• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713
• X Corp. v. Sterling Computers CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00299 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated Dumais-based and Kircher/Krug grounds; Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s motions to exclude are dismissed as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 8–9. In its response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 14–15 (“Patent Owner and its expert adopt the Board’s definition for purposes of this Response”). Having considered the record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’217 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached

    “1. “computer program modules” The parties dispute whether four “computer program modules comprising” (1) “a monitoring module,” (2) “a first relevance measurement module,” (3) “a second relevance measurement module,” and (4) “a relevance analysis module” (collectively, “module limitations”) invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and should be treated as means-plus-function limitations. See Pet. 8–18; PO Resp. 15–18; Pet. Reply 3–5; PO Sur-reply 4–7. However, the parties do not argue that the construction of these terms affects the analysis of Petitioner’s challenges. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Moreover, our analysis does not rely on any particular construction of these terms and, so, we need not resolve this dispute.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “2. “one or more measures derived from the group consistent of” Petitioner asserts limitations 1[g] and 1[g][i]–1[g][iv] recite an open Markush group listing alternatively useable members. Pet. 20–21 (citing Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbot Lab’ys v. Baxter Pharm. Prod., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that the listing of specified alternatives within a claim is referred to as a Markush group or Markush grouping)); See Ex. 1001, 47:47–58. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction. See PO Resp; PO Sur-reply. As these terms are not in controversy, we need not opine on this construction.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s respective constructions overlap in their requirement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. See Pet. 18; PO Resp. 20–21; PO Sur-reply 10. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s construction “exclude[s] ‘groups’ from the claims” and further limits the scope of to users who share actions (Pet. Reply 8–9), but Patent Owner states that its proposed construction does not so limit the claims (PO Sur-reply 10). As such, there is no disagreement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. As there is no controversy, we need not, and do not, construe the meaning of “cognate.” However, Patent Owner’s requirement that “at least one other of the plurality of users” is specifically cognate to “the user” who was sent the content is plainly recited in the claim language itself. The claim recites a “relevance score of a piece of electronic content sent from a sender to a user” in the preamble and similarly again in limitation 1[g]. See Ex. 1001, 47:25–28 (emphasis added), 45:62–64. The limitation in question directly references the claimed “user” when reciting the cognate relationship: “identify at least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user.” Ex. 1001, 47:43–45 (emphasis added). As such, the claim language plainly supports Patent Owner’s requirement and Petitioner does not contest that requirement. See Pet. Reply 8. least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user” as requiring that the identified other user is cognate specifically to the user whose relevance score is being determined.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 7,716,217 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,716,217
• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00160 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10–13, 15–18, and 20–31 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed Toge-Kumar combination did not establish the claimed remote internet site hosted on a server.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner filed a Response. Paper 23 (“PO Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply. Paper 27 (“Reply”). Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply. Paper 35 (“Sur-reply”). Additionally, during trial, Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name a real party in interest (namely, Petitioner’s corporate parent, Resmed Inc.). Paper 37. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 38. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 39. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 44.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability. C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level). D. Summary of the Asserted Prior Art” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “summarized above, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have implemented Toge’s physician-side computer as a web server using a “localhost” architecture as proposed by Petitioner because such a configuration cannot communicate with external devices over the public internet, a deficiency that directly contradicts Petitioner’s stated motivations for the combination of permitting broad data access. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Chatterjee, expressly acknowledged in his Reply Declaration that when a client and server reside on the same machine, the communications between them do not traverse the internet. Ex. 1069 ¶ 8. Specifically, Dr. Chatterjee cited the Microsoft Computer Dictionary’s definition of “localhost” as “[t]he name that is used to represent the same computer on which a TCP/IP message originates,” noting that “[a]n IP packet sent to localhost has the IP address 127.0.0.1 and does not actually go out to the Internet.” Id. (citing Ex. 1070, 316). Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed configuration of placing both the client and web server on Toge’s physician-side computer would create a closed loop of communication that does not reach the broader network. Id. As noted by Patent Owner, “[i]f ‘the physician-side computer and the web server are on one machine,’ the local web server would not communicate with other devices via the Internet.” Sur-Reply, 3–4 (comparing Ex. 1069 ¶ 19 with id. at ¶ 8). Thus, the consequence of Petitioner’s proposed Toge-Kumar configuration is that other devices in the system, such as the PAP device that generates the treatment data and any remote client devices that might need to access that data, would be unable to send data to or retrieve data from the localhost web server. Patent Owner persuasively argues, supported by evidence of record, that under Petitioner’s proposed configuration, “the PAP device could not send data thereto nor could other clients receive data therefrom, as only the local client browser can exchange data.” Id. (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 8); see Ex. 2003, 4 (one-tier architecture “is not suitable for a web application” because “it can only access data available in a single computer or server” and therefore “is not suitable for a web application.”); Ex. 2022, 3 (Unlike more advanced multi-tier systems, a one-tier architecture “cannot transmit information from one client machine to another.”); Ex. 2020, 4 (While “the client process and server process can be on the same computer,” this architecture “is rarely used today” precisely because it cannot “take advantage of the distributed computing environment.”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,786,680 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,786,680
• Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgment
  PTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · PGR2025-00086 · APJ Tawen Chang · PGR · Adverse judgment

