• Ipr2026-00242Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2026 · IPR2026-00242 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

  The Director denied institution of IPR2026-00242 after reviewing discretionary and non-merits considerations.

  RulingsDirector review decision

  • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

    “NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary and non- merits considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00239* IPR2026-00241* IPR2026-00243* IPR2026-00240* IPR2026-00242*” slip op. at 1

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 11,894,098
• Ipr2026-00239Institution denied
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2026 · IPR2026-00239 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Director review

  The Director denied institution in IPR2026-00239 after review of discretionary and non-merits considerations.

  RulingsDirector review decision

  • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

    “NOTICE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), after review of discretionary and non- merits considerations, institution of inter partes review is denied in the following proceedings: IPR2026-00239* IPR2026-00241* IPR2026-00243* IPR2026-00240* IPR2026-00242*” slip op. at 1

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,164,942
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. / Cisco Systems, Inc. et al. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2022-01199 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1, 24, and 25 unpatentable as obvious over Buruganahalli; the copying evidence did not outweigh the strong obviousness showing.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Scope on Remand On remand, the panel here will not address issues outside the scope of the Federal Circuit’s mandate. See Hayward Indus., Inc. v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa, Inc., 814 F. App’x 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The Board is bound by the terms of a mandate issued by an appellate court. Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 121 F.3d 726, 1997 WL 413329, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ‘Unless remanded by [an appellate] court, all issues within the scope of the appealed judgment are deemed incorporated within the mandate and thus are precluded from further adjudication.’ Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).”). The sole issue on remand is whether “the evidence of copying” is sufficient to overcome the obviousness ground of unpatentability over Buruganahalli. Centripetal Networks, 19–20. We restate portions of the former Final Written Decision, as an aid to the reader, but substantially incorporate the analysis of the prior Decision below. C.” slip op. at 4

  • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

    “not object to a new panel of APJs hearing this case if remanded.” Id. at 20. As such, Patent Owner requested Director Review (Paper 74), asking that the Director “de-institute,” based on an abuse of discretion. The Director (Paper 75) denied the request and directed the Board to assign a new panel on remand (see Papers 76, 77). B.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelOther

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in The Art We adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the prior Decision. See Decision 25. F.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “This argument is unpersuasive because Buruganahalli uses rules/policies to filter encrypted packets by correlating them with handshaking packets that have unencrypted data, in the same way that is done in the ‘856 Patent. The only “filtering step” in the patent that “use[s] rules to filter encrypted packets without decryption” (PO Resp. 20) is the hello message approach used, for example, at steps 19 and 23 (see id.), which is clearly disclosed in Buruganahalli.7 As explained above, the ‘856 Patent does not describe applying rules to encrypted packets. Instead, it describes (a) filtering encrypted packets by correlating them with unencrypted data in other packets and (b) by decrypting the packets and applying the rules that are recited in the claims to unencrypted data. As also explained above, the amendment added the rules of step 22, which are applied to decrypted data, to a claim that was drafted to cover filtering of encrypted packets. However, among the criteria used in the filtering performed at step 22 is a “uniform resource identifier (URI),” which, we conclude, covers Buruganahalli’s “domain name.” Thus, despite the error made during prosecution, the claims that issued cover Buruganahalli’s method of determining that a session should be filtered based on a domain name in unencrypted handshake data.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 9,917,856 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,917,856
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. / Cisco Systems, Inc. et al. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2022-00182 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1, 24, and 25 are unpatentable under § 103 over Buruganahalli; the evidence of copying does not outweigh the strong obviousness showing.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Scope on Remand On remand, the panel here will not address issues outside the scope of the Federal Circuit’s mandate. See Hayward Indus., Inc. v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa, Inc., 814 F. App’x 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The Board is bound by the terms of a mandate issued by an appellate court. Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 121 F.3d 726, 1997 WL 413329, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ‘Unless remanded by [an appellate] court, all issues within the scope of the appealed judgment are deemed incorporated within the mandate and thus are precluded from further adjudication.’ Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).”). The sole issue on remand is whether “the evidence of copying” is sufficient to overcome the obviousness ground of unpatentability over Buruganahalli. Centripetal Networks, 19–20. We restate portions of the former Final Written Decision, as an aid to the reader, but substantially incorporate the analysis of the prior Decision below. C.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › CopyingObjective indicia outweighedNot shown unpatentable

