- Roofr Inc. v. Pictometry International Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00435 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–8, 10–13, and 15–17 as obvious over Pershing-789 and Abhyanker; claims 9 and 14 over the Pictometry combination; and claims 1–17 over Kennedy, Abhyanker, and Bailey.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Mr. Cummings qualifies as a skilled artisan. Pet. Reply 2–7. As Petitioner notes, the ’800 patent’s computer-related features are fairly basic—i.e., “standard computer input devices, applications, and graphical user interface elements” that “would be familiar to and understood by one” with experience like Mr. Cummings’s. Pet. Reply 5–6 (citing Ex. 1001). As we explained in our Institution Decision, “[a]lthough Mr. Cummings may lack formal computer-related education, he ‘ha[s] extensive experience using software related to construction’ including ‘decades working with software related to construction modeling and estimation.’” Paper 16, 8 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 6). Mr. Cummings also “ha[s] experience collaborating with software developers to create new software in my field.” Id. In light of the ’800 patent’s basic computing features, Mr. Cummings’s experience is sufficient. In addition, we do not find it problematic that the Petition repeats certain portions of Mr. Cummings’s testimony. Though portions of the Petition may be the same as Mr. Cummings’s testimony, that does not by itself undermine the testimony’s persuasiveness or its status as evidence, nor does it mean Petitioner’s arguments are conclusory, as Patent Owner suggests. See PO Resp. 37–39.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Mr. Cummings qualifies as a skilled artisan. Pet. Reply 2–7. As Petitioner notes, the ’800 patent’s computer-related features are fairly basic—i.e., “standard computer input devices, applications, and graphical user interface elements” that “would be familiar to and understood by one” with experience like Mr. Cummings’s. Pet. Reply 5–6 (citing Ex. 1001). As we explained in our Institution Decision, “[a]lthough Mr. Cummings may lack formal computer-related education, he ‘ha[s] extensive experience using software related to construction’ including ‘decades working with software related to construction modeling and estimation.’” Paper 16, 8 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 6). Mr. Cummings also “ha[s] experience collaborating with software developers to create new software in my field.” Id. In light of the ’800 patent’s basic computing features, Mr. Cummings’s experience is sufficient. In addition, we do not find it problematic that the Petition repeats certain portions of Mr. Cummings’s testimony. Though portions of the Petition may be the same as Mr. Cummings’s testimony, that does not by itself undermine the testimony’s persuasiveness or its status as evidence, nor does it mean Petitioner’s arguments are conclusory, as Patent Owner suggests. See PO Resp. 37–39.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In an inter partes review proceeding, we construe patent claims using the same standard used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 2; see generally PO. Resp. We agree that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundMixed
“Moreover, Petitioner’s proposed combination is sufficient for obviousness even if we accept Patent Owner’s proposed temporal requirement. Specifically, Petitioner’s rationale for adding Abhyanker’s user inputs (i.e., “allowing a user to designate a geographic position of a roof and to subsequently confirm that the roof location is correct would promote the accuracy of the system,” Pet. 24, 67 (emphasis added, Petitioner’s emphasis omitted)), explains why one skilled in the art would have provided Abhyanker’s lock pushpin option after placing a marker. See also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43, 127. Patent Owner’s argument, in contrast, assumes a skilled artisan could do no more than bodily incorporate Abhyanker’s placement and lock features without any thought as to sequence. That, however, is not the test for obviousness. See, e.g., Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (noting that “a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ”). For these reasons, and in light of the Petition’s analysis, see Pet. 24– 25, 33–35, 67, 74, we agree with Petitioner that its proposed combination teaches “responsive to receiving the designation of the building roof structure location, providing a second computer input capable of signaling user-acceptance of the building roof structure location within the first image, wherein user-acceptance is one or more affirmative steps undertaken by the user to confirm the designation of the building roof structure location,” as claimed.6” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 10,648,800 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,648,800 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Cobblestone Wireless, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00319 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of success on either obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on Dr. Almeroth, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or the equivalent, and at least two years of experience working in the field.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 41). Petitioner further states that “[r]elevant work experience would include experience with cellular telecommunications and networking, radioaccess network architectures, protocols, and signal propagation in wireless networks,” and that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not set forth a proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner and not disputed by Patent Owner as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 10
