- Global Tel*link Corporation v. Securus Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00825 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; the petition did not prove claims 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 14–18 unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Applying these principles to the instant case, in an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on Petitioner to prove “unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379. (explaining petitioner “had the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence, and this burden never shifted”). Petitioner also has the initial burden of production. Id. Petitioner satisfied its burden of production by arguing in its Petition that Spadaro was prior art under § 102(e) and, in combination with one or more other prior art references, would have rendered claims 1–20 obvious at the time the invention was made under § 103(a). Pet. 4–5, 13–36.” slip op. at 11
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable
“Even if we were to find that Petitioner’s citation to two pages of its declarant’s testimony, without explanation, does not amount to improper incorporation by reference, the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Leonard J. Forys, Ph.D., is insufficient to show one of ordinary skill in the art was in possession of the subject matter of the claims at issue. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”). First, the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Forys, is conclusory, merely quoting some portions of the ’357 patent without adequately explaining how the quoted portions relate to the subject matter recited by the claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Moreover, during cross-examination Dr. Forys explained his analysis, “I just went through the ’167 patent and just picked a few things out that seem to indicate that they are already there. . . . So it was illustrative. It’s not a detailed analysis. It is just suggestive.” Ex. 2006, 48:1–7.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The ’357 patent does not set forth a special definition for “call application management system.” As confirmed by Dr. Forys (id.), the plain language of the claim specifies the function required to be performed by the call application management system—connecting calls responsive to receiving a request to connect the call. Although Dr. Forys found Patent Owner’s proposed construction to be “reasonable,” Patent Owner’s proposed construction unnecessarily introduces the term “call processing,” which is not recited by the claim itself and on its face seems broader than the recited function of a call application management system—to connect a call. We do not agree with Patent Owner that a call application management system must perform examples of call processing described by the Specification, but not recited in the claim. Limitations from embodiments are not to be imported into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1184. Furthermore, we find that Patent Owner’s contention— the name “the call application management system of Claim 1 would be understood [by one of ordinary skill in the art] to manage, from start to finish, each call placed or received at the plurality of prisons” (PO Resp. 6)—places too much weight on the term “management” without sufficiently addressing the term “application.” We credit the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, who disagrees that call application management system is 25 required to manage “all call processing, ‘from start to finish.’” Ex. 1020 ¶ 8 (emphasis omitted). Therefore, in light of the plain language of the claim, the Specification of the ’357 patent, and according the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant and Petitioner’s declarant appropriate weight, we construe “call application management system” to mean a system that performs the enumerated function—“connecting a call to or from the telephone terminals over a telephone carrier network responsive to receiving a request for connecting the call.”” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In general, we adopt the areas of agreement in the parties’ proposals. Patent Owner’s proposed academic or industry experience of telephony14 systems comports with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record, which relate to telephone communication systems. Petitioner has not explained sufficiently why the broader field of communications systems is a more appropriate area of academic or industry experience than telephony systems. Thus, we generally adopt Patent Owner’s proposed academic or industry experience in telephony systems. Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or an equivalent field, as well as at least three years of academic or industry experience in telephony systems.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 7,529,357 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,529,357 - Avx Corporation v. Greatbatch Ltd.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 19, 2015 · IPR2015-00713 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment and cancelled claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 23, 24, 30, and 31.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include disclaimer of the involved application or patent and cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial. Id. In light of Patent Owner’s disclaimer of claims 1–44 of the ’077 patent, we determine that entry of judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 23, 24, 30, and 31 of the ’077 patent is appropriate.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,035,077 - Global Tel*link Corporation v. Securus Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 2, 2015 · IPR2014-00810 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 5–7 are unpatentable as anticipated by Silberschatz; Petitioner did not show claims 4 and 8 unpatentable because Silberschatz does not disclose allocating or de-allocating a specific telecommunications resource.