    “given to the Eastern District of Virginia court’s opinion because it was later vacated. The district court considered all of the Read factors (applying Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-827 (Fed. Cir. 1992)), of which only the first factor is directed to deliberate copying, although factors 2 and 9 bear indirectly on the issue of copying. The district court determined that “[t]he fact that Cisco released products with Centripetal’s functionality within a year of these meetings goes beyond mere coincidence. Therefore, the fact that Cisco’s system mirrors the functionality of the Centripetal patents is compelling evidence that damages should be enhanced for copying.” Ex. 1027, 157. Without more, it is difficult to evaluate the processes that the district court employed to reach its determination. As the Federal Circuit instructed, we need “not [] go searching throughout the entire litigation record to find the evidence of copying, but [we have] an obligation to consider the specific evidence that was put before” us. Centripetal Networks, 19. We continue to determine that the vacated finding of the district court should be provided little weight, especially in view of the strong case of obviousness discussed above. Examination of Aaron Striegel We also do not find the Aaron Striegel’s testimony to be particularly persuasive. The testimony provides statements such as “I found evidence that it could be plausible,” “[s]o we can see the timeline is very plausible,” and “I found it very plausible that indeed that this technology could have made its way into these respective accused products.” Ex. 1029, 31:12–32:3. This testimony suggests the possibility of copying but does not demonstrate actual evidence of copying. At most, this testimony indicates that further consideration of the underlying evidence is warranted, but does little to support an ultimate finding of copying. Again, even taking this testimony as evidence of copying, it still must stand up against the strong case of obviousness discussed above.” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “The District Court did not provide an element-by-element analysis of how the claims of the ‘856 Patent cover this description. See Ex. 1027, 41. However, from the description, we understand the Court to have concluded that the system receives rules, identifies a set of packets as part of a flow using the NetFlow logs, “determines” that encrypted packets in the flow match known malicious signatures based on unencrypted data in other packets (e.g., data in the SNI), and then filters the flow based in a URI (e.g., that from the SNI), routing it to the null interface. The Court does not describe how the system “determines” that encrypted packets match known malicious signatures based on information in unencrypted packets, but we assume that is done as in the ‘856 Patent, by correlation, i.e., an encrypted packet is “determined” to match a threat indicator if it is in the same flow as a packet with unencrypted information that matches the threat indicator.10 With that understanding, we conclude that the allegedly infringing system operates, as least at the level described in the court’s decision, in the same way Buruganahalli’s system operates, filtering encrypted packets due to their presence in a flow that includes packets with unencrypted data, such as in a handshaking packet. It follows that Patent Owner is unable to establish a nexus, because “[w]here the offered secondary consideration actually results from something other than what is both claimed and novel in the claim, there is no nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.” Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1330” slip op. at 38