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Under these facts, Petitioner has failed to set forth a sufficient basis to support the claim construction it relies on and, consequently has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that its unpatentability arguments, which are based on that construction, have merit. Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with the Board’s prior decisions in Hologic, Orthopediatrics, and Samsung, upon which Patent Owner relies. See Prelim. Resp. 10–14. However, we note that our determination does not rely on discretionary denial or exclusively on Rule 42.104(b)(3), but rather it is based on Petitioner’s failure to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that limitation [1.3] is obvious based on Sesia. Where a petitioner specifically relies on a particular construction of a claim term in order to demonstrate unpatentability, particularly a construction different from the ordinary meaning, that claim construction is part of the unpatentability analysis, and the petitioner must provide a sufficient basis to support that construction. See, e.g., Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“In determining whether a claim is invalid as obvious, we compare the prior art to the claim language, and if necessary, after the claim language has been properly construed when the meaning or scope is in dispute.”). Here, Petitioner has not done so because: (1) Petitioner does not rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, and its own expert testifies that its construction is contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning; (2) Petitioner offers no intrinsic or extrinsic evidence that the construction it relies on is correct; and (3) Petitioner and its expert assert that the proffered construction is inconsistent with the ’347 patent Specification.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Under these facts, Petitioner has failed to set forth a sufficient basis to support the claim construction it relies on and, consequently has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that its unpatentability arguments, which are based on that construction, have merit. Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with the Board’s prior decisions in Hologic, Orthopediatrics, and Samsung, upon which Patent Owner relies. See Prelim. Resp. 10–14. However, we note that our determination does not rely on discretionary denial or exclusively on Rule 42.104(b)(3), but rather it is based on Petitioner’s failure to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that limitation [1.3] is obvious based on Sesia. Where a petitioner specifically relies on a particular construction of a claim term in order to demonstrate unpatentability, particularly a construction different from the ordinary meaning, that claim construction is part of the unpatentability analysis, and the petitioner must provide a sufficient basis to support that construction. See, e.g., Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“In determining whether a claim is invalid as obvious, we compare the prior art to the claim language, and if necessary, after the claim language has been properly construed when the meaning or scope is in dispute.”). Here, Petitioner has not done so because: (1) Petitioner does not rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, and its own expert testifies that its construction is contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning; (2) Petitioner offers no intrinsic or extrinsic evidence that the construction it relies on is correct; and (3) Petitioner and its expert assert that the proffered construction is inconsistent with the ’347 patent Specification.” slip op. at 20
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,891,347 - Samsung Electronics America, Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Cobblestone Wireless, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00316 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 10–13, 15, and 17 were obvious over Gaal or Gaal and Khoryaev.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“c) Analysis Based on the present record, we agree with Patent Owner that Gaal does not teach or suggest the claim 10.3 and 10.4 requirements: determine, based on the quality status of the first frequency spectrum resource, that the first frequency spectrum resource is a sub-optimal resource, for the uplink channel and the downlink channel, relative to other frequency spectrum resources that are available for use by the wireless base station; and in response to the determination that the first frequency spectrum resource is the sub-optimal resource, assign the first frequency spectrum resource to a shared resource pool. Ex. 1001, 18:64–19:6. Petitioner asserts that flexible subframes are sub-optimal because they can be more prone to interference than fixed subframes. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 76; Proctor Decl. ¶ 165). But this simply is the result of the fact that a subframe in one base station cell can be handling uplink while a corresponding subframe in an adjacent base station cell is handling downlink. Proctor Decl. ¶¶ 166–168. There is nothing in Gaal to indicate that a subframe is designated as flexible, or created to be flexible, as the result of any measurement of quality status. Indeed, as the Petition admits, “Gaal does not specifically provide any criteria for designating a subframe as flexible.” Pet. 63. As discussed above in Section III.D.1, for Release 12 of the LTE standard, an eIMTA feature provides for an embellishment of the seven predefined TDD configurations, in which each configuration assigns certain subframes as fixed and others as flexible. Nor is there any concept in Gaal of a “shared resource pool” to which a flexible subframe is assigned in response to being determined as sub-optimal. Petitioner characterizes the flexible subframes as being assigned to a shared resource pool because they can be allocated to either uplink or downlink. Pet. 38. But this is an inherent property of a flexible subframe — Petitioner does not establish that the flexible subframe is assigned to a shared resource pool or anything else in response to a determination that it is sub-optimal. In addition, as Patent Owner argues, nothing in Gaal teaches determining, based on quality status, that a flexible subframe is sub-optimal for both uplink and downlink. The only quality status measurements disclosed in Gaal are CSI measurements, which relate to downlink but which are useless for uplink. Ex. 1001, 9:8–12; Ex. 1004 ¶ 85. