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  • PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00085 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13, and 15 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a), we have authority to institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, the Preliminary Reply, the Preliminary Sur-reply, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’659 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the Challenged Claims on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “We disagree with Patent Owner. Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation.”8 The Director’s Memorandum explains that, when a petitioner makes a Sotera-type stipulation, “it mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB” and “[w]ith such a stipulation, if an IPR or PGR is instituted, the grounds the PTAB resolves will differ from those present in 8 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretio nary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (“Director’s Memorandum”). the parallel district court litigation.” Director’s Memorandum 7 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19). Pursuant to the Director’s Memorandum, we “will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Id. Because Petitioner provides a Sotera-type stipulation, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 8

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision as it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art). Petitioner’s proposed definition appears overly restrictive, as it requires a graduate degree in a narrow field of engineering or equivalent experience. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’659 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 19. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “We disagree with Patent Owner’s claim construction. By using the word “or,” the plain and ordinary meaning of “prone, kneeling, or standing” is that only one must be satisfied to meet the claim. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Furthermore, and although claims are read in light of the specification, limitations in a specification are not read into a claim. In re van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Even if the Specification describes embodiments in which the user can begin in a prone position and then transition to a kneeling or standing position, as Patent Owner points out (see Prelim. Resp. 20), the claim does not recite the term “transitioning,” and we do not read the terms “each of” or “substantially flat surface” into this claim limitation. For example, the claim does not recite a “substantially flat” top surface and Patent Owner’s attempt to infer this structure into the claim is not supported under the law. See id. at 29–30. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with Petitioner and construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,586,659
  • PTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2024-00086 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10-15, 17, 18, 20, and 21 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining Fintiv denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in an inter partes review). slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “1. “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position” With respect to the claim term “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” Patent Owner points to passages of the Specification, arguing that all three positions are possible. Prelim. Resp. 19–21 (citing Ex. 1001, Abstr., 4:13–17, 4:33–40; Ex. 2006 ¶ 18). We do not agree with Patent’s Owner proposed construction because even if the Specification discloses that all three positions are possible, that is not what the plain language of the claim requires. Claim 1 recites “or,” which means that a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in any one of the three positions. See, e.g., SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc., 727 F.3d 1187, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The disjunctive ‘or’ plainly designates that a series describes alternatives.”). Patent Owner does not identify any definition or disclaimer that would modify this plain meaning. See Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, we agree with Petitioner and apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “wherein a user can be disposed on the top surface of the flotation device in a prone, kneeling, or standing position,” to construe “prone, kneeling, or standing” as alternatives, and the prior art need only show one to satisfy this aspect of the claim.” slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Neither party explains how or why its particular proposal impacts the issues before us in this proceeding. We find that a bachelor’s degree with the accompanying experience proposed by Patent Owner more closely aligns with the prior art of record and the ’044 patent. We note, however, there is some overlap in the proposed levels of ordinary skill in the art because Patent Owner’s proposal includes “at least” a bachelor’s degree, which would encompass Petitioner’s master’s degree as well. Prelim. Resp. 10. Nonetheless, our determination herein would be the same under either party’s definition.” slip op. at 12

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted

      “As the Board has held in a precedential decision, “at the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential).” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,359,044
  • PTAB · May 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00259 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 7, 9, 32, 38, and 40 on the asserted obviousness ground over Bhattacharya and Yost.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “that because judgements have been entered in the district court actions, this suggests finality. In a similar instance in Volvo, where a district court’s § 101 determination was appealed to the Federal Circuit, the Director determined that the Board had the authority to institute an inter partes review and a Fintiv analysis should be performed. See Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., IPR2022-01366, Paper 15 at 1–8 (PTAB May 2, 2023). The Director has additionally distinguished the Fintiv analysis in AviaGames under similar circumstances to those here, where “the district court’s judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 101, i.e., a statutory ground that could not have been raised before the Board, does not raise concerns of inefficient duplication of efforts or potentially inconsistent results between the Board and the district court.” AviaGames, IPR2022- 00530, Paper 14 at 3 (PTAB Mar. 2, 2023) (Decision on Director Review). Further, the Director determined that “the challenged claims have not yet been cancelled and remain in force until the opportunity to appeal has been exhausted,” noting that “[b]y the time an appeal will have concluded, Petitioner will be barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from bringing a new challenge in an IPR petition.” Id. at 3–4. Fintiv states that “a district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal duplicate the obviousness issues addressed here. The timing of the progress of the appeal and any potential remand to the district court is uncertain. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand from the Federal Circuit to the district court to address any obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.” slip op. at 10

