- PTAB · Jul 9, 2024 · IPR2024-00117 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all petitioned grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including anticipation of claim 1 by Nguyen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and any response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons below, we determine that Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim, and we institute an inter partes review as to all challenged claims of the ’836 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedNot shown unpatentable
“A reference qualifies as a printed publication only if it was publicly accessible before the effective filing date of the challenged patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1); M & K Holdings, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 985 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Public accessibility “has been called the touch-stone” in determining whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication. M & K Holdings, 985 F.3d at 1379 (quoting Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Id. (quotes and citations omitted).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“2. Independent Claim 1 a. Preamble Petitioner contends that Nguyen discloses the claim 1 preamble, which recites “an adapter for mating with optical fiber connectors.” Ex. 1001, 18:12. Pet. 32–33 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 26–30, Figs. 1, 2). We find that Petitioner’s contention for the claim 1 preamble is adequate for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“2. Reasons to Combine Petitioner contends that it would have been obvious to modify Nguyen’s adapter in two ways. Pet. 54. First, Petitioner asserts it would have been obvious to include “optical-fiber connectors that employ handles configured to remotely release connectors from the adapter” by replacing Nguyen’s connectors with Lee’s connectors. Pet. 54–56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 289–295). Second, Petitioner asserts it would have been obvious to include “a transverse wall that includes slots halfway between two ends of the adapter and sleeve holders that employ sockets to mate with cylindrically-shaped ferrules” by replacing Nguyen’s wall with Lee’s sleeve holders. Pet. 54, 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 296–302). Petitioner provides several reasons for the first modification, including a desire for convenience, tightly packed fiber optic ferrules, ease of maintenance, and scalability. Pet. 54 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 289–290). According to Petitioner, these goals would be served because “Lee’s handle allows a user to disengage the latch arm further from the adapter” whereas “[t]he latch arms of Nguyen require a user to be closer to the adapter.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 289). Petitioner also provides reasons for the second modification, asserting that “Lee’s sleeve holders are easy to maintain because they are removable, able to snap into place, and coordinate with dust caps to maintain cleanliness, as opposed to Nguyen’s immobile wall.” Pet. 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 297). According to Petitioner, “a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Nguyen’s adapter to incorporate Lee’s sleeve holders and slots to provide a system that is easier to maintain.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 298–299). We find that Petitioner’s asserted rationale for modifying Nguyen in view of Lee is adequate for purposes of institution.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,333,836 - PTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00699 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 based on the § 103(a) grounds instituted in the LG IPR and granted VIZIO’s motion to join that proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an IPR may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons we discuss below, we institute an IPR as to claims 1–18 of the ’805 patent, and we grant VIZIO’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“because this proceeding and the LG IPR are substantively identical (i.e., they involve the same claims, the same patent, the same prior art references, the same expert declaration, and the same arguments and evidence). See Mot. for Joinder 4–6. Stated differently, VIZIO asserts that the Petition and supporting evidence filed in this proceeding do not raise any new substantive or procedural issues. See id. VIZIO further argues that, because it is willing to work with counsel for LG (i.e., as an understudy) to consolidate all filings and discovery, joinder will not impact the schedule of the LG IPR, thereby allowing us to complete a single consolidated proceeding in a timely manner. Id. at 7–9. VIZIO also argues that, if it is joined as a party with the LG IPR, Multimedia will not suffer any prejudice because granting joinder under these circumstances will not add new issues for consideration by or costs to Multimedia above and beyond those already presented in the LG IPR, nor will granting joinder affect the issues, briefing, or discovery in the LG IPR, as they will remain the same. Id. at 9–10. Given that Multimedia did not oppose VIZIO’s Motion for Joinder (Ex. 3002), and VIZIO agrees to consolidate all filings and discovery with LG (Mot. for Joinder 6–7), VIZIO has demonstrated that joinder will not unduly complicate or delay the LG IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (providing for “the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding” (emphases added)). We, therefore, grant VIZIO’s Motion for Joinder and, as a result, join VIZIO as a party with the LG IPR.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 10,419,805 - PTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00696 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–14 on the existing § 103(a) grounds and granted VIZIO’s motion to join the LG IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an IPR may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons we discuss below, we institute an IPR as to claims 1–14 of the ’174 patent, and we grant VIZIO’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“14, 2024 (Paper 4 (“Notice of Filing Date Accorded to Petition and Time for Filing Patent Owner Preliminary Response), 1), and the Motion for Joinder was filed on the same day. As such, VIZIO’s Motion for Joinder was timely, because joinder was requested no later than one month after May 21, 2024, the institution date of the LG IPR. See LG IPR Dec. on Inst.