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we determine that the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that claim 10 would have been obvious over Gaal.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“determine, based on the quality status of the first frequency spectrum resource, that the first frequency spectrum resource is a sub-optimal resource, for the uplink channel and the downlink channel, relative to other frequency spectrum resources that are available for use by the wireless base station; and in response to the determination that the first frequency spectrum resource is the sub-optimal resource, assign the first frequency spectrum resource to a shared resource pool. Ex. 1001, 18:64–19:6. Petitioner asserts that flexible subframes are sub-optimal because they can be more prone to interference than fixed subframes. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 76; Proctor Decl. ¶ 165). But this simply is the result of the fact that a subframe in one base station cell can be handling uplink while a corresponding subframe in an adjacent base station cell is handling downlink. Proctor Decl. ¶¶ 166–168. There is nothing in Gaal to indicate that a subframe is designated as flexible, or created to be flexible, as the result of any measurement of quality status. Indeed, as the Petition admits, “Gaal does not specifically provide any criteria for designating a subframe as flexible.” Pet. 63. As discussed above in Section III.D.1, for Release 12 of the LTE standard, an eIMTA feature provides for an embellishment of the seven predefined TDD configurations, in which each configuration assigns certain subframes as fixed and others as flexible. Nor is there any concept in Gaal of a “shared resource pool” to which a flexible subframe is assigned in response to being determined as sub-optimal. Petitioner characterizes the flexible subframes as being assigned to a shared resource pool because they can be allocated to either uplink or downlink. Pet. 38. But this is an inherent property of a flexible subframe — Petitioner does not establish that the flexible subframe is assigned to a shared resource pool or anything else in response to a determination that it is sub-optimal. In addition, as Patent Owner argues, nothing in Gaal teaches determining, based on quality status, that a flexible subframe is sub-optimal for both uplink and downlink. The only quality status measurements disclosed in Gaal are CSI measurements, which relate to downlink but which are useless for uplink. Ex. 1001, 9:8–12; Ex. 1004 ¶ 85. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we determine that the Petition does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that claim 10 would have been obvious over Gaal.” slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“IV. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF INSTITUTION Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion to deny institution “in light of parallel district court litigation involving the same patent, the same parties, the same claims, and the Petition’s lead reference.” Prelim. Resp. 2. However, because we are denying institution on the merits, it is unnecessary to determine whether it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to deny institution based on the parallel litigation.8” slip op. at 24
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 3–4 (citing Proctor Decl. ¶ 42). Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this preliminary response, Patent Owner does not challenge that definition.” Prelim. Resp. 9. Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579. On this record, the level of ordinary skill is neither in dispute nor dispositive of any challenge. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s articulation.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,368,361 - PTAB · Jun 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00136 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on challenged claim 1 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored denial and the petition did not present compelling merits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Thus, in circumstances where the Board determines that the other Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, the Board shall decline to discretionarily deny under Fintiv without reaching the compelling merits analysis. In circumstances where, however, the Board’s analysis of Fintiv factors 1–5 favors denial of institution, the Board shall then assess compelling merits. Id. at 4–5. In this case, Fintiv factors 1–5 favor denial. Specifically, weighing factors 1–5 in this case, we find that the approximately 8-month delay between the estimated trial date and the deadline for a final written decision in this IPR (factor 2), the progress of and investment made by the parties and the Court in the parallel district court case (factor 3), and the fact that Petitioner is also a party in the District Court Litigation (factor 5) outweigh Petitioner’s stipulation mitigating the concerns about overlap between the two proceedings (factor 4). Additionally, we find that factor 1 is neutral. Thus, we address whether the merits of Petitioner’s case are compelling.” slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that it is appropriate for us to exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution in this proceeding. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review based on the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Based on the present record, Petitioner has not presented a compelling, meritorious case that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Petitioner bases its case upon a claim construction that it ascribes to Patent Owner, and then expressly criticizes as being inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language and the ’347 patent Specification. Pet. 14–15. Additionally, Petitioner does not provide reasoning or evidence showing why the applied construction is correct, and Patent Owner does not agree with the construction in the Preliminary Response. Id. Under these facts, Petitioner has failed to set forth a sufficient basis for us to find a compelling case of unpatentability. Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with the Board’s prior decisions in Hologic, Orthopediatrics, and Samsung, upon which Patent Owner relies. See Prelim. Resp. 10–14. Moreover, we find that the contrary cases upon which Petitioner relies are inapposite here because they involved alternative constructions advanced by the petitioner. For example, in 10X Genomics, the Board explained that: [E]ven if our rules and guidance were correctly interpreted as prohibiting a petitioner from relying solely on a claim construction it believes is incorrect, that is not what Petitioner has done here. Petitioner proposes alternative claim constructions and presents at least one ground of unpatentability for each construction. 10X Genomics, Paper 8 at 22 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Donnelly, also cited by Petitioner, the petition offered alternative constructions—the construction proposed by the patent owner in district court and the “proper construction” that the petitioner believed was the correct one. Donnelly, Paper 2 (Petition) at 29–33 (identifying alternative constructions of “grip portion”). For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not made a compelling, meritorious showing that “path parameter information,” as required by the challenged claims, is disclosed by or would have been obvious over Sesia. As a result, factor 6 does not weigh in favor of institution.” slip op. at 23
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“Based on the present record, Petitioner has not presented a compelling, meritorious case that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Petitioner bases its case upon a claim construction that it ascribes to Patent Owner, and then expressly criticizes as being inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language and the ’347 patent Specification. Pet. 14–15. Additionally, Petitioner does not provide reasoning or evidence showing why the applied construction is correct, and Patent Owner does not agree with the construction in the Preliminary Response. Id. Under these facts, Petitioner has failed to set forth a sufficient basis for us to find a compelling case of unpatentability. Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with the Board’s prior decisions in Hologic, Orthopediatrics, and Samsung, upon which Patent Owner relies. See Prelim. Resp. 10–14. Moreover, we find that the contrary cases upon which Petitioner relies are inapposite here because they involved alternative constructions advanced by the petitioner. For example, in 10X Genomics, the Board explained that: [E]ven if our rules and guidance were correctly interpreted as prohibiting a petitioner from relying solely on a claim construction it believes is incorrect, that is not what Petitioner has done here. Petitioner proposes alternative claim constructions and presents at least one ground of unpatentability for each construction. 10X Genomics, Paper 8 at 22 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Donnelly, also cited by Petitioner, the petition offered alternative constructions—the construction proposed by the patent owner in district court and the “proper construction” that the petitioner believed was the correct one. Donnelly, Paper 2 (Petition) at 29–33 (identifying alternative constructions of “grip portion”). For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not made a compelling, meritorious showing that “path parameter information,” as required by the challenged claims, is disclosed by or would have been obvious over Sesia. As a result, factor 6 does not weigh in favor of institution.” slip op. at 23
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,891,347 - PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00212 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3 and 5–14, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on the Tajima–Foster and Foster–Hayhurst obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“B. Claim Construction “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“We note that the claims do not use the term “long-term” in referring to storage devices. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, . . . to define the scope of the patented invention.”). Nor do we see support in the ’116 specification for limiting the claims to “long-term storage,’ which, itself, would require further construction to determine what qualifies as “long-term.” We are, therefore, skeptical of Patent Owner’s proposed limitation of the term “storage device.” However, we need not resolve whether the claims require long-term storage at this stage because we disagree with Patent Owner that this feature distinguishes the systems resulting from combining Foster with Tajima or Hayhurst. See discussion in Sections II.C.2 and II.D, infra.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner provides a motivation to combine the teachings of Tajima and Foster with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 36–40. Petitioner contends that “[persons of ordinary skill] would have recognized that Tajima-Foster would have beneficially provided even further security . . . because encrypted data fragments/key pairs and the KEK needed to decrypt the keys are each stored on different databases under separate control of respective service sites.” Pet. 39. Furthermore, Dr. Bhattacharjee testifies that “to safely include encryption keys with encrypted data, Foster teaches encrypting the encryption keys.” Bhattacharjee Decl. ¶ 153.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,178,116 - PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00215 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would be obvious over Foster and Hayhurst.