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  • PTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2024-01230 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 for all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “discretionary denial under § 325(d). The Notice Regarding Amendment Options explains that the Board may deny institution under § 325(d) of a requested AIA trial proceeding if a parallel Office proceeding, for example, is in a more advanced stage and involves overlapping issues with the proposed AIA trial proceeding. 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,657 (emphasis added). We find that the EPR is not in a more advanced stage as compared to this proceeding, and therefore does not weigh in favor of the Board exercising discretion to deny institution, despite its overlapping issues with those in the Petition.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review to be instituted unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–5 of the ’336 patent, based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “the art.7 On consideration of the record, specifically the patent and cited prior art, we find Petitioner’s proposed educational levels and subject matter (bachelor’s degree in electrical or mechanical engineering) more appropriate. Specifically, Patent Owner’s reference to a degree in computer science does not appear relevant to the claimed electro-mechanical device. We find Patent Owner’s proposed hands-on experience more persuasive as Petitioner’s definition is too vague (“generally familiar”) to assist our determination. On this record and for the purposes of institution, we find that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the challenged claims, as of the earliest claimed priority date, would have a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in electrical engineering or mechanical engineering, and would have two years of experience in designing and/or implementing hardware components for computers, servers, and/or other electronic devices. We further determine that more experience could compensate for the absence of a bachelor’s degree. The level of skill is reflected by the testimony of the parties’ declarants and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “We determine that the plain meaning of claim 1 supports Patent Owner’s interpretation. Claim 1 recites a body, provided with a fan in center of the body, an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at top of the body, a power socket and a first connector on one side of the body, and a second connector on another side of the body . . . such that when the power socket on the one side of the body is supplied with power, the fan and the illumination area of the body are respectively driven into rotation and illumination . . . Ex. 1001, 4:5–9 (emphasis added). Claim 1 expressly recites three body locations: “the top of the body,” “one side of the body,” and “another side of the body.” Id. “A power socket and a first connector” are listed together in the same clause “on one side of the body.” Id. The plain language of the claim further supports that “one side of the body” includes both power socket and first connector, as the limitation is repeated later in the claim: “the power socket on the one side of the body.” See id. at 4:12 (emphasis added). The location of the second connector is defined in relation to the one side with the first connector. See id. at 4:5–9. Accordingly, the plain meaning of claim 1 defines three sides of the claimed body, a top of the body (with an illumination area on two sides of the fan), one side of the body with a power socket and a first connector, and another side of the body with a second connector. See id. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that no other claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,690,336
  • PTAB · Feb 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01262 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–26 on all petition challenges and granted Altice USA’s motion to join IPR2024-00322, subject to participation limits.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The patentability challenges in the Comcast IPR met the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). IPR2024-00322, Paper 13, 36.” slip op. at 4

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Under the present circumstances, we agree with Petitioner that joinder is appropriate and will not unduly impact the ongoing trial in IPR2024- 00322. Nonetheless, we lay out the following restrictions in order to ensure minimal impact on the trial schedule, cost, discovery, and potential briefing. Specifically, we limit Petitioner Altice USA, Inc.’s participation in the joined proceeding, such that (1) Comcast Communications, LLC alone is responsible for all petitioner filings in the joined proceeding until such time that it is no longer an entity in the joined proceeding, and (2) Altice USA, Inc. is bound by all filings by Comcast Communications, LLC in the joined proceeding, except for (a) filings regarding termination or settlement and (b) filings where Altice USA, Inc. receives permission to file an independent paper. Altice USA, Inc. must obtain prior Board authorization to file any paper or to take any action on its own in the joined proceeding, so long as Comcast Communications, LLC remains as a non-terminated petitioner in the joined proceeding. This arrangement promotes the just and efficient administration of the ongoing trial in IPR2024-00322 and protects the interests of Comcast Communications, LLC as original petitioner in IPR2024-00322, and of Patent Owner. For the foregoing reasons, and with the limitations discussed above, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is granted.” slip op. at 6

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,356,251
  • PTAB · Feb 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01231 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–26 on all petition grounds and granted Charter’s motion to join IPR2024-00322, subject to participation limits.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The patentability challenges in the Comcast IPR met the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). IPR2024-00322, Paper 13, 36.” slip op. at 4