  The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment and terminated the PGR as to claims 1–34 after Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims.

  RulingsAdverse judgment

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

    “A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” including by “[d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent” or “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.73(b)(1)–(b)(2). Accordingly, we grant Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment and terminate the proceeding. slip op. at 2

  None
  Patents in suitUS 12,290,598
• Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · IPR2022-00981 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 8–11, 13, 17, and 19 were held unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandMixed

    “8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and remanded “for consideration of the patentability of those claims.” Id. at 14. We understand both the reversal and vacature are with respect to Ground 1 of alleged unpatentability, not Ground 2, because the Federal Circuit’s decision did not discuss anything relating to Ground 2. Paper 43. The parties agreed. Paper 44. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing or evidence. In a telephone conference call, both parties expressed agreement with the Board (1) that “there is no issue regarding collateral estoppel or issue preclusion with respect to dependent claims 8– 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and (2) that the remand proceeding would not involve the Board revisiting any matter or issue concerning alleged obviousness of claims 1, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, and 19 over Ground 2.4 Papers 43, 44. The parties also agreed that the remand proceeding would only involve the Board reviewing the alleged obviousness of dependent claims 8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 as obvious over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton. Id. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. On the record before us, which is the same as the record before us at the time we issued the first final written decision (Paper 34), we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8– 11, 13, 17, and 19, but not claim 15, of the ’936 patent are unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton.” slip op. at 3

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “5. Petitioner’s Request to Discredit Dr. Cooklev’s Declaration Petitioner makes several arguments discrediting Dr. Cooklev’s declaration (Ex. 2031) and asserts that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration should be accorded little to no weight. Reply 13–14. We have already considered and rejected this request in the Final Written Decision issued on November 7, 2023. Paper 34, 21–23. Our reasoning need not be reiterated here. Petitioner does not persuade us that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration testimony should be accorded little to no weight.” slip op. at 15

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute Petition’s definition of level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Cooklev, accepts Dr. Kotzin’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2031 ¶ 24. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. This level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22) and is consistent with the level reflected in the ’936 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “only when it is analogous to the claimed invention.” Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). A prior art reference constitutes analogous art if it is “from the same field of endeavor” or “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that a reference is analogous art. See Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 8,472,936 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,472,936
• AT&T Services, Inc. / Cellco Partnership D/B/A Verizon Wireless et al. v. Pegasus Wireless Innovation LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 2, 2026 · IPR2025-00083 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over Takeda and Yan; the Board found the alternative Marinier, Yan, and R1-1711853 ground insufficient.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related discipline, knowledge of the relevant 3GPP standards” and “at least 2 years of experience working in a field involving wireless communications.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–40). According to Petitioner, a “person with a different degree but with additional relevant experience could still qualify if the additional experience compensates for the different educational background.” Id. Petitioner also asserts a “person with less than 2 years of experience working in a field involving wireless communications could still qualify if the person has additional education that compensate[s] for their lesser experience.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. See generally PO Resp. We find that “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill in the art is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, because it appears consistent with the ’463 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached

    “Petitioner asserts that elements 1[b] and 1[c] constitute a mean-plus- function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) and Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s assertion. See Pet. 5–7; PO Resp. 11–13. As demonstrated below, there is no dispute as to whether the prior art teaches limitations 1[b] and 1[c] under Petitioner’s claim construction. Therefore, we need not address whether 35 U.S.C. § 112 (f) applies. “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s backward compatibility rationale for combining the teachings of Yan and Takeda. Patent Owner’s arguments are misplaced because they are premised incorrectly on Takeda’s teachings being limited to 5G NR (i.e., standalone 5G NR), and the proposed combination requiring “mixing standards and behaviors.” To the contrary, Petitioner explicitly asserts that “Takeda states that its teachings are applicable to both 4G and 5G”––i.e., non-standalone 5G. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 239). Likewise, instead of mixing 5G and 4G standards and behaviors as argued by Patent Owner, Petitioner merely proposes retaining Yan’s 4G method of allocating UL channel resources sets with Takeda’s teaching of 5G NR BWPs. See Pet. 14–15. We credit Dr. Roy’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network capability because it is supported by the cited evidence of record. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 105, 106 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 239; Ex. 1031, 1, 3; Ex. 1033, 5:23–31; Ex. 1034, 10; Ex. 1035, 1, 5; Ex. 1037, 31). Moreover, as pointed out by Petitioner, Dr. Shimony’s deposition testimony regarding the usefulness of backward compatibility and the importance of a non-standalone UE having the ability to communicate over both 4G and 5G standards supports Dr. Roy’s testimony, yet undermines Patent Owner’s arguments. See Ex. 1050, 178:16–182:16; Pet. Reply 14–15. Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network compatibility.10 See Pet. 13–15; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We credit Dr. Roy’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network capability because it is supported by the cited evidence of record. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 105, 106 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 239; Ex. 1031, 1, 3; Ex. 1033, 5:23–31; Ex. 1034, 10; Ex. 1035, 1, 5; Ex. 1037, 31). Moreover, as pointed out by Petitioner, Dr. Shimony’s deposition testimony regarding the usefulness of backward compatibility and the importance of a non-standalone UE having the ability to communicate over both 4G and 5G standards supports Dr. Roy’s testimony, yet undermines Patent Owner’s arguments. See Ex. 1050, 178:16–182:16; Pet. Reply 14–15. Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Takeda’s teachings with Yan’s teachings to provide Takeda with backwards network compatibility.10 See Pet. 13–15; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,638,463 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,638,463
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00117 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable: claims 1–9, 11–16, 18, and 19 as obvious over Kim; claims 10 and 17 as obvious over Kim and Fang, Park, and Park and Fang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) monolithic 3D structures and NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 7. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed 4 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 103; PO Resp. the ’711 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, we agree with Petitioner that “on a surface” should be interpreted in line with the definition of “on” set forth in the ’711 patent. Ex. 1001, 4:1–6. We particularly note that the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ . . . should be interpreted in the broadest manner” and that “on” is not limited to “directly on.” Id. Instead, the ’711 patent states that “‘on’ also includes the meaning of ‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Id. Patent Owner agrees that this definition controls the “standalone ‘on’” term such that A may be on B even if there is an intervening layer between them. Tr. 55:8–11 (“The standalone ‘on,’ we agree in the context of the patent, you can have intervening layers. I think the patent is clear about that.”). Claim 14 recites that the etch-stop layer is “on” something; i.e., “on a side surface and a top surface of each step.” Ex. 1001, 16:20–22. Patent Owner agrees that a surface is a “something.” Tr. 56:5–8 (“surface obviously is a something”). Substituting the “a “‘on’ something with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween” results in claim 14 reading as, “on a surface with an intermediate feature or layer therebetween.” Unlike “directly on,” which specifies the relation between two things, “a surface” may merely indicate the thing that something is “on,” particularly when “on” is “interpreted in the broadest manner” as expressly required by the ’711 patent.