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to all claims challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“The record at this stage sufficiently supports Petitioner’s argument that Foster’s receiver 430 stores content that it receives. Pet. 65 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 4, 8, Fig. 8). According to Dr. Rubin’s annotations, receiver 430 can be a personal computer (PC) or set-top box. Ex. 2003 ¶ 83 (labeling the receiver in Figure 16 as such). This is consistent with Foster. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 49, 51 (describing PC 18 and a set-top box). Foster describes how the receiver stores encrypted content. See id. ¶¶ 8, 79. For example, Foster explains, “Once received, recipient 430 can then synchronously store the encrypted content.” Id. ¶ 79, cited in Pet. 68–69. According to Foster, “The encrypted title key is then attached to the content packet and the header for synchronized transmission to, or storage by a receiver.” Id. ¶ 8 (emphasis added), quoted in Pet. 65. For at least the reason that Foster teaches a PC or at this stage that Foster’s data set is “for storage.” See Pet. 65–66, 80–82. At this stage, we credit Dr. Bhattacharjee’s testimony (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 221–222) over Dr. Rubin’s (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 108–109) because it is better supported by the current record. In particular, we see no support for Dr. Rubin’s testimony that Foster’s receiver cannot provide long-term storage or is unlike the ’854 patent’s storage devices. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 108– 109. For instance, we see little difference between Foster’s PC 18 and the magnetic or optical disk, USB key drive, or other devices that Dr. Rubin claims are long-term storage devices. Ex. 1001, 67:16–19, cited in Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 108–109. PC 18 has “data storage.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 75. Foster explains “optical media” or “magnetic media” are types of data storage. Id. Foster also states that the receiver stores data. Id. ¶ 8. In view of these parts of Foster, we credit Dr. Bhattacharjee’s testimony that Foster’s receiver has data storage (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 221–222) over Dr. Rubin’s testimony that Foster’s devices are unlike those described in the ’854 patent (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 108–109), at this stage.” slip op. at 17
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with three years of experience in the area of securing data from unauthorized access or use.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 10032 ¶¶ 37–38). Petitioner also asserts that a “higher level of education may substitute for less experience.” Id. Patent Owner does not respond to Petitioner’s assertions or argue for a definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. Here, we apply the skill level proposed by Petitioner. Pet. 6.” slip op. at 4
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“key (the encryption operation Petitioner contends would be reordered/repeated).” Id. at 16. Dr. Rubin explains why reordering the steps in the way that Petitioner proposes would have been pointless: Indeed, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would recognize that encryption with the alleged external key would not be an appropriate step to repeat or reorder because it is parsed along with the data set into portions and those portions are then encrypted. Consequently, encrypting the shares with the alleged external key (i.e., the session master key) would render the splitting and encryption of the alleged external key pointless. Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 52–53. Dr. Bhattacharjee does not fully explain why the key that is parsed and encrypted is then used to further secure the data. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 110–111. Thus, we credit Dr. Rubin’s testimony (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 52–53) over Dr. Bhattacharjee’s (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 110–111) on this issue. For this additional reason, Petitioner has not shown that Orsini discloses the Different-Order Version. See Pet. 33–35.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,452,854 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Headwater Research LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00003 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner failed to show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 were unpatentable on any asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to make a sufficient showing as to limitation [1.3] for purposes of institution. As Patent Owner notes, limitation [1.3] requires that “the network message server” is configured to receive multiple requests to transmit application data “indicating a corresponding one of the mobile end-user devices and one of a plurality of applications” from “each of a plurality of network application servers.” Ex. 1001, 163:57–62. Petitioner maps the claimed “network message server” to Houghton’s push server 8015, and the “plurality of network application servers” to application server 7026. Pet. 17, 20. Petitioner also maps the claimed “multiple requests to transmit application data” from the network application servers to Houghton’s “trigger event” that triggers “application server 702 to push an application command message to the push client 704”7 (the “device messaging agent”). Id. at 13, 21. According to Petitioner, these “command messages” initiate “a mobile terminal client trigger event in a mobile application 705” running on a mobile terminal. Id. at 21. 5 As noted above, Petitioner explains that “Houghton also refers to push servers as components 202, 301, 401, 501, 701, and 901.” Pet. 17 n.5. 6 Petitioner notes that “Houghton also refers to application servers as components 502, 802, and 902.” Pet. 20 n.6. 