- Keeper Security, Inc. v. Cumberland Systems LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Nov 20, 2017 · CBM2017-00057 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · CBM · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–19 because Petitioner did not show that the patent qualified as a covered business method patent.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has failed to show adequately that the ’647 patent “claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service,” to qualify as a covered business method patent. As we explained above, Secure Axcess requires a challenged patent to “have a claim that contains . . . a financial activity element.” Secure Axcess, 848 F.3d at 1381 (emphasis added). Petitioner fails to point to any element of claims of the ’647 patent that it contends meets the “financial activity element” required by Secure Axcess. Instead, it merely points to statements in the specification regarding potential applications for the claimed cryptographic algorithm. At best, Petitioner argues that the claimed encryption method can be for financial matters, such as securing e-commerce transactions, but this is not sufficient after the Federal Circuit’s guidance in both Unwired Planet and Secure Axcess. See id. Petitioner has simply failed to identify anything in the claims that are financial in nature.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,023,647 - PTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00630 · APJ Eleni Mantis Mercader · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving in place the denial of institution because the petitioner did not show that the Board overlooked or misapprehended its arguments about Engel and application-specific conversational flows.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing an abuse of discretion, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,954,789 - Ipr2017-00630Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00630 · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the petitioner's request for rehearing of the decision denying institution.
NonePatents in suitUS 6,954,789 - PTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00451 · APJ Eleni Mantis Mercader · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, concluding Petitioner showed no overlooked or misapprehended matter and did not establish that Engel’s protocol-specific hash tables linked packets by application activity as required.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Regardless of whether Petitioner’s arguments on rehearing were presented sufficiently in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner as to the merits of those arguments, and are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters in rendering our Decision. In particular, Petitioner’s rehearing arguments conflate the terms “application” and “protocol.” See Opp. 9–15. Petitioner’s referencing of matching “IP addresses stored in each dialog record of the NFS dialog hash table” at best links a packet exchange between a server and a client using the NFS protocol, and not a packet exchange pertaining to specific application activity, as our interpretation of “conversational flows” requires. See Req. Reh’g 7 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 89) (emphasis omitted). Other hash tables similarly would be populated with protocol-specific information (e.g., “FTP records in one table, . . . Telnet records in another table, TCP records in a further table”), but again, linking by protocol is not the same as linking by application. See Opp. 10–11. We find Patent Owner’s example of a single Skype application spawning multiple connections using different protocols, such as one audio protocol and one video protocol to be illustrative of the difference between Engle and the claimed invention. Id. at 12. In this scenario, and based on Petitioner’s arguments, Engel’s system would “put the audio protocol information in an appropriate hash table and the video information in a different table.” Id. Petitioner provides no explanation of how Engel would recognize these hash tables as being related to the same application (i.e., single Skype application). Id.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Regardless of whether Petitioner’s arguments on rehearing were presented sufficiently in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner as to the merits of those arguments, and are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters in rendering our Decision. In particular, Petitioner’s rehearing arguments conflate the terms “application” and “protocol.” See Opp. 9–15. Petitioner’s referencing of matching “IP addresses stored in each dialog record of the NFS dialog hash table” at best links a packet exchange between a server and a client using the NFS protocol, and not a packet exchange pertaining to specific application activity, as our interpretation of “conversational flows” requires. See Req. Reh’g 7 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 89) (emphasis omitted). Other hash tables similarly would be populated with protocol-specific information (e.g., “FTP records in one table, . . . Telnet records in another table, TCP records in a further table”), but again, linking by protocol is not the same as linking by application. See Opp. 10–11. We find Patent Owner’s example of a single Skype application spawning multiple connections using different protocols, such as one audio protocol and one video protocol to be illustrative of the difference between Engle and the claimed invention. Id. at 12. In this scenario, and based on Petitioner’s arguments, Engel’s system would “put the audio protocol information in an appropriate hash table and the video information in a different table.” Id. Petitioner provides no explanation of how Engel would recognize these hash tables as being related to the same application (i.e., single Skype application). Id.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 6,839,751 - PTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00450 · APJ Eleni Mantis Mercader · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, finding Engel’s protocol-specific hash tables did not show application-specific conversational flows as required by the claims.