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for petitioner

    “need and industry recognition for the technology claimed in the ‘856 Patent because it describes the problem of detecting threats in encrypted traffic as ‘unsolvable.’” PO Resp. 68 (citing Ex. 1027, 64). Given that this is a press release by a company announcing that company’s new commercial product, however, we 8 The concurrence reevaluates Patent Owner’s evidence of industry praise and nexus, but we deem such considerations outside the remit of the Federal Circuit’s remand. are reluctant to give the “unsolvable” characterization much weight, as it may amount to puffery. But beyond that, it appears that the problem identified as “unsolvable” in the press release––“detect[ing] known attack signatures even in encrypted traffic”––had, in fact, already been solved in Buruganahalli, using the very same hello message, flow correlation, and man-in-the-middle techniques described in the ‘856 Patent. We thus cannot say that the press release identifies a long-felt need that was actually unsolved. See ZUP, 896 F.3d at 1374 (explaining that “[w]here the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention are . . . minimal . . . it cannot be said that any long-felt need was unsolved”) (quoting Geo. M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (first alteration in original)).” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 9,917,856 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,917,856
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00115 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 10, 11, 14, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 33, and 35 are unpatentable; claim 15 is not shown unpatentable, based on the four asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Wieselthaler’s Declaration (Exhibit 1041), portions of Mr. Crosby’s Reply Declaration (Exhibit 1042), portions of the deposition transcript of Dr. Wieselthaler (Exhibit 2028), and the exhibits “upon which that testimony is based” (Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050). Mot. 1. According to Patent Owner, the Motion was made “to preserve objections previously made in the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Patent Owner did not timely move to strike any of the evidence at issue as being outside the scope of reply evidence. Patent Owner asserts that because an inter partes review must be based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), the testimony of Mr. Crosby and Dr. Wieselthaler concerning “various physical devices allegedly known” to a person of ordinary skill in the art is inadmissible, along with all of the exhibits (consisting of printed materials such a journal abstracts, press releases, and papers) related to those physical devices. Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Reply 1–4 (arguing that “devices that Petitioner’s witnesses assert were in public use prior to the claimed inventions, are not prior art that can form the basis of an inter partes review”). According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wieselthaler was unable to “link two of these physical devices to the printed prior art asserted in this [inter partes review], but those attempts fell apart during his cross examination.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner further reasons that because the evidence “cannot be the basis” of an inter partes review, it “has probable,” “is irrelevant and not admissible,” “presents substantial danger of confusing the issues, causing undue delay, and wasting time in this trial,” and “are not ‘based on sufficient facts[,] the product of reliable principles and methods[, or] ‘a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” Id. at 7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401–403, 702) (modification in original). With regard to Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that Patent Owner identifies no plausible legal theory for their inadmissibility based on the contention that they discuss physical devices. See Mot. Resp. 3. We also agree with Petitioner that the exhibits are not “the basis for any ground” asserted in this proceeding, and may be properly relied upon by Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby as support for their rebuttal testimony directed to Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the prior art relied upon in the instituted grounds. See id. at 3–4. In regard to the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and” slip op. at 80

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “‘electronics for power and control’”). According to Mr. Crosby, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood based on the disclosure of this setup that these speed and motor parameters were monitored by a sensor providing feedback to the controller.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 725. Mr. Crosby identifies no support for this opinion, which we give little weight to. The mere fact that Bourque’s pump used software to control speed and motor parameters does not show that Bourque used “one or more sensors” to provide feedback signals to the external control unit. Indeed, Petitioner fails to identify any evidence that Bourque used any “sensor” to monitor “speed and motor parameters.” Mr. Crosby also states that “[e]ach of the ‘ultrasonic flow probe’ and the ‘solid-state catheter-type pressure transducer’ described in [Bourque] is a ‘sensor’ as recited in Claim 33 that provides feedback signals to the external control unit (e.g., ‘electronics for power and control’ and ‘data acquisition’).” Id. ¶¶ 581, 726. Mr. Crosby’s opinion is again unsupported by the evidence, because, as explained above, there is no teaching in Bourque that either the “ultrasonic flow probe” or the “pressure transducers” used in the “in vitro characterization” studies were part of the heart assist pump device. Based on our review and consideration of Petitioner’s arguments and evidence directed to claim 11, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted combination of Bourque and Wampler teaches or suggests each of the limitations of dependent claim 11. We reach the same conclusion for the same reasons with regard to claim 33.” slip op. at 48

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “magneto coupling” Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, a second magnetic device “positioned” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,674,517 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,674,517
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00096 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 7, 10, 12, and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over Schima and Akamatsu; claim 5 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Fed. R. Evid. 702 serves “a ‘gatekeeping role,’ the objective of which is to ensure that expert testimony admitted into evidence is both reliable and relevant.” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). There is no question that the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby is relevant to the asserted motivation to combine and reliable, only whether it becomes “not relevant” or “unreliable,” in light of limited scope upon which grounds of unpatentability may be based under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), because the testimony is based on, or supported by, knowledge of physical devices and publications discussing physical devices. Patent Owner directs us to no support for the notion that an expert’s testimony in an inter partes review must be limited to only the prior art relied upon as grounds for unpatentability and may not take into account any knowledge of, or publications concerning, other “physical devices” that would have been known to a person of ordinary skill at the relevant time. See generally Mot.25 In sum, we find that Patent Owner has 25 Patent Owner improperly asserts for the first time in its Reply in support of the Motion that “Petitioner in this case is improperly relying on non-prior art evidence.” Mot. Reply 3. This argument was not made in the Motion, and Patent Owner fails to identify what “non-prior art evidence” it seeks to exclude. We recognize that Petitioner appears to raise the argument that “non-prior art evidence” may be relied upon by an expert, but Petitioner also fails to identify what evidence it is referring to and that argument was not responsive to any issue Patent Owner raised in the Motion. See Mot. Resp. 5. To the extent the Parties intend “non-prior art evidence” to refer to the testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby, we view the issue as pertaining to the weight afforded that testimony, in light of the supporting evidence relied upon, rather than one of admissibility. for the exclusion of evidence in this proceeding and deny the Motion.” slip op. at 83

