PTAB
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  • PTAB · Aug 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00580 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

    The Board held claim 8 not shown unpatentable under each of three §103 grounds because Petitioner failed to establish motivation to combine the references with a reasonable expectation of success.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In addressing the level of ordinary skill in the art, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) would have had at least a Ph.D. in biochemistry, molecular biology, or a related field and between one and four years of post-doctoral experience in the field of gene therapy. Alternatively, a POSA would have had at least a Master’s or Bachelor’s Degree in biochemistry, molecular biology, or a related field, with a corresponding number of additional years of experience in the field of gene therapy. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 111–115). Patent Owner states that it does not challenge Petitioner’s definition. PO Resp. 10. On this complete record, we accept Petitioner’s proposed definition, as it appears consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’274 Patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that the ’274 patent “does not specify a particular program or set of program parameters that should be used to align sequences and calculate percent identity for purposes of determining whether a particular test sequence falls within the scope of the claims.” Pet. 21. Petitioner asserts that it analyzed the percent identity claim elements, as Patent Owner did in the parallel District Court litigation, Penn-II, “using the Clustal program at default settings to generate amino acid sequence alignments and calculate percent identity values.” Id. at 21–22. Petitioner, however, does not ask for any particular construction of any claim term. See id. Patent Owner states that it “does not challenge Petitioner’s articulation of the lack of a need for claim construction.” PO Resp. 10. Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction of any claim term is necessary to reach our decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd. v. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803)).” slip op. at 12

    • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “According to the import of the complete recitation of paragraph 250 of the ’772 Publication set forth above that Petitioner relies upon for the motivation to improve efficient gene transfer in liver, AAV8 already fulfills this need. See Tr. 28:15–18. We do not read the ’772 Publication as calling for a search for a more efficient variant to improve efficient gene transfer in liver. We credit Dr. Samulski’s testimony that supports this view of the teachings of the ’772 Publication. Dr. Samulski testifies: Additionally, when the inventors compared AAV8’s expression in the liver against new serotypes AAVrh2, AAVrh10, AAVrh13, and AAVrh21, they found that AAV8 remained superior: EX1007, ¶ 253. Notably, AAV8 was shown to have over fifty percent (50%) greater expression in liver than AAVrh10. As I discuss more below, a skilled artisan in 2005 would not have expected a single amino acid substitution to significantly alter tropism in order to target to a different tissue. Thus, in my opinion, in 2005, a skilled artisan with the goal of targeting the liver would have selected the best known vector for delivery to liver at that time—AAV8. Ex. 2027 ¶ 42. We also agree with Dr. Samulski’s opinion that a POSA would have selected the best vector for liver, AAV8, instead of modifying another vector to increase tropism to liver. Dr. Samulski testifies: In my opinion, a skilled artisan in 2005 would not have looked solely to modify a vector to try to improve tropism to a particular tissue. As discussed throughout this declaration, changing tropism is difficult to predict, and a skilled artisan would not have had a reasonable expectation that changes could be made to improve or alter tropism. A skilled artisan would also have been concerned that changes, even small ones, could negatively impact other properties of the capsid protein. Therefore, rather than seek to modify a vector, a skilled artisan” slip op. at 29

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

      “The ’772 Publication, however, does not indicate as Petitioner asserts that a new variant is necessary to improve the efficiency of gene transfer to liver; the ’772 Publication indicates that AAV8 fulfills that need. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 250. In the paragraph that Petitioner relies upon for the alleged need to improve the efficiency of gene transfer to the liver, the ’772 Publication states in full: The tropism of each new vector is favorable for in vivo applications. AAV2/7 vectors appear to transduce skeletal muscle as efficiently as AAV2/1, which is the serotype that confers the highest level of transduction in skeletal muscle of the primate AAVs tested to date. Importantly, AAV2/8 provides a substantial advantage over the other serotypes in terms of efficiency of gene transfer to liver that until now has been relatively disappointing in terms of the numbers of hapatocytes stably transduced. AAV2/8 consistently achieved a 10 to 100-fold improvement in gene transfer efficiency as compared to the other vectors. The basis for the improved efficiency of AAV2/8 is unclear, although it presumably is due to uptake via a different receptor that is more active on the basolateral surface of hepatocytes. This improved efficiency will be quite useful in the development of liver-directed gene transfer where the number of transduced cells is critical, such as in urea cycle disorders and familial hypercholesterolemia. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). According to the import of the complete recitation of paragraph 250 of the ’772 Publication set forth above that Petitioner relies upon for the motivation to improve efficient gene transfer in liver, AAV8 already fulfills this need. See Tr. 28:15–18. We do not read the ’772 Publication as calling for a search for a more efficient variant to improve efficient gene transfer in liver. We credit Dr. Samulski’s testimony that supports this view of the teachings of the ’772 Publication. Dr. Samulski testifies: Additionally, when the inventors compared AAV8’s expression in the liver against new serotypes AAVrh2, AAVrh10, AAVrh13, and AAVrh21, they found that AAV8 remained superior:” slip op. at 28

