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  • PTAB · Sep 3, 2021 · IPR2020-01612 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board granted rehearing and instituted IPR on all petition grounds for claims 1–4, 6–9, 11, 12, and 15, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

      “II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “preliminary stage, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claim 1.” slip op. at 44

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “The only dispute pertaining to claim construction at this stage of the proceeding is whether the phrase “a process for creating said response message,” recited in claim 1, is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.6 Petitioner 6 As noted above, Petitioner raises a second claim construction issue in its Rehearing Request. See Req. Reh’g 12–15 (asserting that the claims require only one instance of copying information from a formatted message to a response message based on which formatted message was received). Petitioner did not raise this issue in the Petition, Patent Owner has not had an contends that the phrase should be interpreted as a means-plus-function limitation, whereas Patent Owner contends that it should not. Compare Pet. 2–7 (advocating for a means-plus-function construction), with Prelim. Resp. 9–11 (advocating for an ordinary and customary meaning). At this stage of the proceeding, the dispute between the parties regarding the construction of this claim phrase does not impact our Decision. Accordingly, we need not construe expressly any claim terms for the purpose of this Decision.” slip op. at 17

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “VI. ANALYSIS Legal Standards – Anticipation “[A] claim is anticipated ‘if each and every limitation is found expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.’” King Pharm., Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Anticipation is a question of fact, In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2009), assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, see Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“the dispositive question regarding anticipation [i]s whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from the [prior art reference’s] teaching that every claim element was disclosed in that single reference” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)).” slip op. at 18

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 6,925,308
  • PTAB · Feb 6, 2020 · IPR2018-01033 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 17 is anticipated by Bednar, and claims 1 and 17 are obvious over Bednar and Gunther; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “requesting institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 4–6, and 17–19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,004,922 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’922 patent”). VLSI Technology LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 12). Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we instituted an inter partes review of all challenged claims. Paper 17 (“Inst. Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “to the level of ordinary skill in the art was incorrect. Accordingly, because our preliminary finding is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering (or an equivalent subject), together with three years of post-graduate experience designing power management circuits; or (2) a master’s degree in electrical engineering (or equivalent subject) together with two years of post-graduate experience designing power management circuits.” Inst. Dec. 8–9; see Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 26–27).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “construction of “memory device,” specifically whether it encompasses a latch. Neither party argues that “memory device” is expressly defined in the ’922 patent. Accordingly, the plain and ordinary meaning of the term controls. And, the standard under which we construe the term is the broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification.” slip op. at 45

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

      “preponderance of the evidence, that (1) claim 17 is anticipated by Bednar, and (2) claims 1 and 17 would have been obvious over the combination of Bednar and Gunther. For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) claim 1 is anticipated by Bednar or (2) claims 4–6, 18, and 19 would have been obvious over the combination of Bednar, Gunther, and Willingham. The chart below summarizes our conclusions.” slip op. at 91

    Patent outcomesUS 8,004,922 mixed
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,004,922
  • PTAB · Jan 7, 2020 · IPR2019-00731 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied IPA Technologies’ rehearing requests and left institution in place, finding no abuse of discretion or matter misapprehended or overlooked.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “II. ANALYSIS A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). “The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id. When rehearing a decision on a petition, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Here, however, we are not making a final determination whether the Martin reference qualifies as prior art based on a full record developed during trial. Rather, at this preliminary stage of the proceeding, we are considering, based on the 4 In an apparent contrast to the argument that the difference in authorship was the only evidence on which the institution decision relies, Patent Owner also appears to argue that Dr. Moran’s testimony is the only evidence presented regarding patentability. See Req. Reh’g 9–10 (Patent Owner points to a footnote in the Preliminary Response and argues that the Board provided only a “superficial discussion” regarding, in part, the alleged uncorroborated nature of the Moran declaration because the panel did not address a case quoted in that footnote for a proposition regarding the situation where one witness’s testimony alone is asserted to invalidate a patent claim.). current record, whether Petitioner has made a threshold showing to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing during trial in showing that the Martin reference qualifies as prior art under § 102(a). Dec. 20. A determination as to whether Petitioner has met its ultimate burden will be made in a final written decision and after a complete development of the record during trial.” slip op. at 4

