- PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00531 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–15 on all grounds; found a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6 and 8–15 are obvious over Warren.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- BurdenInstituted
“limitations set forth in claim 1. Pet. 16–23 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 7–14, 58–63, 93, 230–324, 390–446, Figs. 18, 22A, 23A; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–92). Patent Owner counters that “Warren does not teach one or more sensors configured to detect a current contact force.” Prelim. Resp. 25. The “current contact force” is detected by “one or more sensors” as recited in limitation 1b and limitation 1c requires “detecting the current contact force based on a sensor signal from the one or more sensors.” Ex. 1001, 12:40–45. Patent Owner does not currently contest Petitioner’s showing relating to Warren’s teaching of the other limitations recited in the method of claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. 25–27.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner cites portions of Warren and Dr. Wolfe’s testimony to support these reasons. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 93, 226–252, 283–318, 331, 332; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–71). Patent Owner has yet to submit expert testimony, so Dr. Wolfe’s testimony relating to the motivations of an ordinarily skilled artisan is largely unrebutted.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“available because Petitioner’s showing impermissibly incorporates argument by reference. Id. at 29–30. Although Petitioner’s showing is somewhat brief, see Pet. 2, we have no concerns about the sufficiency of that showing, which is based on direct testimony from a witness with undeniable personal knowledge of the history of the RepRap online forum in which RepRap20208 appears, Adrian Bowyer. Nor do we find it necessary to “piece together” arguments based on Mr. Bowyer’s testimony, which we find to be clear, concise, and probative on the nature of the RepRap forum and who frequented that forum during the relevant time period. Patent Owner is entitled to test the probative value of Mr. Bowyer’s testimony at trial if it desires.” slip op. at 13
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,168,698 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00532 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims, 1–16, and all asserted grounds; it found a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–6 and 9–16 are obvious over Warren.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner identifies four motives for adding a transducer 3740 and vibration sensor 3730 used in connection with Warren’s vibro-capillary dispenser 3700 to Warren’s through-nozzle dispenser 100. Pet. 11–14. Petitioner cites portions of Warren and Dr. Wolfe’s testimony to support these reasons. Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 93, 226–252, 283–318, 331, 332; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–72). Patent Owner has yet to submit expert testimony, so Dr. Wolfe’s testimony relating to the motivations of an ordinarily skilled artisan is largely unrebutted.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted
“First, that Petitioner fails to establish that RepRap20208 was publicly available because Petitioner’s showing impermissibly incorporates argument by reference. Id. at 27–28. Although Petitioner’s showing is somewhat brief, see Pet. 2, we have no concerns about the sufficiency of that showing, which is based on direct testimony from a witness with undeniable personal knowledge of the history of the RepRap online forum in which RepRap20208 appears, Adrian Bowyer. Nor do we find it necessary to “piece together” arguments based on Mr. Bowyer’s testimony, which we find to be clear, concise, and probative on the nature of the RepRap forum and who frequented that forum during the relevant time period. Patent Owner is entitled to test the probative value of Mr. Bowyer’s testimony at trial if it desires.” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelOther
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,556,381 - Google LLC v. Ecofactor, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2025-00097 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted EcoFactor’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed claims 1–18 and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party before the Board “may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). “Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial” constitutes a request for adverse judgment. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). As all claims of the ’394 Patent have been disclaimed, Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment is granted, and the proceeding is terminated.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,835,394 - PTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00618 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7, 8, 12–15, 18, and 19 on both § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim under each ground is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one of the challenged claims of the ’823 patent. We institute inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’823 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa” and that “POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and techniques.” Id. Patent Owner “does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition” of a POSITA at this stage of the proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 17. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the ’823 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“given its plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific claim construction of any claim term is required.” Pet. 10. Petitioner explains that the parties have proposed “different constructions for various claim terms pending in the Related Litigation” but that the Grounds “render the claims unpatentable under either party’s construction, and any reasonable construction, and thus the Board need not construe any term.” Id. at 10–11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 367; Ex. 1070; Ex. 1071).2 Patent Owner does not expressly address claim construction in its Preliminary Response. We determine that, at this stage of the proceeding, no explicit constructions are required to resolve the dispute between the parties. A final determination as to claim construction will be made at the close of the proceeding, after any hearing, based on all the evidence of record. The parties are expected to assert all their claim construction arguments and evidence in the Petition, Patent Owner’s Response, Petitioner’s Reply, Patent Owner’s Sur-reply, or otherwise during trial, as permitted by our rules.