7 As noted above, Petitioner states that “Houghton also refers to push clients at components 704, 804, 904, and 906.” Pet. 13 n.4. Petitioner, however, does not sufficiently explain how Houghton teaches that the “network message server” (push server 701 or 801) is configured to receive requests from “each of a plurality of network application servers” (application servers 702 and 802) to transmit application data “indicating a corresponding one of the mobile end-user devices and one of a plurality of applications,” as limitation [1.3] requires. Relying on Column 21, line 35 through Column 22, line 18, Petitioner argues that “Houghton discloses a ‘COMMAND PUSH’ . . . process in which an ‘application server 702’ pushes an ‘application command message’ to a push client executing on a mobile terminal.” Pet. 20–21 (emphasis added). The cited portion of Houghton, however, does not state that application server 702 pushes a command message to the push client, but rather states that push server 701 carries out this step. As Houghton explains: Figure 7 illustrates an example of an ‘COMMAND PUSH’ procedure wherein the push server 701 is triggered by a trigger event as for example from an application server 702 to push an application command message to the push client 704 and thereby initiate a mobile terminal client trigger event in a mobile application 705 from a plurality of such applications, program modules, and user interface features on the terminal 705. Ex. 1005, 21:35–22:4 (emphasis added). As this passage from Houghton explains, it is push server 701, not application server 702, that sends the command message to push client 704. Application server 702 merely triggers push server 701 to send the command message.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to make a sufficient showing as to limitation [1.3] for purposes of institution. As Patent Owner notes, limitation [1.3] requires that “the network message server” is configured to receive multiple requests to transmit application data “indicating a corresponding one of the mobile end-user devices and one of a plurality of applications” from “each of a plurality of network application servers.” Ex. 1001, 163:57–62. Petitioner maps the claimed “network message server” to Houghton’s push server 8015, and the “plurality of network application servers” to application server 7026. Pet. 17, 20. Petitioner also maps the claimed “multiple requests to transmit application data” from the network application servers to Houghton’s “trigger event” that triggers “application server 702 to push an application command message to the push client 704”7 (the “device messaging agent”). Id. at 13, 21. According to Petitioner, these “command messages” initiate “a mobile terminal client trigger event in a mobile application 705” running on a mobile terminal. Id. at 21. 5 As noted above, Petitioner explains that “Houghton also refers to push servers as components 202, 301, 401, 501, 701, and 901.” Pet. 17 n.5. 6 Petitioner notes that “Houghton also refers to application servers as components 502, 802, and 902.” Pet. 20 n.6. 7 As noted above, Petitioner states that “Houghton also refers to push clients at components 704, 804, 904, and 906.” Pet. 13 n.4. Petitioner, however, does not sufficiently explain how Houghton teaches that the “network message server” (push server 701 or 801) is configured to receive requests from “each of a plurality of network application servers” (application servers 702 and 802) to transmit application data “indicating a corresponding one of the mobile end-user devices and one of a plurality of applications,” as limitation [1.3] requires. Relying on Column 21, line 35 through Column 22, line 18, Petitioner argues that “Houghton discloses a ‘COMMAND PUSH’ . . . process in which an ‘application server 702’ pushes an ‘application command message’ to a push client executing on a mobile terminal.” Pet. 20–21 (emphasis added). The cited portion of Houghton, however, does not state that application server 702 pushes a command message to the push client, but rather states that push server 701 carries out this step. As Houghton explains: Figure 7 illustrates an example of an ‘COMMAND PUSH’ procedure wherein the push server 701 is triggered by a trigger event as for example from an application server 702 to push an application command message to the push client 704 and thereby initiate a mobile terminal client trigger event in a mobile application 705 from a plurality of such applications, program modules, and user interface features on the terminal 705. Ex. 1005, 21:35–22:4 (emphasis added). As this passage from Houghton explains, it is push server 701, not application server 702, that sends the command message to push client 704. Application server 702 merely triggers push server 701 to send the command message.” slip op. at 17
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Pet. 20–23. Moreover, Dr. Traynor’s declaration does not help Petitioner because Dr. Traynor merely repeats the Petition’s assertions with respect to limitation [1.3], without providing additional detail or explanation. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–48; see 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We further note that neither Petitioner nor Dr. Traynor provides a claim construction for the term “secure interprocess communication service.” Pet. 2–3, 27–31, 83–85; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23, 52–54, 134–137. The plain meaning of this term would appear to cover a secure service that communicates between processes. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Traynor suggests that the term would have a different meaning, or explains how Ellison’s secure platform for protecting applications against unauthorized modification would provide a secure service for communicating between processes. Finally, we note that Dr. Traynor’s quotation of a portion of the ’117 patent specification discussing an “interprocess software communication bus” does not cure the deficiencies in Petitioner’s position. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 135 (citing Ex. 1001, 42:45–67, 43:1–4). To begin with, the Petition does not rely on this portion of the ’117 patent in discussing the “secure interprocess communication service” limitation. Pet. 83–85. And, neither the Petition nor Dr. Traynor contends that the claim term “secure interprocess communication service” should be construed to be (or to cover) an “interprocess software communication bus.” Id. at 2–3, 27–31, 83–85; Ex. 1003 ¶ 135. Moreover, even if the term “secure interprocess communication service” were construed to cover an “interprocess software communication bus,” neither Petitioner nor Dr. Traynor points to an “interprocess software communication bus” in Ellison. Pet. 2–3, 83–85; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 134–137.” slip op. at 39
