• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00909 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Toyama, based on the First Exemplary Structure and, for some limitations, the Second Modification.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND 2 We apply AIA 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 to the ’378 patent because it was filed after, and never claimed the benefit of an effective filing date before, March 16, 2013. Petitioner also applies AIA §§ 102 and 103. See Pet. 2, 24–26. 3 Neither party presents evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness. Pet. 104; PO Resp. experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–39). Petitioner further asserts that a POSITA “would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about semiconductor manufacturing and 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. Patent Owner does not object to such a definition. PO Resp. 13. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the Specification of the ’378 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner asserts that only the term “a staircase structure in the alternating layer” should be construed, and that the term should be construed as “a staircase structure in the alternating layer stack.” Pet. 32–33. Patent Owner does not dispute this construction, and our determination would be unaffected by Petitioner’s proposed construction. Therefore, we need not provide an express construction of this term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Petitioner asserted that all other terms should receive their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 33.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither the language of claim 15 nor the Specification indicates a narrower meaning, we agree with Petitioner that the phrase “a substrate with an isolation structure” should be given its plain meaning. Patent Owner argues that the plain meaning of “with” is “having” or “inclusive of.” PO Sur-reply 2 (citing Ex. 1038, 8). Citing the same dictionary, Petitioner argues that the plain meaning of “with” includes objects that are separate. Pet. Reply 3 (stating, “In the sentence ‘Alice went to school with Bob,’ it would be nonsensical to interpret that to mean that Bob is part of Alice.”) (citing Ex. 1038, 7). The cited definition of “with” states that it may indicate “accompaniment,” such as “went there [with] her,” as well as combination (“milk [with] honey”). Ex. 1038, 7. Based on the evidence and arguments presented, we determine that the phrase “a substrate with an isolation structure” should be given its plain meaning, which includes accompaniment (A is accompanied by B) as well as combination (A is part of B, or A and B are a part of C).4” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner that the lower volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the isolation structure and the upper volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the dielectric structure. First, the structure may be the same material; i.e., SiO2. Ex. 1001, 10:37–40 (isolation structure 233 filled with SiO2), 10:46–47 (dielectric structure can include SiO2, and can include the same material as dielectric layer 230), 10:12–14 (dielectric layer 230 is formed of SiO2). Second, the ’378 patent indicates that the dielectric structure may be “aligned to” and “in contact with” the isolation structure. Id. at 10:30–36. Thus, the two structures of the ’378 patent may appear as two aligned and contacting structures; e.g., a single column of the same material. Third, the ’378 patent specification describes that the dielectric structure and a top portion of the isolation structure may be formed in the same deposition step. When etching the opening 600 that is to be filled with dielectric structure 232, “opening 600 may extend partially into STI structure 233;” i.e., “the etch process used to form opening 600 may also remove (recess) portion of the top surface of STI structure 233.” Id. at 15:12–20; Fig. 6. Then, “opening 600 can be filled with a dielectric layer 702,” which may be the same SiO2 material as the isolation structure, and “[a]s a result, dielectric structure 232 is formed.” Id. at 15:42–54. Thus, the ’378 patent describes a dielectric structure that partially replaces or re-forms, with the same material, its isolation structure. The ’378 patent does not mention whether this results in a dielectric structure that extends into the isolation structure or an isolation structure re-filled to its original height, and it would not appear to matter because both structures may be composed of the same material. The ’378 patent’s indifference to the exact boundary between dielectric structure 232 and isolation structure 233 during formation from the same material indicates that these structures need not be taught by distinct elements. applicable only if the ’378 patent describes that the isolation region and dielectric structure were formed as a single unitary structure. PO Resp. 51; PO Sur-reply 16–18. Retractable Techs. focuses on whether the two elements at issue “could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance,” not whether they were formed integrally. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304 (“The specifications further disclose a method to couple the two structures . . . to allow some diffusion or insipient melting to occur where they touch . . . . This passage suggests that [the structures] could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance”). Retractable Techs. looks to whether the specification suggests that the claim terms require separate structures. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Patent Owner’s focus on whether the claimed structures were disclosed as being separately formed disregards the issue of whether the separately claimed structures require specific methods of forming those structures. Here, as in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the Specification does not indicate any particular structure or function for the structures that results from their separate steps of deposition. Thus, as held in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the two portions of Toyama “need not be two separate parts” to teach two separate claim limitations. Retractable Techs., 635 F.3d at 1303–04. Consequently, we determine that the claim language does not support a requirement that these structures be separate and distinct. Patent Owner’s further arguments are not availing. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument, in our “Third” point, supra, we do not state that the isolation structure and the dielectric structure are formed in the same deposition step. PO Resp. 52–53; PO Sur-reply 18; Supra at 34. We only” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 10,658,378 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,658,378
• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 5, 2026 · IPR2024-00788 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 15–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Toyama, Mushiga, and Mushiga with Makala.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “at the critical time “would have had a bachelor of science degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2-3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) NAND flash memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may replace some of the professional experience).” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 36–37). Petitioner further asserts March 16, 2013. Petitioner also applies AIA §§ 102 and 103. See Pet. 2, 24–26. 3 Neither party presented evidence or arguments regarding objective evidence of non-obviousness during trial. knowledgeable about semiconductor manufacturing and 3D NAND’s structure, its component parts, how it operates, and how it is controlled.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner does not object to this assessment. PO Resp. 12. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill, as it appears to be consistent with the specification of the ’378 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner does not dispute Patent Owner’s construction, asserting that its grounds render obvious this limitation under Patent Owner’s construction propose construction of the term “through array contact,” which was at issue in the Preliminary Response and in the parallel district court proceeding. Id. Nor have the parties indicated, in response to Board inquiry, that any relevant construction has occurred. See Paper 34. with Petitioner that Patent Owner does not dispute this aspect of the “a dielectric structure on the isolation structure” limitation in Petitioner’s assertions based on Toyama. PO Sur-reply 20–21. Patent Owner does dispute that Mushiga’s insulating spacer 586 is “on” the isolation structure. PO Resp. 70–72. However, because Petitioner relies upon a dielectric structure that includes other portions of Mushiga that Patent Owner does not dispute to be on the asserted isolation structure, the dispute is whether Petitioner is correct to include multiple components as part of a single dielectric structure, and not whether spacer 586 is on an isolation structure. Id. Because Petitioner’s assertions and our determination would be unaffected by its proposed construction, we need not construe this term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s citations to the Specification do not support its proposed construction. Patent Owner relies on multiple embodiments, only one of which describes a substrate “with” an isolation structure. PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 1001, 22:27–28). For example, one of Patent Owner’s cited embodiments recites “on” an isolation region, but Patent Owner specifically argues that the “on” embodiment does not apply to the claimed “with” embodiment. Id. at 22 (denying that “the ‘with’ relationship encompasse[s] the ‘on’ relationship”). Only one of the embodiments cited is clearly within the scope of the “with” claim language, and that embodiment describes no more than the claim language itself. Ex. 1001, 22:27–28. Moreover, Figure 2, cited by Patent Owner, is an illustration “according to some embodiments,” but is not described as depicting all embodiments. Ex. 1001, 3:35–36. These other embodiments need not be included in claim 15’s “with” language because other claims (not at issue in this proceeding) specifically recite language from other embodiments. Ex. 1001, 23:20–21 (“a dielectric structure on an isolation region of the substrate”), 23:58 (“forming an isolation structure on a substrate”). Thus, the specification of the ’378 patent does not limit “a substrate with an isolation structure” in claim 15 to “part of” an isolation structure, such as in a shallow region or other partial-depth portion of the substrate. Because neither the language of claim 15 nor the Specification indicates a narrower meaning, we agree with Petitioner that the phrase “a Patent Owner argues that the plain meaning of “with” is “having” or “inclusive of.” PO Sur-reply 2 (citing Ex. 1038, 7). Citing the same dictionary, Petitioner argues that the plain meaning of “with” includes objects that are separate. Pet. Reply 3 (stating, “In the sentence ‘Alice went to school with Bob,’ it would be nonsensical to interpret that to mean that Bob is part of Alice.”) (citing Ex. 1038, 7). The cited definition of “with” states that it may indicate “accompaniment,” such as “went there [with] her,” as well as combination (“milk [with] honey”). Ex. 1038, 7. Based on the evidence and arguments presented, we determine that the phrase “a substrate with an isolation structure” should be given its plain meaning, which includes accompaniment (A is accompanied by B) as well as combination (A is part of B, or A and B are a part of C).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner that the lower volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the isolation structure and the upper volume of Toyama’s dielectric fill portion teaches the dielectric structure. First, the ’378 patent indicates that both the dielectric structure and the isolation structure may be the same material; i.e., SiO2. Ex. 1001, 10:37–40 (isolation structure 233 filled with SiO2), 10:46–47 (dielectric structure can include SiO2, and can include the same material as dielectric layer 230), 10:12–14 (dielectric layer 230 is formed of SiO2). Second, the ’378 patent indicates that the dielectric structure may be “aligned to” and “in contact with” the isolation structure. Id. at 10:30–36. Thus, the two structures of the ’378 patent may appear as two aligned and contacting structures; e.g., a single column, of the same material. Third, the ’378 patent specification describes that the dielectric structure and a top portion of the isolation structure may be formed in the same deposition step. When etching the opening 600 that is to be filled with dielectric structure 232, “opening 600 may extend partially into STI structure 233;” i.e., “the etch process used to form opening 600 may also remove (recess) portion of the top surface of STI structure 233.” Id. at 15:12–20. Then, “opening 600 can be filled with a dielectric layer 702,” which may be the same SiO2 material as