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“In this case, the ’637 patent discloses multiple embodiments of telephony and telecommunication resources being allocated and de-allocated, but during prosecution, the applicant removed the modifying limitation of “telecommunication”3 leaving only the term “resource” in the issued claims. Compare Ex. 1004, 60–69 (Application No. 09/072,436) with Ex. 1002, 44–47. The claims, thus, recite “resource” and do not recite “telecommunications resource” nor do they recite “computer resource.” The lack of a limiting term modifying “resource” indicates a scope broader than the scope encompassed by a “resource” that is limited to only a “telecommunications resource” or “computer resource.” Moreover, the Examiner characterized the claims of the application that issued as the ’637 patent as “broader in scope than the claims [in] the parent patent.” Ex. 1002, 95. The Applicant did not dispute the Examiner’s characterization of the claims. Id. at 107. Although the ’637 patent discloses embodiments using “resources,” the ’637 patent does not define explicitly the term “resource.” Therefore, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term as would be understood by one of 3 The term “telecommunication” was recited in the proposed claims of earlier-filed parent Application No. 09/072,436. The ’637 patent claims priority to patent Application No. 09/072,436. See Ex. 1002, 1. ordinary skill in the art. A technical dictionary, IEEE Dictionary4, defines “resource” as “[a]ny capability that must be scheduled, assigned, or controlled by the underlying implementation to assure non[-]conflicting usage by processes.” Id. at 976. As shown by the dictionary definition, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “resource” is not limited to a telecommunications resource or a computer resource.5 Thus, the ordinary meaning of “resource” is consistent with the term’s use in the ’637 patent, which readily interchanges the term “resources” with “components” and “capability” in the context of computer telephony resources. Ex. 1001, 1:27–29. For example, in one embodiment in the ’637 patent, the telecommunication “resource” is a telephony line card that is coupled to a telephone. Id. at 9:12–15. In other embodiments, the telecommunication “resources” are components or ports coupled via a data bus to a central processing unit system, a data port system, a video system, a network system, a storage controller, and a high speed communication system. Id. at 8:1–27, 10:64–11:10, 11:14–22. In every embodiment in the ’637 patent, 4 IEEE 100: The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms: Seventh Edition (Standards Information Network, IEEE Press ©2000) (Ex. 3001) (hereinafter “IEEE Dictionary”). 5 Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Forys, testified on cross-examination that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have telecommunications experience because all of the embodiments in the ’637 patent are directed to telecommunications. Ex. 2002, 47:2–14. Based on this testimony, Patent Owner argues that the ’637 patent would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of a telecommunications systems. PO Resp. 8–9. We agree the ’637 patent may have been understood in the context of a telecommunications system, however, that does not indicate that a skilled artisan would have understood “resource” to have been limited to only a telecommunications resource. resources are a component or capability of a system that is managed (i.e., identified, allocated, de-allocated) by some module in the service kernel. Id. at 9:27–39, 10:10–14, 10:64–11:10, 11:14–22. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s position, because” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s Declarant, Dr. Forys, opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’637 patent “would have a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or an equivalent field and one year to two years of industry experience in telecommunications.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 32. Patent Owner does not disagree with Petitioner’s assertions regarding the level of skill in the art, nor does Patent Owner’s Declarant, Dr. Akl, offer any contrary explanation regarding who would qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’637 patent. PO Resp. 9–10; Ex. 2003 ¶ 42. Based on our review of the ’637 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’637 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Petitioner’s Declarant, we conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a similar discipline, and at least one year of work experience in telecommunications technologies. We further note that the applied prior art reflects the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We do agree with Patent Owner’s argument, however, with regards to dependent claims 4 and 8, which require the return of “the allocated telecommunications resources to control of the management module.” Ex. 1001, 21:52–22:6, 22:44–52; see supra, Section II.A.3. Petitioner has not indicated a disclosure in Silberschatz that demonstrates the allocation or de-allocation of a specific telecommunications resource. Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to show Silberschatz anticipates dependent claims 4 and 8.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner’s position, because Petitioner identifies CPU time as a specific resource that is requested (Pet. 23–24), allocated (id. at 25), used (id. at 25), and de-allocated (id. at 26). We credit the testimony of Dr. Forys, who explains how and where Silberschatz discloses each element of the challenged claims. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 64–80. Specifically, Dr. Forys testifies regarding the request, allocation, use, and de-allocation of a single type of resource (e.g., CPU time), thereby meeting the limitations of the challenged claims. Id. ¶¶ 74–80. Although Patent Owner correctly points out that Petitioner discusses multiple types of resources, we do not agree that Petitioner discusses or applies the disclosure of Silberschatz inconsistently, because Petitioner at least consistently identifies CPU time as a resource requested, allocated, used, and de-allocated.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,324,637 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,324,637 - Dr. Michael Farmwald / RPX Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00948 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s adverse-judgment motion, entered judgment against Patent Owner, and cancelled claims 2, 22, 23, and 25.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Judgment” is defined as “a final written decision by the Board, or a termination of a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. Although Patent Owner uses the term “termination” in its Motion, it did not submit the Motion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 and it did not explain why termination is appropriate in this circumstance. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (noting that the Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision “where appropriate,” such as when the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a)). Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason not to grant Patent Owner’s Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, this Decision is a Final Written Decision, not a termination of the proceeding.1” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,370,371 - Dr. Michael Farmwald / RPX Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00947 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion for adverse judgment and cancelled claims 1, 23, 25, 161, 193, and 202.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Judgment” is defined as “a final written decision by the Board, or a termination of a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. Although Patent Owner uses the term “termination” in its Motion, it did not submit the Motion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 and did not explain why termination is appropriate in this circumstance. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (noting that the Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision “where appropriate,” such as when the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a)). Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason not to grant Patent Owner’s Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, this Decision is a Final Written Decision, not a termination of the proceeding.1” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 6,061,551 - Dr. Michael Farmwald / RPX Corporation v. Parkervision, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 29, 2015 · IPR2014-00946 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion for adverse judgment and cancelled claims 1, 82, 90, and 91.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request entry of adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Judgment” is defined as “a final written decision by the Board, or a termination of a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.2. Although Patent Owner uses the term “termination” in its Motion, it did not submit the Motion under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 and did not explain why termination is appropriate in this circumstance. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.72 (noting that the Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision “where appropriate,” such as when the trial is consolidated with another proceeding or pursuant to a settlement under 35 U.S.C. § 317(a)). Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason not to grant Patent Owner’s Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed above, this Decision is a Final Written Decision, not a termination of the proceeding.1” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“(collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Petition for inter partes review of U.S. Patent No. 6,266,518 B1 (“the ’518 patent”). Paper 1. ParkerVision, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response on September 24, 2014. Paper 7. On December 18, 2014, we instituted this inter partes review of claims 1, 82, 90, and 91 of the ’518 patent. Paper 8.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,266,518 - Global Tel*link Corporation v. Securus Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 11, 2015 · IPR2014-00749 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–14 are unpatentable: claims 1–3 and 8–11 as obvious over Spadaro, and claims 4–7 and 11–14 as obvious over Spadaro and Hodge.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Therefore, in light of the plain language of the claim, the Specification of the’003 patent, and according Patent Owner’s evidence and the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant appropriate weight, we construe “call application management system” to mean a system that is located as required by claim 1—“connected via the LAN to the networking device” and to which a validation system is connected via the LAN—and performs at 17 least the functions recited by claim 1—processing the outgoing VoIP data packets for transmission to a telephone carrier network and processing signals from the telephone carrier network into the incoming VoIP data packets. A “call application management system” is not required to perform call processing as defined by the Patent Owner—“control a call from origination, maintenance of that call, and subsequent release of that call [and] does not include call authorization functionality” (PO Resp. 15).” slip op. at 17
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“The parties propose similar levels of ordinary skill in the art and do not directly challenge the other’s proposal. We consider the level of ordinary skill in the art to be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The prior art references, like the ’003 patent, relate to telephone communication systems. See Ex. 1001, 1:41–42 (indicating the technical field relates to call processing); Ex. 1004, 1:7–9 (indicating the field of the invention relates to the processing of voice telephone calls); Ex. 1005, 1:7–9 (indicating the field of the invention relates to telephone communication systems). In general, we adopt the areas of agreement in the parties’ proposals. Patent Owner’s proposed academic or industry experience of telephony9 systems comports with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record, which relate to telephone communication systems. Petitioner has not explained sufficiently why the broader field of communications systems is a more appropriate are of academic or industry experience than telephony systems. Thus, we generally adopt Patent Owner’s proposed academic or industry experience in telephony systems.” slip op. at 20
