- PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–3 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, we determine the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’347 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that a decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design and/or fabrication, including the processing of semiconductor materials, analysis of device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53). Petitioner also contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 19. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition or offer its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’347 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’347 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”)” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“type gate material of independent claim 1 requires that the “bottom of the ptype gate material is more than 10% wider than the top of the material.” Pet. 19. We begin our analysis with the language of the claims themselves. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Here, the claims do not recite any numerical degree of horizontal extension, let alone a requirement that the bottom of the p-type gate material must be more than 10% wider than the top of the material. Thus, the plain language of the claims themselves do not support Petitioner’s proposed construction. Of course, the claims do not stand alone, but rather, must be read in view of the specification, of which they are part. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Petitioner relies on a numerical value for horizontal extension disclosed in Lidow, which is incorporated by reference in the ’347 patent. Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 41–42, Fig. 8; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–74). But Lidow’s disclosure of a numerical value (10%) is made in the context of discussing a single embodiment. Ex. 1011 ¶ 41. Lidow does not include a numerical value in its disclosure of other embodiments. See, e.g., Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 43–51.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Again, Patent Owner’s arguments raise issues that are best resolved on a full record. While we do have some concern’s regarding Petitioner’s asserted reasons to combine all of the prior art references, Petitioner has provided sufficient argument and evidence for purposes of institution that a POSITA would have had reason to manufacture the modified Figure 1A of Saxler by using Beach’s self-aligned technique with Shenoy’s isotropic etching process, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–62, 93; Ex. 1014 (Xu); Ex. 1021 (Sheppard); Ex. 1015 (Smith); Ex. 1018 (Hu); Ex. 1009 (Shenoy); Widmann (Ex. 1023); Ahn (Ex. 1010); see also Pet. 31–35. For example, Dr. Shealy testifies that a POSITA would have recognized that using Beach’s self-aligned techniques and Shenoy’s isotropic etching process to arrive at Saxler’s non-recessed gate structure would have been a simple and predictable combination in view of Smith’s use of self-alignment techniques to create its stacked gate structure and would have done so to reduce steps and costs while improving reproducibility. Ex. 1003 ¶ 93. We also note that we understand Petitioner’s proposed combination uses a single photomask when etching both the gate metal and the p-type gate material layer, including when etching the gate metal to form a pair of ledges on the p-type gate material below the gate metal. See, e.g., Pet. 48 (stating that it would have been obvious to use one mask to etch the gate metal and cap layer and further stating that using Shenoy’s method of isotropically etching the gate metal would form symmetric undercuts of the photomask). To the extent, the Board’s understanding of Petitioner’s argument is not correct, the parties are urged to address this issue. Finally, Patent Owner asserts that Shenoy is non-analogous art and may not be combined with Saxler or Beach because Shenoy involves electrochemical etching, a highly specialized etching method with little relevance to the process described in the ’347 patent or Saxler. Prelim. Resp. 27.” slip op. at 32
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,748,347 - PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01384 · APJ Jeffrey W Abraham · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim of the ’335 patent is unpatentable over the prior art of record, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims. And because we find some grounds sufficient for institution, we institute on all grounds in the petition. See SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1353 (2018); PGS Geophysical, 891 F.3d at 1360. determination with respect to the patentability of any challenged claim or any underlying factual or legal issue, including claim construction. IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of claims 1–7 of the ’335 patent is instituted with respect to all grounds of unpatentability asserted in the Petition, commencing on the entry date of this Decision; and FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of trial.” slip op. at 54