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “viii. Conclusion Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that claim 1 is rendered obvious by Bhattacharya and Yost.” slip op. at 32

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “IV. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in the field working with working with navigation and/or geolocation systems. Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 8). Petitioner also contends that additional education could compensate for less work experience and vice versa. Id. at 7. For the purposes of the Preliminary Response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 26. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner, except for the inclusion of “at least,” as it is consistent with the ’753 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedOther

      “patent and district court issued claim constructions for some terms that were disputed. Ex. 1020; Ex. 1025. Petitioner uses the district court’s construction or the agreed-upon construction for the terms “calibration data,” “calibration points,” “grid point,” “network measurement report,” and the order of the “providing,” “generating,” “evaluating,” and “selecting” steps of claim 1. Pet. 7–9 (citing Ex. 1020; Ex. 1025). Petitioner proposes that all terms should be interpreted consistent with the Phillips standard. Id. at 7. Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s statement on claim construction for the purposes of this Preliminary Response” and “reserves the right to present arguments on the constructions should the Petition be instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 26. For the purposes of this Decision, we will use the district court’s claim constructions and those agreed-upon by the parties in the litigations, where the adoption of those constructions have been agreed to by the parties at this juncture in this proceeding. We determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms at this juncture. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,406,753
  • PTAB · May 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00032 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–22, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, and 35 on all asserted grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–5, 9, 11, 12, 14–16, 18–22, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, and 35 of the ’494 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.” slip op. at 15

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “an IDS in the ’494 patent, we agree with Patent Owner that the record shows that Bhattacharya and Spain10 were listed on an IDS during prosecution of the parent ’358 patent, which the ’494 patent Examiner was required to consider. Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing MPEP 609.02). As such, we determine that Bhattacharya and Spain were presented previously to the Office. See Prelim. Resp. 9; Advanced Bionics at 7–8. We also agree with Patent Owner that the addition of Meunier does not substantially impact our § 325(d) analysis because of the Petition’s limited reliance on this reference. For these reasons, we determine that the first prong of Advanced Bionics is met and turn to the second prong.” slip op. at 23

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar discipline, and at least two years of experience in the field working with working with navigation and/or geolocation systems. 1003 ¶ 8; Pet. 6, n.2. According to Petitioner, “[s]uperior education could compensate for a deficiency in work experience, and vice-versa.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 8. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim Resp. 43. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’494 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,786,494
  • PTAB · May 10, 2024 · IPR2024-00031 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 15–20, 24, 26, and 27 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on anticipation and obviousness.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “time it was made, 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires us to resolve the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include, but are not limited to, the types of problems encountered in the art, the sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers in the field. Id. In a given case, one or more factors may predominate. Id.” slip op. at 6

    • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “district-court-type standard, as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “district-court-type standard, as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19.” slip op. at 7

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Fintiv states that “a district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv at 6. In view of the circumstances, we do not discern that the § 101 issues addressed in the Federal Circuit appeal would duplicate the anticipation and obviousness issues addressed here. Accordingly, given the limited § 101 issues on appeal, we do not discern there are any concerns about duplication of efforts. Moreover, because of the uncertainty of the timing of any remand from the Federal Circuit to the district court to address any anticipation or obviousness issues, the present circumstances with a pending appeal effectively act as a stay on the assessment of invalidity issues.7” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,400,358
  • PTAB · May 8, 2024 · IPR2024-00168 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution

    Instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8 on all petition grounds addressing those claims, based on a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–6 and 8 of the ’245 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in a field relating to the semiconductor manufacturing process, such as materials science, physics, electrical engineering, and/or other related subjects, and at least two to three years of experience with fabrication of integrated circuits.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 20). Petitioner also contends “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 4–5. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’245 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Claim 1 affirmatively recites, for example, “a plurality of layers under the top layer.” Ex. 1001, 4:13. Claim 1 also affirmatively recites that the “plurality of layers compris[es] a bottom routing layer having signal traces thereon.” Id. at 4:14–15. So, claim 1 requires a bottom routing layer having signal traces. Claim 1 then recites “where[] none of the signal traces of the bottom routing layer are located over ball pads of the ball pad layer which are disposed in an area within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die.” Id. at 4:17–20. This recitation serves to describe the “signal traces of the bottom routing layer.” The recitation does not affirmatively recite a required location of any ball pads. Likewise, the claim as a whole also does not state that the ball pad layer comprises ball pads disposed within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die. Rather, the claim recites “said ball pad layer having a plurality of ball pads” without affirmatively indicating where those ball pads must be located within the ball pad layer. Thus, on the present record, we interpret claim 1’s recitation of “none of the signal traces . . . within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die” as requiring that no signal traces of the bottom routing layer be located over ball pads of the ball pad layer disposed within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die if any such ball pads exist in this location. We do not interpret claim 1 as affirmatively requiring ball pads disposed within two ball pad pitches of the corner of the die. To the extent Patent Owner maintains arguments regarding this recitation in a Patent Owner Response, we invite the parties to further address this claim construction issue at trial to the extent permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 22

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions for all of the elements of independent claim 1, as well as the supporting evidence. Pet. 45–55. Based on the record before us, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s discussion of the particular structures and methods in Chung and Celeron establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial on the issue of whether the combined teachings of Chung and Celeron teach or suggest all of the limitations of independent claim 1. Id. Also, based on the present record, we are persuaded that Petitioner adequately establishes that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Chung and Celeron.” slip op. at 24

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,345,245
  • PTAB · Apr 1, 2024 · IPR2023-01457 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 44–48 and 50 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “partes review is authorized when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on the current record, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we grant institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics, plus 2–3 years of experience in LiDAR design.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaning

      “Neither party proposes that we adopt any construction that was proposed before the ITC. The rules provide that we should consider an ITC determination on claim construction in an inter partes review proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). However, the ITC made no determination on claim construction before the Section 337 investigation was terminated upon Petitioner’s request for arbitration. Prelim. Resp. 3. Accordingly, the ITC case does not provide any determination on claim construction that we must consider in this proceeding. We decline to explicitly construe “field of view” since neither party advocates for a particular construction. Therefore, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of “field of view” in the analysis of limitations 44(c) and 44(f), which is “the maximum angle of view that can be seen through a lens or optical instrument,” which may be defined by an aperture, consistent with the textbook definitions discussed above.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayMotivation foundTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “discredit[s], or otherwise discourage[s] the solution claimed.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). At this time, Patent Owner’s evidence is insufficient to establish that Retterath “criticizes, discredits or otherwise discourages” simultaneous use of Retterath’s waveguides and macro detector lens. See Ex. 1005, Fig. 9 (waveguide layer), Fig. 10 (macro detector lens). Patent Owner may be correct that Retterath describes waveguides and a macro detector lens as alternatives to one another. Prelim. Resp. 30. However, Patent Owner does not show that Retterath (or any other prior art) “criticizes, discredits or otherwise discourages” using the waveguides and macro detector lens together. Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (A reference “that ‘merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into’ the claimed invention does not teach away.”)” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,190,750
  • PTAB · Apr 1, 2024 · IPR2023-01456 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5–8, and 10–17 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’381 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims (i.e., 1–3, 5–8, and 10–17) of the ’381 patent, based on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics, plus 2-3 years of experience in LiDAR design.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner “adopts Petitioner’s definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA)] as having an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics and two to three years of experience in LiDAR design” for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 4. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s unopposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