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “D. Claim Construction In this proceeding we construe claims using the same claim” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “5. Rationale in Support of Asserted Combination Petitioner shows, and there is no dispute, that Bourque and Wampler” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 11,351,356 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,351,356
• Røde Microphones, LLC / Freedman Electronics Pty Ltd. v. Zaxcom, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00232 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held that Petitioner did not prove any challenged claims of the ’207 patent unpatentable under the Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “in these respects. The preambles of claims 17 and 59 recite the “audio device wearable by a user for storing locally generated audio.” There is neither mention of “multi-track” audio in the claim, nor is the audio device limited to capturing a single source of sound, such as a single performer. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the ’443 and ’207 patent claims support the limited scope that Patent Owner urges for the term “locally generated audio.” None of Patent Owner’s citations to the specification define or require that the “locally generated audio” correspond to audio generated only by a single performer. See, e.g., 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 8:59−62 (stating that the local audio input device “may be worn by the performer and connects to local audio device 102 at local audio input device port 314”). Patent Owner’s argument that the specification “teaches a single creator/performer per local audio device” is well-taken, but the teachings do not indicate the intent to exclude other sounds from being captured at the local audio device (or indicate how the device would prevent the capture of other sounds, such that the audio would be “isolated” as Patent Owner contends). See 230 Sur-Reply 10 (citing 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 4:28−32, 10:29−34, and Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contr., Inc., 99 F.3d 1098, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[C]laim 1 refers to ‘a cup’ and ‘the cup’ repeatedly, suggesting that only one cup is involved . . . . [N]either the specification nor the drawings disclose the use of more than one cup.”)). For instance, the specification describes that the “independent track of audio is received from one of the performer’s local audio device 102.” 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 10:33−34. Thus, in this description the audio track corresponds to the audio captured by a particular audio device—which was worn by the performer— but does not limit that captured audio to only sounds made by the performer. As to the “local audio data” term, Patent Owner argues that “audio data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 20

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Skepticism / industry praiseObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

    “1. Industry Praise: Academy and Emmy Awards Patent Owner argues that it “revolutionized [the] industry with the” slip op. at 97

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for patent owner

    “2. Long-Felt Need Patent Owner further proffers the testimony of two witnesses as” slip op. at 104

  Patent outcomesUS 10,276,207 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,276,207
• Røde Microphones, LLC / Freedman Electronics Pty Ltd. v. Zaxcom, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00230 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board determined that Petitioner had not shown any challenged claims of the ’443 or ’207 patents unpatentable, including under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonySkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “E. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Based on the argument and evidence presented in the Petition and Patent Owner’s preliminary response, we determined, as stated in our Decision on Institution, that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience working with audio and wireless communications systems.” 230 Dec. on Inst. 16; 232 Dec. on Inst. 22−23. Patent Owner reiterates its position that a person of ordinary skill the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two to five years’ experience working with multi-track audio and wireless communications systems in the professional performance industry.” 230 IPR, PO Resp. 6−7 (emphasis added) (identical passage in 232 PO Resp. 8). Thus, the dispute centers on whether the level or ordinary skill includes specific work experience with multi-track audio in the professional performance industry. We do not agree that this specific work experience is necessary to the level of ordinary skill in the instant proceedings. In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17−18 (1966). “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu‑Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The “person of ordinary skill in the art” is a hypothetical construct, from whose vantage point obviousness is assessed. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In determining the level or ordinary skill, we may consider various factors including “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Patent Owner’s proposed specificity of work with multi-track audio in a professional performance industry is not supported by the record. First, Patent Owner submits conclusory declaration testimony of James DeFilippis—repeating verbatim, and without any supported reasoning, Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. Ex. 2140 ¶ 15. As such, the testimony is not persuasive. Second, Patent Owner’s additional declaration testimony of Jack” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 21