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design and/or 1 The relevant sections of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, took effect on March 16, 2013. Because the ’335 patent has an effective filing date prior to the effective date of the applicable AIA amendments, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 US 2006/0108606 A1, published May 25, 2006 (Ex. 1007). 3 JP H11-261053, published Sept. 24, 1999 (Ex. 1005 (original language); Ex. 1006 (certified English translation)). 4 US 2007/0007547 A1, published Jan. 11, 2007 (Ex. 1008). 5 R.V. Shenoy, et. al, Effect of Mask Wall Angle on Shape Evolution during Through-Mask Electrochemical Micromachining, J. ELECTROCHEM. SOC., Vol. 143, No. 2, 544, Feb. 1996 (Ex. 1013). device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53). Petitioner also contends that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition or offer its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’335 patent and the prior art of record, at this stage of the proceeding we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’335 patent and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“type gate material of independent claims 1 and 5 requires that the “bottom of the p-type gate material is more than 10% wider than the top of the material.” Pet. 19. We begin our analysis with the language of the claims themselves. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Here, the claims do not recite 7 Patent Owner cites to the Lidow-508 patent itself, instead of the published application included in the record as Ex. 1011, which Petitioner cites to. The parties have not identified any difference between the two references. the bottom of the p-type gate material must be more than 10% wider than the top of the material. Ex. 1001, 5:5–6:30. Thus, the plain language of the claims themselves does not support Petitioner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“As discussed above, however, we are persuaded, at this stage, by Petitioner’s argument that that Saxler teaches or suggests an operable enhancement-mode device. See § II.D.1.a.i, supra. Additionally, Patent Owner’s argument regarding modifications that “could be detrimental” to certain devices is not only speculation, but also comprised entirely of attorney argument. Finally, Patent Owner does not directly address Petitioner’s arguments and accompanying evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Saxler and Yoshida to take advantage of simplified manufacturing steps and reduced costs. Based on the present record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Saxler and Yoshida disclose or suggest all of the limitations in claims 1, 3, and 4, and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Saxler and Yoshida with a reasonable expectation of success. Accordingly, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge that claims 1, 3, and 4 are unpatentable as obvious in view of Saxler and Yoshida. For the same reasons as noted above, we decline to address Petitioner’s challenge of claims 2 and 5–7 based on Saxler and Yoshida alone at this stage. See § II.D.1.c, supra.” slip op. at 44
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,312,335 - PTAB · Mar 26, 2024 · IPR2023-01424 · APJ Donna M Praiss · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 and 18–20, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted grounds, including anticipation by Ueda and obviousness over Plante and Cho.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any argument not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at 1 Petitioner identifies itself as the real party in interest. Pet. 1. In addition, Petitioner notes that Spectrum Holdco LLC is its parent company and that Spectrum Holdco LLC and Spectrum Intermediate LLC “have a financial interest in, or could be substantially affected by the outcome of, this proceeding.” Id. 2 Patent Owner identifies itself as the real party in interest and notes that it is a wholly owned subsidiary of OraSure Technologies, Inc. Paper 4, 2. least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–16 and 18–20 of the ’632 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“We decline to exercise our discretion here. As pointed out by Petitioner, the same or substantially the same art or arguments were not previously presented with respect to the ’632 patent. Pet. 123–24. Petitioner challenges the ’632 patent on grounds that were not asserted against the ’646 patent, namely the grounds based on Ueda. Id. at 71–123. In addition, we found Petitioner’s arguments based on Plante sufficiently persuasive and determined that the challenged ’646 patent claims are unpatentable. IPR2022-01347, Paper 43 (Feb. 7, 2024). For these reasons, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(POSITA) “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, or similar technical degree and at least 3 years of experience in the medical device industry, including experience with containers and valves used in disposable medical devices.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 51–52). Petitioner further asserts that such a person would have collaborated with a team member with training and experience in the biological aspects of the invention and education and experience relating to the collection of biological samples. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 51– 52). Patent Owner does not offer an alternative definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art at this time. See generally Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that it is not necessary for us to construe “biological sample” or “annular valve” at this stage of the proceeding because neither party contends that construing either term is material to deciding whether to institute a trial on the asserted grounds in the Petition. See Nidec Motor Corp. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,536,632 - PTAB · Mar 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01381 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–12 on all petition grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’294 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’294 patent on all of the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science, or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design or fabrication, including the processing of semiconductor materials, analysis of device operation, or the development of new device topologies.” Pet. 5–6. Patent Owner does not address the knowledge or education of a person of ordinary skill in the art. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art as it appears consistent with the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends the terms “compensated GaN layer” and “above” require construction. Pet. 12–17; Prelim. Reply 1–5. Patent Owner contends only the term “compensated GaN layer” requires construction. Prelim. Resp. 5–15; Prelim. Sur-reply 1–3. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that only the term “compensated GaN layer” requires construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Claims Claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, which is the “meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Patent Owner does not present evidence that the ordinary meaning in the art of a “GaN layer” is “GaN gate material.” Indeed, the prior art of record discloses multiple GaN layers that do not appear to be “gate material.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 32; Ex. 1005 ¶ 74 (“the channel layer 20 is GaN”); Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 24–25 (noting that the buffer layer and semiconductor layer are GaN). Nor does Patent Owner contend that the term “compensated” requires or implies a particular orientation or location with respect to the gate contact. Thus, by itself, the term “compensated GaN layer” does not require a “compensated GaN gate material.” Rather, Patent Owner contends that given the placement of the “compensated GaN layer” above the barrier layer and below the gate contact, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the claimed “compensated GaN layer” is a “compensated GaN gate material.” Prelim. Resp. 7. We are not persuaded by this argument, at this stage of the proceeding, because the prior art (Uemoto) discloses a compensated GaN layer that is above a barrier layer and below a gate contact, as recited in claim 1, and Patent Owner contends this layer is not a “compensated GaN layer.” Ex. 1006, Fig. 7; Prelim. Resp. 31–32. This tends to suggest that the placement of a “compensated GaN layer” above a barrier layer and below a gate contact, without more, does not necessarily indicate that said layer is part of the gate. In view of the foregoing, on this record, we determine that the language and structure of claim 1 does not support a construction requiring that the “compensated GaN layer” be a “compensated GaN gate material.”” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,350,294 - PTAB · Mar 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01383 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–5 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Yoshida, Beach, and Sheppard.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim of the ’508 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’508 patent on all grounds asserted in the Petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018); PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that a decision to institute is “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had a “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, chemical engineering, physics, or material science or a closely related field and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design or fabrication, including the processing of semiconductor materials, analysis of device 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 2011), includes revisions to Section 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the challenged claims issued from an application filed before March 16, 2013, we apply the pre-AIA law to the challenges. See Ex. 1001, code (30). 2 JP H11-261053, published Sept. 24, 1999 (Ex. 1004, pp. 8–11 (original language), pp. 1–7 (certified English translation), p. 12 (certification) “Yoshida”)). All references are to the English translation portion of Ex. 1004. 3 US 2007/0057624, published June 23, 2005 (Ex. 1005, “Beach”). 4 US 7,238,560, issued July 3, 2007 (Ex. 1006, “Sheppard”). 5 US Pub. App. No. 2006/0273347, published Dec. 7, 2006 (Ex. 1007, “Hikita-347”). 6 US Pub. App. No. 2008/0079023, published Apr. 3, 2008 (Ex. 1008, “Hikita-023”). education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex 1003 ¶ 69). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition or offer its own. See generally, Prelim. Resp. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’508 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’508 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“At this stage of the proceeding, based on the present record, we determine that the claims require that the dielectric layer steps of [1f] must occur before the ohmic contact steps of [1g] but that the claims do not require that the gate structure be formed before the source and drain contacts. Step [1f] recites depositing a dielectric layer; applying a contact photo resistant pattern; etching the dielectric layer to open the drain and source contact area; and removing the contact photo resistant pattern. Ex. 1001, 7:5–9. Thus, it appears that the drain and source contact area recited in step [1f3] is the area where the drain and source contacts are formed. The ohmic contact steps of [1g] are directed to forming the drain and source contacts. As a matter of logic, the drain source contact area must be opened before the drain and source contacts are formed. As such, the dielectric layer steps of and removal of the contact photo resistant pattern––must be performed before the ohmic contact steps of [1g] to form the Ohmic drain and source contacts are performed. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Reply 1–9 (disputing whether the gate must be formed before the source and drain, but not disputing that the dielectric layer [1f1] must be deposited before forming the source and drain contacts [1g]).