 of the ’660 patent is unpatentable.” slip op. at 85

  Patent outcomesUS 9,592,660 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,592,660

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.