    Patent outcomesUS 11,680,274 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,680,274
  • PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00147 · APJ Linda E Horner · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8–20 after finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prove at least one challenged claim unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and the preliminary response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review of claims 1‒6 and 8‒20 of the ’124 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “At this stage of the proceeding, there is no dispute about the level of ordinary skill in the art.7 Based on the testimony of Dr. Anthony, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, optical engineering, or related field of study, or equivalent experience, and at least two years’ experience in academia or industry studying or developing physiological monitoring devices such as non-invasive biosensors. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have also been familiar with, for example, sensor system design, including inertial and other motion sensor system design, signal processing, and human-machine interfaces. A higher level of education or skill can substitute for less experience, and vice versa. Ex. 1002 ¶ 29. We determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted above is consistent with the level of technical understanding and competence reflected in the ’124 patent Specification and the asserted prior art references, based on our review of the limited record.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached

      “We need not reach the issue of whether the preamble is limiting for purposes of determining institution. Even were we to agree with Patent Owner that the preamble is limiting and the claims are limited to a fingerworn ring, at this stage Petitioner has demonstrated that the cited art teaches or suggests such a limitation. That is, Petitioner relies on the fingerring of Schroder for the claimed form factor of a “wearable computing device configured to be worn around a finger of a wearer.” Pet. 22 (Ground 1), 45 (Ground 2, relying on Yuen for adding the functionality of light sources with a photodetector, temperature sensors, and varying the sampling frequency of sensor data acquisition), 56 (Ground 3). Further, to the extent Petitioner contends that Yuen’s toe band or earring is structurally and functionally equivalent to a finger-ring (Pet. 45, 57), Patent Owner has not, at this stage of the proceeding, structurally distinguished a device configured to worn around a finger from a toe band or earring. For instance, Patent Owner has not explained how a device to be worn around a finger differs in size, configuration, or design from a toe band or earring. And the ’124 patent recognizes that “a human being’s finger can come in various different sizes and so should the [wearable computing device].” Ex. 1001, 12:64‒65. For instance, challenged dependent claim 10 recites that the width of the external housing of the wearable computing device is within a range of 3 mm to 8 mm and a thickness of the device is within a range of 1.5 to 3 mm. Id. at 35:8‒12. Should Patent Owner pursue this argument during the proceeding, the record would benefit from further development on the structural similarities and dissimilarities between a fingerworn ring and a toe band.” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner’s showing of reasons to combine Mestas and Schröder is sufficient for purposes of granting institution of an inter partes review. Although general similarities between the references are usually not by themselves sufficient to show a reason to combine particular teachings, Petitioner here also provides more particularized contentions, such as “[i]mplementing Mestas’s device in Schröder’s ‘finger-ring’ form factor would ensure a tighter fit than a device worn, e.g., on the user’s arm or wrist, reducing motion artifacts, providing better shielding against ambient light, and permitting higher quality reading from device sensors (e.g., accelerometer, heart rate, temperature)” and that Mestas’s concern with “slippage around a user’s wrist or other body part” would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art “to consider placing the device on the finger, as in Schröder, to improve traction and prevent slippage.” Pet. 19‒20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 169; Ex. 1010 ¶ 152). These reasons are sufficient to present a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to at least one challenged claim based on the proposed combination of Mestas and Schroder for purposes of institution. Patent Owner will have an opportunity to further address Petitioner’s reasoning during the proceeding.” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,188,124
  • PTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00669 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–8 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Makower, Fang, and Edwards, with claim 4 also obvious over those references and Stern; the Board did not reach Grounds 1–4.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “Based on the record before us, including the types of problems and solutions described in the ’077 patent and the cited prior art, we find a POSA would have had (1) a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or at least a bachelor of science degree in biomedical engineering or a related discipline, (2) at least three years of experience in the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of medical devices that deliver energy to tissue, and 3) knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa. 11 Patent Owner suggests a POSA’s ability to “learn about” the nasal anatomy invokes the wrong standard because a POSA “must have the necessary background at the time of the invention.” PO Sur-reply 27. We agree in part with Patent Owner; the hypothetical POSA is presumed to possess the requisite skill at the time of the invention. Nevertheless, as it concerns an engineer with extensive experience designing and developing RF ablation devices (like Dr. Martin), we see no basis to conclude that such person may not become familiar with the features of the nose through review of the literature and/or consultation with clinicians. Ex. 1098 ¶ 44 (testifying a person with device design experience could learn about the relevant nasal anatomy and apply their skill to problems or solutions for that area by reviewing the relevant literature). Moreover, that Dr. Martin may not have had personal experience designing devices for the nose prior to 2006 does not mean that he cannot testify from a POSA’s perspective. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA, Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“An expert need not have acquired the skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art” because “an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a [POSA] knew at the time of the invention”) (emphasis omitted). Petitioner that the ’077 patent discloses delivering neurotoxins to any target, and not just the nose, the claims of the ’077 patent are directed to methods of treating a nasal condition by delivering energy to the nasal cavity. Pet. Reply 32. Thus, to fill a gap between Petitioner’s POSA definition and the scope of the challenged claims, we add to Petitioner’s definition the requirement for knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. We additionally add that a POSA’s educational background may include a bachelor of science degree in biomedical engineering or related discipline to reflect the nature of the field of invention. Nonetheless, we also note that our analysis and conclusions herein would not change even under Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a POSA. We do not agree with Patent Owner that prior experience designing or developing nasal medical devices is required for a POSA. PO Resp. 19–20. A definition inclusive of the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of nasal medical devices that deliver energy to tissue is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’077 patent and prior art. Consequently, we disagree with Patent Owner that Dr. Bu-Saba fails to qualify as a POSA because he lacks experience specific to designing medical devices. PO Resp. 19 n.4. We also disagree that Dr. Martin’s testimony should be discounted for a lack of first-hand experience designing RF ablation devices specific for the nose (which experience Patent Owner’s engineer expert also lacks). Id. As Dr. Martin’s testimony concerns certain issues in dispute (i.e., use of bipolar electrodes), we find Dr. Martin is qualified and his testimony helpful in resolving those disputes. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining And, even if there may be gaps in Dr. Martin’s experience or knowledge about the nasal anatomy, such gaps are filled by Dr. Bu-Saba’s extensive clinical expertise and testimony of record. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that we should discount the testimony of Dr. Bu-Saba or Dr. Martin; we give their testimony appropriate weight in reaching our conclusions here.” slip op. at 15

