• Meta Platforms, Inc. / ROKU, Inc. et al. v. Almondnet, Inc. And Intent Iq, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00666 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 6–23 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required determination that access occurred during a predetermined period.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and two years of work experience in the field of network-based computer systems, such as systems for sending and receiving information over local networks and wide area networks (such as the Internet or World Wide Web).” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 10–14). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 26 (adopting Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art for the purposes of this proceeding). We are persuaded that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner “does not believe claim construction is necessary at this time.” Pet. 7. “Patent Owner does not contend that any terms in the challenged claims require express construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition’s invalidity grounds.” PO Resp. 7. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “date of Provisional Application No. 60/858,204 (Ex. 1004, “’204 Provisional”), and is prior art to the ’878 Patent under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Pet. 9. Petitioner asserts that the ’204 Provisional provides support for the disclosure of Baig and provides § 112 support for at least one claim in Baig. Id. Petitioner asserts that there are no material differences between Baig and the ’204 Provisional. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 43 (citing Ex. 1005 (redline comparison of Ex. 1003 and Ex. 1004))). Petitioner further contends that the ’204 Provisional includes 17 claims that are identical to the claims in Baig, and, therefore, provides written description support for the corresponding claims in Baig. Id. Petitioner also asserts the ’204 Provisional provides enablement. Id. Patent Owner has not challenged the status of Baig as prior art. See PO Resp. Based on our review of the complete record, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Baig is entitled to the earlier effective filing date of the ’204 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires there to be a determination that devices accessed the LAN during the predetermined period of time. The claim language recites that the determining of limitation (a) (which recites the determination of an association between the identifiers) is done using the stored association-detection information (which is alleged to be the cookies and session table of the cited art) “to determine” that the mobile devices have separately accessed the internet through a LAN “during a predetermined period of time.” See Ex. 1001, 24:29–49. Thus, we read this language to require that a determination be made that the required access occurred during a predetermined period of time. This reading of the claim language is accord with the opinion expressed by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt, at his deposition.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,715,878 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,715,878
• Meta Platforms, Inc. / ROKU, Inc. et al. v. Almondnet, Inc. And Intent Iq, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2024-00701 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 6–23 were not shown unpatentable because the prior-art combinations did not establish a determination that devices accessed the Internet during a predetermined period.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and two years of work experience in the field of network-based computer systems, such as systems for sending and receiving information over local networks and wide area networks (such as the Internet or World Wide Web).” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 10–14). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 26 (adopting Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art for the purposes of this proceeding). We are persuaded that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner “does not believe claim construction is necessary at this time.” Pet. 7. “Patent Owner does not contend that any terms in the challenged claims require express construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition’s invalidity grounds.” PO Resp. 7. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “date of Provisional Application No. 60/858,204 (Ex. 1004, “’204 Provisional”), and is prior art to the ’878 Patent under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Pet. 9. Petitioner asserts that the ’204 Provisional provides support for the disclosure of Baig and provides § 112 support for at least one claim in Baig. Id. Petitioner asserts that there are no material differences between Baig and the ’204 Provisional. Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 43 (citing Ex. 1005 (redline comparison of Ex. 1003 and Ex. 1004))). Petitioner further contends that the ’204 Provisional includes 17 claims that are identical to the claims in Baig, and, therefore, provides written description support for the corresponding claims in Baig. Id. Petitioner also asserts the ’204 Provisional provides enablement. Id. Patent Owner has not challenged the status of Baig as prior art. See PO Resp. Based on our review of the complete record, we find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Baig is entitled to the earlier effective filing date of the ’204 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires there to be a determination that devices accessed the LAN during the predetermined period of time. The claim language recites that the determining of limitation (a) (which recites the determination of an association between the identifiers) is done using the stored association-detection information (which is alleged to be the cookies and session table of the cited art) “to determine” that the mobile devices have separately accessed the internet through a LAN “during a predetermined period of time.” See Ex. 1001, 24:29–49. Thus, we read this language to require that a determination be made that the required access occurred during a predetermined period of time. This reading of the claim language is accord with the opinion expressed by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt, at his deposition. Q So is it your opinion that the – the limitation 1B requires that the system determines whether or not the accesses by the -- the two electronic devices occurred within a predetermined period of time? A Yes.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,715,878 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,715,878
• Meta Platforms, Inc. / ROKU, Inc. et al. v. Intent Iq, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 19, 2025 · IPR2023-01281 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 6–23 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations did not establish a determination that devices accessed the Internet during a predetermined period.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at critical time. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The resolution of this question is important because it allows us to “maintain[] objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu–Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 3 U.S. Pat. Pub. 2008/0113674 A1, published May 15, 2008 (Ex. 1003, “Baig”). 4 U.S. Pat. Pub. 2004/0128547 A1, published July 1, 2004 (Ex. 1006, “Laidlaw”). 5 U.S. Pat. No. 6,427,170 B1, issued July 30, 2002 (Ex. 1007, “Sitaraman”). 6 Harley Hahn, The Internet Complete Reference (2d ed. 1996) (Ex. 1008, “Hahn”). 7 U.S. Pat. No. 7,730,030 B1, issued June 1, 2010 (Ex. 1009, “Xu”). 8 U.S. Pat. Pub. 2006/0282328 A1, published Dec. 14, 2006 (Ex. 1010, “Gerace”). 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Generally, it is easier to establish obviousness under a higher level of ordinary skill in the art. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“A less sophisticated level of skill generally favors a determination of nonobviousness . . . while a higher level of skill favors the reverse.”). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science, and two years of work experience in the field of network-based computer systems, such as systems for sending and receiving information over local networks and wide area networks (such as the Internet or World Wide Web).” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 10–14). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 26 (adopting Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art for the purposes of this proceeding). We are persuaded that Petitioner’s description is consistent with the prior art and patent specification. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s description.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. 42.100(b) (2023). Our rule adopts the same claim construction standard used by Article III federal courts, which follow Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), and its progeny. Under this standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent including the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. Petitioner “does not believe claim construction is necessary at this time.” Pet. 7. “Patent Owner does not contend that any terms in the challenged claims require express construction for purposes of evaluating the Petition’s invalidity grounds.” PO Resp. 7. We determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. First, we agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires there to be a determination that devices accessed the LAN during the predetermined period of time. The claim language recites that the determining of limitation (a) (which recites the determination of an association between the identifiers) is done using the stored association-detection information (which is alleged to be the cookies and session table of the cited art) “to determine” that the mobile devices have separately accessed the internet through a LAN “during a predetermined period of time.” See Ex. 1001, 24:29–49. Thus, we read this language to require that a determination be made that the required access occurred during a predetermined period of time. This reading of the claim language is accord with the opinion expressed by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt, at his deposition.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,715,878 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,715,878
• Apple Inc. v. S.M.R Innovations Ltd And Y.M.R Tech LtdInstituted
  PTAB · Jan 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01048 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and all four grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on at least one claim.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “We begin our analysis with independent claim 1. Considering these factors, we preliminarily determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Zhang, Fillebrown, and Pasanen, for the reasons explained below.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