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “not be impacted if it were to join that proceeding because “[t]he grounds in the instant Petition—and evidence upon which they rely—are identical to the grounds in the Comcast IPR, which the Board instituted.” Mot. 1, 5. Furthermore, Petitioner agrees that, if joined as a party to the Comcast IPR, it will act as “understudy” and will not assume an active role unless Comcast terminates its involvement after joinder. Mot. 1, 7–8. Under the present circumstances, we agree with Petitioner that joinder is appropriate and will not unduly impact the ongoing trial in IPR2024- 00322. Nonetheless, we lay out the following restrictions in order to ensure minimal impact on the trial schedule, cost, discovery, and potential briefing. Specifically, we limit Petitioner Charter Communications, Inc.’s participation in the joined proceeding, such that (1) Comcast Communications, LLC alone is responsible for all petitioner filings in the joined proceeding until such time that it is no longer an entity in the joined proceeding, and (2) Charter Communications, Inc. is bound by all filings by Comcast Communications, LLC in the joined proceeding, except for (a) filings regarding termination or settlement and (b) filings where Charter Communications, Inc. receives permission to file an independent paper. Charter Communications, Inc. must obtain prior Board authorization to file any paper or to take any action on its own in the joined proceeding, so long as Comcast Communications, LLC remains as a non-terminated petitioner in the joined proceeding. This arrangement promotes the just and efficient administration of the ongoing trial in IPR2024-00322 and protects the interests of Comcast Communications, LLC as original petitioner in IPR2024-00322, and of Patent Owner.” slip op. at 6

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,356,251
  • PTAB · Jan 16, 2025 · IPR2023-01027 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 37–70 are unpatentable: claims 37–41, 47, 50–56, 58–59, 60–62, 64–65, and 70 as anticipated by Alden; the remaining challenged claims as obvious over Alden and the listed combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “alleged invention “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems” and that more education could compensate for less experience and vice versa. See Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). 3 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 01/70538 A2 (Exhibit 1010). 4 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 01/01038 (Exhibit 1006). 5 U.S. Patent No. 4,970,628 (Exhibit 1007). 6 U.S. Patent No. 6,144,158 (Exhibit 1008). 7 U.S Patent No. 6,049,749 (Exhibit 1009). 8 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 02/04247 A1 (Exhibit 1011). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a person of ordinary skill in the art” (PO Resp. 4), and, as we generally agree that it is consistent with the subject matter disclosed in the ’503 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. B.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Claim Construction We construe claims using the standard that would be applied in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), giving terms their ordinary and customary meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the specification and prosecution history. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). The Petition asserts that all claim terms should be given their “ordinary and customary meaning.” See Pet. 8. Patent Owner also proposes that the claim terms be given their ordinary meaning, and identifies the “ordinary meaning” for the terms “identify,” “turn,” and “curve,” which we discuss in our analysis below. We otherwise find that that no express claim construction is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
    Patent outcomesUS 10,894,503 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 10,894,503
  • PTAB · Jan 16, 2025 · IPR2023-01026 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–36 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 7, 10–17, 19–23, 25–27, and 30–36 are anticipated by Alden; claims 5, 6, 8, and 9, and 28–29, are obvious over the stated combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • BurdenUnpatentable

      “III. CONCLUSION For the reasons given, Petitioner has met its burden of showing that claims 1–36 of U.S. Patent 10,894,503 B2 are unpatentable.12 The results are summarized below:” slip op. at 47

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “alleged invention “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems” and that more education could compensate for less experience and vice versa. See Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a person of ordinary skill in the art” (PO Resp. 4), and, as we generally agree that it is consistent with the subject matter disclosed in the ’503 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. B.” slip op. at 10

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

      “While Alden’s Figure 5 shows a sectional view of a segmented-headlight embodiment, thus depicting a single line of LEDs, that does not restrict the embodiment to a one-dimensional array. Indeed, Alden’s disclosures discussed above contradict such a view, as do the disclosures regarding Figure 5 and other segmented-headlight embodiments. We credit Petitioner’s expert’s testimony in this regard. Ex. 2041, 59:10–12 (“[I]t’s very clear we’re talking about a two-dimensional structure that is map of this set of slices in figure 5.”); accord id. at 56:25–60:18. The Figure 5 embodiment includes a switch array to control the individual lighting elements, with “[e]ach lighting element being independently controlled by a corresponding switch in an array of switches 115.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 29. The Figure 6 embodiment includes a face-on view of the headlight plainly showing a two-dimensional array, in addition to a sectional view similar to that of Figure 5. Id. at Fig. 6. And Alden describes that the Figure 6 embodiment uses a “switch array similar to 115 and the process previously described herein.” Id. ¶ 30. Considering Alden’s description of its sensing-and-control circuit in connection with Figure 3, which illustrates a two-dimensional array, and its description of Figure 5’s segmented headlight as working with that approach, we find that Alden’s LED-based segmented headlight is capable of selective illumination in two dimensions. See id. ¶¶ 27, 29, Figs. 3, 5.” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “The Petition asserts that all claim terms should be given their “ordinary and customary meaning.” See Pet. 8. Patent Owner also proposes that the claim terms be given their ordinary meaning, and identifies the “ordinary meaning” for the terms “identify,” “turn,” and “curve,” which we discuss in our analysis below. We otherwise find that that no express claim construction is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 11