      “construction for the term ‘field of view’” in the ITC investigation: “detection area defined by an aperture or lens tube.” Prelim. Resp. 19–20 (citing Ex. 2002, 2). Patent Owner notes that Petitioner relied, in the (now terminated) ITC proceeding, on various pieces of extrinsic evidence to support this construction. See id. at 20–22 (citing Ex. 2004, 282; Ex. 2005, 51, 54–56, 70; Ex. 2006, 28). However, Patent Owner does not appear to argue that this construction is correct or that we should adopt it. See id. at 19–22. We decline to adopt a construction at institution that neither party actually advocates. At this stage of the proceeding, we note that some of the definitions that were cited by Petitioner in the ITC proceeding are broader than the proposed construction. See Ex. 2004, 282 (defining “field of view” as “[t]he maximum angle of view that can be seen through a lens or optical instrument”). Thus, it appears that Petitioner’s ITC construction incorporates additional limitations that, at this stage of the proceeding, we are not persuaded are correct. Thus, for purposes of institution, we simply apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. If either of the parties believe that a construction of this term is necessary, they should address the proper construction during trial. C.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “been motivated to combine Retterath and Borowski with predictable results. Pet. 13–19. Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that following Borowski’s suggestions of implementing each pixel in Retterath’s detector array as a “macro-cell” having multiple SPADs would have “the predictable benefits . . . for smart averaging in time and space, enhancing image depth and acquisition speed.” Id. at 14. Petitioner contends that the combined teachings of Retterath and Borowski would “enhance the signal to noise ratio of Retterath’s detectors, and thereby improve system performance.” Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 134). Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been prompted to implement Retterath’s LiDAR system using multiple SPADs per pixel (as suggested by Borowski) to achieve the performance advantages of SPADs known before September 2015, such as a high data-rate output in combination with low-power operation (and with the high signal-to-noise ratio described above).” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 135). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated “to combine Retterath and Borowski to utilize multiple SPADs for each pixel to improve detection capability and accuracy.” Id. Petitioner also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been prompted to implement the Retterath-Borowski combination due to Borowski’s express suggestion for ‘an improved trade-off between image depth resolution and fast data acquisition for the detection of movements’. . . by ‘local averaging between adjacent detectors to optimize the tradeoff between speed and sensitivity.’” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 3, 26, 83, 136–138, 220, 221, 222, 233, 237, 249, 258, 267–271; Ex. 1003 ¶ 137). Finally, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to combine Retterath and Borowski because doing so was the application of known techniques (Borowski’s suggestion for multi-SPAD detectors) to a known system (Retterath’s LiDAR system that utilized an array of detectors) ready for improvement to yield predictable results.” Id. at 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 138). At this time, Patent Owner does not dispute that there was a motivation to combine Retterrath and Borowski. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that there is a motivation to combine these references.” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,178,381
  • PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2023-01422 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–2, 4–9, 11–14, 16–17, and 19–25 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 14 is obvious over Pacala, Johnson, Pardhan, and Zhang.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1369. Therefore, to prevail in an inter partes review, Petitioner must explain how the proposed combinations of prior art would have rendered the challenged claims unpatentable. We determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious over the proposed combinations of prior art. slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering and two to three years of work experience with electro-optical and electro-mechanical devices or systems. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education or vice versa. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–41). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art for the limited purpose of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 10. We apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art in this decision. We determine that the undisputed level of skill is consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’515 patent and the prior art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We also determine that the proposed level of skill is reflective of the education and experience a person of ordinary skill would have had.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner and Patent Owner each contend that no claim construction is necessary to resolve the patentability disputes in this case. Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this decision, given that no claim terms are in controversy on the current record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “fins with Johnson’s rotor-stator structure would defeat Johnson’s objective of achieving compactness. Prelim. Resp. 23–24, 26–31. However, Petitioner contended that Pardhan’s fins would dissipate heat in the combination, thereby increasing the operating life of the LIDAR device. Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 252). Patent Owner’s argument does not address Petitioner’s evidence that the LIDAR device resulting from Petitioner’s combination would have increased operating life, even if some compactness is sacrificed. That there are simultaneous advantages and disadvantages in making the proposed combination does not necessarily negate the motivation to combine. See Allied Erecting and Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 29