    “Petitioner argues that limitation 1c is taught by the combination of Zhang with Fillebrown. Pet. 18. Petitioner identifies Zhang’s teaching of transmitting commands and media content from the mobile device to helper servers via a wireless network, WLAN. Pet. 16–18 (citing Ex. 1004, 3:25– 60, 4:1–8, 4:32–50, 7:1–14, 8:13–22; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 103, 104, 114–118). Acknowledging that Zhang does not expressly teach an intermediate routing device, Petitioner identifies Fillebrown’s intermediate wireless router (wireless router 120) for providing network range extension by amplifying routed signals. Id. at 19–22 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 16, 34, 49, 51, 57, 61). Petitioner contends a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Zhang to route data via an intermediate wireless router pursuant to Fillebrown to provide network range extension, and that such a modification would have had a reasonable expectation of success because Zhang and Fillebrown teach the same network setup (i.e., WLAN using a wireless protocol/standard such as IEEE 802.11 or Home RF). Pet. 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 109–111)” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The parties do not propose any express claim construction. Pet. 4; see generally Prelim Resp. We also determine that no express claim construction is necessary for our Decision, apart from that discussed in our below analysis. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We preliminarily disagree with Patent Owner. Although the claim lists step 1b before step 1d, method steps are not ordinarily construed to require a specific order of performance unless the claims or Specification directly or implicitly require that specific order. See Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Nothing in the express claim language precludes performing step 1d before step 1b, as in Zhang. For example, the claim does not contain temporal terms, like “then” or “next,” nor does the claim otherwise specify that step 1b must precede step 1d. Although Patent Owner points out that a term of step 1d (i.e., the one more available devices) derives antecedent basis from text in step 1b (i.e., one more available devices), this alone does not directly or implicitly require performing step 1b before step 1d. Prelim Resp. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1002, 240, ’648 patent prosecution history). Nor does the Specification require performing the step of identifying devices as available before the step of wirelessly signaling those devices or even that the steps be mutually exclusive. For example, there are no statements that this step order is important, nor disclaimer of any other order, nor any prosecution history indicating a surrender of any other order. Moreover, according to the Specification, announcer 30, which is the component that identifies devices as available prior to the wirelessly signaling, is only “preferably provided.” Ex. 1001, 7:28–31. Even assuming Patent Owner were correct that step 1b must precede step 1d, Patent Owner’s position that device(s) must be identified as available does not appear to be commensurate with the claims. According to its plain meaning, limitation 1b does not appear to require identifying devices as available; the claim merely requires identifying “available devices.” See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (rejecting arguments “not based on limitations appearing in the claims”). In other words, the claim does not appear to require identifying (i.e., determining) whether devices are available but merely requires identifying devices that happen to be available. According to our preliminary understanding, Zhang’s mobile device 1) discovers (identifies) connected available and unavailable helper servers, and then 2) sends (wirelessly signals) service requests to compatible available and unavailable helper servers. Ex. 1004, 3:44–4:8, 6:51–7:13. Thus, Zhang identifies and then wirelessly signals available devices (Zhang also identifies and then wirelessly signals unavailable devices). As such, we preliminary determine that Zhang meets the claim language “identifying one or more available devices” and “wirelessly signaling the one or more available devices.”” slip op. at 18

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,547,648
• Apple Inc. v. S.M.R Innovations Ltd And Y.M.R Tech LtdInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01047 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that any challenged claim would have been obvious over the asserted combinations.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We, therefore, deny Petitioner’s request to institute inter partes review of the challenged claims on the asserted grounds.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art is similar to Petitioner’s definition with some variation in the amount of education and specificity as to the experience required. As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. We note, however, that our determination in this proceeding would be the same under either formulation.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner “applies the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms as understood by a [person of ordinary skill in the art]” and does not propose construction of any claim term. Pet. 4. Patent Owner also does not propose construction of any claim term. See generally, Prelim. Resp. Based on the record before us, we see no need for express construction of any term for the purposes of this Decision. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “feature of scanning a wireless communication network by the mobile device receiving the streaming data for re-routing, to identify devices connected to the wireless network, are identified as capable to handle the routed media content.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1002, 237–238). Thus, we understand the recited language to require scanning to find devices that have been identified as compatible, not just scanning to find devices and later determining which of those devices, if any, are compatible. Zhang, on the other hand, scans to find devices in the network, but that scan does not seek out devices identified as compatible. Specifically, Zhang scans to find its “helper environment” which is composed of “devices around them.” Ex. 1004, code (57); see also id. 2:16–20. The first step of Zhang’s process is to find “a local device [that] offers helper service.” Id. at 3:62–63. In the next step, Zhang then interrogates the device it scanned for in order to find out whether that device offers the necessary service. Id. at 3:63–4:5. In other words, Zhang is not scanning for compatible devices, but rather it is scanning for any device around it and then asking whether the device provides the necessary service. We find this to be insufficient because the claim is not merely seeking to identify a compatible device, but rather it is scanning “to identify a plurality of devices, identified as compatible to handle said media content.” Thus, for these claims it is not enough that the network be scanned for devices; instead, the network must be scanned for devices “identified as compatible.” The inclusion of Rofheart does not address this issue. Rofheart is relied upon to teach “that a local device identifies and connects with a plurality of remote devices.” Pet. 29. According to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have used Rofheart’s teaching to improve Zhang by adding “the benefit of providing users control to select one or more of a plurality of devices, rather than always connecting to the first identified available compatible device, as taught by Zhang.” Id. As such, neither of the cited references addresses the recited scanning for devices identified as compatible.” slip op. at 21

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 9,699,223
• Apple Inc. v. S.M.R. Innovations Ltd And Y.M.R. Tech LtdInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01050 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Apple did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–3, 9, and 24 would have been obvious over the asserted references.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Considering the above principles, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that any of the challenged claims would have been obvious over Chihara, BluetoothSpec, Everett, and Chang, for the reasons explained below.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent owner contends that a person of ordinary skill “would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or a related field in computing technology, and at least two years’ experience in wireless communication and mobile devices including multimedia streaming, or equivalent education, research, experience, and knowledge.” Prelim. Resp. 2–3. In other words, Patent Owner argues that the person of ordinary skill would have had less education and more specific experience with mobile devices, including multimedia streaming, than Petitioner proposes. Because Petitioner’s argument is supported by declaratory testimony, and Patent Owner does not provide supporting evidence for its argument, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1003, ¶ 29 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:16–20, 4:18–55, 11:61–12:11).” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Although Petitioner doesn’t promote it in its Petition, we agree with Petitioner’s undisputed contention that the ordinary and customary meaning of the “announcer device” limitation is that the “mobile communication device is receiving rerouted data from surrounding equipment, rather than rerouting data to surrounding equipment.” Pet. 19. This is in accord with the specification of the ’990 patent which states that “[t]he announcer device 30 is responsible for announcing to the environment the availability of a current device for accepting routed media.” Ex. 1001, 7:15–17 (emphasis added). The construction that Petitioner does promote, based on its interpretation of Patent Owner’s arguments in the parallel litigation, departs from the term’s ordinary meaning, yet Petitioner has presented no evidence to justify such a 7 Petitioner also argues that we should construe the term media transformer as a means-plus-function limitation invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Pet. 7–11. We need not construe this term to reach our decision not to institute trial in this proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). departure. For example, Petitioner has not shown that the patent applicant has plainly acted as lexicographer for the term, or has plainly disavowed the full scope of the term. See Thorner v. Sony, 669 F.3d at 1365; Multiform Desiccants v. Medzam, 133 F.3d at 1477. We are aware of no evidentiary basis for Petitioner’s proposed construction in the specification or prosecution history of the ’990 patent. To the extent, if any, that Patent Owner may have argued in the parallel district court proceeding for a departure from the term’s ordinary meaning, we find no clear disavowal of the term’s scope, particularly in light of Patent Owner’s ultimate argument that the term should have its “[p]lain meaning.” Ex. 2008, 2.