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,198,117 - PTAB · May 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00137 · APJ Barbara A Parvis · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 9, 10, 12, 20, 21, and 23 over Chitrapu and TS 36.300, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“5 weigh in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Fintiv factors 1–5 weigh in favor of denying institution. Because Fintiv factors 1–5 favor denial of institution, we must also determine whether the Petition presents compelling merits. See” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“reference “explicitly suggests a POSITA[5] look to 3GPP standards” (Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 7; Ex. 1005 ¶ 117)) and the secondary reference is a 3GPP Technical Specification (Ex. 1223, 1). Petitioner’s argument is supported by Chitrapu and TS 36.300, respectively. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 7 (describing systems “constructed in accordance with current specifications of the 3rd Generation Partnership Program”); Ex. 1223 (describing that “[t]his technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project”). At this stage, Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s argument for only one limitation of claim 9 (Prelim. Resp. 8–20) and we find Patent Owner’s dispute does not undermine Petitioner’s showing on the current record. See infra § IV.D.3.c. For these reasons and the reasons discussed further below (see § IV.D.3), based on the record before us, we determine the Petition presents a compelling, meritorious challenge for independent claim 9. We, therefore, determine the facts of this case do not warrant discretionary denial.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“motivated to implement” Chitrapu’s “‘smart handover’ process” “using the [more detailed description of the steps of handover] of TS 36.300” (Pet. 26– 30 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 74; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 120–123, 125, 160–162, 168, 178)), we find, based on the preliminary record, that Petitioner’s reason is supported by Chitrapu and TS 36.300, respectively. Petitioner, more specifically, argues “while Chitrapu describes the ‘negotiation’ and ‘execution’ of these steps [that is, steps of a handover] at a high level, the specific implementation details of these messages are not disclosed,” but TS 36.300 describes “the specific messages associated with that implementation.” Pet. 26–27.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“11 of Chitrapu discloses or suggests that the source base station determines whether or not the UE is ‘current covered’ by the target base station before initiating a handoff.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10. We find, based on the preliminary record at this juncture, that Patent Owner’s argument is contrary to Chitrapu’s disclosures. In particular, Chitrapu describes, “[w]here a handover is to occur, the new serving base station will first implement the selected beams determined for it and acquire the UE communication, before the original serving base station implements its new beam pattern.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 109 (emphasis added). Chitrapu describes expressly that a handover involves a “new” serving base station that differs from the “original” serving base station and that the “new serving base station . . . acquire[s] the UE communication.” Id. Chitrapu describes that, as illustrated in Figure 11, the “general process for conducting ‘smart’ handover” may “result in no handover being made.” Id. ¶ 108 (emphasis added). Figure 11 similarly states that either “THE TARGET BASE STATION,” which differs from the “SERVING BASE STATION” is determined and a “HANDOVER” is executed or the serving base station “MAINTAINS COMMUNICATION THROUGH REFOCUSING BEAM.” Id. at Fig. 11. The handover determination itself is a determination that a “UE” communication, will be acquired by a “new serving base station.” See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 109. Based on the preliminary record before us at this juncture, we find that the requirement of “a determination . . . that the wireless device is not currently covered by the first wireless network but is capable of being covered by the first wireless network” recited in limitation 9.a(2) is taught by Chitrapu’s handover determination. See, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 109, Fig. 11; see also id. ¶ 106 (describing a “handover consideration process” involving “candidate cells,” which also are referred to as “candidate target cells”), ¶ 107 (describing “if a neighboring cell is not able to efficiently accept the UE, it may be determined that the original cell is best situation and should continue to serve the UE” (emphasis added)), ¶ 108 (describing a “general process for conducting ‘smart’ handover, which may actually result in no handover being made” (emphasis added)).” slip op. at 36
