• Abbott Laboratories / Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Altivera LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00425 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 9, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Beck, Heller, and Lovejoy; the Board did not reach the alternative Bandy grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute this assessment. See generally PO Resp. Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’307 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “both the unique sensor ID as well as the associated unique wireless device ID is contradicted, or at least unsupported, by the claim language and the Specification. We determine that this limitation does not require authentication of both the unique sensor ID and the unique wireless device ID, or otherwise require authentication using the unique wireless ID. Rather, the limitation only requires authentication of the unique sensor ID. The language and structure of the claim itself, “the remote server authenticates said unique sensor ID associated with said unique wireless device ID,” requires authentication of the unique sensor ID but not the unique wireless device ID. See Ex. 1001, 19:51–52 (emphasis added). The portion of the limitation reciting “associated with said unique wireless device ID” is linguistically an appositive modifying the “unique sensor ID.” Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges the “plain meaning of the claim term is that the remote server authenticates the unique sensor ID and that such unique sensor ID is associated with a unique wireless device ID.” PO Resp. 18.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed constructions of any of these other claim terms or phrases. PO Resp. 24. We agree with the parties that the identified limitations—which each recite a “means” or “means for” performing a particular function—are means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”). And we agree with Petitioner’s uncontested identification of the recited functions and corresponding structure for these limitations for the reasons explained by Petitioner. See Pet. 11–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:20–21, 2:24–28, 3:33–36, 17:18–30); id. at 13–15 (citing Ex. 1009, 9:4–6, 9:19–20, 9:57–65, 10:10– 11) (explaining that Lovejoy is incorporated by reference into the ’307 Patent). We adopt the uncontested constructions identified by Petitioner, as” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the improvements offered by the incorporation of Heller’s teachings would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Confirming Petitioner’s assertion that the combination yields improvements, Heller states that it improves the type of glucose monitor used in one of Beck’s embodiments. Beck states that its “medical device 130 includes a glucose meter” which “measure[s] blood glucose levels of blood applied to test strips.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 34. Specifically addressing such “conventional” test strip glucose monitoring, Heller states that its in vivo glucose sensor system addresses a need for continuous or automatic monitoring in a small, comfortable device. Ex. 1016, 2:1–7, 2:15–58, 3:19–25. As such, we agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller to improve Beck’s medical device. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. We further agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate sensor implementation details described in Heller, e.g., an A/D converter and patient attachment systems, with Beck’s medical device. Pet. 44–45, 53, 55; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 228, 234, 236–238, 259, 267, 278, which do no more than yield predictable results, e.g., converting signals or attaching a sensor to a patient. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[A] combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 7,969,307 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,969,307
• Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,488,451
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Umbra Technologies Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00344 · APJ St John Courtenay III · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–7 unpatentable under § 103 over Agarwala, finding Petitioner proved unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 23

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notTerm construed petitioner constructionPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “[t]he prosecution history is consistent with the specification’s focus on the data beacons recited in the preamble as being the disclosed invention.” PO Resp. 24. Accordingly, we find the prosecution history also favors Petitioner regarding whether “[t]he term ‘data beacons’ recited in the preamble is an intended use and not limiting.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Accordingly, based on the complete record, we agree with Petitioner” slip op. at 47

  Patent outcomesUS 11,146,632 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,146,632
• Nuvei Technologies, Inc. v. Autoscribe CorporationInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00089 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Nuvei did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–27 would have been obvious over either asserted combination.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “providing” negative limitation of independent claim 1, and the similar negative limitations of independent claims 8, 15, 23, and 25. Accordingly, Nuvei has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on its assertions that the subject matter of independent claims 1, 8, 15, 23, and 25 would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Stringfellow and Kloster.” slip op. at 25

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “the art “would have had at least (1) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years’ experience working with and programming networked computer systems.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 36). Nuvei also argues that “[a]dditional education might substitute for some experience, and vice versa.” Id. In the Preliminary Response, Autoscribe does not address the level of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Nuvei’s proposed assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with both the ’621 patent and the asserted prior art, and it is supported by the testimony of Dr. Almeroth.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “The supporting testimony from Nuvei’s declarant, Dr. Almeroth, on these issues fare no better. Dr. Almeroth provides no additional explanation beyond the arguments and evidence presented in the Petition to support Nuvei’s assertion that Kloster does not provide the payment data token to the payer during its token retrieval functions. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 100.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “argument that Kloster does not teach the “without providing” negative limitation required by each independent claim. Nuvei appears to contend that Kloster teaches this limitation in two different ways—namely, through either a “call back URL” or “API calls by the merchant.” Pet. 50–51 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 15, 23) (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 24). We address Nuvei’s contentions in turn.” slip op. at 21

