- Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 29, 2025 · IPR2024-01178 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Bio-Rad did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable, as relied-upon Saxonov disclosures were not shown to qualify as prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we decline to institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“benefit of its provisional application’s filing date for pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) prior art purposes when two conditions are met: (1) the provisional provides sufficient support for at least one claim in the reference patent or published patent application; and (2) the provisional application provide sufficient support for the subject matter relied upon for prior art purposes in the reference patent or application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1377, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015); MPEP §§ 2136 (I), 2136.03 (III), 2136 (Examples 2, 4, 7); see, e.g., Google LLC v. Ikorongo Tech, LLC, IPR 2021-00058, Paper 14 at 10–12 (PTAB May 10, 2021). The burden of production is on the Petitioner to show in its Petition that the asserted references qualify as prior art. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380 (explaining that a petitioner bears the initial burden of production to establish that the asserted references qualify as prior art).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not reached
“Each of the remaining grounds asserted in the Petition relies on Saxonov to reach a number of limitations of independent claim 1 and the challenged dependent claims. Because Petitioner has not shown that all of the relied-upon portions of Saxonov are prior art to the ’170 patent, we determine that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’170 patent in any of the remaining grounds.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denialNot reached
“Because we deny institution upon consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s challenges, Patent Owner’s argument that we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution is moot.” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,770,170 - Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. California Institute Of TechnologyInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 29, 2025 · IPR2024-01177 · APJ Erica A Franklin · IPR · Institution
Institution was denied for claims 1–9 because Bio-Rad did not show a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on any ground relying on Saxonov, which was not established as prior art.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 26. Because Petitioner’s uncontested definition of one of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable and consistent with the ’051 patent and the cited art, we adopt Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner has identified certain claim terms for which it has proposed constructions in a parallel proceeding. Pet. 27–29. Petitioner notes that it has that “[o]ther terms, as used herein, are consistent with Patent Owner’s arguments and positions in the parallel proceeding,” without identifying those terms. Id. at 28. Patent Owner requests that the Board adopt Patent Owner’s proposed constructions from the parallel proceeding for certain claim terms. PO Prelim. Resp. 26–27. Neither party provides a discussion for their proposed constructions. In any event, for purposes of this Decision, we determine there is no need to expressly construe any claim term, as the parties appear to agree to the ordinary and customary meaning of the identified terms.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artDecided for patent owner
“benefit of its provisional application’s filing date for pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) prior art purposes when two conditions are met: (1) the provisional provides sufficient support for at least one claim in the reference patent or published patent application; and (2) the provisional application provides sufficient support for the subject matter relied upon for prior art purposes in the reference patent or application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat'l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1377, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2015); MPEP §§ 2136 (I), 2136.03 (III), 2136 (Examples 2, 4, 7); see, e.g., Google LLC v. Ikorongo Tech, LLC, IPR2021-00058, Paper 14 at 10–12 (PTAB May 10, 2021). The burden of production is on the Petitioner to show in its Petition that the asserted references qualify as prior art. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1380 (explaining that a petitioner bears the initial burden of production to establish that the asserted references qualify as prior art).” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“explains how each of the relied-upon disclosures in Saxonov Figures 9 and 10, and Saxonov paragraphs 17, 18, 37, 76, and 79, which are not present in the ’013 provisional, are supported by the ’013 provisional, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that those cited portions of Saxonov are entitled to the priority date of the ’013 provisional. Accordingly, on this record, we determine that those relied-upon portions of Saxonov do not qualify as prior art to the ’051 patent.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,068,051 - PTAB · Jan 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01095 · APJ Michael G Mcmanus · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 9 is unpatentable over Suzuki and Caldwell.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that this second factor favors denial based on the trial date set for the District Court action, as well as the District Court’s median time-to-trial data.