    None
    Patents in suitUS 7,069,560
  • PTAB · Nov 8, 2018 · IPR2018-00793 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no abuse of discretion in timely issuing the institution decisions before resolving the § 315(b) time-bar contention.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached

      “telephone conference call with the Board, “put at issue” the question whether an inter partes review may not be instituted under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because Petitioner, a real party in interest, or a privy of Petitioner was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’021 patent more than one year prior to the filing of the Petition. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 10 (contending that Patent Owner put § 315(b) at issue). Patent Owner has not. During the September 17th conference call, Patent Owner mentioned several documents, including indemnification policies, license agreements, and correspondence as materials that Patent Owner is either aware of or seeking from Petitioner. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 6:24–8:3 (discussing these documents), 10:19–11:14 (same). Neither party, however, has placed those documents in evidence, nor has Patent Owner advanced its argument regarding § 315(b) in any briefing. See World Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We agree, however, that a patent owner must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest. A mere assertion that a third party is an unnamed real party in interest, without any support for that assertion, is insufficient to put the issue into dispute.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, at this time, Patent Owner has not “put at issue” whether Petitioner is barred under § 315(b). Additionally, Patent Owner’s Rehearing Request fails to identify where it previously raised the question of § 315(b) in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). As explained above, Patent Owner has not. Thus, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked an issue not raised previously.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Patent Owner has not shown that we abused our discretion by timely issuing institution decisions in the five cases captioned above. Nothing in this Decision precludes Patent Owner from advancing its § 315(b) contention in its post-institution submissions.” slip op. at 7

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,742,021
  • PTAB · Nov 8, 2018 · IPR2018-00791 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no abuse of discretion in issuing the institution decisions before resolving the § 315(b) time-bar contention.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “deadline set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(b). Req. Reh’g 10 n.2. Patent Owner contends that “[t]he deadline under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) should not be an obstacle because Congress has recognized that there should be some flexibility with respect to deadlines.” Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11)). Section 316(a)(11) provides up to six additional months to issue a final written decision when good cause is shown. Section 316(a)(11) does not, however, address extending the three-month time period after a preliminary response is filed to issue an institution decision. That three-month time period is governed by § 314(b), and Patent Owner fails to offer any support for its argument that we can extend the deadline under § 314(b). Accordingly, we are unaware of any statutory authority by which we may extend the deadline to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under § 314(b), even with a showing of good cause.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached

      “than one year prior to the filing of the Petition. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 10 (contending that Patent Owner put § 315(b) at issue). Patent Owner has not. During the September 17th conference call, Patent Owner mentioned several documents, including indemnification policies, license agreements, and correspondence as materials that Patent Owner is either aware of or seeking from Petitioner. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 6:24–8:3 (discussing these documents), 10:19–11:14 (same). Neither party, however, has placed those documents in evidence, nor has Patent Owner advanced its argument regarding § 315(b) in any briefing. See World Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We agree, however, that a patent owner must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest. A mere assertion that a third party is an unnamed real party in interest, without any support for that assertion, is insufficient to put the issue into dispute.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, at this time, Patent Owner has not “put at issue” whether Petitioner is barred under § 315(b). Additionally, Patent Owner’s Rehearing Request fails to identify where it previously raised the question of § 315(b) in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). As explained above, Patent Owner has not. Thus, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked an issue not raised previously.” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Owner”) filed a Request for Rehearing and Reconsideration (“Rehearing Request” or “Req. Reh’g”)2 of our Decision instituting inter partes review (“Decision” or “Dec.”).3 In instituting the inter partes reviews, we determined that Petitioner established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of each challenged patent. See, e.g., Dec. 2, 22.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,742,021
  • PTAB · Mar 27, 2018 · IPR2017-00096 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