the isolation structure, and “[a]s a result, dielectric structure 232 is formed.” Id. at 15:42–54. Thus, the ’378 patent describes a dielectric structure that partially replaces or re-forms, with the same material, its isolation structure. The ’378 patent does not mention whether this results in a dielectric structure that extends into the isolation structure or an isolation structure re-filled to its original height, and it would material. The ’378 patent’s indifference to the exact boundary between dielectric structure 232 and isolation structure 233 during formation from the same material indicates that these need not be taught by distinct elements. We do not agree with Patent Owner that Retractable Techs. is applicable only if the ’378 patent describes that the isolation region and dielectric structure were formed as a single unitary structure. PO Resp. 50; PO Sur-reply 9. Retractable Techs. focuses on whether the two elements at issue “could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance,” not whether they were formed integrally. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304. (“The specifications further disclose a method to couple the two structures . . . to allow some diffusion or insipient melting to occur where they touch . . . . This passage suggests that [the structures] could be formed as an integral structure in the first instance”). Retractable Techs. looks to whether the specification suggests that the claim terms require separate structures. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Patent Owner’s focus on whether the claimed structures were disclosed as being separately formed disregards the issue of whether the separately claimed structures require specific methods of forming those structures. Here, as in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the Specification does not indicate any particular structure or function for the structures that results from their separate steps of deposition. Thus, as held in Retractable Techs. and Powell, the two portions of Toyama “need not be two separate parts” to teach two separate claim limitations. Retractable Techs., 635 F.3d at 1303– 04. Consequently, we determine that the claim language does not support a requirement that these structures be separate and distinct.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 10,658,378 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,658,378
• Google LLC v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00960 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 are unpatentable over Stubler under §§ 102 and 103; claims 2–4 and 9–11 are also unpatentable over Stubler and Wang under § 103.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “could substitute for work experience.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. generally. Based on our review of the record, we find that Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (listing the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology as factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art); see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction that qualifies the words “similar to the object” with “sufficiently similar to identify the specific object,” based on the disclosures of the ’807 Patent Specification. We acknowledge the ’807 Patent Specification discloses the words “the specific object” in the context of acknowledging or detecting the specific object in the image with the object acknowledgement section and retrieving an image from the database that contains the specific object after keywords are added to the image. See Ex. 1001, 4:18–24, 5:54–6:3, 7:28–31. Similarly, the Specification discloses the term “specific person” in the context of retrieving an image from the database that contains the specific person after keywords are added to the image. See Ex. 1001, 4:48–54. We further acknowledge that the Specification discloses a face image similarity determining section to determine if a face image is similar to a face image stored in the database. Ex. 1001, 4:30–34, 4:40–44, 8:60–67, 9:18–22, 10:19–22, 11:58–67. The Specification further includes a passage, cited by Patent Owner, that discloses “if it is determined that the face image coincides to the face image which is contained previously [in a database] or is very similar to the face image which is contained previously, the information for such a human is proposed so as to expedite the user to confirm.” Ex. 1001, 9:18–22; see PO Resp. 16, 17, 19. Finally, we also acknowledge that the Specification further discloses an example of a database record that includes keywords, such as “Jiro” and “second eldest brother” for a human, and further discloses retrieving items from the database with the keyword “Jiro.” See Ex. 1001, 9:47–54, 10:41–58, Figs. 6, 9. however, do not rise to the level of disclaimer or a disavowal of the full scope of the claim term “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database.” For example, Patent Owner does not direct us to any explicit statements or disclosures in the ’807 patent Specification that indicate a clear intention to limit “similar to the object” to “sufficiently similar to identify the specific object” using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction. See Hill–Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1372; Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1367–68; Liebel-Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 906. Therefore, absent disclaimer or disavowal of claim scope, we decline to import limitations into “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database,” recited in claim 1, on the basis of the Specification.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Conclusion Based on the record, we do not agree that “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database,” should be construed as “sufficiently similar to identify the specific object of the image previously claims. As demonstrated in the analysis of the prior art below, we need not provide an explicit claim construction for “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database.” Instead, we give the words “similar to the object of the image previously contained in the database,” recited in claims 1, 7, and 8, their ordinary and customary meaning, as they would be understood by a person or ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not explicitly construe any other claim terms or phrases to resolve any additional disputes between the parties. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Extrinsic evidence (dictionaries, experts)Decided for petitioner