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 9,247,174 - PTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00694 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 11–16, 21, and 22 based on the same § 103(a) grounds as the LG IPR, and joined VIZIO to that proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an IPR may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons we discuss below, we institute an IPR as to claims 1–6, 11–16, 21, and 22 of the ’040 patent, and we grant VIZIO’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“In its Motion for Joinder, VIZIO contends that joinder is appropriate because this proceeding and the LG IPR are substantively identical (i.e., they involve the same claims, the same patent, the same prior art references, the same expert declaration, and the same arguments and evidence). See Mot. for Joinder 4–6. Stated differently, VIZIO asserts that the Petition and supporting evidence filed in this proceeding do not raise any new substantive or procedural issues. See id. VIZIO further argues that, because it is willing to work with counsel for LG (i.e., as an understudy) to consolidate all filings and discovery, joinder will not impact the schedule of the LG IPR, thereby allowing us to complete a single consolidated proceeding in a timely manner. Id. at 6–9. VIZIO also argues that, if it is joined as a party with the LG IPR, Multimedia will not suffer any prejudice because granting joinder under these circumstances will not add new issues for consideration by or costs to Multimedia above and beyond those already presented in the LG IPR, nor will granting joinder affect the issues, briefing, or discovery in the LG IPR, as they will remain the same. Id. at 9–10. Given that Multimedia did not oppose VIZIO’s Motion for Joinder (Ex. 3002), and VIZIO agrees to consolidate all filings and discovery with LG (Mot. for Joinder 6–9), VIZIO has demonstrated that joinder will not unduly complicate or delay the LG IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (providing for “the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding” (emphases added)). We, therefore, grant VIZIO’s Motion for Joinder and, as a result, join VIZIO as a party with the LG IPR.” slip op. at 5
NonePatents in suitUS 9,510,040 - PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00353 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6, 8–10, 12–17, and 19 based on the reasonable likelihood that the Kim, Bae, and WD-Manual combinations, with Coburn for certain claims, render them obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv factors. See Director Memo. Notably, the Director stated that “the PTAB [Patent Trial and Appeal Board] will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any ground that could have been reasonably raised before the PTAB.” Director Memo at 3. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because LG filed a Sotera stipulation in both this proceeding and the district court case where LG is a party. Pet. 131; Ex. 1025.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“For purposes of institution, there is sufficient evidence in the record that enables us to determine the knowledge level of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Relying on the testimony of Dr. Lippman, LG argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . in the field of the ’254 patent, as of its earliest possible filing date of August 17, 2012, would have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the television display technology that is pertinent to the ’254 patent. A [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, or Computer Engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of television systems and networking, human-computer interaction, or related technologies. Lack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19). For the limited purposes of its Preliminary Response, “[Multimedia] adopts [LG’s] definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Pet. 10–11). To the extent necessary, we adopt LG’s assessment of the level of skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’254 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“In any event, the “mere disclosure of alternative designs does not teach away.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). A reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” investigation into the claimed invention. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. When combining references to establish obviousness, the appropriate consideration is whether the proposed combination would work for its intended purpose, not whether the proposed combination is inconsistent with the stated goal of one of the references, as Multimedia argues. See Prelim. Resp. 30; DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Furthermore, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (citation omitted). To the extent Multimedia argues that LG’s reasons to combine the relevant teachings of Kim with those of Bae and WD-Manual are deficient, we determine, on the preliminary record, that LG has made a sufficient showing regarding the proposed combination. See Prelim. Resp. 31 n.4. At this stage in the proceeding, Multimedia merely offers attorney argument that Kim’s remote controller 200, which may include “other appropriate user input device[s],” is a generic statement that an improvement is possible, but it does not suffice to incorporate the specific features of Bae or WD-Manual. Id. (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 175); cf. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value). Based on the preliminary record, LG has presented sufficient arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that would support the following: (1) modifying Kim’s CHANNEL BROWSER card object 1340 or TV GUIDE card object 1350 to include Bae’s on screen channel number selection window 330 so that the user may change the channel by selecting corresponding numbers using left and right arrow keys; and (2) modifying Kim’s remote controller 200 to include WD-Manual’s remote control features, including, among other things, assigning or programming any one of the shortcut/function keys A, B, C, and D to display specific types of media content or device information. See Pet. 18–25; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 38, 60, 86, 90, 115, 127, 174, 175, 177, 188, 192–217, 283, Figs. 7, 8, 22, 38; Ex. 1006, 5–7, 11, 25–26, 138–139; Ex. 1008 ¶ 23; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–83.” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“In any event, the “mere disclosure of alternative designs does not teach away.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). A reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” investigation into the claimed invention. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. When combining references to establish obviousness, the appropriate consideration is whether the proposed combination would work for its intended purpose, not whether the proposed combination is inconsistent with the stated goal of one of the references, as Multimedia argues. See Prelim. Resp. 30; DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Furthermore, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (citation omitted). To the extent Multimedia argues that LG’s reasons to combine the relevant teachings of Kim with those of Bae and WD-Manual are deficient, we determine, on the preliminary record, that LG has made a sufficient showing regarding the proposed combination. See Prelim. Resp. 31 n.4. At this stage in the proceeding, Multimedia merely offers attorney argument that Kim’s remote controller 200, which may include “other appropriate user input device[s],” is a generic statement that an improvement is possible, but it does not suffice to incorporate the specific features of Bae or WD-Manual. Id. (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 175); cf. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value). Based on the preliminary record, LG has presented sufficient arguments and evidence for purposes of institution that would support the following: (1) modifying Kim’s CHANNEL BROWSER card object 1340 or TV GUIDE card object 1350 to include Bae’s on screen channel number selection window 330 so that the user may change the channel by selecting corresponding numbers using left and right arrow keys; and (2) modifying Kim’s remote controller 200 to include WD-Manual’s remote control features, including, among other things, assigning or programming any one of the shortcut/function keys A, B, C, and D to display specific types of media content or device information. See Pet. 18–25; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 38, 60, 86, 90, 115, 127, 174, 175, 177, 188, 192–217, 283, Figs. 7, 8, 22, 38; Ex. 1006, 5–7, 11, 25–26, 138–139; Ex. 1008 ¶ 23; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–83.” slip op. at 35
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,055,254 - PTAB · Jun 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00404 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 3, 4, 7–10, 13, 14, 16–18, and 22 on all asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“In evaluating arguments under § 325(d), we use a two-part framework: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential).” slip op. at 7
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. “frame mode” Petitioner proposes we construe “frame mode” the same as we did in IPR2021-00822 as “having the keyboard face down on a surface with the screen face up, and the base and display components forming a non-zero angle.” Pet. 8–9. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction in its Preliminary Response. On the current record, we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“2. “content mode” Petitioner proposes we construe “content mode” consistent with Patent Owner’s construction during the ’844 Reexam, where Patent Owner “argued for and received a construction of [‘Content Mode’] as meaning ‘displaying some information that represents a higher-level construct into which content is grouped.’” Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 1005, 6). Further, “[t]his recitation is distinct from merely displaying individual things (e.g., applications) that may be grouped into a content mode.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction in its Preliminary Response. On the current record, we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,624,844 - PTAB · May 31, 2024 · IPR2024-00255 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–4 and 6–11 on both asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“that, because judgments have been entered in the district court actions, there is finality as that relates to Fintiv issues. In a similar instance, where a district court’s § 101 determination was appealed to the Federal Circuit, the Director determined that the Board had the authority to institute an inter partes review and a Fintiv analysis should be performed. See Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., IPR2022-01366, Paper 15 at 1–8 (PTAB May 2, 2023). The Director has additionally distinguished a Fintiv analysis under similar circumstances to those here, where “the district court’s judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101, i.e., a statutory ground that could not have been raised before the Board, does not raise concerns of inefficient duplication of efforts or potentially inconsistent results between the Board and the district court.” AviaGames, Inc., Paper 14 at 3. Further, the Director determined that, “the challenged claims have not yet been cancelled and remain in force until the opportunity to appeal has been exhausted,” noting that “[b]y the time an appeal will have concluded, Petitioner will be barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from bringing a new challenge in an IPR petition.” Id. at 3–4. Fintiv states that “a district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand from the Federal Circuit to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.9” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 7 n.2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 8, 10, 26). Dr. Sundaresan testifies that a person having ordinary skill in the art “had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in the field working with . . . navigation and/or geolocation systems,” and “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 8. For the purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 32. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’104 patent and the prior art. See” slip op. at 7