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

      “We do not agree with Patent Owner that prior experience designing or developing nasal medical devices is required for a POSA. PO Resp. 19–20. A definition inclusive of the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of nasal medical devices that deliver energy to tissue is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’077 patent and prior art. Consequently, we disagree with Patent Owner that Dr. Bu-Saba fails to qualify as a POSA because he lacks experience specific to designing medical devices. PO Resp. 19 n.4. We also disagree that Dr. Martin’s testimony should be discounted for a lack of first-hand experience designing RF ablation devices specific for the nose (which experience Patent Owner’s engineer expert also lacks). Id. As Dr. Martin’s testimony concerns certain issues in dispute (i.e., use of bipolar electrodes), we find Dr. Martin is qualified and his testimony helpful in resolving those disputes. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining And, even if there may be gaps in Dr. Martin’s experience or knowledge about the nasal anatomy, such gaps are filled by Dr. Bu-Saba’s extensive clinical expertise and testimony of record. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that we should discount the testimony of Dr. Bu-Saba or Dr. Martin; we give their testimony appropriate weight in reaching our conclusions here.” slip op. at 16

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “construction standard used to construe claims in a civil action before the courts under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing claims’ language in accordance with its ordinary and customary meaning as understood by the POSA, in view of the patent’s specification and considering the patent’s prosecution history. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We need only construe terms that are in controversy and only to the extent needed to resolve the dispute. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding claim construction is for “resolution of disputed meanings”). Petitioner contends that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR, the Board need not construe any terms.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner responds that “the Board need not construe any terms to determine Petitioners have failed to carry their burden in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 20. On the record before us, we conclude that the claims need not be expressly construed to resolve the dispute before us. Insofar as the parties dispute the mapping of the prior art to dependent claims 4 and 7, we address that dispute below including, to the extent necessary, any implicit disagreement about the subject matter encompassed by those claims.” slip op. at 17

    • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

      “For all the reasons above, we determine that the evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that a POSA would have reasonably expected success in combining the prior art to arrive at the subject matter of claim 1.” slip op. at 44

    Patent outcomesUS 11,679,077 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,679,077
  • PTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00280 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 2, 5, 8–10, 12, and 14 are unpatentable as obvious over Makower, Fang, and Edwards; the Board did not reach Grounds 1–3.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “Based on the record before us, including the types of problems and solutions described in the ’011 patent and the cited prior art, we find a POSA would have had (1) a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or at least a bachelor of science degree in biomedical engineering or a related discipline, (2) at least three years of experience in the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of medical devices that deliver energy to tissue, and 3) knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 12

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “We do not agree with Patent Owner that prior experience designing or developing nasal medical devices is required for a POSA. PO Resp. 19–20. A definition inclusive of the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of nasal medical devices that deliver energy to tissue is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’011 patent and prior art. Consequently, we disagree with Patent Owner that Dr. Bu-Saba fails to qualify as a POSA because he lacks experience specific to designing medical devices. PO Resp. 19 n.4. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that we should discount the testimony of Dr. Bu-Saba and we give Dr. Bu-Saba’s testimony appropriate weight in reaching our conclusions here.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “On the record before us, we conclude that the claims need not be expressly construed to resolve the dispute before us. Insofar as the parties dispute the mapping of the prior art to dependent claim 9, we address that dispute below including, to the extent necessary, any implicit disagreement about the subject matter encompassed by claim 9.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that Makower and Fang7 are analogous art to the challenged claims. Pet. 77 (arguing Makower and Fang “are in the same field” and are “reasonably pertinent” to solving problems addressed by the claimed invention); Ex. 1002 ¶ 178. According to Petitioner, Makower and 7 Petitioner argues a POSA had reasons for combining Edwards with Makower and Fang with a reasonable expectation of success (see, e.g., Pet. 74–76, 81–85). We find persuasive Petitioner’s reasoning and evidence on the addition of Edwards, and Patent Owner provides no rebuttal about Edwards. energy to tissue and “each uses RF energy to treat tissue.” Pet. 77 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1, 43, 132, 164, 187; Ex. 1006, 876–877).” slip op. at 25