    “Although “extrinsic evidence may be useful . . . it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.” As explained in the previous sections, the intrinsic evidence (i.e., the claims and Specification) does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Dr. Papanikolopoulos’ testimony regarding the proposed claim construction is at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves and the Specification and, therefore, Dr. Papanikolopoulos’ testimony cannot supersede the intrinsic evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1308.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,486,807 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,486,807
• Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. And Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01193 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 7–13, 15–19, and 23–25 are unpatentable: claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 as anticipated by Zhang; all challenged claims also as obvious over at least one …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’448 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed

    “construction of “feature flag” is inconsistent with the language of claim 8, which states that “the feature flag indicates that the running state of the second apparatus is the sleep state.” Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is not supported by claim 24, which depends from claim 23 and states that “the feature flag is located at a header of the sleep login packet.” Id. at 3. We agree with Petitioner. The plain language of claim 8 states what a feature flag indicates. Claim 24 recites where the feature flag is located. Neither claim suggests any of Patent Owner’s additional limitations.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “[A] prior art reference will anticipate if it ‘disclose[s] each and every element of the claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration by Federal Circuit)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Id. (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration by Federal Circuit); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 are anticipated by Zhang. slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 10,602,448 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,602,448
• Fubotv Media Inc. / Yanka Industries, Inc. et al. v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00918 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable as obvious over Leaning alone or, for claims 9 and 11, over Leaning and Gamble.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “argue, that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in implementing any of its proposed modifications.” PO Sur-reply 9. This argument is misplaced. Petitioner does not propose modifying any of Leaning’s teachings. Rather, Petitioner relies on Leaning’s alternative embodiment (i.e., “employ[ing] a criterion which anticipates underflow and avoids it”). See Ex. 1004, 15:3–6; Pet. 35–36 (citing same). Patent Owner acknowledges this fact. See PO Sur-reply 11 (“Leaning proposes an alternative embodiment.”) (citing Ex. 1004, 15:3–6). Accordingly,” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “argue, that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in implementing any of its proposed modifications.” PO Sur-reply 9. This argument is misplaced. Petitioner does not propose modifying any of Leaning’s teachings. Rather, Petitioner relies on Leaning’s alternative embodiment (i.e., “employ[ing] a criterion which anticipates underflow and avoids it”). See Ex. 1004, 15:3–6; Pet. 35–36 (citing same). Patent Owner acknowledges this fact. See PO Sur-reply 11 (“Leaning proposes an alternative embodiment.”) (citing Ex. 1004, 15:3–6). Accordingly,” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “connections or multiple, parallel/simultaneous TCP connections are critical, unclaimed features of the ’564 patent. Indeed, Petitioner does not argue as much, and claims 2, 9, and 11 all at least recite multiple TCP connections. Notwithstanding, I would reach the same conclusion as my colleagues that Patent Owner is not entitled to a presumption of nexus. I am persuaded by Petitioner’s argument (Pet. Reply 22–23) that Patent Owner cannot credibly maintain that it is entitled to a presumption of nexus to the same products— the MOVE Media Player and “Sling TV”—across nine patents and 120 claims having different scope while citing to substantially the same alleged evidence of secondary considerations. The MOVE Media Player and “Sling TV” cannot be coextensive with the challenged claims here under these circumstances. In addition, Patent Owner’s own cited evidence suggests that MOVE’s plug-in is a “key” feature of its technology, particularly to ensure “fluidity of playback” (PO Resp. 50 (quoting Ex. 2048) (emphasis omitted)), but the claims do not recite a plug-in. This also undermines Patent Owner’s assertions of coextensiveness for claims that all recite “continuous playback.” Otherwise, I agree with my colleagues’ finding that Patent Owner has not adduced significant evidence of direct nexus. Accordingly, I join in my colleagues’ finding that Patent Owner has failed to establish a nexus between the asserted evidence of secondary considerations and the challenged claims. I also agree that Patent Owner’s evidence of secondary considerations is entitled to insignificant weight, or little to no weight, and that it does not outweigh Petitioner’s persuasive obviousness showing under the other Graham factors. Thus, I join in my colleagues’ determination that” slip op. at 111