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“presented sufficiently in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner as to the merits of those arguments, and are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters in rendering our Decision. In particular, Petitioner’s rehearing arguments conflate the terms “application” and “protocol.” See Opp. 9–15. Petitioner’s referencing of matching “IP addresses stored in each dialog record of the NFS dialog hash table” at best links a packet exchange between a server and a client using the NFS protocol, and not a packet exchange pertaining to specific application activity, as our interpretation of “conversational flows” requires. See Req. Reh’g 7 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 89) (emphasis omitted). Other hash tables similarly would be populated with protocol-specific information (e.g., “FTP records in one table, . . . Telnet records in another table, TCP records in a further table”), but again, linking by protocol is not the same as linking by application. See Opp. 10–11. We find Patent Owner’s example of a single Skype application spawning multiple connections using different protocols, such as one audio protocol and one video protocol to be illustrative of the difference between Engle and the claimed invention. Id. at 12. In this scenario, and based on Petitioner’s arguments, Engel’s system would “put the audio protocol information in an appropriate hash table and the video information in a different table.” Id. Petitioner provides no explanation of how Engel would recognize these hash tables as being related to the same application (i.e., single Skype application). Id.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“presented sufficiently in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner as to the merits of those arguments, and are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters in rendering our Decision. In particular, Petitioner’s rehearing arguments conflate the terms “application” and “protocol.” See Opp. 9–15. Petitioner’s referencing of matching “IP addresses stored in each dialog record of the NFS dialog hash table” at best links a packet exchange between a server and a client using the NFS protocol, and not a packet exchange pertaining to specific application activity, as our interpretation of “conversational flows” requires. See Req. Reh’g 7 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 89) (emphasis omitted). Other hash tables similarly would be populated with protocol-specific information (e.g., “FTP records in one table, . . . Telnet records in another table, TCP records in a further table”), but again, linking by protocol is not the same as linking by application. See Opp. 10–11. We find Patent Owner’s example of a single Skype application spawning multiple connections using different protocols, such as one audio protocol and one video protocol to be illustrative of the difference between Engle and the claimed invention. Id. at 12. In this scenario, and based on Petitioner’s arguments, Engel’s system would “put the audio protocol information in an appropriate hash table and the video information in a different table.” Id. Petitioner provides no explanation of how Engel would recognize these hash tables as being related to the same application (i.e., single Skype application). Id.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 6,771,646 - PTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00769 · APJ Eleni Mantis Mercader · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the rehearing requests, concluding Petitioner did not show the Board overlooked or misapprehended arguments or abused its discretion in denying institution.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Regardless of whether Petitioner’s arguments on rehearing were presented sufficiently in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner as to the merits of those arguments, and are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters in rendering our Decision. In particular, Petitioner’s rehearing arguments conflate the terms “application” and “protocol.” See Opp. 9–15. Petitioner’s referencing of matching “IP addresses stored in each dialog record of the NFS dialog hash table” at best links a packet exchange between a server and a client using the NFS protocol, and not a packet exchange pertaining to specific application activity, as our interpretation of “conversational flows” requires. See Req. Reh’g 7 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 89) (emphasis omitted). Other hash tables similarly would be populated with protocol-specific information (e.g., “FTP records in one table, . . . Telnet records in another table, TCP records in a further table”), but again, linking by protocol is not the same as linking by application. See Opp. 10–11. We find Patent Owner’s example of a single Skype application spawning multiple connections using different protocols, such as one audio protocol and one video protocol to be illustrative of the difference between Engle and the claimed invention. Id. at 12. In this scenario, and based on Petitioner’s arguments, Engel’s system would “put the audio protocol information in an appropriate hash table and the video information in a different table.” Id. Petitioner provides no explanation of how Engel would recognize these hash tables as being related to the same application (i.e., single Skype application). Id.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“presented sufficiently in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner as to the merits of those arguments, and are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters in rendering our Decision. In particular, Petitioner’s rehearing arguments conflate the terms “application” and “protocol.” See Opp. 9–15. Petitioner’s referencing of matching “IP addresses stored in each dialog record of the NFS dialog hash table” at best links a packet exchange between a server and a client using the NFS protocol, and not a packet exchange pertaining to specific application activity, as our interpretation of “conversational flows” requires. See Req. Reh’g 7 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 89) (emphasis omitted). Other hash tables similarly would be populated with protocol-specific information (e.g., “FTP records in one table, . . . Telnet records in another table, TCP records in a further table”), but again, linking by protocol is not the same as linking by application. See Opp. 10–11. We find Patent Owner’s example of a single Skype application spawning multiple connections using different protocols, such as one audio protocol and one video protocol to be illustrative of the difference between Engle and the claimed invention. Id. at 12. In this scenario, and based on Petitioner’s arguments, Engel’s system would “put the audio protocol information in an appropriate hash table and the video information in a different table.” Id. Petitioner provides no explanation of how Engel would recognize these hash tables as being related to the same application (i.e., single Skype application). Id.