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “In light of our disagreement with Petitioner’s proposed claim- construction, we do not find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that Chihara teaches the “announcer limitation,” either alone or in light of BluetoothSpec. Although Petitioner shows that Chihara’s phone 11B announces its availability for pairing with nearby Bluetooth-compatible devices, Petitioner does not argue that phone 11B indicates availability to receive any rerouted data from either headset 13 or watch 12B. To the extent that phone 11B receives data for rerouting, it appears to receive it from a mobile or fixed communication network, not from any surrounding Bluetooth devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 79 (phone 11B receives video and audio data via “a fixed telephone network or another mobile telephone set accommodated in a mobile communication network,” and transmits that streaming data to watch 12B and headset 13), 53–54 (calls arrive via mobile telephone antenna 26, which are then processed and transmitted via Bluetooth antenna 21 to watch 12). Regarding the bidirectional communication between phone 11B and headset 13 or watch 12B, Petitioner has not pointed to any evidence that the data sent from watch 12B or headset 13 to phone 11B includes rerouted data. Similarly, Petitioner’s contention that Chihara’s phone 11B, in light of BluetoothSpec, indicates its availability (e.g., that the phone is “powered on” and transmits signals to discover nearby devices) fails to meet the plain language of claim 1, which requires the streaming device (phone 11B) to indicate its availability to receive rerouted data from the surrounding devices (headset 13 or watch 12B). Thus, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that Chihara, in view of BluetoothSpec and the other references, teaches the “announcer device” limitation. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that it would be likely to prevail if we instituted an inter partes review.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,969,990
• Apple Inc. v. S.M.R. Innovations Ltd And Y.M.R. Tech LtdInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01049 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Apple did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 22–24 would have been obvious over Chihara, BluetoothSpec, Everett, and Chang.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “Thus, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that Chihara, in view of BluetoothSpec and the other references, teaches the “announcer device” limitation. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that it would be likely to prevail if we instituted an inter partes review. CONCLUSION For the reasons above, Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’866 patent is unpatentable. Therefore, we deny the Petition. ORDER It is ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Although Petitioner doesn’t promote it in its Petition, we agree with Petitioner’s undisputed contention that the ordinary and customary meaning of the “announcer device” limitation is that the “streaming device is receiving rerouted data from surrounding media handling devices, rather than rerouting data to surrounding media handling devices.” Pet. 19–20. This is in accord with the specification of the ’866 patent which states that “[t]he announcer device 30 is responsible for announcing to the environment the availability of a current device for accepting routed media.” Ex. 1038, 7:22– 24 (emphasis added). The construction that Petitioner does promote, based on its interpretation of Patent Owner’s arguments in the parallel litigation, departs from the term’s ordinary meaning, yet Petitioner has presented no 7 Petitioner also argues that we should construe the term media transformer as a means-plus-function limitation invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Pet. 7–11. We need not construe this term to reach our decision not to institute trial in this proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). evidence to justify such a departure. For example, Petitioner has not shown that the patent applicant has plainly acted as lexicographer for the term, or has plainly disavowed the full scope of the term. See Thorner v. Sony, 669 F.3d at 1365; Multiform Desiccants v. Medzam, 133 F.3d at 1477. We are aware of no evidentiary basis for Petitioner’s proposed construction in the specification or prosecution history of the ’866 patent. To the extent, if any, that Patent Owner may have argued in the parallel district court proceeding for a departure from the term’s ordinary meaning, we find no clear disavowal of the term’s scope, particularly in light of Patent Owner’s ultimate argument that the term should have its “[p]lain meaning.” Ex. 2008, 2.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “In light of our disagreement with Petitioner’s proposed claim- construction, we do not find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that Chihara teaches the “announcer limitation,” either alone or in light of BluetoothSpec. Although Petitioner shows that Chihara’s phone 11B announces its availability for pairing with nearby Bluetooth-compatible devices, Petitioner does not argue that phone 11B indicates availability to receive any rerouted data from either headset 13 or watch 12B. To the extent that phone 11B receives streaming or media data for rerouting, it appears to receive it from a mobile or fixed communication network, not from any surrounding Bluetooth devices. See, e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 79 (phone 11B receives video and audio data via “a