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “irrelevant under Federal Rules of Evidence 401–403. Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has failed to establish that these documents reflect the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art, or that they are consumer-oriented documents, but not technical references or sources for understanding the meaning of claim terms. 230 IPR, Paper 64, 3−4. According to Patent Owner, these exhibits lack a “technical foundation” that establishes the technical meaning of a claim term. Id. We do not agree with Patent Owner as it conflates relevance with sufficiency of evidence to prove a contention on claim construction. Dictionary definitions are often useful when determining a claim term’s plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the specification, and as such are relevant when claim terms are disputed. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Furthermore, the evidence of record shows testimony as to whether the “Sweetwater” glossary entry for “body pack” would be relevant to the meaning of the term in the “world of wireless performance.” 230 IPR, Paper 67, 4 (citing Ex. 1073 ¶ 42). Patent Owner’s objections are overruled as to relevance.” slip op. at 116

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “after a full and fair hearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 125

  Patent outcomesUS 7,711,443 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,711,443
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00114 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Wieselthaler’s Declaration (Exhibit 1041), portions of Mr. Crosby’s Reply Declaration (Exhibit 1042), portions of the deposition transcript of Dr. Wieselthaler (Exhibit 2028), and the exhibits “upon which that testimony is based” (Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050). Mot. 1. According to Patent Owner, the Motion was made “to preserve objections previously made in the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Patent Owner did not timely move to strike any of the evidence at issue as being outside the scope of reply evidence. Patent Owner asserts that because an inter partes review must be based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), the testimony of Mr. Crosby and Dr. Wieselthaler concerning “various physical devices allegedly known” to a person of ordinary skill in the art is inadmissible, along with all of the exhibits (consisting of printed materials such a journal abstracts, press releases, and papers) related to those physical devices. Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Reply 1–4 (arguing that “devices that Petitioner’s witnesses assert were the basis of an inter partes review”). According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wieselthaler was unable to “link two of these physical devices to the printed prior art asserted in this [inter partes review], but those attempts fell apart during his cross examination.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner further reasons that because the evidence “cannot be the basis” of an inter partes review, it “has no tendency to make any fact of consequence in this trial more or less probable,” “is irrelevant and not admissible,” “presents substantial danger of confusing the issues, causing undue delay, and wasting time in this trial,” and “are not ‘based on sufficient facts[,] the product of reliable principles and methods[, or] ‘a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” Id. at 7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401–403, 702) (modification in original). With regard to Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that Patent Owner identifies no plausible legal theory for their inadmissibility based on the contention that they discuss physical devices. See Mot. Resp. 3. We also agree with Petitioner that the exhibits are not “the basis for any ground” asserted in this proceeding, and may be properly relied upon by Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby as support for their rebuttal testimony directed to Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the prior art relied upon in the instituted grounds. See id. at 3–4. In regard to the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and” slip op. at 77

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “1. “magneto coupling” Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “a second magnetic device . . . positioned to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Ex. 1001, 5:34–37. Claim 11 recites, in relevant part, “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor so as to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor relative to the one or more walls via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Id. at 6:42–48. Petitioner argues that “magneto coupling” means “a transfer of torque from one rotating permanent magnetic component to another rotating permanent magnetic component via a magnetic field.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 68–87). According to Petitioner, this construction is consistent with the ’879 patent, which describes “a coupling between two rotating ‘bar magnets’—a drive wheel rotates one bar magnet which causes another bar magnet (connected to a rotor) to rotate.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55 (analyzing Ex. 1001, 2:28–52, 4:44–64, Fig. 2)). Patent Owner argues that “magneto coupling” should be afforded “its plain and ordinary meaning, which would encompass a magnetic coupling through both rotating magnets and the use of a rotating magnetic Owner directs us to the testimony of Mr. Leschinsky, who explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’879 patent to use “magneto coupling” to generally describe “a way to couple the rotor to a drive element while sealing the two from one another and avoiding use of a direct mechanical coupling.” Ex. 2015 ¶ 67. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner provides no recognizable basis for limiting the plain meaning of magnetic coupling to one type of magnet and excluding another type of magnet.” PO Resp. 6–7 (citing Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc., v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989–992 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not provide a sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’879 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 13 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 7; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)).” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableUnpatentable