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,287,515
  • PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · IPR2023-01421 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 21 and 23–34 over all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’405 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims (i.e., claims 21 and 23–34) of the ’405 patent, based on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “had an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics and two to three years of experience in LiDAR design.” Pet. 12. Petitioner further contends that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education or vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner “adopts Petitioner’s definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art] as having an undergraduate degree in mechanical or electrical engineering or physics and two to three years of experience in LiDAR design” for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 4. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “constructions in a co-pending ITC case3 involving the ’405 patent; however, no “terms require construction to resolve the patentability dispute.” Pet. 12. Petitioner further argues that “Petitioner demonstrates how the prior art renders obvious the challenged claims under any proposed construction.” Id. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner “proposed the following construction for the term ‘aperture’” in the ITC case: “a small hole that defines a field of view for an individual pixel.” Prelim. Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2001, 2). Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We find on the current record that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that there is a motivation to combine Hall, Borowski, and Spector. We note that Patent Owner does not dispute, at this time, that there is a motivation to combine Hall and Borowski. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions with respect to the combination of Hall and Borowski and find it sufficient. We focus our analysis on combination of Hall and Spector. To begin with, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contentions that a person of ordinary skill would not have looked to Spector because Hall already solved the problem of cross-talk. See Prelim. Resp. 32–36. Although Patent Owner is correct that Hall offers some techniques to address the problem of cross-talk, Hall is clear that those methods are not the exclusive methods or universally solve the problem of cross-talk. For the first technique identified by Patent Owner, Hall states that “[i]n some embodiments, the delay time is set to be greater than the time of flight of the measurement pulse sequence to and from an object located at a maximum range of the LIDAR device. In this manner, there is no cross-talk among any of the sixteen multi-pulse illumination systems.” Ex. 1008, 9:13–17 (emphasis added). And for the second technique, Hall states In some other embodiments, measurement pulse may be emitted from one pulsed illumination system before a measurement pulse emitted from another pulsed illumination system has had time to return to the LIDAR device. In some of these embodiments, care is taken to ensure that there is sufficient spatial separation between the areas of the sur-rounding environment [interrogated] by each beam to avoid cross-talk.” Id. at 9:18–25 (emphasis added). Thus, Hall makes clear that these options for some embodiments, and that the technique works only if certain conditions are met. Thus, on this record, we do not agree that a person of ordinary skill would have been discouraged from looking at other techniques to address the cross-talk problem. Here, Hall discloses several, non-exclusive methods, that may address the cross-talk problem in certain circumstances, but we disagree with Patent Owner that would discourage a person of ordinary skill from looking to other methods of reducing cross-talk to improve Hall’s device. See Allied Erecting and Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Attachments, LLC, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“A given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.”). Patent Owner’s argument that Hall teaches away from the combination with Spector because Spector is a single-light-source device with a gimbal is also not persuasive. See Prelim. Resp. 37–39. Here, Petitioner proposes using the apertures used in Spector’s LIDAR device in Hall’s device. See Pet. 64–65. Petitioner does not propose incorporating Spector’s light source or its gimbal. Compare Pet. 65 (showing annotated version of Figure 1 of Spector showing aperture), with Prelim. Resp. 38 (showing annotated version of Figure 1 of Spector highlighting light source.). We disagree with Patent Owner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would ignore everything taught in Spector, which also discloses a LIDAR system, because Hall might criticize one component of Spector. We note that Hall does not appear to criticize Spector’s apertures or the components Petitioner seeks to rely on. “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. Indeed, “in many cases[,] a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” Id. at 420. Thus, we disagree that Hall teaches away from incorporating Spector’s apertures, as Patent Owner contends. Finally, on this record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Spector teaches away from the combination. See Prelim. Resp. 41–47. We note that much of Patent Owner’s argument is based on its assertions of how the modified device would operate. See id. at 43–44. However, these assertions are supported only by attorney argument, and entitled to little weight. See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Attorney argument is not evidence.”). Moreover, we note that the proposed combination seeks to improve Hall’s device, not Spector’s, so it is unclear why a person of ordinary skill would necessarily compare the performance of Spector’s device versus the combined device. But even if we ignore these problems, we note that “[a] reference does not teach away, however, if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not ‘criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage’ investigation into the invention claimed.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Spector’s discussion of obtaining a “complete scan of the scene,” Ex. 1005, 5:12, does not necessarily “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage,” anything less than “a complete scan of the scene.” Indeed, “[i]t’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it be a suitable option.’” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). At this stage, Patent Owner does not provide any evidence suggesting that Petitioner’s expert’s testimony is incorrect. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 185–195. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Hall and Spector.4 We note that this is only a preliminary finding and Patent Owner is free to develop further its various motivation to combine arguments by providing additional reasoning and evidence, and by cross examining Petitioner’s expert about his testimony.” slip op. at 23

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,175,405

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.