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Although Dr. Campbell testified in his deposition in response to Petitioner’s counsel that “on the surface” requires direct contact with the surface, his interpretation was based on “embodiments of” the patent rather than a general understanding of a person skilled in the art confronted with that term. Ex. 1027, 122:6–25, 124:6–23 (“I’m not sure if there are other sources for that, but it was on the ’711, so I’ve taken it there.”). Dr. Campbell, upon questioning from Patent Owner’s counsel, later stated that “an expert in semiconductor fabrication” would understand “on the surface” to mean “contact between one layer and another . . . with nothing in between.” Id. at 146:25–147:6. However, Dr. Campbell did not explain why such an interpretation is particular to the semiconductor fabrication art, or provide other explanation or support for this statement, which is in tension with the definition of “on” in the ’711 patent. Accordingly, we significantly discount the weight accorded to that statement. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (stating, “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court. Similarly, a court should discount any expert testimony ‘that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and patent.’”). On balance, Dr. Campbell’s testimony is best understood as a description of certain Figures of the ’711 patent rather than a representation of an ordinarily skilled person’s understanding of the term “on the surface.” See Ex. 2009 ¶ 47 (describing Figs. 1, 3, and 4 as depicting layers in contact with the underlying layer or substrate). For example, Dr. Campbell describes Figure 9A as having a barrier layer “on and directly contacting the top and side surfaces of each step.” Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis added) (citing inter alia Ex. 1001, 7:6–67). Dr. Campbell does not explain why, beyond the fact that many Figures show layers as adjacent and in contact, a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would understand those Figures to limit the claim language rather than illustrating particular embodiments that fall within a broader scope of claims 14 and 15. See Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“While we read claims in view of the specification, of which they are a part, we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specifications into the claims.”).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Kim’s first and second section are described as compatible, not mutually exclusive, embodiments. Kim’s second section builds further layers upon the structure of its first section, and states: In these embodiments, the same elements as in the embodiments previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B will be denoted by the same reference numbers therein, and for concise description, overlapping description of elements previously described with reference to FIGS. 5A through 14A and FIGS. 5B through 14B may be omitted. Ex. 1005 ¶ 184 (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that only the embodiments in Figures 17A–22B describe an etch-stop layer and a barrier layer (as claimed), and that the language cited for a gate-stack-on-top configuration (e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 90, 91, and 240) is “conspicuously absent from the description of Figures 17A–22B.” PO Resp. 20 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 36). However, Figures 17A–22B do not further address the underlying staircase structure that was detailed in the descriptions of the Figures 4 through 15 embodiments. While Figures 17A–22B show a gate-stack-on-bottom configuration, this merely continues the gate-stack-on-bottom illustrations that were used in all of the previous Figures, even for those in which it is undisputed that a gate-stack-on-top configuration is a described alternative. The Figures exemplify rather than limit the description of the gate-stack-on-bottom view in Figures 4–15 and do not exclude the gate-stack on bottom description of the embodiments exemplified by those figures.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,672,711 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,672,711
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co. Ltd.Adverse judgment
  PTAB · May 19, 2026 · IPR2025-01327 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Adverse judgment