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Regardless of whether Petitioner’s arguments on rehearing were presented sufficiently in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner as to the merits of those arguments, and are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters in rendering our Decision. In particular, Petitioner’s rehearing arguments conflate the terms “application” and “protocol.” See Opp. 9–15. Petitioner’s referencing of matching “IP addresses stored in each dialog record of the NFS dialog hash table” at best links a packet exchange between a server and a client using the NFS protocol, and not a packet exchange pertaining to specific application activity, as our interpretation of “conversational flows” requires. See Req. Reh’g 7 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 89) (emphasis omitted). Other hash tables similarly would be populated with protocol-specific information (e.g., “FTP records in one table, . . . Telnet records in another table, TCP records in a further table”), but again, linking by protocol is not the same as linking by application. See Opp. 10–11. We find Patent Owner’s example of a single Skype application spawning multiple connections using different protocols, such as one audio protocol and one video protocol to be illustrative of the difference between Engle and the claimed invention. Id. at 12. In this scenario, and based on Petitioner’s arguments, Engel’s system would “put the audio protocol information in an appropriate hash table and the video information in a different table.” Id. Petitioner provides no explanation of how Engel would recognize these hash tables as being related to the same application (i.e., single Skype application). Id.” slip op. at 6
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,651,099 - PTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00629 · APJ Eleni Mantis Mercader · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Petitioner’s rehearing requests, leaving in place the denials of institution because the arguments did not show that the Board overlooked or misapprehended the application-specific conversational-flow requirement.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“presented sufficiently in the Petition, we agree with Patent Owner as to the merits of those arguments, and are not persuaded that we misapprehended or overlooked any matters in rendering our Decision. In particular, Petitioner’s rehearing arguments conflate the terms “application” and “protocol.” See Opp. 9–15. Petitioner’s referencing of matching “IP addresses stored in each dialog record of the NFS dialog hash table” at best links a packet exchange between a server and a client using the NFS protocol, and not a packet exchange pertaining to specific application activity, as our interpretation of “conversational flows” requires. See Req. Reh’g 7 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 89) (emphasis omitted). Other hash tables similarly would be populated with protocol-specific information (e.g., “FTP records in one table, . . . Telnet records in another table, TCP records in a further table”), but again, linking by protocol is not the same as linking by application. See Opp. 10–11. We find Patent Owner’s example of a single Skype application spawning multiple connections using different protocols, such as one audio protocol and one video protocol to be illustrative of the difference between Engle and the claimed invention. Id. at 12. In this scenario, and based on Petitioner’s arguments, Engel’s system would “put the audio protocol information in an appropriate hash table and the video information in a different table.” Id. Petitioner provides no explanation of how Engel would recognize these hash tables as being related to the same application (i.e., single Skype application). Id.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 6,954,789 - PTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · IPR2017-00862 · APJ Eleni Mantis Mercader · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the rehearing requests, leaving in place the denial of institution because Engel’s protocol-specific hash tables did not establish application-specific conversational flows.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). The party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing an abuse of discretion, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,665,725 - Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Transport Technologies, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · IPR2016-01633 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 10 not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish the Draft Ontario Report was prior art.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedReference not prior artNot shown unpatentable
“consider whether the document was distributed, displayed without indicia of confidentiality, able to be found, or available on request to persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter to which the document relates. See Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F. 3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“To qualify as a printed publication, a reference ‘must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.’” quoting In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed.Cir.1989)). We consider the question of whether the Draft Ontario Report is a printed publication anew, based on the complete record, in light of the evidence and arguments adduced at trial.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s Declarant, Mr. Andrews, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’101 patent “would have a Bachelor’s of Science degree in Electrical or Computer Engineering, or the equivalent,” as well as “two years of experience working with automated toll roads, intelligent transportation systems, RFID tracking systems, or a similar field of experience.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 47. Patent Owner does not offer any contrary explanation regarding who would qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’101 patent. See generally PO Resp. Based on our review of the ’101 patent, the types of problems and solutions described in the ’101 patent and cited prior art, and the testimony of Petitioner’s Declarant, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“E. Discretion Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Patent Owner contends that we should have denied the Petition because Petitioner presented “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments” in this proceeding as in the earlier ’1077 IPR. PO Resp. 2 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 325(d)). Patent Owner further contends that we abused our discretion by instituting trial in the present proceeding because we did not “explain[] how the invalidity grounds presented in this proceeding are not ‘the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments,’” and as such, our decision was arbitrary and capricious, and violates Patent Owner’s due process rights. Id. at 13–15. Lastly, Patent Owner contends that the Petition is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 15. We decline to address these issues insofar as they are moot in light of our conclusion that the Draft Ontario Report is not demonstrated to qualify as prior art and our ultimate conclusion that the challenged claims are not shown to be unpatentable in view of challenges based on the Draft Ontario Report.