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedNew argument consideredMixed

    “E. Summary on Motion to Strike For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the Motion is partly” slip op. at 107

  Patent outcomesUS 9,407,564 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,407,564
• Fubotv Media Inc. / Yanka Industries, Inc. v. DISH Technologies L.L.C.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00917 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable: claims 1 and 3–18 as obvious over Leaning, and claim 2 as obvious over Leaning and Ala-Honkola.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. “continuous playback” This term appears in independent claims 1 and 13. For example, limitation 1D of claim 1 recites “adapting the successive determinations to shift the playback quality based on the factor to achieve continuous playback of the video using the streamlets of the highest quality copy of the video that is determined to be sustainable at that time.” Claim 13 recites a similar limitation. Petitioner contends “[t]he claims’ plain language only requires that the shift in playback quality is made ‘to achieve continuous playback.’” Pet. Reply 1 (citing claim 1). According to Petitioner, “shifting quality ‘to achieve continuous playback’ is aspirational, not limiting, language.” Id. (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Petitioner asserts that “[n]othing in the claims requires uninterrupted playback before, during, or after the shift in quality.” Id.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredMixed

    “continuous playback.” We also do not rely on Exhibit 1045. Accordingly, we consider Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike in this regard to be moot. For these reasons, we do not strike Petitioner’s reply arguments or supporting evidence regarding claim construction. B. Leaning’s Clear Buffer Step Patent Owner alleges Petitioner has shifted its position on reply slip op. at 89