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“processing—meaning controlling a call from origination, maintenance of that call, and subsequent release of that call, but which does not include call authorization functionality (PO Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 162)) against evidence of the written description of the term in the Specification and language of claim 1, we do not agree that call application management system necessarily must control a call from origination, maintenance of that call, and subsequent release of that call. It is within our discretion to assign the appropriate weight to the testimony offered by Dr. Oliver. See, e.g., Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding the Board has discretion to give more weight to one item of evidence over another “unless no reasonable trier of fact could have done so”); In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). First, as discussed above, the Specification and earlier application provide examples of call processing functionality that contradict Dr. Oliver’s position and which are not addressed directly by Dr. Olivier. Second, the inconsistency of Dr. Olivier’s own testimony regarding the definition of call processing undercuts his position. In his declaration, Dr. Olivier identified additional functions as part of call processing—including call authorization which Dr. Olivier testifies is not included in call processing. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 67 (showing Dr. Olivier’s annotation of Figure 2 of the ’003 patent to identify call processing), 69, 70, 73. Third, we are unpersuaded by 16 Dr. Olivier’s reliance on a vague statement of the Specification that the call application management system “forms the heart of call processing functionality provided by call processing platform 101” (PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 165)). Dr. Olivier testifies that the context of “forms the heart” would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art as meaning “that call connection control and switching control is performed at a centralized location,” because the Specification describes the call application management system as controlling completing a call between parties (Ex. 2001 ¶ 165). We are mindful that, according to the Specification, the call application management system “control[s] completing a call between” two parties. Ex. 1001, 8:16–22 (emphasis added). Even so, “controlling completing a call” on its face seems more limited than Patent Owner’s position that call application management system is a system performing call processing—“control a call from origination, maintenance of that call, and subsequent release of that call.” We also are mindful that Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Forys, does not agree with Dr. Olivier’s position regarding call processing. Ex. 1018 ¶¶ 7–12.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“7. Conclusion of Obviousness over Spadaro We have resolved the question of obviousness based on factual determinations of (1) the scope and content of Spadaro; (2) differences between the subject matter of claims 1–4 and 8–11 and the teachings of Spadaro; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. Patent Owner has not put forth any evidence of secondary considerations for us to consider. For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of evidence, that the subject matter recited in each of claims 1–3 and 8–11 as a whole would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of Spadaro. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We determine, however, Petitioner has not established, by a preponderance of evidence, that the subject matter in claim 4 as a whole would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of Spadaro.” slip op. at 58
Patent outcomesUS 8,577,003 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,577,003 - Reg Synthetic Fuels LLC v. Neste Oil OyjAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 5, 2015 · IPR2014-00192 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 103; proposed substitute claims 25–28 are patentable and entered because the prior art did not motivate the claimed 5,000–8,000 w-ppm sulfur range.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“Based on the record before us, we conclude that Neste has carried its burden of demonstrating that claim 25 is patentable over the prior art of record. We concluded above, in discussing the original claims, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine Jakkula and Monnier I to add sulfur to the feedstock of an HDO process that is followed by an HI step, because the prior art suggests that concentrations of 2000 or 4431 w-ppm have beneficial effects on catalyst activation and decarboxylation selectivity. A person of ordinary skill would, therefore, weigh the possible deleterious effects of sulfur on the HI catalyst, against the 28 possible benefits. The question of whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to add an even higher concentration of sulfur—in the range of 5000–8000 w-ppm—is an altogether different one. The record before us does not establish persuasively that there was any art-recognized benefit to using a concentration of sulfur over 4431 w-ppm. Absent any indication of a benefit to be obtained from adding even greater amounts of sulfur, the skilled artisan would have no reason to make the modifications to Jakkula necessary to result in the claimed invention. Such modifications would involve catalyst replacement costs, additional processing steps such as stripping, or catalyst substitutions18 that—although not prohibitive if the prior art suggested a benefit might be obtained—would not be undertaken if the person of ordinary skill saw no benefit to making them. For these reasons, we conclude that Neste has established sufficiently that there was no reason to modify the prior art to arrive at the process of claim 25.” slip op. at 28
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“We are not convinced by REG’s rate constant argument. First, REG does not direct us to any evidence in the record, other than the testimony of Dr. Sughrue, that establishes that increasing the rate constant of the conversion reaction was recognized in the art to be beneficial. This is in stark contrast to decarboxylation selectivity, which is described by several 17 Furthermore, as discussed above with respect to Laurent I, we do not find such a significant increase in sulfur concentration—from 2000 to 5000–8000 w-ppm—to be “routine.” 26 references as decreasing hydrogen consumption and, therefore, processing cost. We are, therefore, left with only Dr. Sughrue’s statement that an “increase in rate constant is important because a higher activity allows for less catalyst to be used to deoxygenate the feedstock.” Ex. 1043 ¶ 125. Dr. Sughrue cites no support for such an assertion, and we accord it little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Second, we note that Table 4 of Laurent II reports, along with kDES, the rate constants k4MA and kGUA, pertaining to the HDO conversion of 4- methylacetophenone and guaiacol, respectively. Ex. 1011, 107. While kDES is shown to increase with sulfur concentration, k4MA decreases and kGUA is unaffected by sulfur concentration. Id. REG provides no evidence or argument establishing why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered only the kDES rate constant in determining the benefit of increased sulfur concentration.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“evidence that the prior art teaches all elements of challenged claims 1–24, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the disclosures. Furthermore, we conclude that such a combination would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art, as evidenced by 17 the prior art of record. We, therefore, conclude that claims 1–24 would have been obvious at the time of the invention, and thus are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