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 6,980,101 not shown unpatentable§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,980,101 - Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Transport Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · IPR2016-01077 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 6, and 8 are unpatentable over Hassett ’183, and claims 5 and 10 are unpatentable over Hassett ’183 and Hassett ’389.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“As we discussed in our Decision to Institute, “a preamble generally is not limiting when the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention.” Catalina Marketing Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Even though the preamble provides antecedent basis for the claim term “registrant,” deleting the preamble would not affect the structure of the invention recited in claim 1. The body of claim 1 not only defines a structurally complete vehicle occupancy monitoring system with a transmitter, a sending transponder, and a reading data collector, but the body of the claim substantially overlaps with the recitation of the preamble (compare Ex. 1001, 3:26–28, with id. at 3:29–37). Similarly, the body of claim 6 describes a complete process and also substantially reiterates the preamble; “receiving the claim by a registrant as to number of occupants in a vehicle and reading the signal from the vehicle that identifies the registrant as the vehicle transits the designated section of highway” (compare id. at 4:13–16, with id. at 4:22–25).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The claims recite language broader than that of the disclosures cited by Patent Owner. See Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1184. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments to construe the term “registrant” to refer to a specific, instead of a generic, program so as to exclude registering one’s vehicle because Patent Owner’s construction impermissibly imports limitations from the specification. See PO Resp. 20; see Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1184; see Inst. Dec. 10–11. We further disagree with Patent Owner that the construction of “registrant” should be revised to account for its use in the claims because we agree with Petitioner that the body of claim 1 does not require the registrant to have made the “claim as to the number of occupants in the vehicle” and claim 6 does not impose any further limitations on the registrant itself. See Reply 2. We also decline to consider whether “registrant” could refer alternatively to an entity and a person because it is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us. See id. at 3; see Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803. Because the specification of the ’101 patent does not define explicitly the term “register” or “registrant,” we refer to the ordinary and customary meaning of these terms, as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. See Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d at 1257. To determine the ordinary and customary meaning of the terms, we refer to its dictionary definition. The dictionary definition for the term “register” is “to enter in or as in a record or list; enroll or record official” and definition for the term “registrant” is “a person who registers.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary 4th Edition, 1999 (Ex. 3001, 4). In our Institution Decision, we concluded that the claim term “registrant” encompasses a person who has registered their vehicle or enrolled in a program. Inst. Dec. 10–11. Registering one’s vehicle constitutes recording officially the ownership of the vehicle, such as with a state department of motor vehicles, consistent with the dictionary definition of register set forth above. Based on the arguments and evidence adduced at trial, we are not persuaded to deviate from our preliminary construction of the claim term “registrant.”” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s Declarant, Mr. Andrews, testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’101 patent “would have a Bachelor of Science in Electrical or Computer Engineering or the equivalent, plus two years of experience with automated toll roads, intelligent transportation systems, RFID tracking systems, or similar experience.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 49. Patent Owner does not offer any contrary explanation regarding who would qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art relevant to the ’101 patent and indicates that it “does not disagree with [Petitioner’s] definition.” PO Resp. 9. Based on the arguments and evidence adduced at trial, we see no reason to modify our decision to adopt and apply Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“the complete record, and in particular, based on the portions of Hassett ’183 cited by Petitioner and Mr. Andrews’s testimony in the Petition and the arguments and evidence adduced at trial, we agree with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the vehicle operator (i.e., driver) disclosed in Hassett ’183 would, in some cases, be a registered owner of a vehicle, and thus, we are satisfied that Petitioner establishes sufficiently that Hassett ’183 teaches the “registrant” recited in claim 1. See Pet. 7; see Ex. 1008 ¶ 78; see Ex. 2015, 39:3–6; see Reply 21. We further agree with Petitioner that the teachings of the VIN and identifying signal disclosed in Hassett ’183, when considered in light of the background and state of the art, would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan to disclose (implicitly) a licensing authority with which a vehicle is registered and a program administrator for automatic tolling systems, thus mirroring the two types of registration discussed above in Section II.A.3. See Pet. 11–13 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 32, 34, 77–79); see Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 32–39; see Ex. 2015, 67:7–19. Thus, we are satisfied that Petitioner establishes sufficiently that Hassett ’183 teaches the “program administrator” recited in claim 1. We are also satisfied that Petitioner establishes sufficiently that the disclosure of a VIN and an identifying signal for the vehicle-borne transponder in Hassett ’183 teaches the “code” recited in claim 1. We credit the testimony from Mr. Andrews that the VIN identifies indirectly the registered vehicle owner via the vehicle title and the factual evidence cited in paragraphs 32 through 39 of Mr. Andrews’s Declaration. See Ex. 1008 ¶ 78. We further credit his testimony that the transponder identifying signal (which can encompass the VIN) would be unique at least because it encompasses the VIN, through which a registered owner could be identified. Reply 18 (citing Ex. 2015, 62:20–63:1, 73:16–18, 86:16–20). In view of the above, we are satisfied that Petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Hassett ’183 teaches the “sending transponder” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 6,980,101 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,980,101
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.