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the district court’s construction of “grid point” as “a point associated with representative calibration data for an area.” See Ex. 1054, 18–20. This construction is consistent with the claim language and the specification of the ’104 patent and is further supported by the reasoning provided by the district court’s claim construction order. See id. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,561,104 - Mediatek Inc. v. Parkervision, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00150 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 on all four asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Gibson and Schiltz combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“As set forth in the Director’s Memorandum, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (dated June 21, 2022), at 7, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf, the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR . . . in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition. Petitioner’s stipulation (Ex. 1025) satisfies the language from the Director’s Memorandum quoted above. Therefore, we need not analyze each Fintiv factor to reach the determination that we will not exercise our discretion to deny institution in view of the parallel Western District of Texas Litigation.” slip op. at 14
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. The Petition is clear that it presents alternative challenges where Goldberg, Thacker, ITU-T J.83, and/or AAPA are added to the combination of Gibson and Schiltz or are added to Crols, if the term “cable modem,” recited in the preamble of claim 1, is determined to be limiting. Pet. 6–7. In the context presented here, “and/or” clearly means one or more of the four additional references. And Petitioner’s reliance on one or more of the additional references is clear in the context of the issues before us based on Petitioner’s analysis of the preamble of claim 1, where Petitioner clearly states, “[a]nd to the extent that the preamble is limiting and requires a ‘cable modem,’ it would have been obvious to use the modem of Gibson (as modified by Schiltz, discussed below) as a cable modem, in view of Thacker, Goldberg, ITU-T J.83, and/or AAPA.” Pet. 42 (Ground 1); see id. at 66–67 (similarly asserting, in the context of Ground 2, that, “[t]o the extent that the preamble is limiting and requires a ‘cable modem,’ it would have been obvious to use the modem of Crols as a cable modem, in view of Thacker, Goldberg, ITU-T J.83, and/or AAPA”). Petitioner also includes a discussion as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to “use the modems of Gibson modified with Schiltz (Ground 1), and Crols (Ground 2), as ‘cable modems,’ in view of the DOCSIS References (Thacker and Goldberg), ITU-T J.83, and AAPA,” and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in so doing. Id. at 37–40. Thus, we do not agree with Patent Owner that the Petition lacks particularity and we find that the Petition clearly sets forth the alternative combinations discussed above such that Patent Owner has a fair opportunity to respond.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“l. Summary as to Claim 1 For the reasons discussed above, on the present record we find that Petitioner has established that the combination of Gibson and Schiltz teaches each of the elements of claim 1 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of these two references as proposed by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success in so doing.” slip op. at 40
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is identical to the level of skill that we found applicable in the final written decision in the TCL IPR. See IPR2021-00985, Paper 44 at 13. We see no reason to deviate from our previous finding, which is now further supported by Dr. Larson’s testimony. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 26. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceeding and on the present record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’835 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,292,835 - PTAB · May 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00352 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–14 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims were obvious over Woods and over Woods with Machida.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Sotera stipulation must be filed in the two parallel district court cases. See Prelim. Resp. 13–16. This same argument was raised previously in another proceeding before the Board. See Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Alidouble, Inc., IPR2023-00369, Paper 7 at 10 (PTAB July 12, 2023) (Institution Decision) (declining to discount petitioner’s stipulation because petitioner did not file it in the district court). In Taiwan Semiconductor, patent owner urged the Board to exercise discretion to deny institution under § 314(a) in light of a parallel district court litigation because, in part, petitioner had not filed the stipulation in the district court. Id. at 9. The Board disagreed and found that the Director’s Memo does not require that such a stipulation be filed in the district court, only that the petitioner must “stipulate[]” or “present[] a stipulation.” Id. (citing Director’s Memo at 3, 7). Here, we agree with the Board’s reasoning in Taiwan Semiconductor case, and we understand the Director’s Memo as only requiring Petitioner to “stipulate[]” or “present[] a stipulation.” The Director’s Memo is silent regarding any requirement