  Patent outcomesUS 10,757,156 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,757,156
• Salvacion USA, Inc. v. Trutek CorpAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2024-00711 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 8 are unpatentable as anticipated by Chen, Baker, Wahi ’005, and, for claims 1, 2, and 8, Rolf; the Board also finds them obvious over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as it was undisputed at the time and consistent with the evidence of record. Inst. Dec. 7–8. Based on our consideration of the full record, we maintain our determination that a POSITA at the time the application for the ’802 patent was filed “would have had at least an undergraduate degree in pharmacy, chemistry, biochemistry, biomedical engineering or a closely related field, such that the POSITA generally understand[s] pharmaceutical formulation.” Pet. 12. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that “[a] POSITA would be familiar with the chemical ingredients in the [’802] Patent, biocidic agents, and cationic agents, have knowledge of airborne particles including viruses and bacteria, and understand electrostatic fields, electrostatic attraction and repulsion, adhesion and cohesion.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–39).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. Inst. Dec. 7–8. The parties do not dispute our construction of the preambles of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. See generally PO Resp.; Pet. Reply 2–4. After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction of the preamble of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting for the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision. Id. Briefly, the preamble of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 limits the challenged claims as both the preamble and the body are used to define the subject matter claimed. See Allen Engineering Corp., v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, the preamble is “necessary to give life, meaning and vitality” to the claim, see id., because it provides the only description in the claim for the application site of the formulation, i.e., “to skin or tissue of nasal passages,” and how the formulation is applied, i.e., “in a thin film.”” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction. From our perspective, the claims themselves support this construction as the claims expand upon the term “electrostatically inhibiting” with specific means for achieving such inhibition. Specifically, claims 1 and 2 recite electrostatically attracting the particulate matter, holding the matter in place, and inactivating the matter. Additionally, the Specification supports our construction as it describes the use of “an electrostatic field such that oppositely charged airborne particulates (including microorganisms) in the vicinity of the surface are electrostatically trapped, held thereto and one or more of the microorganisms so captured is neutralized, killed, inactivated, and rendered harmless.” Ex. 1001, 3:36–40; PO Resp. 10 n.6.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt the parties’ construction of “adequate impermeability” that has been accepted in the related district court litigation: “Adequate impermeability” refers to the “thin film holding harmful particles in place and inhibiting them from penetrating the thin film and contacting the skin or tissue of an individual’s nasal passages. This is done by varying the concentration of ingredients . . .[,] thereby adjusting the adhesion and cohesion of the thin film.” Pet. Reply 3 (quoting Ex. 1010, 17). Furthermore, as stated in our Institution Decision, along with that term, the claim language explains that the thin film is meant to stick to the skin or tissue and to hold the particulate matter in place. Inst. Dec. 9–10. The claim language also explains that the cohesion of the formulation is adjusted to provide adequate impermeability to the thin film. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the recited impermeability is a function of the cohesive properties of the thin film, and that such impermeability refers to a property of the thin film, i.e., inhibiting the penetration or passage of matter through it onto the skin or tissue at the application site.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 8,163,802 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,163,802
• Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00816 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–13, 16, 23, 25–27, and 29 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 11. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Here, as in the Director’s example, Petitioner advanced a narrower construction of the dynamic limitations before the district court, which the district court declined to adopt. Pet. 10; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. Instead, the district court adopted a “plain-and-ordinary meaning” construction, which Patent Owner proposed. PO Resp. 36–38; PO Sur-reply 10 n.2; Ex. 2015; Ex. 2025, 31–47. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed applying the plain and ordinary meaning construction that had already been preliminarily adopted by the district court. Compare Pet. (filed May 1, 2024) with Ex. 2015 (preliminarily adopting plain and ordinary meaning construction on March 25, 2024). Applying Revvo, we find that Petitioner had a sufficient reason for advancing the broader, court-adopted construction in this IPR. Thus, we give the dynamic limitation its plain-and-ordinary meaning, which is “adjusting during operation based—at least in part—on information gained during operation.”” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “component” or “impedance” that is dynamically adjusted, and instead focus on why the low-pass and high-pass filter circuits do not teach the limitation, which is not Petitioner’s position. As stated above, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language – i.e., that it “requires adjusting a variable impedance of a circuit or component thereof, while it is in the signal path.” See PO Resp. 49. However, Patent Owner’s reading of the claim does not persuasively address why the Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit” or “component.” We have reviewed Dr. Larson’s cited testimony and disagree with Patent Owner that he provided “a well-supported opinion . . . as to why a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would not understand the entire bandpass box to be “a component,” “a circuit,” or “an impedance” in the claims.” Sur-reply 4 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 46–48, 71, 74–83). Dr. Larson testifies that the ’330 patent “teach[es] these adjustments [that dynamically change operating parameters] as changes effected in a single circuit block.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 46 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1001, Figs. 8A, 9A, 8:20–25, 8:36–39, 9:36–59, 10:1–18 (emphasis added)). Dr. Larson does not provide further explanation as to what he means by a “single circuit block,” but relies on Figures 8A and 9A, which show a “function block,” and other disclosures referring to a “function block.” Id. There is no dispute that the recited “circuit” or “component” in the receiver signal path is referring to these “function blocks.” See Tr. 22:20–23:4. The ’330 patent states that Figure 8A, which includes function block 820, is “an embodiment of the present invention” that describes a “possible power saving technique[].” Ex. 1001, 3:30–33, 8:20–25. Similarly, Figure 9A, which includes function block 920, “illustrate[s] one of the possible power saving techniques.” Id. at 3:33–34. The ’330 patent describes that “[f]unctional block 820 . . . may be a filter, mixer, amplifier, or other circuit or circuits in a wireless transceiver or other electronic circuits or system.” Ex. 1001, 8:22–25 (emphasis added). Based on these disclosures, we are not convinced that Function Block 820 or 920 cannot include multiple filters in a Variable Bandpass Filter Block, or that Behbahani’s Variable Bandpass Filter Block does not teach the recited “circuit,” “component,” or “impedance.”” slip op. at 42