    “reasons discussed above. See supra Section III.D.3. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s contentions are premised on an unsupported claim construction that we reject, Petitioner fails to show how Wampler teaches or suggests “a magnetically driven rotor . . . axially adjacent to a first magnet device,” as required by claims 1 and 11, as well as by claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14– 16, and 18–20, which depend from either claim 1 or claim 11. In its Reply, Petitioner suggests that “[u]nder [Patent Owner’s] construction from the [Patent Owner Response], Wampler also teaches or suggests this limitation,” because Patent Owner “concedes [that] ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 11,572,879 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,572,879
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SAAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00112 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 10, 11, 14, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Schima and Akamatsu; the other asserted grounds were not established.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’357 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 11 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 9–11; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)). distinguished “magneto coupling” drives from drives using stators. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1011, 1 (explaining that the rotating field is generated by rotating magnets in a magnetic coupling pump and by electric stator windings in a stator pump)). Petitioner does not explain how this cited reference evidences that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “magneto coupling” requires rotating permanent magnets. At most, this reference teaches an example device that provides “magneto coupling.” See Ex. 1011, 1. In sum, we agree with Patent Owner that “magneto coupling,” consistent with our Institution Decision, encompasses generating a rotating field either by rotating magnets or by an electromagnet / stator. See Inst. Dec. 22” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “ignores the readily apparent fact that the lower arrow is placed in a location that misrepresents the minimum distance between the magnetically driven rotor and the second magnetic device to suggest that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor,” as required by claim 1. Petitioner purports to justify this misrepresentation by asserting that “the vast majority of the impeller 74 is spaced significantly farther apart from the stators 90 and 94 than the magnetic pieces 88 are positioned from the stators 90 and 94.” Id. at 33–34. Claim 1 does not recite any feature based on the “vast majority” of a component and it is readily apparent from Petitioner’s own annotated version of Figure 11a that the distance from both the “motor magnets [88]” and “impeller 74” to the “circular electromagnetic stator[s] [90 and 94]” is the same. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has provided a “misleading Figure with two red arrows denoting measurement distances to illustrate its incorrect view that the second magnetic device is farther from the magnetically driven rotor than from the first magnetic device.” PO Resp. 13–15 (providing an annotated version of Wampler’s Figure 11a with an orange arrow showing that in Wampler the distances from the second magnetic device to both the rotor and the first magnetic device are the same). Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor.”” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To orient the pump in the least obtrusive position (i.e., in the human configuration, as in Figure 3), it was decided that the rotational axis of the pump’s rotor should be perpendicular to the body’s long axis. That resulted in a sharp bend in the flow before it enters the impeller. To minimize the losses in this transition, the flow is slightly accelerated through this elbow. that this type of elbow [i.e., the elbow used with Bourque’s centrifugal pump] was unnecessary,” applying Wampler to Bourque would have improved “blood flow.” Pet. 73 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 418–419; Ex. 1007, 402; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–76). As explained above, Wampler does not teach that “this type of elbow” was unnecessary. Bourque uses a centrifugal pump with an additional elbow specifically so that the centrifugal pump may be oriented “in the least obtrusive position.” Ex. 1007, 402. Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to support Petitioner’s assertion that eliminating the elbow from Bourque would improve “blood flow.” Mr. Crosby’s declaration provides no additional explanation or support to show how “blood flow” would have been improved. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 419. Nor does Mr. Crosby address the fact that Bourque expressly states that “flow is slightly accelerated” through the elbow to “minimize losses in this transition.” Ex. 1007, 402. Eliminating the elbow from Bourque, as Petitioner and Mr. Crosby propose, would mean the pump could no longer be placed in “the least obtrusive position” according to Bourque and there is no persuasive evidence that such a modification would improve blood flow.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 11,351,357 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,351,357

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.