    Patent outcomesUS 10,894,503 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 10,894,503
  • PTAB · Jan 14, 2025 · IPR2023-01034 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–33 are unpatentable: claims 1–8, 10–19, 21–30, 32, and 33 as obvious over Alden and Kobayashi; claims 9, 20, and 31 as obvious over Alden, Beam, and Kobayashi.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner asserts that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Patent Owner does not dispute that level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. We adopt the undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision and refer to people with that skill as skilled artisans.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “B. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION The parties agree that no express claim construction is required at this stage. Pet. 8; PO Resp. 7. We agree with the parties and therefore do not further construe the claims for this decision. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “relies on Kobayashi, submitting that it would have been obvious to “use map data to identify road curvature when adapting the LEDs of Alden to ‘direct light into the corner.’” Pet. 23–24 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 36). Petitioner reasons that Alden discloses detecting road curvature through roadside reflectors and steering-wheel sensors, and Kobayashi discloses an additional way to detect road curvature. Id. at 24. Petitioner continues that, because Kobayashi discloses using map data to control vehicle headlights, skilled artisans would have had reason to adopt its teachings in Alden’s system “to maximize successful detection in different environments.” Id. at 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70). Petitioner relies on Kobayashi also for determining a light change to increase light in the direction of road curvature and shaping light based on the road curvature. Id. at 27. Finally, Petitioner relies on Kobayashi for the requirement to control the light sources both based on the determined light change and also prior to the vehicle reaching the road curvature. Id. at 30.” slip op. at 10

    Patent outcomesUS 11,208,029 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 11,208,029
  • PTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00986 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 3, 4, and 6 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the claims are unpatentable over Shin despite concerns about Ground 2.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition. Prelim. Resp. 10 (citing Pet. 7–8). Petitioner’s definition appears consistent with the challenged patent and the prior art of record. See Pet. 7–8. Thus, we apply that definition.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner proposes giving each term its plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 7. Patent Owner agrees. Prelim. Resp. 10. On the current record, no terms are in controversy, and the Board does not need to construe any term here.” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightOther

      “We agree that Petitioner’s obviousness rationale appears to be based on the challenged patent’s disclosure—at least in part. See Pet. 46–47 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:25–50), 61 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:34–40). Dr. Mark P. Mahon’s corresponding testimony relies on the same parts of the challenged patent, adding little additional technical reasoning or support from the prior art of 8 Petitioner cites “Section 5.8a.1.3.”, but the quoted passage appears in Section 5.8.1.3. Pet. 60 (emphasis added). challenged patent itself raises the possibility that Petitioner has succumbed to impermissible hindsight bias. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 815 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)) (discussing the “the distortion caused by hindsight bias”); see also InTouch Tech., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It appears that [the expert] relied on the . . . patent itself as her roadmap for putting what she referred to as pieces of a ‘jigsaw puzzle’ together.”). Even so, the preliminary record also indicates that it may be inherent in an NB-IoT system that “DCI indicating an SC-MCCH change notification must be transmitted in a different subframe from the DCI indicating a resource for the updated SC-MCCH information.” Pet. 61. This is a factual issue best resolved on a fully developed record.” slip op. at 20