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “The absence of meaningful disclosure of the implementation details of the circuit in the ’330 patent suggests that the circuit implementation details Patent Owner argues about now would have been within the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. That is, Patent Owner did not provide in its own specification “the type of detail [it] now argues is necessary in prior art references,” which permits a “finding that one skilled in the art would have known how to implement the features of the references and would have concluded that the reference disclosures would have been enabling.” In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994). When a patent specification does not “specifically describe[]” any “equipment or techniques to be used,” it may be deduced “that all of the equipment and technical knowledge required to perform the claimed method” is known to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Fox, 471 F.2d 1405, 1407 (CCPA 1973); see also Southwire Co. v. Cerro Wire LLC, 870 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (without proof to the contrary, when there is no focus on a disputed claim limitation in the specification, the limitation is merely “an observed result of an old process”). To that end, Petitioner provides persuasive testimony from Dr. Abidi that signal strength measurement circuits were known in the art, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood how to implement a known technique for measuring signal strength, which is not disputed by Patent Owner. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 180– 181; Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 12–16; see Pet. Reply 24–26; Pet. 60–62. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that Behbahani’s disclosure at least suggests circuitry for performing such a determination of signal strength. See Pet. Reply 24 (citing Pet. 60–61; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 92–98, 179–181). Petitioner further argues that Tan “provides an example of circuitry used to detect signals at various points in the low-pass filter signal path as a means of implementing a prefilter automatic gain control.” Pet. 60–61 (citing Ex. 1006, 481); Ex. 1003 ¶ 180. The example in Tan is a peak detector circuit. Pet. 61; Ex. 1003 ¶ 180; Ex. 1006, Fig. 8. Dr. Abidi testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Tan’s signal strength measurement circuitry to measure nodes AI and AO. Ex. 1003 ¶ 180. In response to Patent Owner’s argument that Petitioner does not sufficiently explain how to use Tan’s peak detector in Behbahani (PO Resp. 70), Dr. Abidi provides testimony explaining how Tan’s peak detector circuit provides a measure of the signal strength, which we find persuasive, and is unrebutted by Patent Owner. Ex. 1042 ¶ 15.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 7,010,330 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,010,330
• Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00817 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan; Patent Owner’s motion to strike is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDenied

    “Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), a reply “may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding . . . patent owner response.” We agree with Petitioner, for the reasons stated in the Opposition, that the arguments and declaration testimony is responsive to arguments raised in the Patent Owner Response. See Opp Mot. 7–11 (explaining the positions taken in the Petition, Patent Owner’s arguments in Response, and the arguments presented in Reply); Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1008– 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Petitioner does not provide a new theory of unpatentability; rather, Petitioner responds and elaborates on the theory presented in the Petition to explain why Patent Owner’s arguments are incorrect. E.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. One World Techs., Inc., 944 F.3d 919, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Parties are not barred from elaborating on their arguments on issues previously raised.”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1081–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reasoning that rebuttal evidence should be responsive such that it is offered “to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party”). “[T]he introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in [IPR] trial proceedings” and permissible “as long as the opposing party is given notice of the evidence and an opportunity to respond to it.” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. P’ship v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. At the institution stage, we did not see a material difference in the proposals given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, and thus adopted Patent Owner’s proposal. Inst. Dec. 11. We requested that the parties address during trial if either believed that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis. Id. Neither party has done so. Accordingly, because nothing in the record persuades us that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because neither party has challenged our finding, we maintain our adoption of Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Thus, the parties do not dispute the meaning of “signal path,” and we adopt the district court’s construction of plain and ordinary meaning, as agreed by the parties. See PO Resp. 40–41; Pet. 9; Ex. 2025, 14. The dispute concerns the application of this and the surrounding claim language (i.e., “in the receiver signal path”) to the disclosures in Behbahani. See PO Resp. 40–42. Therefore, we will provide further discussion in the context of the parties’ arguments regarding Behbahani below. However, we agree with Patent Owner’s plain reading of the claim language in limitation 1(e) and the corresponding limitations in independent claims 3, 5, 7, and 8 – i.e., that “[t]he plain language requires adjusting a bias current, or a bias current and an impedance, in a circuit, while it is in the signal path.” See PO Resp. 48. We determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 20