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING Although we have closely reviewed each asserted ground, in evaluating Petitioner’s reasonable likelihood of prevailing, we focus our discussion on Ground IX, which concerns the asserted unpatentability of claim 9. As claim 9 depends from claim 1, we additionally discuss that claim. We determine that Petitioner’s arguments regarding claim 9 demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Caldwell teaches that “[b]ecause backlighting can be advantageously aligned with an operative touch surface, it is sometimes desirable to locate a touch sensor in close proximity to and/or atop a light emitting device.” Ex. 1011 ¶ 6; see Pet. 74. Petitioner argues that integrating a touch sensor into a light emitting device can “greatly reduce the cost and complexity of using backlighting with touch sensors” and can “reduce or eliminate the extra material and manufacturing cost associated with the separate touch sensor and lighting assemblies known in the art, which must be electrically coupled and aligned.” Pet. 74 (quoting Ex. 1011 ¶ 7). Petitioner argues that such reduction of cost and complexity, as well as a desire for a thinner OLED profile, would have motivated one of skill in the art to combine touch sensor functionality into the device of claim 1. Id.; see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 241, 242.” slip op. at 22
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,828,425 - PTAB · Jan 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01094 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–4, 6, and 8–14 on all asserted grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Ma.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“We apply a two-part framework when assessing whether to exercise our discretion to deny a petition under Section 325(d). First, we consider whether the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. Second, if either condition is satisfied, we assess whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (setting forth twopart framework that guides the Board’s decision whether to exercise its discretion to deny review under Section 325(d)).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“In Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Massimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential), the Board declined to exercise its discretion to deny review under Fintiv where the patent owner stipulated “if IPR is instituted, they will not pursue in the District Court Litigation any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in an IPR.” Sotera Wireless, Paper 12 at 18. Importantly, moreover, on June 21, 2022, the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued a Memorandum setting forth an “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Guidance Memo”).6 The Guidance Memo states that “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Guidance Memo 3 (footnote and emphasis omitted).” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’223 patent would have had a university degree in chemistry and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of electrical engineering, particularly optoelectronics, or alternatively a university degree in electrical engineering and additional expertise or a second university degree in the field of chemistry. The person of ordinary skill in the art has spent several years studying the structure and function of organic optoelectronic components, in particular OLEDs, and has detailed knowledge of the chemical structure of light-emitting organic layers and the transport of charge carriers to these layers. In this respect, the person of ordinary skill in the art works at the interface between electrical engineering/physics (charge carrier transport and light emission processes in optoelectronic components) and chemistry, in particular organic chemistry (materials and layer stack combinations suitable). Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–47). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s argument. See generally Prelim. Resp. Neither party indicates that the result on institution would change depending on the definition selected. Accordingly, for the sole purpose of deciding whether to institute review, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition, because, on this record, it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See Ex. 1005, (code 57); Ex. 1007, 8107 (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid 7 Following the parties’ convention, when citing Exhibit 1007, we refer to original page numbers, not page numbers added by Petitioner. Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party indicates that an express construction for any claim term is necessary to our decision whether to institute review. Pet. 15; see generally Prelim. Resp. On this record, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,558,223 - PTAB · Jan 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01093 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–16 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by Choulis.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“We apply a two-part framework when assessing whether to exercise our discretion to deny a petition under Section 325(d). First, we consider whether the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office. Second, if either condition is satisfied, we assess whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019- 01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (setting forth twopart framework that guides the Board’s decision whether to exercise its discretion to deny review under Section 325(d)).” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Importantly, moreover, on June 21, 2022, the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued a Memorandum setting forth an “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Guidance Memo”).8 The Guidance Memo states that “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Guidance Memo 3 (footnote and emphasis omitted).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends: A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’164 patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa. Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s argument. See generally Prelim. Resp. Neither party indicates that the result on institution would change depending on the definition selected. Accordingly, for the sole purpose of deciding whether to institute review, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposed definition, because, on this record, it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See Ex. 1004, (code 57); Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1008, code (57); Ex. 1009, code (57) (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“to the meaning of particular claim terms.”). Claim 1 recites first, second, and third matrix materials but, aside from reciting relationships between the LUMOs and HOMOs of the matrix material, does not require any particular composition or any particular amount for any of the three matrix materials. Ex. 1001, 9:4–22. Nor does claim 1 recite that any of the matrix materials must be present in a continuous phase. Id. Claim 1 does recite that the organic functional layer, which includes the three matrix materials, is doped with at least one emitter material. Id. at 9:21–22. On this record, no words in claim 1 limit a “matrix material” to the meaning advanced by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,723,164 - A&A Global Imports, Inc. v. Lerman Container CorporationInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01138 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the single claim would have been obvious over any of the four asserted reference combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“After considering the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in challenging the patentability of the ’151 patent’s claim. Thus, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner submits that a designer of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in Industrial Design, Mechanical Engineering, or related field and approximately 5 years of professional experience in the field designing consumer products.” Pet. 42 (citing Fletcher Decl. ¶ 48). Petitioner adds that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute this proposed definition. Prelim. Resp. 19. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested proposal regarding a designer of ordinary skill in the art. See Fletcher Decl. ¶ 48; Rake Decl. ¶ 29.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“and Petitioner’s failure to persuasively explain why the particular proportion depicted in the ’151 patent is preferable to any other, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that this proportion is primarily functional and should not be considered as part of the ornamental design. See, e.g., LA Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“When there are several ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental purpose.”). Moreover, we agree with Patent Owner that the differences in proportion between Neutrogena and the claimed design contribute significantly to the overall visual impression of the design. See Prelim. Resp. 28 (“[T]he two designs considered as a whole present dramatically different visual appearances.”), 33–36 (“To get from the Neutrogena jar design . . . to the design of the D ‘151 patent would require entirely changing the proportions of the jar—from a short neck with a tall base to a tall neck with a short base . . . .”). For example, Patent Owner creates an image showing that simply changing the height of the Neutrogena jar neck to have the same neck-height to base-height ratio as the ’151 patent without changing the other dimensions of the jar would yield a “ridiculous result.” Id. at 37. We agree that the two images, reproduced below, do not convey the same overall visual impression. This figure contains two images side by side. On the left is a side view drawing of the claimed jar. On the right is a front side image of the Neutrogena jar with the image manipulated to show a neck to base proportion equivalent to that of the claimed jar drawing. Prelim. Resp. 38. The images above show a figure from the ’151 patent, above left, and Patent Owner’s created image of Neutrogena, above right, with only the neck height modified to match the proportion of neck to base height shown in the ’151 patent. Although we do not necessarily agree with Patent Owner’s assertion that the created Neutrogena image represents the proposed combination asserted in the Petition, or that the modified image created by Patent Owner is accurate, we do agree with Patent Owner that the image of the modified Neutrogena jar illustrates that the proportion of neck height to base height contributes to ornamental aspects of the claimed jar and significantly affects the overall visual impression.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“We find these aspects of the design significantly affect the overall visual impression of an otherwise simple design, particularly in an otherwise crowded art. Petitioner addresses these differences by stating that a designer of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that different degrees of radius for the concave bottom surface would be a design choice for volume and accessibility to the contents, especially together with the radiused transition between the sidewall and bottom surface.” Pet. 56 (citing Fletcher Decl. ¶ 98). However, the present record does not support a finding that, even though other interior compartment shapes and depths are available, functionality dictates a certain shape and depth. Petitioner cites no other prior art that shows an interior compartment with a shape and depth equivalent to that shown in the ’151 patent. See Pet. 28–29 (showing annotated versions of Huang’s drawings, which do not clearly show the shape or depth of the interior compartment), 63 (proposing to modify Huang’s two chamber interior compartment with that of Canamasas Puigbo), 85–88 (showing the McKernan Jar drawings, which do not indicate the shape or depth of the interior compartment); Ex. 2002, 13 (explaining that the interior of Zamberlan is different in shape and depth than the claimed design). We are not persuaded to the contrary by Petitioner’s expert testimony. Mr. Fletcher testifies that Canamasas Puigbo “explicitly discloses a concave bottom surface in an article having more visually