- LG Energy Solution, Ltd. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 2, 2025 · IPR2024-01005 · APJ Avelyn Ross · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner, terminated review of claims 1–23, and cancelled the scheduled hearing after Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, and we construe a disclaimer of all claims involved in a trial as a request for adverse judgment. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims, and has requested adverse judgment, we determine that it is appropriate to enter adverse judgment against Patent Owner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) and to terminate this proceeding. Under these circumstances, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion, and” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,636,649 - PTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00631 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, and 15–22 on all five asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2020); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’027 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims (i.e., 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–13, and 15–22) of the ’027 patent, based on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “possessed an undergraduate degree in chemistry, polymers, materials science, chemical engineering (or related field) and one to two years of experience with constructing and manufacturing tires, tire patches, tire decals/stickers and/or the like.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–11). According to Petitioner, “Additional education could compensate for less practical experience. Conversely, additional practical experience could compensate for less education.” Id. Patent Owner does not provide an alternate definition, but, “Patent Owner does not acquiesce to, and reserves the right to address, [Petitioner’s] definition of a POSA.” Prelim. Resp. 6 n.6. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’027 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s contentions that these disclosures indicate that Wilson’s patch would not meet the construction of “barrier material composition.” None of these disclosures even suggests that the base of Wilson’s patch is rigid as Patent Owner suggests. To begin with, the fact that the housing is “more rigid” provides no information about the absolute rigidness of the patch. See Ex. 1009, 9:16–21. As for the disclosure that the patch is contoured (id. at 3:35–67), Patent Owner provides only attorney argument to support its contention that the contour demonstrates that Wilson’s patch must be so rigid that it cannot be meet the claim limitation. In contrast, Petitioner demonstrates that Wilson discloses using the exact same materials described in the challenged patent (see Ex. 1001, 6:33–58 (noting “[e]lastomeric materials useful for forming the intermediate layer 24 include but are not limited to gum rubber, vulcanized natural rubber SBR . . . or comparable materials”); Ex. 1009, 3:49–55 (noting the patch may be constructed from natural rubber (NR), a preferred mixture of chlorobutyl rubber and natural rubber (CR/NR), or a preferred mixture of SBR and natural rubber (SBR/NR)), and provides detailed testimony from its expert to support its contentions (see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–119). On the current record, we find Petitioner’s reasoning and evidence to be persuasive, and find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Willson discloses or teaches this limitation.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,124,027 - PTAB · Aug 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00560 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–29 and every asserted ground, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Chang and Fang.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board determines whether to institute a trial on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing human breast pump equipment. More education could substitute for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–18). Mr. Bauer’s Declaration testimony states he considered some of the factors listed above. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Mr. Bauer testifies that based on his background and experience, in his opinion, the level of ordinary skill is as stated by Petitioner. Id. at 18. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’381 patent, and Mr. Bauer’s undisputed testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill.13” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We do not perceive the need to construe any claim limitation. Claims must be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 19 F.4th 1325, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because binding. We wish to have the record developed before rendering any binding determination, finding, or conclusion. 14 The citation to Ex. 1005, 2290 appears to be an error. We do not find the cited claim construction at this location. we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe the claim preambles here where the construction is not ‘material to the [obviousness] dispute.’” (citations omitted)).” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner also asserts that “[m]ultiple reasons would have prompted a POSITA to implement a diaphragm pump in Chang’s breast pump device in accordance with Fang’s suggestions.” Id. at 21–24. Based on the record before us, we agree that Fang discloses a diaphragm, as recited in clause 1[a][1]. We also agree, based on the record before us, that a person of ordinary skill would have had multiple reasons to use Fang’s diaphragm pump in Chang’s device with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,813,381 - Shenzhen Xinzexing E-Commerce Co., Ltd. v. Shenzhen Carku Technology Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00222 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 6–23, and 25–33 are unpatentable, including as anticipated by Chen and as obvious over the Chen and Inskeep combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“have at least a Bachelor’s Degree in Electrical Engineering and at least two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering and specifically power supply management such as battery charging system design.” PO Resp. 31. Petitioner presents a similar formulation. Pet. 10. Although we do not discern any meaningful distinction between the parties’ formulations, we adopt Patent Owner’s description of a person of ordinary skill as it is consistent with the prior art and challenged patent’s specification. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“a first current through one or more output ports of the at least one output port in a first operating mode,” and “is configured to output a second current capable of starting a vehicle engine through the pair of output terminals in a second operating mode.” Ex. 1001, 8:25–34. Claim 21 has similar first and second operating-mode limitations. Id. at 9:40–46. Patent Owner proposes that “[t]he proper construction for ‘first operating mode’ is ‘an operating mode of the portable backup charger wherein the battery pack is configured to output a first current through one or more output ports of the at least one output port, and outputting a second current capable of starting a vehicle engine through the pair of output terminals is inhibited.’” PO Resp. 25. Similarly, Patent Owner argues “[t]he proper construction for ‘second operating mode’ is ‘an operating mode of the portable backup charger wherein the battery pack is configured to output a second current capable of starting a vehicle engine through the pair of output terminals, and outputting a first current through one or more output ports of the at least one output port is inhibited.’” Id. at 27. Patent Owner asserts that claim differentiation supports its construction because dependent claim 3 recites “a third operating mode for outputting the first current and the second current simultaneously,” and “if the battery pack could output the first current and the second current simultaneously in the first operating mode, then there would be no difference between the claimed first operating mode and the claimed third operating mode.” Id. at 26. We disagree with Patent Owner’s constructions because, as Petitioner explains, they wrongly import current-inhibiting limitations beyond the plain language in the claim. Pet. Reply 1. Nothing in the at-issue language addresses inhibiting current. In addition, the claimed first and third operating modes are still distinct without importing additional limitations because outputting just the first current is sufficient for the first operating mode, but not for the third. In other words, whereas the third operating mode requires simultaneity, the first and second merely permit it. Thus, claim differentiation does not support Patent Owner’s construction. Last, although Patent Owner asserts that its construction “is consistent with the specification,” nothing in the cited passages describes inhibiting current. Prelim. Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:30–33, 5:30–33, 5:58–62). Instead, the specification characterizes the modes solely by what the portable charger “can output,” not what is inhibited. Ex. 1001, 4:30–33, 5:30–33, 5:58–62. Thus, we decline to read the first and second operating modes to require the current-inhibiting features that Patent Owner asserts.” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Patent Owner argues the two current paths are not different because Chen’s Figure 1 shows they overlap between the lithium battery and the output control circuit and “only diverge when making the connection to the output control circuit.” PO Resp. 32. We disagree. First, Patent Owner’s argument is based on a claim construction for “different” current paths that we do not adopt for the reasons above. In addition, we agree with Petitioner that Chen shows the claimed different current paths even under Patent Owner’s construction. Pet. Reply 8–12. Specifically, as Petitioner explains, a skilled artisan would recognize that Chen’s physical circuits are depicted in Figures 4–7, rather than in Chen’s Figure 1, which is merely a “block diagram of the principle of present invention.” Id. at 9; Ex. 1006 ¶ 15. Unlike Figure 1, Chen’s Figures 5, 6, and 7 show current paths between the battery and USB outputs, and between the battery and DC multi-gear output, that do not overlap with the high current path shown in Chen’s Figure 4. Pet. 9–12. Based on Petitioner’s analysis and for the reasons above, we agree with Petitioner that Chen teaches the claimed “pair of output terminals coupled to the battery pack and having a current path to the battery pack different from that of the at least one output port to the battery pack.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Patent Owner asserts one skilled in the art would not have added White’s fuse to Chen because doing so was “unnecessary” given Chen’s built-in relay K1 that already provides protection. PO Resp. 42–43. We disagree because, as Petitioner notes, “the Petition cited ample evidence that both layers of over current prevention provide improved safety and protection to the battery.” Pet. Reply 17 (citing Pet. 31–33); see also, e.g., Pet. 31 (describing “advantageously reduc[ing] the likelihood of damage”), id. at 32 (describing “the additional benefit of a safety fuse along a jumper cable to promptly cut off current in the event of a short circuit” and “more simplified maintenance and repair”). Given Petitioner’s unrebutted rationale, Petitioner has articulated sufficient reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion that adding White’s fuse and polarity-protection connector to Chen’s power-supply system would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Other than the arguments addressed above, Patent Owner does not additionally challenge Petitioner’s obviousness showing based on Chen and White. We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence and, based on that analysis, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1, 2, 6–9, 11–14, 16–22, 25–28, and 30–33 would have been obvious over Chen and White.