  The Board entered adverse judgment against Throughtek on claims 1–19 after finding it abandoned the contest by failing to file mandatory notices or respond to the show-cause order.

  RulingsAdverse judgment

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

    “The Order to Show Cause explained that under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [a]bandonment of the contest.” Paper 8, 3. The Order to Show Cause also explained that failure to participate in a proceeding, such as failure to file mandatory notices as required under 37 C.F.R. § 42.8, may be considered abandonment of the contest and result in adverse judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Id. (citing Cellpak, Inc. v. Mambate USA Inc., IPR2021-00007, Paper 4 at 2 (PTAB Mar. 23, 2021)). The Order to Show Cause gave Patent Owner ten calendar days to show cause why adverse judgment should not be entered against it. Id. Patent Owner did not respond to the Order to Show Cause. More than ten calendar days have elapsed since the date the Order to Show Cause was entered, and Patent Owner has not filed mandatory notices. In view of Patent Owner’s failure to file mandatory notices within the specified time period, we determine that Patent Owner has abandoned the contest. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(4), we construe Patent Owner’s abandonment of the contest as a request for adverse judgment. Under these circumstances, we determine that entry of judgment against Patent Owner is appropriate.” slip op. at 3

  None
  Patents in suitUS 9,727,655
• Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. Halozyme, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 18, 2026 · PGR2025-00006 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 8–13 are unpatentable under §112(a) for lack of written description and enablement, and under §103 as obvious over the ’429 patent and Chao.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the grounds of unpatentability in view of the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to 3 US 7,767,429 B2, issued Aug. 3, 2010 (the “’429 patent”) (Ex. 1005). 4 Chao et al., Structure of Human Hyaluronidase-1, a Hyaluronan Hydrolyzing Enzyme Involved in Tumor Growth and Angiogenesis, 46 BIOCHEMISTRY 6911–20 (2007) (Ex. 1006). 5 Patent Owner withdrew the Declaration of Dr. Triggs-Raine. PO Resp. 10 n.6. herein as “POSA”) as of the effective filing date of the challenged claims. Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree, a Ph.D., and post-doctoral experience in scientific fields relevant to study of protein structure and function (e.g., chemistry, biochemistry, biology, biophysics). From training and experience, the person would have been familiar with factors influencing protein structure, folding and activity, production of modified proteins using recombinant DNA techniques, and use of biological assays to characterize protein function, as well with techniques used to analyze protein structure (i.e., sequence searching and alignments, protein modeling software, etc.). Pet. 16.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “5. Evidence and Analysis “The construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language in order to understand and explain, but not to change, the scope of the claims.” Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We first turn to the intrinsic evidence because “the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “[T]he specification may reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.” Id. at 1316. [T]he definition in the patent documents controls the claim interpretation. . . . Any other rule would be unfair to competitors who must be able to rely on the patent documents themselves, without consideration of expert opinion that then does not even exist, in ascertaining the scope of a patentee’s right to exclude. Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995). a) Intrinsic evidence Our analysis begins with the claims and Specification of the ’262 patent. Claim 1 recites a “modified PH20 polypeptide” that also requires the polypeptide sequence is 95% identical to one of the 35 recited SEQ ID NOs and with at least one of seven amino acids at position 317 of the reference sequence. The ’262 patent states “PH20 refers to a type of hyaluronidase that occurs in sperm and is neutral-active.”7 Ex. 1001, 45:45– 46; cf. id. at 68:33–37. The ’262 patent further explains that “[r]eference to PH20 includes precursor PH20 polypeptides and mature PH20 polypeptides (such as those in which a signal sequence has been removed), truncated forms thereof that have activity, and includes allelic variants and species variants, variants encoded by splice variants, and other variants.” Id. at 45:62–67. The ’262 patent states that “PH20 polypeptides also include those that contain chemical or posttranslational modifications and those that do not contain chemical or posttranslational modifications.” Id. at 46:4–7.” slip op. at 15

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable

    “four species tested, and particularly in a primate model that is physiologically more similar to humans, shows that a POSA would not have understood even unmodified PH20 polypeptides to provide a contraceptive effect in humans and most other species. The data Patent Owner relies upon at most shows an immunocontraceptive effect for unmodified PH20 polypeptides limited to guinea pigs. It does not evidence that a POSA would have understood that the recited modified polypeptides would provide such an effect or otherwise be useful in a contraceptive vaccine. Accordingly, even if the term “modified PH20 polypeptides” were interpreted to include inactive polypeptides that can serve as antigens to provide a contraceptive effect, the preponderance of the evidence does not show that a POSA would have understood the inventors to be in possession of the full scope of the recited polypeptides capable of such use. 7. Analysis We find the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the claims fail to comply with the written description requirement. “Every patent must describe an invention. It is part of the quid pro quo of a patent.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1345. In determining compliance with the written description requirement for nucleic acid genus claims, the Federal Circuit has identified two extremes. In Capon, claims relying on known nucleotide sequences with known functions were found to satisfy the written description requirement. Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005). At the other end, Juno found that for broad claims to a nucleic acid encoding a chimeric T cell receptor with a functional requirement to bind a target, “the written description ‘must demonstrate that the applicant has made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus.’” Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349). As explained above, claim 1 requires modified PH20 polypeptides with some hyaluronidase activity. See supra Section II.B. Based on this claim interpretation, we find the evidence in this case closer to Juno than Capon, and that the ’262 patent does not disclose sufficient structural features in the PH20 sequences associated with hyaluronidase or” slip op. at 57