similar design, which would provide ample motivation to incorporate the feature.” Fletcher Decl. ¶ 98 (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Fletcher appears to agree that the shape of the Canamasas Puigbo’s internal compartment is noticeably different than that of the ’151 patent. Mr. Fletcher does not address why a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have overlooked these differences or found them so minimal as to not affect the overall impression of the resulting modified jar. For example, Mr. Fletcher does not support this conclusion with any objective evidence, such as pointing to other prior art with an interior compartment the same shape and depth as that of the ’151 patent. Nor does Mr. Fletcher otherwise explain why a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have chosen to use the particular shape and depth claimed by the ’151 patent as opposed to all other possible configurations. See, id. ¶¶ 83–101. Moreover, as noted above, “expert testimony cannot take the place of disclosure from patents or printed publications.” 2019 Trial Practice Guide at 36. Accordingly, even after combining the visual features of Neutrogena and Canamasas Puigbo as proposed by Petitioner, the record evidence does not support Petitioner’s assertion that a designer of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to modify Neutrogena such that its internal compartment is the same shape and depth as claimed by the ’151 patent.” slip op. at 32
§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham - Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00976 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because BOE did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–3 under any of its three obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“We have authority to institute an inter partes review where a petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). For reasons that follow, Petitioner does not meet that evidentiary threshold. We decline to reach the issues raised in the Reply or Sur-reply, which relate to Patent Owner’s alternative argument that a discretionary denial of the Petition is warranted.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Pet. 26. Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art” as “set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition (Pet. 26) because, on this record, it is consistent with the specification. We take note that neither party indicated that the result would change under any different definition.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner discusses the terms a “data line having a broad-width portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 1, as well as a “data line having a broad portion” and a “scanning line having a broad-width portion” recited in claim 2. Petitioner cites the ’079 patent for “offering a lexicographic definition of the term ‘broad width’” to support the plain meaning interpretation of the terms “‘broad-width portion’ and ‘broad portion’ as a portion that is broader than another portion of the subject element.” Pet. 16. Patent Owner does not provide arguments directed specifically to Petitioner’s proposed claim constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 10–11. Taking account of the information presented, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of deciding whether to institute review. Compare Pet. 16 (addressing issues of claim construction, citing the ’079 patent for supporting the plain and ordinary meaning of “broad-width portion” and “broad portion” without demonstrating that an express construction is necessary to resolve whether to institute review), with Prelim. Resp. 10–11 (addressing the merits of Petitioner’s challenges, without asserting an express claim construction). To the extent that the scope of any claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in the following analysis of the challenges.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Id. (emphasis added). Sato ¶ 26 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “data lines composed of an Al film.” Id. Importantly, Petitioner does not connect Sato’s disclosure, relating to benefits associated with a data line arrangement, to any particular arrangement of scan lines. Sato ¶ 28 is equally deficient. Sato ¶ 28 also discusses benefits of utilizing a specific “arrangement,” namely, “capacitance lines formed of [a] metal film.” Id. ¶ 28. [0028] With this arrangement, the provision of the function as the shading layer with the capacitance lines formed of the metal film, the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as the wiring, as well as the provision of the function as the light absorption layer with the capacitance electrodes formed of the polysilicon film, or the like, in addition to the function as electrodes, prevents the laminated structure from becoming complex by additionally forming a dedicated shading layer and a dedicated light absorption layer. Accordingly, this arrangement is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof. Id. (emphasis added). Here again, Sato ¶ 28 is entirely silent on scan lines and clearly links the cited benefits to “this arrangement” of “capacitance lines formed of metal film.” Id. Petitioner does not bridge the gap in its rationale to combine by attempting to explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have extrapolated benefits, pertaining to an arrangement of capacitance lines, to a similar arrangement of scan lines. Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Flasck, provides no further insight as to how or why Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 would have been understood to apply to scan lines. Dr. Flasck’s comments on Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28 merely repeat, nearly verbatim, the Petition’s conclusory contentions. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 139 (Dr. Flasck declaring “Sato specifically teaches that its device ‘is very advantageous by simply arranging the electro-optical device, and simplifies a manufacturing process thereof.’”); Pet. 37. Dr. Flasck does not cite to any additional supporting evidence other than Sato ¶¶ 26 and 28. Ex. 1002 ¶ 139.” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,502,079 - Boe Technology Group Co., Ltd. v. 138 East LCD Advancements LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00977 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving claims 7–13 and 15–20 unpatentable on any asserted ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, physics, or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing semiconductor display devices, including LCD displays.” Pet. 19. Petitioner also asserts that “[a]dditional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Id. On the record presented, Patent Owner “does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 8. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any particular proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’606 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“As discussed below, we are able to determine whether to institute review without resolving the construction of any claim terms. Accordingly, we need not and do not construe any terms expressly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“view. First, as Petitioner admits, data line 6a is not connected to image signal line 101d and line 109 other than when sample hold circuit 101c connects them due to shift register 101b outputting an enabling signal. Pet. 49. This is supported by the layout of the four elements in Fujikawa’s Figure 2. Ex. 1005, Fig. 2 (depicting sample hold circuits 101c between and connecting data lines 6a and signal lines 101d). In addition, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. E. Fred Schubert, testifies that “two separate lines straddling circuitry are [not] one line.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 64. The dispute between the parties on this issue is largely one of claim construction: should the term “wiring line” in claim 7 be construed broadly enough to encompass a collection of lines separated by a sample hold circuit? In order to determine that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the recited wiring lines, we would need to answer this question in the affirmative. Yet, as discussed above, neither party proposes construing “wiring line,” or any other term used in the claims of the ’606 patent. Pet. 18; Prelim. Resp. 7. The failure to argue for and sufficiently support a broad construction of the term “wiring line” means that Petitioner does not show sufficiently, for purposes of supporting institution of review, that Fujikawa discloses or teaches the “wiring line” limitation of claim 7. b) Conclusion Regarding Claim 7 Based on the record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 7 is unpatentable as anticipated by or obvious in view of Fujikawa.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,557,606 - PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00973 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that BOE would prevail on claim 4 over Reiner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“We secondly conclude Petitioner’s stipulation is commensurate in scope with a Sotera stipulation. See Sotera, Paper 12, at 13–14, 18–19; Guidance Memo, at 3. The Guidance Memo states: Consistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB. Guidance Memo, 3, 7–8. Thus, applying that guidance here, we do not deny institution in view of the Co-Pending Litigation.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We conclude the preliminary record supports, sufficiently to justify institution, Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to configure Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 to include the ESD protection network structure illustrated in Figure 5. First, we agree with Petitioner’s position that Reiner discloses both of its display drivers 61 and 63 would benefit from ESD protection. That is, Reiner describes display drivers 61 and 63 as “typical example[s]” of integrated circuit devices that can benefit from utilizing Reiner’s bump bridge technology for providing ESD protection, due to the large number of parallel output lines that must cross power supply lines. See Ex. 1005, 4:15–16, 9:11–20 (describing Fig. 4), 12:4–5. Thus, based on this preliminary record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s position that Petitioner mischaracterizes Reiner’s teachings in this regard. Second, based on the preliminary record, Dr. Murphy’s testimony that the ESD protection network structure of Reiner’s Figure 5 would be suitable for implementing in Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 due to similarities between the two drivers is supported by the evidence sufficiently to justify institution. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105, 111–120. A first similarity is Reiner’s indication that both display drivers 61 and 63 “have areas where the output or input metal lines have to cross power supply lines” Vdd and Vss. Ex. 1005, 9:11–20, 12:4–5, Fig. 3 (illustrating exemplary integrated circuit device 30 powered by supply voltages Vdd and Vss). A second similarity is Dr. Murphy’s testimony that, at least in some embodiments of Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63, “each of the [scan] lines being driven will have its own semiconductor units . . . [that] drive that particular line,” akin to the individual output devices 70 and source lines 67 of Figure 5. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 113, 117; see also Prelim. Resp. 21–22 (arguing “Reiner [discloses] that the gate driver integrated circuit comprises individual gate drivers” and “a POSITA would understand that individual gate/scan line drivers are coupled to one another”). These similarities between Reiner’s display drivers 61 and 63 support Dr. Murphy’s conclusion that Reiner’s bump bridge technology for providing ESD protection could and would have been implemented in Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 in the same fashion as illustrated in Figure 5 for Reiner’s source/data driver module 61. We appreciate, as Dr. Schubert testifies, that the individual circuits in gate/scanning driver 63 will drive their respective gate/scan lines 68 in different ways than the individual output devices 70 in source/data driver module 61 will drive their respective source/data lines 67. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 55–59. Nonetheless, based on the present record, we conclude such differences in the signal outputs of Reiner’s display drivers 61 and 63 have little to do with the benefits of configuring the power inputs of the display drivers to protect the individual circuits from electrostatic discharge events, or how to do so.” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We conclude the preliminary record supports, sufficiently to justify institution, Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to configure Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 to include the ESD protection network structure illustrated in Figure 5. First, we agree with Petitioner’s position that Reiner discloses both of its display drivers 61 and 63 would benefit from ESD protection. That is, Reiner describes display drivers 61 and 63 as “typical example[s]” of integrated circuit devices that can benefit from utilizing Reiner’s bump bridge technology for providing ESD protection, due to the large number of parallel output lines that must cross power supply lines. See Ex. 1005, 4:15–16, 9:11–20 (describing Fig. 4), 12:4–5. Thus, based on this preliminary record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s position that Petitioner mischaracterizes Reiner’s teachings in this regard. Second, based on the preliminary record, Dr. Murphy’s testimony that the ESD protection network structure of Reiner’s Figure 5 would be suitable for implementing in Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 due to similarities between the two drivers is supported by the evidence sufficiently to justify institution. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105, 111–120. A first similarity is Reiner’s indication that both display drivers 61 and 63 “have areas where the output or input metal lines have to cross power supply lines” Vdd and Vss. Ex. 1005, 9:11–20, 12:4–5, Fig. 3 (illustrating exemplary integrated circuit device 30 powered by supply voltages Vdd and Vss). A second similarity is Dr. Murphy’s testimony that, at least in some embodiments of Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63, “each of the [scan] lines being driven will have its own semiconductor units . . . [that] drive that particular line,” akin to the individual output devices 70 and source lines 67 of Figure 5. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 113, 117; see also Prelim. Resp. 21–22 (arguing “Reiner [discloses] that the gate driver integrated circuit comprises individual gate drivers” and “a POSITA would understand that individual gate/scan line drivers are coupled to one another”). These similarities between Reiner’s display drivers 61 and 63 support Dr. Murphy’s conclusion that Reiner’s bump bridge technology for providing ESD protection could and would have been implemented in Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 in the same fashion as illustrated in Figure 5 for Reiner’s source/data driver module 61. We appreciate, as Dr. Schubert testifies, that the individual circuits in gate/scanning driver 63 will drive their respective gate/scan lines 68 in different ways than the individual output devices 70 in source/data driver module 61 will drive their respective source/data lines 67. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 55–59. Nonetheless, based on the present record, we conclude such differences in the signal outputs of Reiner’s display drivers 61 and 63 have little to do with the benefits of configuring the power inputs of the display drivers to protect the individual circuits from electrostatic discharge events, or how to do so.” slip op. at 35
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’157 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, physics, or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing semiconductor display devices, including LCD displays,” and “[a]dditional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 75–76. “Patent Owner does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 14; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 19–20. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’157 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,184,157 - Shenzhen Root Technology Co., Ltd. v. Chiaro Technology Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00953 · APJ Amee A Shah · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on claims 1–46 under § 314(a), finding the petitioner had not justified parallel petitions challenging the same claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- Parallel petitionsInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“parallel petitions challenging claims 1–46 of the ’380 patent are warranted. The mere fact that different references are asserted in this proceeding and the ՚1296 IPR is not justification for a parallel petition under the circumstances presented here. Weighing all the circumstances here, including Patent Owner’s acknowledgment of Petitioner’s preference of the ՚1296 IPR in arguing for denial of this proceeding and in its objection to the dismissal request, we deny this proceeding in favor of evaluating institution of inter partes review in the ՚1296 IPR to reduce the unnecessary burden on the Board and on the Patent Owner and for fairness and efficiency concerns. Based on these circumstances, we find that the reasons provided by Petitioner do not show that parallel petitions are warranted. However, we emphasize that the denial of institution of this proceeding in favor of the ՚1296 IPR does not impact the merits of the ՚1296 IPR. In other words, the denial of institution of this proceeding does not address the substance of the ՚1296 IPR nor does it affect the denial or grant of institution of the ՚1296 IPR.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,413,380
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.