    Patent outcomesUS 10,894,011 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,894,011
  • PTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00279 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–3, 7, 9, 10, and 17–25 are unpatentable as obvious over Makower and Fang; the Board did not reach the other grounds.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level board ownPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Based on the record before us, including the types of problems and solutions described in the ’675 patent and the cited prior art, we find a POSA would have had (1) a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or at least a bachelor of three years of experience in the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of medical devices that deliver energy to tissue, and 3) knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa. In reaching our finding, we note that, although we agree with Petitioner that the ’675 patent discloses delivering neurotoxins to any target, and not just the nose, the claims of the ’675 patent are directed to methods of treating a nasal condition by delivering energy to the nasal cavity. Pet. Reply 30. Thus, to fill a gap between Petitioner’s POSA definition and the scope of the challenged claims, we add to Petitioner’s definition the requirement for knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. We additionally add that a POSA’s educational background may include a bachelor of science degree in biomedical engineering or related discipline to reflect the nature of the field of invention. Nonetheless, we also note that our analysis and conclusions herein would not change even under Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a POSA. We do not agree with Patent Owner that prior experience designing or developing nasal medical devices is required for a POSA. PO Resp. 19. A definition inclusive of the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of nasal medical devices that deliver energy to tissue is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’675 patent and prior art. Consequently, we disagree with Patent Owner that Dr. Bu-Saba fails to qualify as a POSA because he lacks experience specific to designing medical devices. PO Resp. 19 n.4. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner” slip op. at 12

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

      “Second, we credit the testimony of the experts that, on balance, further confirms that skilled clinicians knew how to manage and remove fluids to the extent necessary. Dr. Bu-Saba testifies that typical steps for RF ablation procedures (even before 2006) included positioning the patient in a seated or slightly reclined position to facilitate the flow of any mucus or fluids away from the nasal cavity, application of topical decongestants, and “[i]n some circumstances,” if mucus or blood was still in the treatment area, “a 11 Nor does Patent Owner identify any disclosure in any other technical literature (either before or after 2006) expressing concerns that electrolytic fluids at the operative site could not be managed and/or would prevent targeted application of RF ablation energy to tissues at that site. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 91–97 (testifying about the hypothetical “fluid” problem, but identifying no independent recognition of such a problem in any corroborating reference); Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 66–76 (same). visualization of the surgical site.” Ex. 1098 ¶¶ 81–89; Pet. Reply 14–15. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Levine, concurs that skilled clinicians knew how to remove mucus and other fluids, testifying that “[i]f [mucus] was obstructing my view” and “[i]f it was this thick . . . I might have to mechanically remove it with forceps, I might have to suction it, I might have to irrigate the nose with a saline solution to wash out the nose.” Ex. 1089 (Levine Tr.), 83:3–84:6 (admitting residual saline could either be swallowed or suctioned out); see also id. at 86:1–16 (testifying a patient may be positioned such that by “[v]irtue of gravity . . . fluid would fall to the bottom”).” slip op. at 33

