- PTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00744 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 21, 23, 31, 37, 41, and 42 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 21 is obvious over Fager and Martins.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’791 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’791 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. Pet. 4 (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶¶ 21–25). Patent Owner, at this stage, does not disagree or propose a different definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that “[t]he prior art cited herein . . . renders the challenged claims obvious under any reasonable construction,” and “Petitioner therefore respectfully submits that, for purposes of this IPR, express constructions are not required.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner contends that “no express claim construction is necessary for the purposes of this Preliminary Response,” and “[t]he challenged claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, consistent with the specification and as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 7. On this record and for purposes of this decision, we determine that no claim terms require express construction.” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“It is our understanding that Petitioner’s obviousness theory merely relies on Martins’ teaching of using camera images to detect a surface of physical objects. See Pet. 21 (“It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Martins’ teachings regarding using camera images to detect a surface of a physical object with Fager’s augmented reality and head-mounted display system.” (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 84). The proposed resulting combination is “using the camera of Fager’s head-mounted display to capture images used to detecting physical surfaces of a play area, such as the floor, ceiling, and walls of a room in which a user wishes to play a game of, for example, virtual tennis.” Id. at 21–22 (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 84). According to Petitioner, the combination would use images to detect wall surfaces, and that it would have been obvious “to apply the same functionality to detect the surfaces of other objects in Fager’s game, such as the ‘suspended lamp’ described in Fager and other objects, given that Fager’s system models the behavior and movement of virtual objects (such as a ‘fictitious ball’) based on the determined surfaces of real-world objects.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 80, 83, 85). Petitioner contends, inter alia, that the proposed combination would have been obvious as “the combination of prior art elements, with no change in their respective functions, according to known methods—i.e., simply using the camera of the user’s head-mounted display for performing surface detection in connection with modeling the user’s physical environment.” Id. at 21 (citing Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 84). Petitioner also contends that Fager provides a motivation in explaining that its system is primarily applied indoors, where there are surfaces such as floors, ceilings, and walls, and that physical objects may be incorporated into game play. Id. at 22–23. Petitioner’s contentions are supported by the testimony of Dr. Cooperstock, which, at this stage, is unrebutted. We determine that Petitioner has shown adequately for purposes of institution that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to make the proposed combination and that the proposed combination would result in the claimed subject matter.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,019,791 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00739 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Jaszlics and Rallison.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 8, 13, and 20 of the ’277 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. (EX1002, ¶¶21-25.) Pet. 4. Patent Owner at this stage does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. See Ex. 1001, 2:37–41, 2:61–67, 3:21–23, 8:50–64. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (Ex. 1001, 1:56–58), which indicates that the applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” Ex. 1001, 11:12–14. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a “physical playfield” with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Even if we were to accept Patent Owner’s unsupported contention that the location of Jaszlics’s image processor is outside of the display device, this would result in only two identified, predictable locations of the image processor. The image processor would either be located outside of the display device or inside of the display device. We are persuaded that substituting Rallison’s location of inside the display device instead of outside the display device provides sufficient reason to combine the teachings of Jaszlics and Rallison. See Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (reversing the Board’s determination of lack of motivation “because Okubo’s terminal-side plotting and Konishi’s server-side plotting were both well known in the art, and were the only two identified, predictable solutions for transmitting a map and plotting locations, it would have been obvious to substitute server-side plotting for terminal-side plotting in a combination of Okubo and Konishi”) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,179,277 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00738 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 3, and 6–8 of the ’448 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), includes revisions to Section 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the challenged claims issued from an application claiming the benefit of the filing date of an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply pre-AIA law. 2 U.S. Patent No. 6,166,744 issued Dec. 20, 2000 (Ex. 1003). 3 Int’l Patent Appl. Pub. No. WO 2003/107039 A2 published Dec. 24, 2003 (Ex. 1008). 