Patent outcomesUS 8,278,492 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,278,492 - Avx Corporation v. Greatbatch Ltd.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 14, 2015 · IPR2014-01461 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, entered judgment against it on claims 1–20, and cancelled those claims.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party1 may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Although not titled as such, we interpret Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response as a request for adverse judgment under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request for judgment against itself is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) with respect to claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 7,244,279; and FURTHER ORDERED that claims 1–20 of U.S. Patent No. 7,244,279 are CANCELLED.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 7,244,279 - Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 17, 2014 · CBM2013-00034 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as anticipated by Paul; the Board rejected the Ratsimor anticipation and obviousness grounds because Ratsimor was not proven publicly accessible.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“1. “subsidy” Independent claim 1 recites “recognizing a subsidy, according to the subsidy program, for the subscriber.” The ’670 patent does not set forth a special definition for “subsidy.” Accordingly, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term “subsidy”—financial assistance given by one to another.5 The ’670 patent’s use of “subsidy” is consistent with its ordinary meaning. Specifically, the ’670 patent describes an advertiser setting up a subsidy program to subsidize communication fees, offer product discounts, generate and accumulate “reward points” for subscribers, or mitigate or defer other expenses of the subscriber. Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 39-45 (referring to Fig. 2). These examples are financial in nature. Product discounts reduce the monetary cost of a financial transaction, reward points are a form of currency, and mitigating or deferring expenses reduces the monetary cost of a financial transaction or postpones the monetary cost of a financial transaction, respectively. Also, the ’670 describes, as part of a subscriber setup process, an intermediary presenting, to a subscriber for selection, “subsidy programs available, including the criteria for continued subsidy and levels of subsidy.” Ex. 1001, col. 4, ll. 59-65 (referring to Fig. 3); see id. at col. 4, ll. 16-17. In an example of a bi-directional endorsement process, the ’670 patent further describes an advertiser calculating the amount to” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“We agree the preamble is limiting. In general, a preamble is construed as a limitation “if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). When the limitations in the body of the claim “rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.” Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Notably, the preamble of independent claim 1 requires “a source communication device possessed by a subscriber,” “a destination communication device possessed by a recipient,” and “an advertisement.” The body of claim 1 recites “the source communication device,” “the subscriber,” “the destination communication device,” and “the 17 advertisement,” all of which rely on and derive antecedent basis from the preamble of claim 1. Accordingly, we conclude that the preamble of independent claim 1 is entitled to patentable weight.” slip op. at 17
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedReference not prior artNot shown unpatentable
“Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we do not find sufficient evidence that the Ratsimor paper was accessible publicly and, therefore, we conclude the Ratsimor paper is not a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Section 102 states: “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention was . . . described in a printed publication . . . more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2011). “The statutory phrase ‘printed publication’ has been interpreted to give effect to ongoing advances in the technologies of data storage, retrieval, and dissemination.” In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As such, a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) may be an electronic publication, such as the Ratsimor paper is purported to be. See In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (CCPA 1981) (holding that an electronic publication is considered to be a “printed publication” “upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it and recognize and comprehend therefrom the essentials of the claimed invention without need of further research or experimentation”).” slip op. at 22
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To anticipate, a prior art reference must disclose more than “multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371; see also In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972) (“The [prior art] reference must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.”). Although the elements must be arranged 30 or combined in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Moreover, the prior art reference is read from the perspective of one with ordinary skill in the art. In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A reference anticipates a claim if it discloses the claimed invention such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession of the invention.”); In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]t is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”).” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 8,457,670 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,457,670
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.