for Petitioner to file a stipulation in the district court case where Petitioner is a party. Director’s Memo at 3, 7. Even if arguendo Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation should also be filed in district court, here Petitioner did file a “Notice of Sotera Stipulation” in the district court case where Petitioner is a party. Ex. 1012. This Notice states that “[LG] hereby stipulate[s], consistent with the stipulation made by the [p]etitioner in Sotera that, if the PTAB institutes an IPR in response to [LG’s] petition against [Multimedia’s] U.S. Patent No. 9,247,174 (IPR2024- 00352), [LG] will not pursue in this litigation the grounds raised or any other grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB in that instituted proceeding.” Id. at 2. Consequently, the purpose of Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation has been achieved here because it “mitigates any concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions.” Sotera, Paper 12 at 19 (citing Sand Revolution II, LLC v. Cont’l Intermodal Group – Trucking LLC, IPR2019-01393, Paper 24 at 12 (PTAB June 16, 2020) (Decision Granting Request for Rehearing) (informative)). Although Patent Owner is correct that Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation would have little, if any, impact on the district court case where Vizio is a party (see Prelim. Resp. 16–17), the Director’s interim guidance does not condition or otherwise qualify the effect of a Sotera stipulation on our exercise of discretion to deny this Petition based on any remaining defendants in the parallel district court cases that are not subject to the stipulation (see Director Memo at 7, 9). Put simply, Petitioner has filed a Sotera stipulation in this proceeding and, as a result, we will not exercise our discretion to deny its’ Petition.” slip op. at 21
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that the subject matter of independent claim 1 would have been obvious over Woods, considered as a single reference under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 35
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose claim construction for any term, although it identifies two terms it contends are defined in the Specification of the ’174 patent. Pet. 11. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s statements on claim construction. Prelim. Resp. 30. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent necessary for institution, we note a disagreement between the parties regarding the term “application panel” in claims 1 and 10, and address it below. See infra § VI.A.10.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“the operation panels of Machida to be relevant to a television environment,” and that Machida performs panel selection automatically and not as a direct result of user selection, and therefore Machida “teaches away from combining Machida with Woods, particularly with respect to the panels described in Woods.” Prelim. Resp. 39. But Machida expressly describes a television environment in paragraph 35, which explicitly contemplates “TV type services, data broadcasting services, and data added TV services.” Moreover, we preliminarily are of the view that Patent Owner is imputing an overly narrow construction to at least claim 1 regarding the term “panel,” as discussed supra. Further, a reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” investigation into the invention claimed. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For at least these reasons, we preliminarily find that Petitioner’s arguments regarding claims 1–14 under Ground 3 over Woods and Machida are sufficient at this juncture.” slip op. at 39
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,247,174 - PTAB · May 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00351 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 11–16, 21, and 22 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“On June 21, 2022, the Director issued interim guidance in the form of a memo that further clarifies how we should approach analyzing the Fintiv factors. See Director Memo. Notably, the Director stated that “the PTAB [Patent Trial and Appeal Board] will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any ground that could have been reasonably raised before the PTAB.” Director Memo at 3. With this interim guidance in mind, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of this proceeding under Fintiv because LG filed a Sotera stipulation in both this proceeding and the district court case where LG is a party. Pet. 93; Ex. 1014.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Based on the preliminary record, there is no readily discernible controversy between the parties that requires us to construe any claim terms at this time. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Based on the preliminary record, we are persuaded that LG has presented sufficient evidence that would support a finding that Kim teaches “wherein at least one of the sources is highlighted as being associated with the first content information.” Pet. 46–48 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 211, 228; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 133–142). Kim discloses that, “[u]pon receipt of an incoming call,” smart TV 100 automatically displays PHONE card object 1390 on display 180. Ex. 1005 ¶ 211. If the incoming call is received while PHONE card object 1390 is already being displayed on display 180, “[PHONE card object 1390] may be highlighted or otherwise distinguished from the other card objects.” Id. This is consistent with another passage in Kim, which discloses distinguishing active card objects from partially displayed card objects using “color, tint, brightness, shading, fading, or another appropriate characteristic.” Id. ¶ 228 (emphases added). In our view, these cited disclosures in Kim collectively teach or suggest that, when smart TV 100 actively displays a card object (e.g., PHONE card object 1390), it distinguishes the active card object from other card objects presented on display 180 by using highlighting.” slip op. at 29
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,510,040
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.