4 U.S. Appl. Pub. No. 2002/0163486 Al published Nov. 7, 2002 (Ex. 1009) 5 U.S. Patent No. 6,361,438 B1 issued Mar. 26, 2002 (Ex. 1006). 6 U.S. Appl. Pub. No. 2004/0002843 A1 published Jan. 1, 2004) (Ex. 1007). combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. (EX1002, ¶¶21-25.) Pet. 5. Patent Owner at this stage does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. Ex. 1001, 2:32–36, 2:55–61, 3:14–16, 5:63–65, 6:30–32, 8:31–45, 9:4–9, 19:60–20:22, 22:5–6. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (Ex. 1001, 1:56–58), which indicates that the applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” Ex. 1001, 11:12–14. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a “physical playfield” with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case”).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. . . . A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem. If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection. In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Jaszlics discloses that the “invention relates . . . to systems for combining virtual images with real-world scenes” to provide applications such as virtual reality games (Ex. 1003, 1:13–21), which is the same field as the ’448 patent’s field of “location-based games and augmented reality systems” (Ex. 1001, Title). Turning to Sofer, the purpose of the detector of Sofer is to detect the location of objects in the user’s surrounding environment (Ex. 1008, Abstract; see id. at 2, 6, 11), which is the same purpose as the detector of the ’448 patent (Ex. 1001, 15:4–5; see id. at 1:28–31, 2:5, 16:11–18, 19:54–57). Therefore, Sofer’s detector is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem of detecting the location of objects in the user’s surrounding environment. We are sufficiently persuaded that Jaszlics and Sofer are analogous to the claimed invention.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,744,448 - PTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00742 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 6-10, 14, 17, 24-28, and 30 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), the Director may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’243 patent on all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAOther
“portable device 100 as “portable” even when components of that “device” are integrated in a “non-portable” device, such as a car. Examples of such portable devices are provided as wireless telephones, PDAs, laptops; handheld devices, and music players. Ex. 1009 ¶ 22; See Ex. 1001, 4:22−28 (describing a visor as a portable gaming system); 7:21−27 (listing additionally Blackberries, Personal Electronic Devices, IPODs and any other portable electronic device, to be configured as a gaming system). Taking these disclosures together, the ’243 patent does not define the degree of the “portability” of the claimed device to require that the “portable device” must be completely “free of encumbering external connections.” If “portability” can include integrating a component of the “portable device” into a “non-portable device,” then there is support for holding that the recited “portable device” could be tethered to a non-portable device.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“rotation sensors are found not to be positioned on Levesque’s display, it would have been obvious to do so in light of Ronzani because Ronzani teaches equipping the head-mounted device with external and internal sensors). Petitioner’s arguments and evidence regarding motivation to combine amount to showing that “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). The inquiry at this juncture is whether Petitioner has shown sufficiently that an ordinarily skilled artisan is “able to recognize, based on her background knowledge, [a technique’s] potential to improve the device and be able to apply the technique.” Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artInstituted
“A reference that is in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention is analogous art,5 and such a qualification means that one of ordinary skill in the art is presumed to have been aware of the reference and thus the refence properly may be considered if it predates the claimed invention. See Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petitioner contends that the field of endeavor of the claims of the ’243 patent is “the field of portable user-worn devices for providing location based-entertainment.” Pet. 19−20. According to that description of the relevant field of endeavor, Petitioner argues that both Levesque and Ronzani are analogous to the ’243 patent. Id. Patent Owner appears to argue that the field of endeavor is “video games.” Prelim. Resp. 29−30. This is not the correct field of endeavor because although the claim recites a location based game system, the claims considerably focus on the head-mounted device. Indeed, for claim 1 all the structural elements claimed involve or are placed in the head-mounted device. Thus, “video games” generally is not an appropriate field of endeavor, as it is too broad and ignores the significant focus of the claims of the ’243 patent. Petitioner’s statement of the field of endeavor is, therefore, more indicative of the correct field of endeavor involved here. And as such, it is unpersuasive to argue that Ronzani does not belong to the field merely because it is not solely focused on video” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,904,243 - PTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00618 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7, 8, 12–15, 18, and 19 on both § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim under each ground is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’823 patent. We institute inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’823 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa” and that “POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and techniques.” Id. Patent Owner “does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition” of a POSITA at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 17. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’823 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific claim construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 10. Petitioner explains that the parties have proposed “different constructions for various claim terms pending in the Related Litigation” but that the Grounds “render the claims unpatentable under either party’s construction, and any reasonable construction, and thus the Board need not construe any term.” Id. at 10–11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 367; Ex. 1070; Ex. 1071).2 Patent Owner does not expressly address claim construction in its Preliminary Response. We determine that, at this stage of the proceeding, no explicit constructions are required to resolve the dispute between the parties. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“E. Combination of Vasell, Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall As explained above, Petitioner contends that the technical implementation details that were intended to implement Vasell’s teachings are described in Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall. Pet. 36. Petitioner argues, therefore, that the motivation to modify Vasell to include features described in the other references is demonstrated by the references themselves. Id. at 36–37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 375–376). For example, according to Petitioner, a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Vasell with Alves’ teaching of a centralized application repository for storing its distributed applications to provide increased scalability. Id. at 38, 39 (citing Ex. 1008, 263, 266; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 378–379). Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Vasell with Rellermeyer’s management software to provide for load balancing, failover and elastic scalability. Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 380). Finally, Petitioner argues that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Vasell with Hall’s management software that requires digital signatures for distributed applications to provide increased security for using third party applications. Id. at 38, 39 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 381). Patent Owner does not separately dispute Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Vasell, Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall. to combine the prior art references and determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Vasell, Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall with a reasonable expectation of success for the reasons provided by Petitioner.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,695,823 - Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00619 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Microsoft did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9 obvious over Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITAs”)] as of June 2013 would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field. Additional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. To that end, POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and familiar with operating/distributed systems and security and privacy techniques. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58).4 Patent Owner does not contest this in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 36–37. We apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art here.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,686,871 - Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00617 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Microsoft did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 6–8, 10–13, and 15 obvious over Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITAs”)] as of June 2013 would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field. Additional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. To that end, POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and familiar with operating/distributed systems and security and privacy techniques. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 59).4 Patent Owner does not contest this in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 39. We apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art here. 2 Congress amended § 103 when it passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011). Petitioner asserts that the version amended by the AIA applies here. Pet. 23. 3 We use Petitioner’s nomenclature in which Petitioner collectively refers to the Vasell patent (Ex. 1004) and its corresponding provisional applications (Exs. 1015, 1016) as “Vasell.” 4 Erez Zadok, Ph.D. submitted a declaration on behalf of Petitioner. See Ex. 1003.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,893,095 - PTAB · Sep 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00741 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 12, 17, and 20 of the ’493 patent on all asserted §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its contentions of obviousness for claim 1 of the ’559 patent and claim 1 of the ’493 patent.” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Rallison is evidence of the knowledge that a head-mounted display would include a processor—provides sufficient rational underpinning for the combination of teachings. Petitioner proffers that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that including a processor in a head-mounted display is a known technique to improve a similar device (Jaszlics’s visor) in the same way and predictably. 740 Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1004, 10:4−14; 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 80). We do not find at this juncture that this argument is unsupported or speculative, as Patent Owner argues. Additionally, we understand Patent Owner’s arguments—that Jaszlics system would have no need for incorporating a processor in the visor as taught by Rallison—as contentions that Jaszlics either teaches away from such a combination or the benefits of such a configuration are outweighed by significant drawbacks. These contentions are underdeveloped and unsupported. Petitioner’s argument and evidence, at this juncture, reasonably explain the reasons to combine under precedent that there is a motivation to combine when “a known technique ‘has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.’” See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)). The location of the processor in the head-mounted display of Jaszlics does not need to be the best option, so long as it is a suitable option. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197-98 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Finally, as for Rallison and Jaszlics’s alleged incompatibility, we are not persuaded that more evidence is needed at this juncture for details on the modification of Jaszlics to include the processor of Rallison. Such argument amounts to a bodily incorporation argument, and our analysis focuses rather on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the “teachings” as alleged. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Indeed, we note the evidence presented by Petitioner that a head-mounted display’s use of electronics to generate the displayed video images was well known. 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 82; Ex. 1004, 10:4−14.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,376,493 - PTAB · Sep 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00740 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 12, 17, and 20 of both patents on all asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of each patent is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons stated in this Decision, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’559 patent and at least one claim of the ’493 patent are unpatentable, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all grounds raised in the instant Petitions. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill, would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a 2 US Patent No. 6,166,744, issued Dec. 26, 2000 (Ex. 1003). 3 US Patent No. 6,369,952 B1, issued Apr. 9, 2002 (Ex. 1004). 4 WO 03/107039 A2, published Dec. 24, 2003 (Ex. 1008). 5 US Patent Application US 2002/0163486 A1, published Nov. 7, 2002 (Ex. 1009). person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. 740 Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 21−25); 741 Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not propose a level of ordinary skill. As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“At this stage, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed construction persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” The Paper 10 in the 740 IPR; and Patent Owner filed a Preliminary Sur-reply, filed as Paper 11 in the 740 IPR. Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. Ex. 1001, 2:38−40, 2:63–3:2, 3:23–25, 6:11−13, 6:46−48, 8:48– 62, 9:23–28, 20:28−58, 22:1−4. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (740 Ex. 1001, 1:58−60), which indicates that applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined, or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” 740 Ex. 1001, 11:12−14. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing a physical playfield with defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a physical playfield with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case.”). We, therefore, agree at this juncture with Petitioner’s claim construction analysis, and note that the alleged goal of improving the safety in virtual reality gaming does not support Patent Owner’s construction.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Second, Petitioner’s explanation of its alternative theory—that Rallison is evidence of the knowledge that a head-mounted display would include a processor—provides sufficient rational underpinning for the combination of teachings. Petitioner proffers that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that including a processor in a head-mounted display is a known technique to improve a similar device (Jaszlics’s visor) in the same way and predictably. 740 Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1004, 10:4−14; 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 80). We do not find at this juncture that this argument is unsupported or speculative, as Patent Owner argues. Additionally, we understand Patent Owner’s arguments—that Jaszlics system would have no need for incorporating a processor in the visor as taught by Rallison—as contentions that Jaszlics either teaches away from such a combination or the benefits of such a configuration are outweighed by significant drawbacks. These contentions are underdeveloped and unsupported. Petitioner’s argument and evidence, at this juncture, reasonably explain the reasons to combine under precedent that there is a motivation to combine when “a known technique ‘has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way.’” See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)). The location of the processor in the head-mounted display of Jaszlics does not need to be the best option, so long as it is a suitable option. See PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1197-98 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Finally, as for Rallison and Jaszlics’s alleged incompatibility, we are not persuaded that more evidence is needed at this juncture for details on the modification of Jaszlics to include the processor of Rallison. Such argument amounts to a bodily incorporation argument, and our analysis focuses rather on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the “teachings” as alleged. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Indeed, we note the evidence presented by Petitioner that a head-mounted display’s use of electronics to generate the displayed video images was well known. 740 Cooperstock Decl. ¶ 82; Ex. 1004, 10:4−14.