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 9,643,506 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 9,643,506 - Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalInstitutedPTAB · Jul 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00371 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–25 based on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that POSCO would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–25 of the ’227 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’227 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions. Pet. 3. We do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Takagi and Cornette, citing the Declaration of Dr. Miles for support. Pet. 1, 6–49 (citing Ex. 1003) (Petitioner’s Ground 1A). a. Claim 1 Petitioner argues that Takagi and Cornette teach or suggest each recitation of claim 1. Pet. 6–31. Petitioner argues, for example, that the preamble of claim 1 is not limiting or, alternatively, imparts no structural distinction from Takagi. Id. at 20–23 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 48). Petitioner further argues that Takagi and Cornette teach forming or hot stamping to arrive at their products. Id. at 23 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1016 ¶ 36 (Takagi referring to “form[ing]” its products shape); Ex. 1014, 9–11 (Cornette referring to “hot stamping”); Ex. 1003 ¶ 48. Petitioner argues that Takagi teaches a strip of base steel having a first and second side. Id. at 23–24 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶ 49; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 13, 36. Petitioner argues that Takagi teaches a coating that is a “diffusion layer” having five phases as depicted by Takagi Figure 2A and explained by Takagi Table 1 (Takagi Fig. 4). Id. at 24–30 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–59; Ex. 1016 ¶ 20, Fig. 2A). Petitioner argues that Takagi alone or as modified by Cornette teaches a coating thickness greater than than 30 µm. Id. at 30–31; Ex. 1014, 9; Ex. 1016 ¶ 35; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–61. Petitioner explains why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine teachings of Takagi and Cornette with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 11–20 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 31–47; Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 19–37, 47; Ex. 1014, 9; Ex. 1025, 5:17–20; Ex. 1026, 7; Ex. 1034 ¶ 13; Ex. 1055 ¶¶ 2, 7, 14–15, 18, Fig. 3). Based on our review and consideration of the current record, we determine that the information presented sufficiently supports, for purposes of institution, Petitioner’s assertions that Takagi and Cornette teach or suggest each limitation of claim 1. See Pet. 6–31. We therefore determine Petitioner has met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 would have been obvious over Takagi and Cornette.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,326,227 - Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalInstitutedPTAB · Jul 23, 2025 · IPR2025-00370 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–30 on all twelve asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that POSCO would prevail.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–30 of the ’602 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’602 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions. Pet. 3. We do not discern a need to construe any claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200” slip op. at 9
- BurdenInstituted
“determine that the information presented sufficiently supports, for purposes of institution, Petitioner’s assertions that Takagi and Cornette teach or suggest each limitation of claim 1. See Pet. 6–33. We therefore determine Petitioner has met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is obvious over Takagi and Cornette.” slip op. at 12
Claim constructioncites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,961,602 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00359 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4 and 7–17 on all petition grounds and granted Samsung’s unopposed motion for joinder in IPR2024-01013.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We instituted review of claims 1–4 and 7–18 of the ’483 patent in IPR2024- 01013 after a review of all arguments and evidence presented by the parties, including Patent Owner’s arguments in its preliminary response. For the reasons discussed in the Institution Decision in IPR2024-01013, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of showing at least one claim of the ’483 patent is unpatentable. Thus, we find that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Upon consideration of Petitioner’s arguments, we are persuaded that it is appropriate under these circumstances to join Petitioner to the proceeding in IPR2024-01013. Petitioner’s agreement to accept an “understudy” role and to not actively participate in IPR2024-01013 unless the current petitioner ceases to participate will limit any potential impact on the trial schedule and will avoid increasing the costs or complexity of the proceeding. Therefore, joinder of Petitioner to IPR2025-00359 will further the goals of a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of Petitioner’s challenge. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).” slip op. at 10
Nonecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,153,483 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00358 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–16 on all petition grounds and granted Samsung’s motion to join IPR2024-01012 as an understudy petitioner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Whether the Petition Warrants Institution As we note above, the Petition challenges the same claims on the same grounds of unpatentability, and relies on the same evidence, including the same declarant testimony, as presented in the 1012 IPR. Pet. 1; Mot. 6– 7. In other words, the Petition is virtually identical to the petition filed in the 1012 IPR. We incorporate our analysis from the 1012 IPR regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and determine that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) that institution of an inter partes review is warranted under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, we determine Petitioner has established good cause for joining the 1012 IPR. Specifically, we find that joining Petitioner to the 1012 IPR is unlikely to require any delay or modification to the scheduling order already in place for the 1012 IPR. We also determine that Patent Owner will not be prejudiced unduly by the joinder of this proceeding. Thus, we determine that granting the Motion for Joinder under these circumstances would help “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” of these proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). For the above reasons, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner as a party to the 1012 IPR.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 10,608,282 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00355 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–23 on the petition’s grounds and granted Samsung’s motion to join the LGES IPR in an understudy role.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“A. Whether the Petition Warrants Institution As we note above, the Petition challenges the same claims on the same grounds of unpatentability, and relies on the same evidence, including the same declarant testimony, as presented in the 1005 IPR. Pet. 1; Mot. 5. In other words, the Petition is virtually identical to the petition filed in the 1005 IPR. We incorporate our analysis from the 1005 IPR regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and determine that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently under 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) that institution of an inter partes review is warranted under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, we determine Petitioner has established good cause for joining the 1005 IPR. Specifically, we find that joining Petitioner to the 1005 IPR is unlikely to require any delay or modification to the scheduling order already in place for the 1005 IPR. We also determine that Patent Owner will not be prejudiced unduly by the joinder of this proceeding. Thus, we determine that granting the Motion for Joinder under these circumstances would help “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” of these proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). For the above reasons, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner as a party to the 1005 IPR.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 9,636,649 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Molecular Rebar Design, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jul 17, 2025 · IPR2025-00356 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–8 on all petition grounds and granted Samsung’s unopposed motion to join IPR2024-01006.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We agree with the parties that the Samsung Petition “involves the same patent, challenges the same claims, relies on the same expert declaration, and is based on the same grounds and combinations of prior art.” Id. (Patent Owner’s admission); see Mot. 3 (Petitioner, averring that the Samsung Petition and the Petition filed in IPR1006 are “substantively identical”). Under these circumstances, our reasons for instituting review based on LG Energy Solution’s Petition apply with equal force to the “substantively identical” Samsung Petition. Id. Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in the Institution Decision filed in IPR1006, we institute review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Samsung Petition. See generally IPR1006, Paper 8 (Institution Decision in IPR1006).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“(1) the Motion for Joinder is timely, having been “filed within one month of the institution decision” in IPR1006; (2) the Samsung Petition “is substantially identical to the” Petition filed in IPR1006; (3) “joinder will have minimal, if any, impact on the trial schedule, as all issues are substantively identical”; (4) Petitioner agrees to “accept an ‘understudy role’” in the joined proceeding, unless LG Energy Solution, Ltd. “is terminated from” IPR1006; and (4) joinder will simplify “briefing and discovery” as all issues will be resolved “in a single proceeding.” Mot. 3–4. Patent Owner contests none of those facts. To the contrary, Patent Owner does “not oppose” the Motion for Joinder and “fully expects this proceeding to be joined with” IPR1006. Waiver 1. Having considered Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder, as well as Patent Owner’s Waiver, we determine that joinder of the instant proceeding with IPR1006 is appropriate. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s unopposed Motion for Joinder, subject to the requirements set forth in the Order below.” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 8,808,909
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.