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“contact is formed after the source and drain contacts are formed––differs from Beach’s process––which appears to form the gate contact at the same time as the ohmic (source/drain). We also acknowledge Patent Owner’s arguments that these two methods are inconsistent and contrary to each other. Prelim. Resp. 20–22. However, Petitioner has provided evidence and argument, supported by declaration testimony, that it would have been obvious to combine Yoshida and Beach to arrive at the subject matter of claim 1. For example, Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have been motivated to use Beach’s resist pattern 13 as a single gate photo resistant pattern to etch away both Yoshida’s gate contact layer and doped GaN layer in order to remove the second mask step to decrease costs and simplify the manufacturing process, as well as improve gate alignment. Pet. 21 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 125–126). Petitioner has also provided evidence and arguments, supported by declaration testimony, that a POSITA would have been motivated to use Beach’s resist pattern 13 as a metal photo resistant pattern to etch away Yoshida’s metal Al (ohmic contact metal) deposited on layer 4. Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 10, 22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 135). These contentions are sufficient, for purposes of institution, to show that a POSITA would have had reason to combine Yoshida and Beach in the manner and arguments, supported by declaration testimony, that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining the teachings of the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention. Pet. 20. We have considered all of Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, and determine they raise issues best resolved on a full record. For all of the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Yoshida, Beach, and Sheppard teach or suggest all of the limitations of claim 1 and that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of the asserted art. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that claim 1 would have been obvious over Yoshida, Beach, and Sheppard.” slip op. at 29
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,404,508 - Amphenol Corp. v. PPC Broadband, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01363 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, and 10–13 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim, including obviousness over Holmberg and Battey.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’483 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the Challenged Claims of the ’483 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends claim 1 should be construed to require that “the drop cable retain its external jacket as it is routed internally.” Pet. 10. Petitioner contends this construction differs from Patent Owner’s apparent construction in the district court, “which allows the external jacket to be removed as the drop cable enters the DIB and the fibers routed inside the box without the external jacket.” Id. at 10–11. Patent Owner contends Petitioner’s narrower construction requiring the “drop cable” retain its external jacket is incorrect, but contends “the Board need not resolve this claim construction dispute to deny institution because Petitioner’s proposed Grounds 1–5 are all insufficient under” either party’s construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). We address below, however, whether the recited cable types themselves constitute claim limitations.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“slack fiber. Prelim. Resp. 33–37. These arguments are not persuasive. First, Petitioner does not propose a bodily incorporation of Battey’s shelf into the device of Holmberg. Rather, Petitioner’s proposed combination retains splice tray 230 of Holmberg and relies on Battey for its disclosure of using a hinge connection for the splice tray. Pet. 40 (asserting that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to modify Holmberg pursuant to Battey, resulting in splice tray 230 moveable relative to main body 216”), 43 (“Such a modification would have been a simple substitution of a hinged connection instead of a fastener.”). Second, although Battey utilizes a fixedly mounted slack basket to store excess cable, we are directed to no disclosure or teaching in Battey that teaches away from using other means of storing slack fiber.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“For the reasons set forth below, we determine that part two of the Advanced Bionics framework has not been satisfied. Thus, we need not address whether part one of the framework is satisfied in view of the alleged cumulative nature of Laporte and Battey.” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,008,483 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2024 · IPR2023-01206 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, and 4–23 based on three obviousness challenges involving Fugitt and the listed papermaking references.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Patent Owner that Papermaking is cumulative to Mohan. Petitioner relies on Papermaking to teach claim 1’s recitation that “a contact surface of said thermo-roller is heated to an elevated temperature of at least 250°F.” Pet. 32–34. Mohan discloses hot hard calendering of paper and paperboard to improve smoothness, where calender rolls have “a roll surface temperature of 250–400°F. during calendering of the web.” Ex. 2002, 1:7–10, 4:46–57.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Institution of inter partes review is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons discussed below, the facts do not warrant exercise of discretion to deny institution, and the reasonable likelihood standard is met. We, therefore, grant institution of an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner is correct that the ’142 Patent does not mention heating a counter-roller of a hot-hard calender, and the surface temperature of the counter-roller is not discussed. Prelim. Resp. 12. But nowhere does the ’142 Patent suggest that the counter-roller should not be heated to an elevated temperature. Under the applicable legal standard, the’142 Patent’s silence about whether the counter-roller is heated is not enough to justify reading a negative limitation into the claim. “negative limitation.” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 Fed. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2021). “[S]uch exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Id. (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting.” GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,’ and ‘clearly express an intent to define the term.’” Id. (citing Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365). Similarly, disclaimer or disavowal requires that the specification or prosecution history demonstrate that the invention does not include a particular feature. Id. Here, Patent Owner does not point to any claim language, lexicography, or disclaimer in the ’142 Patent or its file history that would support defining a “hot-hard calender” as requiring that only one of the two rollers be heated to an elevated temperature.” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“As we understand it, one theory of obviousness advanced by Petitioner is combining Fugitt’s teaching that “[t]he rolls of the calender may be steam heated” with Papermaking’s teaching about the surface temperature that can be obtained when using steam to heat the rolls. Pet. 32–33; temperature of Fugitt’s steam-heated rollers in order to achieve a contact surface temperature of at least 250°F, as recited in claim 1. Instead, we understand Petitioner to be relying on Papermaking to teach the temperature of the unmodified rollers of Fugitt. Under this theory, it was not necessary for Petitioner to show that the paperboard substrate properties disclosed in Fugitt would still be achieved after increasing the temperature. Nevertheless, the Petition also relies on Papermaking’s teaching of temperatures that exceed the upper limit for steam-heated rolls, e.g., “[h]igh thermo roll temperatures (in some cases over 200°C [392°F]” or oil-heated rollers having surface that “can reach over 220°C [428°F].” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1005, 82; Ex. 1010, 98). Patent Owner is correct that Petitioner relies on Fugitt’s disclosure of paperboard properties (smoothness and basis weight Y2 as a function of caliper thickness) obtained without modifying the roller surface temperature. Pet. 35–36; Prelim. Resp. 44. There is a factual issue as to whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have expected to achieve the paperboard properties disclosed in Fugitt and recited in claim 1, if the roller temperature were increased above the level achievable by steamheated rolls. There is also a factual issue as to whether Patent Owner’s evidence of increased energy cost would outweigh Petitioner’s asserted benefits of increased temperature. These issues are best resolved after the parties have had to the opportunity to develop the record and cross-examine the opposing experts. See Arctic Cat Inc. v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 795 F. App’x 827, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board must weigh the benefits and drawbacks of the modification against each other, to determine whether there would be a motivation to combine.”).” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,293,142 - Apple Inc. v. RJ Technology, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Feb 23, 2024 · IPR2023-01350 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 5–14 on all four asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’641 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’641 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art, as of the earliest possible priority date for the ’641 patent, “would have held a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or chemical engineering, with at least 4 years of experience in cell design, electrochemical techniques, and battery materials development.” Pet. 4. Petitioner further contends that a “Master’s Degree can substitute[] for some of the relevant experience,” and “[e]quivalent training with battery specific experience can accommodate other degreed fields.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition, “except noting that other majors may provide equivalent education and experience designing, testing, and building lithium-ion batteries.” Prelim. Resp. 14. Upon review of the prior art of record and the parties’ arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. The parties may further address at trial whether “other majors” should be added to this definition, and whether such a modification would have any impact on the unpatentability analysis in this case.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party contends any terms of the ’641 patent require express construction. Pet. 4–5; Prelim. Resp. 13–14. And, for purposes of this decision, we agree that no claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“This argument is not persuasive. Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, the Federal Circuit has held that “generic” reasons to combine are not inherently suspect, and may reasonably include a desire to make a device “stronger, cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable or more efficient.” See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 797 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Regardless, Petitioner’s asserted reasons to combine are specific (improved safety and less deterioration after repeated charging and discharging cycles), as is the proposed combination (implementing Sakamoto’s range of ratios for the positive and negative electrode materials in Yamaki’s lithium ion battery). Pet. 9–12. Identification of specific benefits that are tied to specific elements of specific prior art references is sufficient to support an obviousness ground. See Intel, 21 F.4th at 797.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,749,641 - Opticis Co., Ltd. v. Inneos LLCInstitutedPTAB · Feb 2, 2024 · IPR2023-01256 · APJ Terry J Owens · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 on all five §103 grounds in the petition.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” A decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (implemented as a result of SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018)). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons explained below, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Ground 1 is based upon obviousness, not anticipation. Patent Owner’s argument is not well taken because it does not address what fixing Kurita’s single optical fiber (40) in place.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedInstituted
“The purpose of requiring reasonable diligence by the first to conceive the invention but second to reduce to practice is to assure that the invention was not abandoned or unreasonably delayed by the first inventor during the period after the second inventor entered the field.” Brown v. Barbacid, 436 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “A patent owner need not prove the inventor continuously exercised reasonable diligence throughout the critical period; it must show there was reasonably continuous diligence.” Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[T]here need not necessarily be evidence of activity on every single day if a satisfactory explanation is evidenced.” Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 261 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, Patent Owner must provide an explanation that is satisfactory to indicate that the relied-upon computer modeling and prior art search update show reasonably continuous diligence from November 10, 2003 to January 15, 2004. Patent Owner has provided some evidence to show diligence from November 10, 2003 to January 15, 2004, but Patent Owner has not explained why, under the facts of this case, the evidence is sufficient to establish reasonably continuous diligence for the period before Bhandarkar’s effective filing date to the date of constructive reduction to practice. We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions as to how Bhandarkar teaches the subject matter of the claims, and we find them sufficiently persuasive at this stage. Based upon the above-discussed evidence and that the optical combiner claimed in claims 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art over Bhandarkar. slip op. at 26
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because the factors identified in Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”), weigh in favor of denying institution in view of the district court litigation (Prelim. Resp. 68–69). A Memorandum from Director Vidal titled Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (USPTO June 21, 2022) (“Interim Procedure”)2 provides that “the PTAB will not deny institution of an IPR or PGR under Fintiv . . . where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition” (Interim Procedure 9). Petitioner has submitted such a stipulation (Paper 11). Thus, we do not exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,198,416 - Intel Corporation v. Besang Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Dec 13, 2023 · IPR2023-00991 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1 and 13–17 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one challenge to claim 13 based on combinations involving Lee or Johnson.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“stackable add-on layer” requires something more than just any type of layer that is directly or indirectly adhered to the substrate or dielectric layer. First, the plain language of the claim does not require merely a “layer” having a plurality of vertically oriented semiconductor memory cells, but rather “a stackable add-on layer.” Ex. 1001, 12:29–32. Second, the written description of the ’702 patent strongly suggests that a “stackable add-on layer” is formed separately from the substrate and then stacked on and bonded to the substrate or a dielectric layer above the that in the invention “a plurality of vertically oriented semiconductor memory devices, or cells, may be added to a separately fabricated substrate that includes electrical devices and/or interconnect lines.” Id. at 1:47–50 (emphasis added). Likewise, the specification explains that an SOI layer refers to “a relatively thin, single crystal portion of a semiconductor wafer that can be cleaved and bonded to another previously fabricated wafer, or similar type of substrate.” Id. at 4:47–51. “In this context,” the ’702 patent explains, “the SOI layer may be thought of as an attachment layer, or stackable add-on structure which is suitable for bonding to a semiconductor substrate already containing devices and/or interconnections.” Id. at 4:53– 57. Again, this suggests that a “stackable add-on layer” is separately formed and then bonded to a previously fabricated substrate. Given the structure of the claims and the description of the invention in the written description of the ’702 patent, we preliminarily construe “stackable add-on layer” to be a layer that is formed separately from the substrate and then bonded to the substrate or a dielectric layer above the substrate. We do not understand a “stackable add-on layer” to include memory cells that are formed by sequential deposition on or above a substrate or dielectric layer without being added to a separately formed substrate. slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownOther
“Independent claims 1 and 13 do not specify how the stackable add-on layer is bonded to the dielectric layer. Nor does Petitioner assert that the plain and ordinary meaning of “bonding” refers to “wafer bonding.” Thus, to limit the claims to wafer bonding, Petitioner must identify a clear expression of intent in the ’702 patent to define “bonding” as “wafer bonding,” or a clear disavowal of claim scope demonstrating that non-wafer bonding methods are outside the reach of the claims. See Thorner v. Sony Comp. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Petitioner does not contend that the patentee acted as its own lexicographer by defining “bonding” as “wafer bonding,” a term that does not even appear in the ’702 patent. Id. at 1365. Nor are we directed to any clear disavowal indicating that methods of bonding other than “wafer bonding” are outside the scope of the claims. Id. at 1366. Thus, we decline to construe “bonded” in claims 1 8 Wafer bonding is a method in which semiconductor layers are formed on separate wafers and then bonded together to create a stacked semiconductor structure. Ex. 1003 ¶ 41. that the standards for lexicography and disavowal are “exacting”). As noted by Petitioner, the ’702 patent describes an SOI layer that is wafer bonded to a previously fabricated substrate. Ex. 1001, 4:47–53. Independent claims 1 and 13, however, do not require an SOI layer, and the disclosure of a single embodiment in which wafer bonding is used is not sufficient to import such a limitation into the claims. See Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“While claim terms are understood in light of the specification, a claim construction must not import limitations from the specification into the claims.”); Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Nonetheless, this court will not countenance the importation of claim limitations from a few specification statements or figures into the claims.”). In summary, we preliminarily construe “stackable add-on layer . . . the first stackable add-on layer is/being bonded” to require a separate layer that is formed apart from the substrate and then subsequently bonded to the substrate or a dielectric layer above the substrate.9 We do not construe independent claims 1 or 13 to require any particular form or method of bonding.10” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“The evidence of record demonstrates that Petitioner and Micron jointly developed the 3D NAND technology that is generally at issue in the district court litigation, and the parties have acknowledged “their long-term joint development partnership” for this technology. Ex. 1013 (district court complaint); Ex. 2010 (“Micron and Intel Extend their Leadership in 3D NAND Flash memory.”); Ex. 2016 (discussing the end of Intel’s and Micron’s NAND partnership). There is no assertion, however, that all 3D NAND technology infringes the challenged claims of the ’702 patent, and Micron and Intel are not accused of infringing the ’702 patent based on the same products and are not co-defendants in any district court litigation. Further, Patent Owner presents no persuasive evidence that the two parties collaborated on the development of either of the accused products, as opposed to general 3D NAND technology, and Petitioner represents that the two parties filed their petitions independently and without coordination or cooperation. Prelim. Reply 1–2; Ex. 2016, 1 (noting that each company sought to independently develop 3D NAND technology in order to “forge” their own path for future NAND development and “better optimize the technology and products for their individual business needs”). relationship between Petitioner and Micron, and Petitioner is not the same petitioner as the petitioner in IPR2023-00900. Thus, General Plastic factor 1 weighs against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“The stipulation filed in the Texas litigation mitigates, to an extent, concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB.12 Director’s Memo at 7. Similarly, Petitioner’s stipulation in the Oregon litigation (i.e., that it will not pursue an invalidity defense that the claims challenged in this IPR proceeding are invalid based on grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised during the IPR) also mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts. Patent Owner contends Petitioner’s stipulation falls short of a Sotera stipulation by carving out any circumstance that “otherwise terminate[s] the instituted IPR.” Prelim. Sur-reply 2–3. Patent Owner interprets this carve- on the patent application publication of the Lee patent. Ex. 1007. Because the disclosures of the Lee patent and patent application publication are substantively identical, we consider the stipulation not to pursue any obviousness ground based on Lee to apply with equal force to Lee’s patent application publication. 12 The stipulation in the Texas litigation bars the defendant from pursuing “any obviousness ground that includes” Lee or Watanabe. IPR2023-00900, Exhibit 1031. Here, Petitioner’s grounds 1A–1F challenge claims 13–17 based in whole or in part on Lee, and grounds 2A–2C and 3 challenge claims 1 and 13 based on combinations of references that do not include Lee or Watanabe. Pet. 3. As such, the grounds to be resolved by the PTAB will differ somewhat from those presented in the Texas litigation. written decision, thereby rendering the stipulation an “empty promise” as the district court in the Texas litigation will undoubtedly resolve validity before a final written decision in this case. Id. at 3. We disagree. We do not understand Petitioner’s stipulation to require that a final written decision be issued before the stipulation takes effect. Rather, so long as an inter partes review is instituted, and until such time as the IPR is terminated or vacated, Petitioner will not pursue any invalidity defense before the district court that is “based on grounds that were raised or could have been raised during the IPR.” Ex. 1034. In summary, given the stipulations filed by the petitioners in the Oregon and Texas litigations, it appears that there will be minimal, if any, overlap between the issues raised in the petitions and in the parallel district court proceedings. Accordingly, Fintiv factor 4 weighs against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,378,702
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.