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for patent owner

      “We see no basis for using China Standard Time here. “The time and date of receipt of an application filed via EFS-Web is the local time and date in USPTO headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia.” Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 502.05 I.C.2 (9th ed. Rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015) (emphasis added).7 The MPEP provides an example of how an application filed from the Pacific Time Zone would receive the filing date as of the USPTO’s local time: For example, if an applicant in California officially files a patent application with the USPTO through EFS-Web by clicking on the SUBMIT button at 10 p.m. Pacific Time in California on May 1, that application would be officially received by the USPTO at 1 a.m., local time (i.e., Eastern Daylight Time) on May 2. Accordingly, the application would receive a filing date of May 2. Id. Thus, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Fujishiro is not prior art for this reason. Prelim. Resp. 28–29.” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
    Patents in suitUS 10,785,764
  • PTAB · Dec 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00985 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 8–14 and 16 on all asserted grounds, finding compelling evidence that the challenges could establish unpatentability.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)InstitutedInstituted

      “1–5 weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Fintiv factor 1 is neutral, factors 2, 3, and 5 weigh in favor of denial, and factor 4 weighs marginally against discretionary denial. On balance, the Fintiv factors weigh in favor of denying institution. Because the Fintiv factors favor denial of institution, we must also determine whether the Petition presents compelling merits. See CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 4 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (precedential) (“In circumstances where . . . the Board’s analysis of Fintiv factors 1–5 favors denial of institution, the Board shall then assess compelling merits.”).” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “or “POSITA”) would have been “familiar with wireless communications networks, equipment, and integrated circuit chips, and would have had at least a working knowledge of communication protocols used in LTE and 5G radio access networks (“RAN”).” Pet. 11–12. According to Petitioner, a POSA would have “at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering or an equivalent field, and at least two years of work experience in design, development, and/or testing wireless telecommunication systems” as well as “familiarity with the wireless standards and protocols related to data transmission and network management.” Id. at 12. At this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition of the POSA. Prelim. Resp. 10 (“For purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.”). Because Petitioner’s description of a POSA appears consistent with the subject matter of the ’566 patent and with the prior art of record and we apply it for purposes of this decision, with the exception of the qualifier “at least” which expand the ranges of education and experience indefinitely with no upper bound. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 16

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We find Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner did not meet its obligation to explain how the claims should be construed unavailing because, on the present record, we do not find a material difference between Petitioner’s assertion in this proceeding that the claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning and the claim constructions that Petitioner agreed to in the district court litigation. We do not find it necessary to expressly construe any claim terms at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))); Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”). We address whether the Petitioner has sufficiently shown that the cited art meets the limitations at issue infra § III.E.1.” slip op. at 17

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “G. Conclusion on Compelling Merits For the reasons set forth above, we determine that Grounds 1–3 of the Petition present a compelling meritorious challenge. That is, “the evidence, if unrebutted in trial, would plainly lead to a conclusion that one or more claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the evidence.” Guidance Memo 4. As the Director explains in OpenSky, however, this finding “should not be taken as a signal to the ultimate conclusion after trial” because “all relevant evidence likely will not have been adduced at the point of institution [and] trial should produce additional evidence that may support a determination in the Final Written Decision that unpatentability has not been adequately proven.” OpenSky, IPR2021-01064, Paper 102 at 49– 50. IV. CONCLUSION Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the accompanying evidence, we find that the Petition presents compelling evidence of the unpatentability of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we grant Petitioners request that we institute inter partes review of claims 8–14 and 16 of the ’566 patent.” slip op. at 25

    Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,601,566
  • PTAB · Dec 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00951 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–5 on all petition grounds, finding compelling evidence of unpatentability based on Wang and Yang.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), inter partes review may not be instituted unless the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Institution of an inter partes review is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (authorizing institution of an inter partes review under particular circumstances, but not requiring institution under any circumstances).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “system are best served by denying or instituting review” when evaluating these factors. Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of Fintiv factors 1–5. As discussed above, factor 1 is neutral, factors 2, 3, and 5 weigh in favor of discretionary denial of institution, and factor 4 weighs marginally against discretionary denial. On balance, we conclude that the evidence of record on factors 1–5 favors exercising our discretion to deny institution of an inter partes review. Following CommScope, where, as here, our analysis of the first five Fintiv factors favors denial of institution, we address the merits of the Petition to determine whether, on this preliminary record, the merits are compelling. CommScope Technologies LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23 at 4–5; Guidance Memo 3–5.” slip op. at 15