    The sole claim is unpatentable under § 102 over Pendergrast and under § 103 over Pendergrast alone or with Knott.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Manufacturing, L.L.C. (collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition to institute an inter partes review of the claim for “[t]he ornamental design for a gravity feed dispenser display” in U.S. Patent No. D595,074 (“the ’074 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Gamon Plus, Inc. (“Gamon” or “Patent Owner”) did not file a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we instituted an inter partes review of the challenged claim. Paper 9 (“Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “[A] design[er] of ordinary skill in the field of the ’074 Patent would have been a person with a background or familiarity with commercial dispensers, and particularly dispensers for consumer commodities such as cans, bottles, or small packaged items. . . . The designer of ordinary skill would also have a basic understanding of physics and or mechanics, which may include practical experience in the field of studying consumer commodity dispensers, or may include high school or introductory college level physics coursework. The designer of ordinary skill would also have a basic understanding of the dimensions and functions afforded to cans and bottles in the context of packaging. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 21, 22. We agree with Mr. Gandy’s undisputed testimony as to the designer of ordinary skill based on the final trial record.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Based on these contentions, Petitioner proposes the broadest reasonable construction of the ’074 patent claim is “the ornamental design of either two or three adjacent cylindrical objects in a gravity feed dispenser display, each cylindrical object comprising a smooth curved surface with planar ends, as shown in the drawings of the ’074 Patent.” Pet. 26 (emphasis omitted). Based on the undisputed arguments above, and considering the relationship of the prior art to the claimed design, we find it helpful to describe verbally certain features of the claim for purposes of this Decision. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 680. We interpret the scope of the claimed design based on the unique or distinctive shape or appearance of the cylindrical objects that is not dictated by function. Based on the final record before us, we find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that the specific arrangement of the cylindrical objects is dictated primarily by function. The precise placement of cylindrical objects is controlled by the use of the gravity feed dispenser and the natural resting position of one cylindrical object on two others. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, Fig. 4. Our invalidity analysis below focuses on what the claimed cylindrical objects contribute to the design’s overall ornamentation. See Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1293–94 (factoring out purely functional aspects of a design patent from an obviousness analysis). Neither party has indicated that our claim interpretation from the Decision to Institute (Dec. 3–8) is improper and we do not perceive any reason or evidence that recommends any deviation from our initial construction. We therefore convey the scope of the claim of the ’074 patent as: “the ornamental design of a gravity feed dispenser display depicting either two or three adjacent cylindrical objects, each cylindrical object comprising a smooth curved surface with planar ends, as shown in the drawings of the ’074 patent.” See Dec. 8.” slip op. at 7

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “Based on the record before us, Petitioner has established persuasively that both embodiments of the ’074 patent design and the design of Pendergrast are substantially the same under the ordinary observer analysis. Both designs are for a gravity feed dispenser display. Petitioner establishes that the ornamental design of the cans of Pendergrast are substantially identical to the ’074 patent cylindrical objects, with each having a smooth curved surface with planar ends. See Ex. 1003, Fig. 1, 3; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 42–47. Further, although not required under our claim construction, the placement and positioning of Pendergrast’s cylindrical objects are also substantially the same as that of the ’074 patent. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 46. Accordingly, based on the final record before us, Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Pendergrast anticipates the claim of the ’074 patent.” slip op. at 14

    Patent outcomesUS D595,074 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  • PTAB · Jan 30, 2017 · IPR2016-00834 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Rehearing

    The Board denied Sony’s rehearing request, leaving institution in place because the “reproducing means” in claims 5 and 8 was not shown to be computer-implemented and need not include algorithmic structure.