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,094,888 - Datavant, Inc. v. Vigilytics LLCInstitutedPTAB · May 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00226 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–19 on all asserted obviousness grounds based on Evenhaim; Evenhaim with Settimi; Dick with Landi; and Dick, Landi, with Murphy.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018) (inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition”). We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’641 patent and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. See SAS Inst. Inc. v Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“patent would have possessed “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the field of computer science, focusing on data privacy, computer networking and/or data records management.” Pet. 9 (citing Clark Decl. ¶ 22). Petitioner adds that “[s]uperior education could compensate for less work experience, and vice-versa.” Id. We regard Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“from Patent Owner’s claim-construction brief in the related district court litigation and “adopts these constructions for this proceeding.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1010, 9–20). Patent Owner’s brief identifies these as “disputed claim terms.” Ex. 1010, i (Table of Contents). The brief indicates that Petitioner disputes Patent Owner’s construction for each of the terms. Id. at 1 (referring to the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Statement). As Petitioner expressly “adopts these constructions for this proceeding” (Pet. 8), we understand these constructions to be Petitioner’s identification of “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” under 37 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(3) (2023). Without a Patent Owner Preliminary Response, we are not in a position to determine which constructions, if any, are necessary and disputed. Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803; Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. Nevertheless, at this stage, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 16
Claim constructioncites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,118,641 - Netskope, Inc. v. Fortinet, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 8, 2024 · IPR2023-00030 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable under § 103 over the Wang-based and Chambers-Terrill-based combinations listed in the decision.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“The parties substantially agree on the level of ordinary skill in the art. Consistent with their proposals, we adopt Petitioner’s definition with Patent Owner’s contention that a master’s degree in electrical engineering and/or computer science and one year of relevant work or research experience also suffice. PO Resp. 7 (asserting that “Patent Owner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art is essentially the same as that of Petitioner”). This level of ordinary skill is consistent with the description of the relevant field of invention and background art in the ’941 patent (see Ex. 1001, 1:14–3:51) and the prior art. However, the outcome of our Decision would be the same under either party’s proposal.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“The ’941 patent describes prior art firewalls as “often used to provide segmentation within internal networks [to] help stop the spread of attacks” and provide “the ability to see and control internal network traffic [that] can be lost” when firewalls move to the cloud. Ex. 1001, 1:35–40 (emphasis added). Thus, prior art firewalls can control internal network traffic between endpoints within the network. Nor does the claim language exclude prior art firewalls from controlling endpoint to endpoint connections. 4. Conclusion We determine that the ’941 patent does not clearly and unmistakably disavow legacy firewalls. The sole use of that term in the specification does not identify what features are disavowed (Ex. 1001, 4:52–67; Reply 2), and the ’941 patent describes prior art firewalls as having features and functions that P/PoPs perform (id. at 3–5) including segmenting internal networks and controlling internal network traffic. Ex. 1001, 1:35–40; see Tr. 12:18–15:1. Thus, we determine that “controlling endpoint to endpoint connections within the enterprise network” has its ordinary and customary meaning, which may include controlling endpoint to endpoint connections via firewalls. We discuss this limitation further in Section III.D.2.c. infra.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“5. Analysis We find that Petitioner’s asserted modifications with Pasdar would have improved Wang because Wang provided services at the firewall level, but Pasdar “implement[ed] these services at the P/PoP(s), offloading some tasks from individual firewalls and thus . . . enhancing performance.” Reply 17 (“Patent Owner ignores other benefits, like the flexibility and granular customization, that Pasdar’s P/PoP system would offer to Wang’s system.”). We find that Pasdar’s P/PoPs would customize Wang’s initial settings to enhance security as the network expands and would have allowed Wang’s distributed devices to leverage a single global perimeter policy for security, privacy, and application resiliency and availability as Pasdar teaches. Pet. 45 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 31; citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 106); id. at 43–45; Reply 20. We agree with Dr. Lee’s testimony that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to add Pasdar’s functionalities to route communications to a P/PoP and customize a P/PoP’s security stack to Wang. Ex. 1002 ¶ 106. The upgrade would have improved Wang’s similarly and would have had a reasonable expectation of success by using Wang’s calls to modify a P/PoP’s security stack to implement a policy, and combining these known prior art elements according to their known functions would have yielded predictable results as Dr. Lee testifies. Id. ¶ 107. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 10,826,941 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,826,941
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.