- PTAB · Feb 8, 2022 · PGR2021-00102 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–28 on all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” After considering the Petition and Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, as well as all supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has satisfied the burden under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) to show that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“These arguments are not persuasive, however, because Patent Owner does not explain adequately how the disclosures of Oehring and Shampine are cumulative of the disclosure of Mu. In this case, the mere fact that 8 We note that Exhibit 2007 does not have ¶ 95 cited by Patent Owner. not mean necessarily that the references are cumulative of Mu. For instance, Petitioner relies on Mu for allegedly disclosing several claim limitations including “receiving a demand hydraulic horse power (HHP) signal,” “the first output power being in a selected range of a maximum continuous power (MCP) level,” and “the second output power . . . being in a selected range of the MCP level to a maximum intermittent power (MIP) level.” Pet. 19–41. Patent Owner does not direct us to any disclosure in Oehring or Shampine that are cumulative of these alleged teachings in Mu. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that either of Oehring or Shampine is cumulative of Mu. As such, we determine that Petitioner’s reliance on Mu does not involve the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously presented to the Office, and the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is not satisfied with respect to Mu. And although Crowe is cited in the ’459 patent (see Ex. 1001, code (56)), Petitioner’s reliance on Crowe is minimal. The ground based on Mu and Crowe, thus, does not implicate § 325(d).” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelOther
“This dispute presents a factual issue best decided on a complete record. Accordingly, for purposes of the Decision, we determine that no express finding is necessary, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that our obviousness analysis in this Decision would not differ if we adopted either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionTerm construed board ownOther
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained sufficiently what a “maximum power output value” means in the context of the ’459 patent. Nor has Petitioner explained sufficiently why “maximum intermittent power” should be tied to the “maximum power output value.” In contrast, Patent Owner’s proposed construction is supported by the Specification, although we do not agree with the last clause of the construction because the references to “typical” values do not assist in understanding the claim language. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we preliminarily construe “maximum intermittent power” to mean “an elevated operating output level that the pump unit may operate intermittently throughout its operating life without excessive damage to the pump unit.”” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,907,459 - PTAB · Dec 6, 2021 · IPR2021-00923 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–14 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate unpatentability. Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). A claim is unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). We resolve the question of obviousness based on underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the prior art and the claims; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“(a) Success in Modifying Petitioner argues that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have anticipated success in modifying Mann’s wristwatch based on similarities in functionality and structure of the computer, cameras, and control functionality taught by Mann and Numazaki.” Pet. 20–21. In support of this argument, Petitioner cites to the Bederson Declaration testimony modification would have been well within the skill set of a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Id. at 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 46). Petitioner also cites to legal precedent for the proposition that it is “obvious to use known techniques to improve similar devices in the same way.” Id. (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)). Petitioner further explains that Mann includes “the requisite structure to capture gestures (i.e., PDA and wristwatch devices with cameras facing that user), and it expressly describes receiving finger-based input to control the operation of the wristwatch,” while “Numazaki similarly describes PDA and wristwatch devices with cameras facing the user such that a user can perform gestures over the devices to exert control over the operation of the device. Id. (citing Ex. 1004, 11–13, 15; Ex. 1005, 52:5–32). Petitioner concludes that “[a] [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have recognized that [the] modif[ication] . . . would have required a straightforward replacement of Mann’s native user-facing imaging with Numazaki’s gesture-recognition hardware” and “a straightforward software update (i.e., adding Numazaki’s gesture detection routines).” Id. at 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 46).” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Patent Owner correctly notes that “[t]he Petition [and the declarant] fail[] to provide any explanation or reasoning as to why Numazaki’s no-touch gestures would draw ‘much less’ attention than physically interacting with a watch interface or using a stylus on a PDA.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10. We further note that though the Bederson Declaration testimony makes statements similar to those in the Petition, no support is provided for what appear to be conclusory statements. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 47. Further, the declarant does not identify any experience or expertise in things of a “covert nature.” See id. at App. A (declarant’s resume). Thus, we give the Bederson Declaration testimony little weight on this point. Patent Owner further argues that physical contact with a wristwatch or PDA was the normal way in which one would have expected someone to interact with such a device at the time of the invention. Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner further argues that “no-touch gesture recognition . . . [is] more likely to intrigue the subject and draw their attention.” Id. at 9–10. On this record, Patent Owner’s arguments appear to have merits. Nevertheless, we do not need to determine whether this additional reason to combine by Petitioner is sufficient in light of our determination regarding the first reason to combine.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We apply these principles to the Petition’s challenges. 2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that “[a] person having ordinary skill in the art (‘PHOSITA’) at the time of the ’924 Patent would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or equivalent with at least one year of experience in the field of human computer interaction” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 29–31). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 5. statement is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’924 patent and prior art of record. We adopt this definition for the purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,194,924
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.