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable

    “6. Analysis Petitioner has the burden to identify how the specification allegedly fails to enable the claims. We address the Wands factors and the parties’ respective arguments and evidence. a) Breadth of Claims and Nature of the Invention Dr. Park states, regarding the breadth of claim 1, that he “calculated the number of distinct polypeptides that exist that meet the specified criteria.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 173. Dr. Park’s table is reproduced below: Dr. Park’s table shows that the “number of distinct peptides is extremely large by all accounts, ranging from 1049 to 1066.” Id. Dr. Hecht agrees, stating the “sequence identity language causes the claims to encompass an immense number of distinct PH20 polypeptides.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 120. To illustrate how large a number like 1066 is, Dr. Hecht states that an “aggregate weight of the smallest set containing one molecule of each of the PH20 mutants would be . . . = 1.37 x 1027 kg. The weight of the Earth is ‘only’ ~ 5.97 x 1024 kg.” Id. ¶ 123. That is, Dr. Hecht states that a complete set of one single molecule of protein that comprises all possible mutations in PH20 as recited in claim 1 would weigh about one thousand times more than the entire mass of planet Earth. See id. In deposition, Dr. Hecht stated “my sense was that the ’262 patent lists a minuscule and highly biased sample of what would be within that fence, in the sense that it only lists single amino acid substitutions while at the same time it’s attempting to claim things that have 20 or more substitutions.” Ex. 2076, 203:6‒12. When asked if a sequence “gives you enough information to tell whether that amino acid sequence is 95 percent identical to SEQ ID NO. 3”, Dr. Hecht answered “Yes, but that’s all it tells you. It doesn’t tell you anything about active, precipitated, aggregated, folded. It doesn’t tell you anything.” Id. at 204:11‒19.” slip op. at 70

  Patent outcomesUS 12,152,262 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 12,152,262
• Motorola Mobility LLC / Google LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00038 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 10–13, 16, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Chin; the Board did not find them anticipated by Chin or Whitehorn.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . (‘POSITA’) would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field plus at least two years of work or post-graduate experience in image capture, image processing, image display, user interfaces, or a related field. Additional education could offset a lesser amount of experience and vice versa. Pet. 16. Patent Owner accepts Petitioner’s definition. See PO Resp. 25. We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’842 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We agree with Petitioner that claim construction is unnecessary. As demonstrated in the analysis provided below addressing this claim limitation in view of the prior art, we need not explicitly construe “wherein in each image capture mode a display on the first or second screen is different.” See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Similarly, we need not construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve the controversy between the parties.” slip op. at 9

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments relying on Kennametal are belated. A “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019)6 at II.I. Thus, we need not consider Petitioner’s belated argument raised for the first time in the Reply. In any event, we agree that Kenneametal is inapplicable for the purpose of supplying a claim limitation missing from Chin’s disclosure. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1270, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Kennametal does not stand for the proposition that a reference missing a limitation can anticipate a claim if a skilled artisan viewing the reference would ‘at once envisage’ the missing limitation.”). Chin’s disclosure is silent regarding what is or is not displayed on first display 51 when images are displayed on second display 52 in self-photographing mode, and similarly silent regarding what is or is not 6 Available at www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trial-practice-guide. displayed on second display 52 when images are displayed on first display 51 in outward-facing mode. See generally Ex. 1004.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the theory of inherency was not raised in the Petition and is therefore waived. Compare Pet. 29–33, with Pet. Reply 11–15. In any event, we also agree that Petitioner’s speculation regarding the disclosure of Chin is insufficient to support a theory of inherency. See Pet. Reply 11–15. As explained above, Chin’s disclosure is silent regarding what is or is not displayed on first display 51 when images are displayed on second display 52 in self-photographing mode, and similarly silent regarding what is or is not displayed on second display 52 when images are displayed on first display 51 in outward-facing mode. See Ex. 1004. Speculation regarding the possibilities and probabilities of what is displayed on first display 51 in self-photographing mode, and what is displayed on second display 52 in outward-facing mode are insufficient to establish inherency. See In re Robertson, 169 F.3d at 745. For the forgoing reasons and based on the entire record developed during trial, the preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s showing that Chin discloses “wherein in each image capture mode a display on the first or second screen is different.” Accordingly, based on the entire record developed during trial the preponderance of the evidence does not support Petitioner’s showing that Chin anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 8,836,842 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,836,842

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.