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner contends that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR, the Board need not construe any terms.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner responds that “the Board need not construe any terms to determine Petitioners have failed to carry their burden in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 20. On the record before us, we conclude that the claims need not be expressly construed to resolve the dispute before us. Insofar as the parties dispute the mapping of the prior art to dependent claim 22, we address that dispute below including, to the extent necessary, any implicit disagreement about the subject matter encompassed by claim 22.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
    Patent outcomesUS 10,610,675 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,610,675
  • PTAB · Jul 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00282 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4 and 7–9 are unpatentable as obvious, principally over Edwards-’535 and Stern for claims 1–3 and 7–9, and Makower, Edwards-’535, and Stern for claims 1, 2, and 4.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “To the extent Petitioner’s definition could be interpreted to encompass someone who only has experience using or testing unrelated medical devices, we tend to agree with Patent Owner. But it does not follow that experience with the clinical use and testing of medical devices, including those that deliver energy to tissue, would not be relevant background for one of ordinary skill. See Reply 27–28 (identifying evidence that clinical experience is relevant). The devices and methods in the challenged patent and asserted prior art are designed to be used by clinicians. Accordingly, clinical experience using and testing them would inform their design and therefore be relevant experience for one of ordinary skill in the art. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed modification of Petitioner’s definition, which would remove clinical use and testing from the list of activities in Petitioner’s POSITA definition. See PO Resp. 7 (proposing redlines). Instead, after reviewing the record, we adopt Petitioner’s definition as it is consistent with the prior art’s demonstration of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Regardless, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Martin, is qualified to offer opinions under either definition. Moreover, the parties do not argue that their respective position would be different under either POSITA definition. See PO Resp. 8 (Patent Owner arguing that the challenges fail “[r]egardless of how a POSITA is defined”); Ex. 1083 ¶ 88 (Dr. Martin testifying that his opinions “remain the same regardless of which definition applies”). Accordingly, all of the findings and conclusions herein would be the same under either side’s definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues that the part of claim 1’s preamble “to treat rhinitis” is not limiting. Pet. 18. According to Petitioner, the body of claim 1 recites a structurally complete apparatus, and the preamble only states an intended use for the device without limiting the claimed structure. Id. at 18–19. Patent Owner neither addresses this issue, nor proposes any other claim construction. PO Resp. 13 (“Patent Owner believes that no claim constructions are required to resolve the issues raised [in this IPR].”). On this record, we find Petitioner’s argument persuasive and determine that the part of claim 1’s preamble “to treat rhinitis” is not limiting.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “techniques of delivering bipolar RF ablation energy through expandable devices to the mucosal tissue of different body cavities.” Id. at 39. According to Petitioner, “combining Edwards-’535 and Stern involves applying Stern’s known bipolar pairing technique to Edwards-’535’s known device that was ready for improvement (because Edwards-’535 omits electrode wiring details) to yield predictable results.” Id. Thus, Petitioner concludes that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success when modifying Edwards-’535 in view of Stern. Id. at 38–40. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s mapping for claim limitations 1[a]-1[c] and 1[f] above, nor does Patent Owner challenge Petitioner’s reasoning for combining Edwards-’535 with Stern. See PO Resp. 14. Patent Owner, however, argues that Petitioner has failed to show Stern teaches limitations 1[d] and 1[e] “because Stern teaches a device comprising only a single pair of bipolar radiofrequency electrodes and a single radiofrequency output channel.” Id. We find that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Edwards-’535 and Stern and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so for the reasons set forth in the Petition. We also find that the articulated combination of Edwards-’535 and Stern teaches all of the limitations of claim 1. We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed analysis of claim limitations 1[a]-1[c] and [f] and reasoning for combining the references, and credit its supporting evidence. See Pet. 26–33, 43–46; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 84–102, 159–165. Below we address the parties’ arguments regarding the disputed limitations 1[d] and 1[e].” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “In our view, nothing is missing. Stern teaches that the circuitry in Figure 15 is configured to form multiple pairs of bipolar RF electrodes. Ex. 1033, 12:61–13:2 (explaining “[a]s an example” the closing of certain switches in Figure 15 to activate a bipolar pair between electrodes 220 and 224 and a second bipolar pair between electrodes 222 and 226 and further noting that “[c]learly bipolar operation is not limited to these . . . pair couplings” because other switches could be operated to activate a bipolar pair between electrodes 220 and 222); Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 108–111, 135–138. Indeed, Stern consistently uses the word “pairs,” i.e., the plural not the singular, to describe the bipolar operation of its device. See, e.g., Ex. 1033, 2:36–40, 3:38–40, 12:20–25, 12:29–30, 13:27–44, 20:9–10 (describing the bipolar operation of “pairs” nine times). Accordingly, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Stern teaches a device configured to have at most only a single pair of bipolar RF electrodes. Second, Stern teaches that the “embodiment of FIG. 15 . . . provides flexibility within the bipolar operation so that any pair or any combination of pairs may be utilized together.” Ex. 1033, 13:39–43 (emphasis added). Thus, even if claim 1 did require simultaneous activation of multiple bipolar pairs, we agree with Petitioner that such functionality is also taught by Stern. See Reply 5–6.” slip op. at 20

    Patent outcomesUS 11,766,286 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,766,286
  • PTAB · Jul 11, 2025 · PGR2025-00009 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Institution

    The Board instituted PGR on claims 1, 2, 6–14, and 16–29, finding the written-description and enablement challenges met the institution threshold; the obviousness challenge did not.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)) and in consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, Reply, Sur-Reply, and the cited evidence of record, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability of claims 1, 2, 6–14, and 16–29 of the ’035 patent, and therefore, we grant post-grant review for the reasons articulated below.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner’s contentions are, at this stage, unavailing because Patent Owner’s proffered definition of a POSA is too restrictive. Petitioner’s proposal is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the level of skill reflected in prior art relevant to the ’035 patent. It is reasonably clear that, in indicating that a POSA would have an advanced degree (like a Ph.D.) and years of experience in analysis of protein structure, Petitioner is asserting that knowledge of proteins generally is sufficient to understand the types of problems encountered in the art and the prior art solutions to those problems, and the ordinary artisan need not be an expert in hyaluronidases. See Pet. 15–16. Petitioner requires that the POSA would be able to apply key scientific concepts (e.g., biochemistry, recombinant biology, sequence analysis and protein modeling) to enzymes such as hyaluronidases. See id.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “refers to a PH20 polypeptide that contains at least one amino acid modification, such as at least one amino acid replacement as described herein, in its sequence of amino acids compared to a reference unmodified PH20 polypeptide. A modified PH20 polypeptide can have up to 150 amino acid replacements, so long as the resulting modified PH20 polypeptide exhibits hyaluronidase activity. Typically, a modified PH20 polypeptide contains 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, or 50 amino acid replacements. It is understood that a modified PH20 polypeptide also can include any one or more other modifications, in addition to at least one amino acid replacement as described herein. Id. at 48:38–53 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 15