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“E. Combination of Vasell, Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall As explained above, Petitioner contends that the technical implementation details that were intended to implement Vasell’s teachings are described in Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall. Pet. 36. Petitioner argues, therefore, that the motivation to modify Vasell to include features described in the other references is demonstrated by the references themselves. Id. at 36–37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 375–376). For example, according to Petitioner, a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Vasell with Alves’ teaching of a centralized application repository for storing its distributed applications to provide increased scalability. Id. at 38, 39 (citing Ex. 1008, 263, 266; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 378–379). Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Vasell with Rellermeyer’s management software to provide for load balancing, failover and elastic scalability. Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 380). Finally, Petitioner argues that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Vasell with Hall’s management software that requires digital signatures for distributed applications to provide increased security for using third party applications. Id. at 38, 39 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 381). Patent Owner does not separately dispute Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Vasell, Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall. to combine the prior art references and determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Vasell, Alves, Rellermeyer, and Hall with a reasonable expectation of success for the reasons provided by Petitioner.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,695,823 - Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00619 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Microsoft did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9 obvious over Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITAs”)] as of June 2013 would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field. Additional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. To that end, POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and familiar with operating/distributed systems and security and privacy techniques. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58).4 Patent Owner does not contest this in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 36–37. We apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art here.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,686,871 - Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2025 · IPR2025-00617 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Microsoft did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 1, 2, 6–8, 10–13, and 15 obvious over Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[Persons of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITAs”)] as of June 2013 would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent degree, and approximately three years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field. Additional experience might substitute for less education and vice versa. To that end, POSITAs in June 2013 would have been knowledgeable about the design and management of networked systems and virtualization technologies, and familiar with operating/distributed systems and security and privacy techniques. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 59).4 Patent Owner does not contest this in its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 39. We apply Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art here. 2 Congress amended § 103 when it passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011). Petitioner asserts that the version amended by the AIA applies here. Pet. 23. 3 We use Petitioner’s nomenclature in which Petitioner collectively refers to the Vasell patent (Ex. 1004) and its corresponding provisional applications (Exs. 1015, 1016) as “Vasell.” 4 Erez Zadok, Ph.D. submitted a declaration on behalf of Petitioner. See Ex. 1003.” slip op. at 5
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how the combination of Vasell, Alves, Hall, and Rellermeyer teaches or suggests a programmable network device and a programmable cloud device that are each “powered by a sandboxing operating system,” as required by all challenged claims. Our reasoning follows.” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,893,095 - Adc Solutions Auto LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00671 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 15, 17, 18, 51, 54, and 57 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Richardson, Zhao, Yu, Paparrizos, and Dao.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and at least two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience with DC power supply or battery charger design[;] . . . [l]ess work experience could be compensated for by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa.” Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 41–44; Ex. 1014, 10–11). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’243 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’243 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary to decide whether to institute, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that the skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teachings of Richardson and Zhao to achieve the subject matter of claim 1. For example, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Richardson’s system to include the USB input circuit of Zhao “to avoid the need to supply a proprietary charger or other type of AC ‘power brick’ that would be less ubiquitous or less standardized,” increase flexibility and convenience, and cater to consumer demand for USB technology. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88–89). Petitioner further alleges that the addition of a USB input circuit would provide for an alternative where traditional charging methods are lost, damaged, or otherwise unavailable. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 88). Thus, Petitioner has provided sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the teachings of the applied references. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 21