fixed telephone network or another mobile telephone set accommodated in a mobile communication network,” and transmits that streaming data to watch 12B and headset 13), 53–54 (calls arrive via mobile telephone antenna 26, which are then processed and transmitted via Bluetooth antenna 21 to watch 12). Regarding the bidirectional communication between phone 11B and headset 13 or watch 12B, Petitioner has not pointed to any evidence that the data sent from watch 12B or headset 13 to phone 11B includes rerouted streaming data. Similarly, Petitioner’s contention that Chihara’s phone 11B, in light of BluetoothSpec, indicates its availability (e.g., that the phone is “powered on” and transmits signals to discover nearby devices) fails to meet the plain language of claim 22, which requires the streaming device (phone 11B) to indicate its availability to receive streaming data rerouted from the surrounding devices (headset 13 or watch 12B). Thus, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that Chihara, in view of BluetoothSpec and the other references, teaches the “announcer device” limitation. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that it would be likely to prevail if we instituted an inter partes review.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,711,866
• K/S Himpp v. Bragi GmbHAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 21, 2025 · IPR2023-01150 · APJ Larry J Hume · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 are unpatentable; proposed substitute claims 22–42 are unpatentable, and the revised motion to amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Burden

    “also determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 22–42 are unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 56

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “also determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that proposed substitute claims 22–42 are unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 56

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Accordingly, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “d. Conclusion for Ground 4: Obviousness of Claim 1 in view of Shaffer and Hain As discussed above, Petitioner’s analysis addresses how the combined” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 9,843,853 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 9,843,853
• Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Daedalus Prime LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2023-01343 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 13–15, 17, and 18 were not shown unpatentable because Bose and White, alone or in the asserted combinations, failed to teach claimed workload comparisons or workload monitoring.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “We are persuaded and find for the reasons given that Petitioner fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that White teaches or suggests “receiving a bus workload for a communication bus and a first processing element workload for a first processing element based on an integrated circuit reaching a limit.” Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Brogioli testifies that “[t]he workload is a function of the demands imposed by, e.g., applications running on the system, and may or may not be subject to direct control, whereas the conditions under which that workload is processed are controlled directly.” Brogioli Decl. ¶ 66. We agree with Dr. Brogioli and find that White’s frequency and voltage monitoring and adjustments do not result in the power management logic receiving the bus workload as recited in claim element 4[a]. Id. ¶¶ 64–66. We find the testimony of Mr. Wyatt on this issue unconvincing. Wyatt Decl. ¶ 103. In support of his opinion that “monitoring the operating voltages and frequencies of the logic core 120A and common logic bridge 110 is monitoring the workload of those components,” he states: “It was well understood that operating frequency and voltage of a component reflect the activity and use, or workload, of that component.” Id. However, he does not provide any evidentiary support for this statement. We, therefore, give it little weight. See PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 40 (Nov. 2019)5 (“Opinions expressed without disclosing the underlying facts or data may be given little or no weight.”) (citing Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “response. Paper 9. At the institution stage, therefore, Patent Owner did not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art or provide its own description. We regarded Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. Institution Dec. 12–13. In its Response, Patent Owner states that it “uses this definition” in its analysis. PO Resp. 15 (citing Brogioli Decl. ¶ 25). In view of the foregoing, for this Decision, we adopt the description of the person of ordinary skill articulated by Petitioner and used in our Institution Decision. In light of our review of the complete record, we find that this formulation is consistent with the ’494 patent and the prior art of record, and is supported by the testimony of Mr. Wyatt. See Wyatt Decl. ¶ 21.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionGranted

    “Post-institution, Patent Owner proposes a construction for the term “workload.” PO Resp. 15–16. Patent Owner contends that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that in the ’494 patent, the term ‘workload’ means ‘an amount of activity over a quantum or period of time.’” Id. at 15. Dr. Brogioli’s testimony supports this construction, as does Mr. Wyatt’s. Brogioli Decl. ¶¶ 36–38; Wyatt Dep. 34:14–36:9. The ’494 patent also supports this construction. Ex. 1001, 8:20–22, 9:60–63. Petitioner does not dispute this proposed construction in its Reply. For the reasons given, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction for “workload.”” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Nowhere does Petitioner or its expert point to an explicit disclosure in Bose of making a comparison of the claimed “bus workload and a bus workload threshold.” Instead, Petitioner relies on its expert’s opinion as to what a person of ordinary skill might have known, without any additional supporting evidence. See, e.g., Pet. 26 (“[A person of ordinary skill] would have understood global PMCU compares a workload threshold as exemplified by the predicted power and performance of each power mode and the monitored workload to select and adjust the power mode of a component” (citing Wyatt Decl. ¶¶ 54–55)). This opinion is not supported by the record. The only disclosure of a comparison in Bose that we have been shown is the comparison of PowerTotal to PowerMax in step 303 of Figure 3, which Petitioner does not rely on to meet the “comparison” limitation in the claim. Hearing Tr. 17:16–20. Also without proper support is Petitioner’s assertion that “a [person of ordinary skill] would have understood that in Bose, selecting or adjusting power mode for a component entails comparing a workload threshold, such as predicted power and performance associated with each power mode with real time statistics, such as the monitored workload of a component.” Pet. 26 (citing Wyatt Decl. ¶¶ 55–56). We determine that for the reasons given, Petitioner fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimed comparison element 1[g] of claim 1 is taught or suggested by Bose. We find, therefore, that Petitioner has not demonstrated that claim 1 is anticipated by Bose, nor has Petitioner demonstrated that to a person of ordinary skill, claim 1 would have been obvious in light of Bose.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 8,898,494 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,898,494
• Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Daedalus Prime LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 8, 2025 · IPR2023-01333 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Sutardja, Sutardja and Rychlik, or Sutardja and Carmack; the Board did not reach the Mathieson-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We regarded Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposal. Institution Dec. 14–15.” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We decline to “throw out” Dr. Horst’s testimony for several reasons. First and foremost, Patent Owner has not moved or otherwise sought to exclude his testimony, or even filed an objection. Hearing Tr. 46:19–47:1. Thus, the issue of whether the testimony should be excluded is not properly before us. Further, Petitioner asserts that “[t]his distinction is irrelevant.” Pet. Reply 2. We agree. Patent Owner has not pointed to any opinion by Dr. Horst that turns on the alleged “flaw” in the definition of the person of ordinary skill. Id. at 46:19–48:3. Finally, there is no prejudice. Patent Owner’s expert used the definition proposed by Patent Owner in his analysis. See Brogioli Decl. ¶ 25. Nor could Patent Owner show us with specificity any place in the record where resolving this dispute would make a difference in this case. Hearing Tr. 46:3–47:3. For the reasons given, we do not see the need to modify our definition of a person of ordinary skill or to exclude or give little weight to Dr. Horst’s opinions.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionGranted

    “operating system.” PO Resp. 12–13. Relying on the Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Patent Owner contends that “[a]n ‘operating system’ is, and would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art to be, ‘The software that controls the allocation and usage of hardware resources such as memory, central processing unit (CPU) time, disk space, and peripheral devices.’” PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2007, 378). Dr. Brogioli’s testimony generally supports this construction, as does Dr. Horst’s. See Brogioli Dep. 8:17–22; Horst Dep. 32:3–8. Petitioner responds that the term “should be understood in accordance with its plain meaning,” and therefore does not require construction, but does not dispute Patent Owner’s proposed construction. Pet. Reply 2. For the reasons given, we adopt Patent Owner’s construction for “operating system.” However, we do not see this construction as dispositive of the central issue of whether the operating system in Sutardja controls the transition of the cores. See Section II.D.1, infra. slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “PMS module do not ‘control’ the core switching module or the hardware on which it runs. Instead, the kernel and the PMS module only make system calls to the core switching module.” PO Resp. 27. We disagree that this is not sufficient control to meet this claim limitation. As Dr. Horst’s testimony (quoted supra) explains, the PMS module and kernel modules “trigger a transition” by generating a call to the hypervisor module or a core switching module. Horst Decl. ¶ 124. Patent Owner’s argument fails because it assumes the claims require direct control, when the claims recite no such restriction (nor have we been asked by either party to construe the claims as such).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 10,049,080 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,049,080

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.