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateInstituted

      “On the current record, the evidence shows it is more likely than not that the claims of the ’035 patent fail to satisfy the written description requirement because they “recite a description of the problem to be solved while claiming all solutions to it and . . . cover any compound later actually invented and determined to fall within the claim’s functional boundaries— leaving it to the pharmaceutical industry to complete an unfinished invention.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353. Accordingly, on the current record, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the ’035 patent does not comply with the written description requirement. Similarly, the current record does not appear to provide evidence of possession of the full scope of the claims of the ’035 patent in the ’731 application or any of the subsequent divisional or continuation applications leading to the ’035 patent that claim priority to the ’731 application (which appear to all have similar specifications) for the reasons given above.10 Therefore, the ’035 patent might not receive the benefit of priority to the earlier filed applications, and based on this preliminary determination, is eligible for post-grant review” slip op. at 30

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 12,123,035
  • PTAB · Jul 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00278 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1, 4–6, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 15–17 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner disputes the second part of Petitioner’s definition “because the ‘and/or’ encompasses within the definition . . . persons who only have experience with the clinical use or testing of medical devices.” Resp. 6. According to Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill “would have had more experience than just clinically using medical devices or simply conducting tests with medical devices” Id. at 6–7. To the extent Petitioner’s definition could be interpreted to encompass someone who only has experience using or testing unrelated medical devices, we tend to agree with Patent Owner. But it does not follow that experience with the clinical use and testing of medical devices, including those that deliver energy to tissue, would not be relevant background for one of ordinary skill. See Reply 33–34 (identifying evidence that clinical experience is relevant). The devices and methods in the challenged patent and asserted prior art are designed to be used by clinicians. Accordingly, clinical experience using and testing them would inform their design and therefore be relevant experience for one of ordinary skill in the art. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed modification of Petitioner’s definition, which would remove clinical use and testing from the list of activities in Petitioner’s POSITA definition. See Resp. 7 (proposing redlines). Instead, we apply Petitioner’s definition. Regardless, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Martin, is qualified to offer the opinions in his declarations under either definition. Moreover, Patent Owner does not identify any testimony it contends would be different under its POSITA definition. See Ex. 1083 ¶ 103 (Dr. Martin testifying that his opinions “remain the same regardless of which definition applies”). Accordingly, all of the findings and conclusions herein would be the same under either side’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “Neither side proposes any terms for express construction. Petitioner contends “the Board need not construe any terms because the Challenged Claims are invalid under any reasonable interpretation.” Pet. 20. “Patent Owner believes that no claim constructions are required to resolve the issues raised” in this IPR. Resp. 13. Nevertheless, in their arguments over whether the prior art teaches certain claim elements, each side accuses the other of misinterpreting or reading requirements beyond their ordinary meaning into those terms. See Reply 3–10 (urging that Patent Owner’s arguments read requirements into elements 1[d] and 1[e]); Sur-Reply 9–15 (arguing Petitioner applies an incorrect definition of “radio frequency output channel”). To the extent the parties’ arguments raise any implicit issues of claim construction, we address those issues within the context they are raised in our analysis below. No further express claim construction is necessary for this decision.” slip op. at 10

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Edwards-535 and Stern, and had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so for the reasons set forth in the Petition. We also find that the articulated combination of Edwards-535 and Stern teaches all of the limitations of claim 1. We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed analysis of claim elements 1[a]-[c] and [f] and reasoning for combining the references, and credit its supporting evidence. See Pet. 7–14, 17–20; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 79–103, 113–21. Below we address the parties’ arguments regarding the disputed elements 1[d] and 1[e].” slip op. at 23

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We find that Petitioner has the more persuasive position and has demonstrated that Stern teaches element 1[e]. Petitioner demonstrates Stern’s multiple RF output channels with the annotated version of Figure 15 shown below. Pet. 42–43. As shown by Petitioner’s annotations above, the channel (highlighted in orange) connecting the output received from voltage source 228 to the first bipolar pair (circled in green on the left) is distinct from the channel connecting the output to the second bipolar electrode pair (circled in purple on the right) because depending on which switches are closed, energy travels through a separate connection between those switches and the corresponding electrodes. We agree with Petitioner, and credit Dr. Martin’s testimony, that each of the output channels highlighted in orange in Stern’s Figure 15 above “are output channels as required by the claims because the channels are separately/individually connected to the electrodes” and “control individual pairs of bipolar RF electrodes.” Id. at 43–44; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 124–128; see also Ex. 1083 ¶ 45 (“an ‘output channel’ connects electrodes and provides the ability to independently control pairs of electrodes”). This understanding of the term “output channel” is consistent with the claim language. Claim 1 recites “multiple radiofrequency output channels” wherein “each pair” of bipolar RF electrodes “is connected with a respective one of the multiple radio frequency output channels.” Ex. 1001, 52:27–33. The RF generator itself and its connection to the output channels is not recited in claim 1. Instead, the claim language focuses on the connection between the electrode pair and its respective output channel. The description in the specification also focuses on the connection to the electrodes and further explains that having a “separate, controlled electrical channel” for “each pair of electrodes” allows for “different regions of the treatment element to be activated separately.” Ex. 1001, 24:45–52, 48:63–65; see also Ex. 1083 ¶ 33 (“[e]very time the patent mentions ‘electrical channel’ or ‘output channel,’ it is referring to connections to electrodes”). This aligns with the depiction of the output channels in the ’318 patent’s figures. See Ex. 1001, Figs. 39–44 (showing RF output channel 961 connected to electrodes). Petitioner demonstrates this in the annotated version of Figure 39 shown below. Reply 8.” slip op. at 29