  • Settled expectationsNot reached

    “Owner’s] settled expectations in long-standing patent rights, and Office policies and efficiency.” Id.; see id. at 25–26. Patent Owner’s arguments essentially reassert the arguments made in the Preliminary Response that inter partes review should be discretionarily denied under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). In the Institution Decision, we were not persuaded by these arguments. Inst. Dec. 15–22. Patent Owner argues that in Ecto World, LLC v. RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc., IPR2024-01280, Paper 13 (PTAB May 19, 2025) (§ A precedential) supports denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). Sur-reply 25. However, Ecto World was designated precedential on May 19, 2025, and our Standard Operating Procedure 2 provides that “[a] precedential decision is binding Board authority in subsequent matters involving similar facts or issues.” SOP2, 7 (emphasis added). Therefore, re-evaluation under Ecto World does not appear to be appropriate under the circumstances here. Patent Owner also argues that proceedings can be properly dismissed post-institution in the Director’s discretion. Sur-reply 26. In support, Patent Owner cites to Hulu LLV v. Piranha Media Distribution, LLC, IPR2024- 01252, Paper 17, at 3 (PTAB April 17, 2025). Id. However, in Hulu, the patent owner timely sought Director Review after the institution decision, and upon Director Review, the institution decision was vacated and denied. IPR2024-01252, Papers 16, 19, 27. By contrast, here, Patent Owner raised this issue for the first time in the Sur-reply (filed August 5, 2025, nearly three months after Ecto World was designated precedential), approximately three weeks prior to oral argument. Patent Owner also did not file a motion to terminate the proceeding. Although we recognize that “that the Board has the inherent authority to reconsider institution decisions (beyond the regulatory time for a patentee’s entitlement to seek reconsideration),” Sling TV, L.L.C. v. Realtime Adaptive Streaming LLC, 840 F. App’x 598, 598–99 (Fed. Cir. 2021), we decline to do so at this late stage in the proceeding.” slip op. at 63

  Patent outcomesUS 10,129,825 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,129,825
• Smaxtec Inc. / Smaxtec Animal Care GmbH v. St Reproductive Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00875 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, and 17–20 are unpatentable under the Trevarthen and Laitinen-based obviousness grounds; claim 6 was not shown unpatentable over Trevarthen alone.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “statistics in the absence of evidence of unique downloads or individuals. Even if the download numbers do not exactly represent unique downloads by unique individuals, the evidence shows that Trevarthen was downloaded to some extent, and therefore distributed, prior to the filing date of the ’206 patent. Accordingly, we find this evidence weighs in favor of Trevarthen’s public accessibility.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “construction issues: (1) the interpretation of limitations 1[E] and 17[F] relating to entering sensed and stored information into “at least one logical expression,” and (2) “implanted in an animal.” Inst. Dec. 19. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that it would have been obvious to combine sensed and stored information into the same “at least one logical expression,” for the reasons set forth below. Accordingly, we need not construe limitations 1[E] and 17[F], relating to “at least one logical expression.”4 We discuss our construction of “implanted in an animal” below.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “would have viewed Trevarthen as a cohesive disclosure of specific improvements to existing dairy farms, as opposed to disparate teachings of unrelated systems. Trevarthen itself proposes “a framework for the use of RFID on dairy farms” including “enhancements and ideas which could be considered as future additions to further add value” for utilizing RFIDs in farm management beyond the Cochrane farm ear-tag RFIDs. Ex. 1005, 99. The enhancements include RFID boluses (id.), milk meters to detect illness (id. at 115), and temperature monitoring by RFID (id. at 121–122). Considering the entire record, Trevarthen itself describes improvements that apply “the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown a that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to” slip op. at 33

  • ExcludeNot reached

    “IV. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1040, 1041, and 1044.” slip op. at 81

  Patent outcomesUS 9,844,206 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,844,206

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.