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,828,559 - PTAB · Sep 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00737 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1, 2, 4–7, 13, and 17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Meta would show at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1, 2, 4–7, 13, and 17 of the ’476 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with two years combined experience in designing and/or developing interactive location-based computer systems/software, such as video games or other simulations incorporating location information (such as GPS information associated with a user’s physical location), and in designing 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), includes revisions to Section 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the challenged claims issued from an application claiming priority to an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply pre-AIA law. 2 US Patent No. 6,166,744 issued Dec. 26, 2000 (Ex. 1003). 3 Wayne Piekarski et al., “Integrating Virtual and Augmented Realities in an Outdoor Application,” Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE and ACM International Workshop on Augmented Reality (1999) (Ex. 1004). 4 US Patent No. 6,361,438 B1 issued Mar. 26, 2002 (Ex. 1006). 5 US Patent No. 6,951,515 B2 issued Oct. 4, 2005 (Ex. 1005). 6 US Publ. No. 2004/0002843 A1 published Jan. 1, 2004 (Ex. 1007). 7 WO 01/42809 A2 published June 14, 2001 (Ex. 1008). and/or developing computer systems/software involving graphical virtual and/or augmented reality. A person could also have qualified as a person of ordinary skill in the art with some combination of (1) more formal education (such as a master’s of science degree) and less technical experience, or (2) less formal education and more technical or professional experience. (EX1002, ¶¶21-25.) Pet. 5–6. Patent Owner, at this stage, does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. See generally, Prelim. Resp. As Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“persuasive for several reasons. The claim does not recite “a defined physical playfield.” Rather, the claim recites “a physical playfield.” Ex. 1001, 21:6– 7; 22:26–27. The Specification’s discussions of “playfield” cited by Patent Owner use non-limiting language such as “for example” and “may” in describing the playfield. Id. at 2:32–36, 2:55–61, 3:14–16, 5:63–65, 6:30– 32, 8:30–44, 9:4–9, 19:60–20:22, 22:5–6. The disclosed examples of “a physical playfield” include “the physical world, a physical environment, or a defined physical playfield” (Ex. 1001, 1:51–53), which indicates that applicant intended “a physical playfield” as claimed to encompass more than a defined, or “bounded” physical playfield. This indication is consistent with the Specification’s disclosure that “the game world corresponds to an actual area of the physical world (such as the planet Earth or New York City).” Ex. 1001, 10:58–61. Thus, in one disclosed embodiment, the physical playfield is the entire (unbounded) world. We are persuaded that the Specification’s descriptions of various embodiments with defined playfields and undefined playfields support construing the scope of a “physical playfield” as encompassing defined boundaries, or a “bounded” playfield, as well as a “physical playfield” with undefined boundaries, or an “unbounded” playfield. Limiting the claim term to only “bounded” play spaces would read out broader embodiments from the claim scope. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that interpreting a claim to exclude an embodiment disclosed in the written description “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support, which is wholly absent in this case.”). We, therefore, agree at this juncture with Petitioner’s claim construction analysis, and note that the alleged goal of improving the safety in virtual reality gaming does not support Patent Owner’s construction. Paper 10, 2 (Petitioner arguing that by describing an augmented reality system where a user can view the physical surroundings, a “bounded” physical playfield is not necessary). Further, we find unpersuasive, at this juncture, Patent Owner’s arguments related to embodiments of how the information about the playfield is captured and stored to construct the playfield and perform scaling. Prelim. Resp. 7−13. As Petitioner notes, and we agree, none of these features are recited in the independent claims. Paper 10, 2. And, to the extent there is a distinction between being “on” or “off” the “physical playfield” as Patent Owner argues, the claim language requires no such determination or detection.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“physical playfield” as properly construed. Prelim. Resp. 30. As discussed in our claim construction above, we are not persuaded that the claim term “physical playfield” is limited to a bounded physical play space. However, even under the Patent Owner’s proposed narrower construction, we are sufficiently persuaded that the combination teaches a bounded physical play space. Jaszlics discloses that its system creates virtual elements in theme parks and entertainment-oriented environments. Ex. 1003, 2:14–16, 2:67– 3:1; see id. at 18:48–55. We are sufficiently persuaded that a theme park is a bounded physical play space. In addition, Jaszlics discloses training armored vehicle crews by using both virtual vehicles and actual vehicles moving over real terrain. Ex. 1003, 1:38–60. We are sufficiently persuaded that a skilled artisan would have envisioned that such training occurs on a military base, which is bounded.8 Jaszlics further discloses that its training field includes boundary markers. Ex. 1003, Fig. 15, 10:1–9. We are sufficiently persuaded that the tank training field of Jaszlics, which has boundary markers and is located on a military base, is a bounded physical play space. Therefore, even under Patent Owner’s narrower construction, we are sufficiently persuaded that a person of ordinary skill would have recognized that a user would have played at least some of the video games provided by the combined system of Jaszlics and Piekarski in a bounded physical play space such as a theme park or a military base. slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,585,476
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.