    Patent outcomesUS 11,033,318 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,033,318
  • PTAB · Jul 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00277 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–4, 6–12, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the Edwards-535, Kong, and Stern combinations, with Edwards-886 added for claim 4.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “To the extent Petitioner’s definition could be interpreted to encompass someone who only has experience using or testing unrelated medical devices, we tend to agree with Patent Owner. But it does not follow that experience with the clinical use and testing of medical devices, including those that deliver energy to tissue, would not be relevant background for one of ordinary skill. See Reply 29–31 (identifying evidence that clinical use and testing experience is relevant). The devices and methods in the challenged patent and asserted prior art are designed to be used by clinicians. Ex. 1083 ¶¶ 5, 14–15 (explaining that clinicians who use such devices gain extensive experience regarding how they work); see also Ex. 1084, 82:13–83:20 (Dr. Bikson testifying that a physician would perform the claimed method steps). Accordingly, clinical experience using and testing them would inform their design and be relevant experience for one of ordinary skill in the art. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed modification of Petitioner definition, which would remove clinical use and testing from the list of activities in Petitioner’s POSITA definition. See Resp. 7 (proposing redlines). Instead, we apply Petitioner’s definition. Regardless, Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Martin, is qualified to offer the opinions in his declarations under either definition and Patent Owner does not identify any testimony it contends would be different under its POSITA definition. See Ex. 1097 ¶ 49 (Dr. Martin testifying that his opinions “remain the same regardless of which definition applies”). Moreover, as explained below, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s challenge to Dr. DelGaudio’s qualifications and give his testimony appropriate weight in our analysis. For these reasons, our findings and conclusions would be the same under either side’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

      “Third, nothing suggests that Dr. DelGaudio is not qualified to offer opinions regarding the knowledge and skill of one of ordinary skill in the art. In addition, to his relevant clinical experience, Dr. DelGaudio has experience designing different types of medical devices and consulting with device manufacturers to provide feedback and improve devices used in nasal surgery. Ex. 1083 ¶¶ 9–11. Thus, even if we had adopted a POSITA definition requiring design and development experience, Dr. DelGaudio would qualify as one of ordinary skill in the art because he has such experience in addition to his extensive clinical background. Id. Nevertheless, Patent Owner argues he is “not an individual capable of designing and developing the medical device used in the claimed method” because “Dr. DelGaudio has no experience in designing medical devices that deliver energy to tissue.” Sur-reply 22–24 (emphasis added). That argument is unavailing because such devices and methods of using them such as those recited in the claims of the ’271 patent are often developed by a team of individuals with different backgrounds and expertise. That Dr. DelGaudio working alone may not be capable of designing and developing such a device does not disqualify him from offering testimony from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, particularly as it relates to those claim elements that recite the use of the device as opposed to its technical details.8 Moreover, Dr. DelGaudio was careful not to overstep the bounds of his expertise, relying on testimony from Dr. Martin to confirm his understanding concerning some of the engineering details of the devices themselves. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 94, 124, 127, 130, 151; see also Ex. 1083 ¶ 12 (explaining he relied on Dr. Martin to confirm his understanding of teachings in Stern that disclose “implementation details about circuitry used to operate the bipolar electrodes, the physics of delivering energy to tissue, among other things”); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 66–131 (Dr. Martin testifying regarding a POSITA’s understanding of the prior art as it relates to such elements). Fourth, even if Dr. DelGaudio did not himself qualify as one of ordinary skill, we could still consider his testimony on those matters on which he was qualified. See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 52, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents /tpgnov.pdf (“CTPG”) (“A person may not need to be a person of ordinary skill in the art in order to testify as an expert under Rule 702, but rather must be ‘qualified in the pertinent art.’”) (citing cases). We agree with Petitioner that this would include matters such as the use of the devices described in the cited references in a clinical setting. See Reply 28. 8 Indeed, by its logic, Patent Owner’s own expert would not be one of ordinary skill in the art because he is not himself capable of practicing the claimed method. See Ex. 1084, 24:13–22, 82:19–83:8 (testifying he has never used an RF device to treat a patient and would not himself perform the recited method).” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “Petitioner’s position is persuasive. Even without taking into account the reasoning based on Baker (which we address separately below), Petitioner has demonstrated a sufficient rationale for incorporating Stern’s arrangement of two rows of bipolar electrode pairs into Edwards-535’s device. Edwards-535 teaches that a plurality of electrodes may be positioned on the surface of its treatment element, but does not specify how those electrodes are arranged or controlled. Ex. 1010, 8:25–27; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 68–69. Stern teaches a control system for selectively delivering power to bipolar electrode pairs arranged in two rows on the surface of its device that provides even heating and precise control. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 80–85. As Dr. DelGaudio explains, one of ordinary skill in the art would have regarded these attributes to be particularly beneficial when delivering treatment to the “nasal passages . . . given the uneven morphology of nasal cavity tissue and the proximity of the RF energy delivery to a patient’s brain and other critical tissues within the head.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 94. We credit the testimony of Petitioner’s experts that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to incorporate Stern’s teachings, including the complementary two-row surface electrode arrangement shown in Figure 19, for these reasons. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 93–94; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 72–73, 75–88, 96–97 (explaining that Stern’s techniques would have been used to improve Edwards-535’s device in a similar way). Petitioner’s reasoning that “arranging electrodes in rows . . . facilitates simple spatial resolution of the applied energy” is also persuasive. See Pet. 47–48. As Dr. Martin explains, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that arranging bipolar electrodes in two or more rows was a “common way to arrange such electrodes” (Ex. 1004 ¶ 34) and a “simple way to direct energy to specific locations for treatment would have been to place pairs of electrodes in rows . . . along the device at the locations being treated.” Id. ¶ 95.” slip op. at 41