    RulingsRehearing decision
    • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

      “When rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). “The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision[,]” which party “must specifically identify all matters the party 1 Section 4(c) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284 (2011), re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 as 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Because the ’676 patent has a filing date before the September 16, 2012, effective date of the statute, we refer to the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112. believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “reproducing means for reproducing the audio data of the channel designated by the default value stored in the storing means,” as recited in claims 5 and 8 of the ’676 patent (the “reproducing means” limitations). Inst. Dec. 12–16. In particular, we agreed with the parties that the reproducing means limitations are written in means-plus-function format pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and that the function of the reproducing means is “reproducing the audio data of the channel designated by the default value stored in the storing means.” Id. at 10, 12–13 (citing Pet. 16; Prelim. Resp. 4). We also agreed with Petitioner’s identification of “synthesizer 11” and “controller 13” as being the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification for the reproducing means limitations. Id. at 12–13, 16. We disagreed, however, with Patent Owner’s assertion that the structure of the reproducing means must further include an algorithm disclosed in the specification, as would be required for a computer-implemented means-plus-function limitation. Id. at 13–14 (citing Prelim. Resp. 1, 2, 8). We concluded, therefore, that the reproducing means limitations are, accordingly, properly construed under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 to cover “a controller and a synthesizer, or the equivalent.” ANALYSIS In the Institution Decision, we determined that the ’676 patent discloses a controller and a synthesizer, neither of which is disclosed in the ’676 patent as being computer-implemented, as structure corresponding to the “reproducing means” recited in claims 5 and 8. Inst. Dec. 14–15. As we explained, “synthesizer 11 and controller 13 both are shown and described in the ’676 patent as discrete hardware elements that interface with other hardware elements of the described information reproducing devices.” Id. at 14. We determined, accordingly, that the reproducing means recited in claims 5 and 8 is not a “computer-implemented” means-plus-function term subject to “the legal rule that computer-implemented means-plus-function terms must be construed to include the corresponding algorithmic structure disclosed in the specification.” Id.; cf. Reh’g Req. 2. Contrary to Patent Owner’s contentions (Reh’g Req. 1–2), we did not determine in the Institution Decision that “unless a claim recites the terms ‘computer’ or ‘microprocessor,’ it is not computer-implemented”; that “the claimed controller is not a computer based solely on a word matching exercise”; or that the Board “is free to disregard the law on how computer-implemented means-plus-function terms are to be construed.” Patent Owner’s arguments in its Request for Rehearing do not persuade us of any error in our Institution Decision. slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Because, on this record, we conclude that the reproducing means limitations of claims 5 and 8 are not properly construed to include “algorithmic structure,” we also disagree with Patent Owner’s further argument that “[b]ecause Petitioners failed to consider the algorithmic structure corresponding to the ‘reproducing means’ and thus failed to compare the ‘reproducing means’ as properly construed to the prior art for structural equivalency, the Board should have denied institution as to all claims with that term.” Id. at 10. We accordingly deny Patent Owner’s Request for Rehearing. Additionally, the Chief Administrative Patent Judge declines” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction
    Patents in suitUS 6,097,676
  • PTAB · Oct 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00946 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion for adverse judgment and cancelled claims 1, 82, 90, and 91.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Judgment” is defined as “a final written decision by the Board, or a termination of a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. Although Patent Owner uses the term “termination” in its Motion, it did not submit the Motion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 and did not explain why termination is appropriate in this circumstance. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (noting that the Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision “where appropriate,” such as when the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a)). Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason not to grant Patent Owner’s Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, this Decision is a Final Written Decision, not a termination of the proceeding.1” slip op. at 3

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “(collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition for inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. 6,266,518 B1 (“the ’518 patent”). Paper 1. ParkerVision, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response on September 24, 2014. Paper 7. On December 18, 2014, we instituted this inter partes review of claims 1, 82, 90, and 91 of the ’518 patent. Paper 8.” slip op. at 2

    None
    Patents in suitUS 6,266,518
Page 7 of 7

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.