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “In addition, Petitioner asserts that, to the extent Wang does not disclose limitation 3.3, it would have been obvious over Wang and the POSA’s knowledge of the art. According to Petitioner, and Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Mahon, it was “well known . . . that TBs could be . . . subdivided in CBs or CBGs and that UEs could transmit HARQ-ACK bits on either a TB or CBG basis to improve the efficiency of the system and potentially prevent the need for retransmission of an entire TB whenever a NACK signal is received.” Pet. 33–34; Ex. 1003 ¶ 281. Petitioner asserts that it was also known that it was desirable to transmit one HARQ-ACK per TB in some instances and one HARQ-ACK bit per CBG in other instances. Id. Petitioner explains that there are a limited number of ways to “distinguish between one HARQ-ACK transmission method and another,” and therefore the POSA would “immediately recognize that one such distinguishing characteristic to devise such a system around is search space configuration, such that one HARQ-ACK bit is transmitted per TB in one search space configuration (e.g., CSS), while one HARQ-ACK bit is transmitted per CBG in another search space configuration.” Id.” slip op. at 25

    § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,531,443
  • PTAB · Dec 10, 2024 · IPR2023-01040 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 48–87 are unpatentable: Alden anticipates most challenged claims, while claims 49 and 51 are obvious over Alden and Beam, and claims 52, 60, 68, 76, and 84 over Alden and Kobayashi.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). Patent Owner does not dispute that level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 6. We adopt the undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art and refer to people with it as skilled artisans.” slip op. at 7

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “enablement for Alden’s system detecting road curves. Pet. Reply 21. As Petitioner points out, Alden uses both intensity and a detected object’s location (including distance) to inform its response. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 27–28. Petitioner’s expert testifies that the same physical system used to accommodate oncoming vehicles could be used to detect roadside reflectors and direct light into road curves. Ex. 2041, 78:16–80:24. Further, Petitioner’s expert testifies that skilled artisans would adjust the intensity and distance thresholds to distinguish roadside reflectors from oncoming vehicles. IPR2023-01039, Ex. 1003 ¶ 150. Based on Alden’s disclosures, we credit Petitioner’s expert’s testimony that Alden’s system would detect and accommodate road curvatures as claimed by the ’551 patent. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 132–134. Although Patent Owner argues that Alden’s system could not do so while also accommodating oncoming vehicles, that position is based on the argument that “the system can’t tell the difference between signs and headlights.” PO Surreply 21–23. Patent Owner contends that “detected intensity is a function of both distance and emission intensity” so a threshold couldn’t distinguish headlights from signs. Id. at 24–25. That position ignores that Alden uses triangulation to calculate each object’s distance, as discussed, which would allow it to distinguish different types of objects using an intensity threshold. We agree with Petitioner’s expert that Alden’s system can distinguish the two, as discussed.” slip op. at 33

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “sufficiently clear to impart a requirement on “classifying” such that a system must choose from multiple classes or types of objects. The parties do not appear to dispute that “classifying the object” includes arranging or grouping the object according to some system or principle. Thus, there is no need to further construe the claims for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 10

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We agree with Petitioner. Alden’s system does not simply dim its headlights where it detects spots of light. Rather, it performs a multistep process in which those spots are detected, analyzed with triangulation to determine distance, and then used to determine dimming zones. Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 27–28. Alden discloses that its sensor “detects the two headlights” of an oncoming vehicle when “[e]lectrons corresponding to the position and intensity of light are categorized by a logic and CPU 71 and stored in a memory 72.” Id. ¶ 27. Petitioner’s expert noted that Alden’s description “move[s] from lights – thresholding lights to objects, and then calculate[s] distance of each thresholding object using triangulation.” Ex. 2041, 109:23–110:2. That testimony supports our view that Alden first detects lights, uses those detected lights to identify and classify an oncoming car, then dims the headlight output to prevent glare. Alden’s dimming decision particularly indicates that it classifies pairs of detected headlights as oncoming vehicles. The CPU makes “assumptions about the space that may potentially be occupied by the driver of the sensed vehicle” and identifies an area of the segmented headlight to dim that is “significantly larger than the headlight dots that were initially received.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 27. Patent Owner agrees that Alden dims “selected surrounding sectors” around detected light (PO Resp. 30), and the way Alden selects those sectors indicates that it identifies vehicles. It does not simply expand an area around each detected light; it dims an area to encompass the driver of the identified vehicle. Ex. 1005 ¶ 27, Fig. 3. By treating a pair of corresponding detected lights collectively for dimming, Alden indicates that it classifies pairs of detected lights as vehicles.” slip op. at 23

    Patent outcomesUS 9,955,551 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 9,955,551

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