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner’s position is persuasive. Stern’s Figure 15 shows bipolar electrodes 220 and 224 in a first horizontal row and electrodes 222 and 226 in a second horizontal row. Stern teaches that bipolar pairs can be formed between various combination of these electrodes resulting in both pairs within a row and pairs formed across two rows. See Ex. 1033, 12:61–13:2 (explaining that “bipolar operation is not limited to [electrode] 220-224 and 222-226 pair couplings” because pairs could also be formed across rows, e.g., between electrodes 220 and 222). Stern’s Figure 19 likewise depicts a plurality of electrodes arranged in two rows. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 71–74 (Dr. Martin explaining that the physical arrangement in Figure 19 is complementary to the control structure in Figure 15 and that there are two rows regardless of which electrodes are paired). In bipolar operation, each of these figures depicts “two rows of bipolar electrode pairs” as recited in element 1[a] because there are two rows comprising multiple pairs.15 Patent Owner’s narrower interpretation of the phrase “two rows of bipolar electrode pairs” is not consistent with the intrinsic record. According to Patent Owner and Dr. Bikson, it is not enough that there are two rows of electrodes comprising multiple pairs––rather each row must itself contain multiple pairs. See Resp. 23; Ex. 2001 ¶ 75 (“A row of only two electrodes is not a row of bipolar electrode pairs because a row of only two electrodes has at most a single pair (not multiple pairs).”). As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner’s interpretation assumes that the “s” in “pairs” modifies each row individually, rather than the recited “rows” collectively. But the claim 15 In reply to Patent Owner’s argument that there must be at least three electrodes in a row for that row to contain multiple pairs, Petitioner shows that Stern also discloses rows with three or more electrodes. Ex. 1083 ¶¶ 36– 40; Ex. 1097 ¶¶ 39–41 (identifying rows with three or more electrodes in Stern’s Figures 4a and 19). We need not address that showing in detail because, as explained below, element 1[a] does not require that there be more than one pair in each row. language does not specify that each row has pairs (plural). Rather, given its plain meaning, “two rows of bipolar electrode pairs” encompasses an arrangement like that shown in Stern’s Figure 15. Ex. 1097 ¶ 30 (Dr. Martin explaining that “what is required is (1) more than one bipolar electrode pair that are (2) spread across rows”). This broader understanding is confirmed by the specification of the” slip op. at 35

    Patent outcomesUS 11,241,271 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,241,271
  • PTAB · Jun 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00313 · APJ Tawen Chang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–54 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to establish a reasonable expectation of success for the proposed combinations; objective indicia also supported non-obviousness.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “As to the first issue, we agree with Patent Owner that defining the level of skill in view of the solution described in the patent risks improper hindsight. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 18 (“[T]he level of skill in the art is a . . . lens through which . . . the Board views the prior art and the claimed invention,” which “prevents . . . factfinders from using their own insight or . . . hindsight[] to gauge obviousness.”). We therefore do not include “practical knowledge about . . . the deuterium isotope effect, including the patents and publications discussed [in the Petition],” as part of our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 18

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedMixed

      “person of ordinary skill in the art would employ” in an obviousness analysis, we give some weight to Dr. Guengerich’s testimony. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 724 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining that “motivation to combine may be found. . . in . . . the background knowledge, creativity, and common sense of the person of ordinary skill”). Nevertheless, even if we were to agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have seen the 1,5-shift in NRPE in Mata’s A2E biosynthetic pathway as a particularly desirable location for intervention, we are not persuaded that such a person would have been motivated to substitute C20 deuterated vitamin A for the vitamin A in Ortho Pharma’s composition and method, because Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that such an artisan would have reasonably expected the substitution to retard the accumulation of A2E or to treat macular degeneration.” slip op. at 42

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

      “In our Institution Decision, we preliminarily construed the preamble of claim 28 as limiting. Inst. Dec. 30–31. Petitioner did not take issue with our construction, or dispute Patent Owner’s construction of the preambles of claims 1 and 29 as also limiting. After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction of the preamble of claim 28 as limiting for the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision. For similar reasons and the reasons set forth in Patent Owner’s Response, we further construe the preambles of claims 1 and 29 as limiting. See PO Resp. 12–14. We further determine that we do not need to construe any other claim term in order to resolve the controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 26

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under this framework, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id.” slip op. at 25

    Patent outcomesUS RE47,045 not shown unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.