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1005 ¶ 28 (emphasis added). Dr. MacCarley testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known what external battery charger could have been used and where to place it in Richardson’s system. Ex. 1044 ¶ 13. In particular, Dr. MacCarley explains that there are numerous points in the circuitry disclosed by Richardson where a charging pathway from an external battery charger (e.g. the “battery charger” that Richardson explains is “not shown”, EX1005, ¶ [0028]) could be connected to charge Richardson’s batteries. EX2010, 52:3–54:5. Any of these connection points would be a trivial modification of Richardson’s embodiment. A PHOSITA would have understood how to implement this type of well-known configuration of an external battery charger and associated charging circuitry, which would have been as simple as wiring connections to the terminal anode and cathode of the batteries. The simplicity of this connection is why it is not surprising that Richardson describes such a pathway and leaves it “not shown” in the figures. Id. We credit the testimony of Dr. MacCarley in this regard. Moreover, Dr. Fayed confirms that it was known to recharge a jump starter with a barrel charger. Ex. 2014 ¶ 23.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 11,584,243 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,584,243 - Adc Solutions Auto LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2024-00577 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 32, 38, 39, 47, 52, and 54 are unpatentable as obvious over Richardson and Zhao and over Yu and Paparrizos.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, as of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and at least two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience with DC power supply or battery charger design[;] . . . [l]ess work experience could be compensated for by a higher level of education, such as a master’s degree, and vice versa. Pet. 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–42; Ex. 1014, 10–11). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’023 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’023 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner submits there are no formal claim constructions necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 23. Patent Owner “does not propose any terms need to be construed.” PO Resp. 18. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary to decide whether to institute, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that the skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teachings of Richardson and Zhao to achieve the subject matter of claim 1. For example, Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Richardson’s system to include the USB input circuit of Zhao to avoid the need to supply a proprietary charger or other type of AC ‘power brick’ that would be less ubiquitous or less standardized,” increase flexibility and convenience, and cater to consumer demand for USB technology. Pet 45–46 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88– 89). Petitioner further alleges that the addition of a USB input circuit would provide for an alternative where traditional charging methods are lost, damaged. or otherwise unavailable. Id. at 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 88). Thus, Petitioner has provided sufficient reasoning with rational underpinnings to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified the teachings of the applied references. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We acknowledge, but are not convinced by, Patent Owner’s arguments that the nature of Richardson requires the ability to charge a high capacity battery and rapid recharging and therefore would not have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to include Zhao’s USB charging circuit in Richardson. See PO Resp. 25–31. In particular, we are not persuaded that Richardson is limited to high capacity, rapid recharging of batteries as Patent Owner suggests. Instead, Richardson broadly describes “an apparatus and method for temporarily delivering supplemental power to the electrical system of a vehicle” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 6) where “[t]he jump starter 10 may be configured for 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 42 or 48 volts” (id. ¶ 34). According to Richardson, this may be achieved by using “two or more batteries of the same or different voltage levels . . . to achieve the voltage requirements of the vehicle to be started.” Id. By way of example, Richardson states that “if the batteries 23 are both 12-volt batteries, the system may be configured for 12- or 24-volt operation” and “[i]f the batteries 23 are 12-volt batteries and a battery 25 is a 6-volt battery, 18- or 30-volt configurations may be provided.” Id. Neither Richardson’s claims nor its specification require any particular charging capacity or charging time. See generally Ex. 1005. While a single, near-final paragraph of Richardson introduces the concept of rapid charging of the jump starter batteries to charge a fleet of vehicles, Richardson characterization is permissive or optional. For example, Richardson states The charging system of the vehicle may be used to charge the capacitors 21 and jump starter batteries 22. . . . This allows the capacitors 21 and jump starter batteries 22 to be fully recharged in about 1 to 5 minutes and can therefore start many vehicles in a row without becoming discharged. Id. ¶ 55 (emphasis added). We do not view this singular occurrence as supplanting the breadth of Richardson’s complete disclosure. Furthermore, the crux of Patent Owner’s argument is that because of Richardson’s goal of charging high capacity batteries a USB charger would require significant charging time. PO Resp. 29; Sur-reply 2–14 But, nowhere does Patent Owner allege that a USB charger would not work given sufficient time.11 See generally PO Resp. and Sur-reply. And, when faced with no alternative, the person of ordinary skill in the art must balance the trade-offs and consider charging slowly, or not at all. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”); see also Winner 11 Petitioner in its Reply presents some evidence of charging times using a USB input charger. Pet. Reply 4–7; Ex. 1044 ¶¶ 6–12, Appendix A. Patent Owner disputes the accuracy of Petitioner’s calculations. Sur-reply 2–11. But, whether Petitioner’s calculations are accurate or not, Petitioner’s proposed alternative modification does not remove the faster charging path and instead adds the convenience and flexibility of a secondary charging method where the primary and faster charging path is unavailable. Ex. 1044 ¶ 12.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,447,023 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,447,023 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00557 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 11, 12, and 15–21 are unpatentable as anticipated by Rogers and obvious over Rogers.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill appear to be substantially the same, are both supported by testimonial evidence, and appear to be consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions addressed in the ’067 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:7–53. Although Patent Owner’s proposed level is more specific about the nature of the practical or industry experience, neither party has argued that the differences between the parties’ proposed levels of ordinary skill would affect the outcome. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for this decision.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“inside” it, the evidence does not support Patent Owner’s position. First, the plain language of independent claim 1 states that the proxy object “compris[es]” the one or more haptic output devices. Ex. 1001, 10:42–43. This is broader than the “within” language of the non-entered amendment. See Ex. 1002, 258. Not only does the evidence fail to show clear disclaimer (see United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 782–83 (Fed. Cir. 1988)), the adoption of broader “comprising” language shows an intent for the claims not to be limited to systems in which the proxy object contains haptic output devices “inside” it. We also do not agree with Patent Owner that the applicant’s attempts during prosecution to distinguish Gonzales are a clear disclaimer of claim scope. The applicant argued that Gonzales’s AR glove, which contained haptic output actuators in it (see, e.g., Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 80–82, Fig. 3B), was not a “proxy object” as recited in the claims because “the virtual objects and/or visible alterations to the vehicle [the user is sitting in while wearing the 6 Once again, Patent Owner mistakenly references Exhibit 2001. glove] are not overlaid on the AR glove . . . [a]nd the physical portions of the vehicle were visible alterations are overlaid do not include any feedback devices.” Ex. 1002, 287. Thus, the issue raised during prosecution was not whether the AR glove comprised haptic output devices—which it clearly did even under Patent Owner’s proposed construction—but whether the AR glove had modified visual effects displayed on it as per limitation 1D3. slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“For the above reasons, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a proxy object comprising one or more haptic output devices” as meaning “a physical object that acts as a proxy for a virtual object and that itself contains inside a haptic output device, e.g., an actuator.” PO Resp. 10. Instead, we conclude that no explicit construction is necessary beyond the ordinary and customary meaning.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Alternatively, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had used both the camera data and the inertial sensor data in determining the “reloading” haptic effect. Pet. 77; Pet. Reply 19–22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 318; Tr. 31:3–10. This is evident in light of Rogers’s disclosures (1) that both sets of data are used to determine the pointing direction of interface object 104 in at least some contexts (Ex. 1010 ¶ 106); and (2) that the “reloading” haptic effect is based on the pointing direction (Ex. 1010 ¶ 105). See Intel Corp., v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“[If] there’s a known technique to address a known problem using prior art elements according to their established functions, then there is a motivation to combine.” (internal quotation omitted)). Thus, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Rogers discloses limitation 1D2, and alternatively that limitation 1D2 would have been obvious based on Rogers’s disclosures.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,665,067 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,665,067 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 31, 2025 · IPR2024-00508 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18, 21–24, and 26–29 are unpatentable as anticipated by Rosenberg; the Board did not reach the alternative Brock grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry experience or graduate-level academic experience with human-computer interaction.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–45). This level of skill appears reasonable in view of the disclosures in the ’546 patent and asserted prior art. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that we need not construe any claim terms explicitly because “the Petition’s prior art discloses each element of the challenged claims under any plausible construction.” Pet. 8. We agree with Petitioner that, for this Decision, we do not need to construe any of the terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent that we discuss specific claim language, we do so below in the context of the prior art. See, e.g., infra Section III.C.2(e).” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“A claim is unpatentable for obviousness under § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.4 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 9,116,546 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,116,546
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