  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,620,621
• Intel Corporation / Lenovo (United States) Inc. et al. v. Collision Communications, Inc.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 28, 2025 · IPR2025-00301 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of review for claims 1–11, 16, and 21 under § 314(a), finding the Fintiv factors favored discretionary denial, and denied joinder.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “2026. This date is nearly five months prior to the date on which the final written decision would be due if trial were instituted in this proceeding. And, even if we assume Petitioner’s alleged February–March 2026 trial date, this date too is several months prior to the projected final written decision deadline. As such, it is unlikely that a final written decision in this proceeding would issue before trial in the district court, unless the trial was delayed or rescheduled for a later time. Thus, we find this factor weighs in favor of exercising our discretion to deny institution. See ARM Ltd. v. Daedalus Prime LLC, IPR2025-00207, Paper 10 at 2 (May 16, 2025) (Before the Office of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office) (exercising discretion to deny institution with the same relative timing between district court trial and final written decision deadline).” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsNot reached
  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, deniedDenied
  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Institution of inter partes review, however, is discretionary. See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding.”). For the reasons discussed below, we exercise discretion pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) not to institute inter partes review. Additionally, for the same reasons and because institution was denied in IPR2024-01248, we deny Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (“[T]he Director . . . may join as a party . . . any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director . . . determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314.”).” slip op. at 3

  Discretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 9,814,071
• TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd. (F/K/A TCL Multimedia Technology Holdings, Ltd.) v. Maxell, Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00135 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR on all challenged claims, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the parallel litigation was advanced and trial would precede a final written decision.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “Under the latest applicable guidance, Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation “is highly relevant, but [is] not . . . dispositive by itself.” CAPJ Memo at 2– 3. Accordingly, we consider Petitioner’s stipulation “as part of [our] holistic analysis under Fintiv.” Id. at 2. In theory, Petitioner’s stipulation could “mitigate[] any concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions” regarding unpatentability/ invalidity. Sotera, Paper 12 at 19. We note that Petitioner’s initial invalidity contentions included the two asserted references here, Bennett and Nashida. Although Petitioner served those contentions before the filing of the instant Petition—in which it proffered its stipulation—we cannot discern from the instant record whether Petitioner’s present invalidity positions in the underlying litigation incorporate any aspects of its grounds here based on Bennett and Nashida. Still, we view Petitioner’s stipulation as significantly mitigating potential conflict given the likelihood that the court would hold Petitioner (and its privies) to Petitioner’s representations made here.5” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Board, however, has discretion to deny a petition even when a petitioner meets that threshold. Id.; see, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential) (“NHK”). For the reasons that follow, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “controller” that “receive[s] an identifier for identifying a second video content from [an] external mobile terminal” and “acquire[s] the second video content via the internet using said identifier.” Ex. 1001, 20:29–31, 20:46–47, 20:52–55 (alterations and emphasis added). In the Bennett obviousness ground, Petitioner cites Bennett’s control signal that directs display of a video stream on a television screen for teaching the recited “identifier.” Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 32). Petitioner further cites Bennett’s teaching of an Internet server as a media source for teaching the “acquire[s]” limitation. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 55). Petitioner alternatively cites its declarant’s testimony and contends that it would have been obvious “to use an identifier such as URL in Bennett’s system to retrieve video content from the Internet.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 87). Yet Patent Owner’s arguments (see Prelim. Resp. 59–64) call into question whether Bennett teaches or suggests the use of either Bennett’s control signal or a URL to “acquire the second video content via the internet.” In addition, we preliminarily agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments regarding the URL “focus on justifying an example of what an identifier could be, and fail[] to address a scenario that would justify the receipt of a URL from a phone/remote” in Bennett’s system. Id. at 63. Petitioner’s further contentions for these limitations in the Bennett– Nashida obviousness ground (see Pet. 73–75) do not necessarily cure the deficiencies mentioned by Patent Owner. Petitioner contends that “Nashida discloses the use of identifiers, such as URLs, for retrieving internet content” and cites Nashida’s teaching of “‘controller 1010 transmit[ting] a command of requesting a transmission of a URL’ for retrieving and displaying web content on a display apparatus.” Id. at 73 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 120). Yet, according to Patent Owner, Nashida appears to show the URL moving in the opposite direction of Petitioner’s intended mapping: “It is therefore the image display apparatus (the alleged ‘display apparatus’) that sends the URL to the remote controller . . . , and not the other way around, as claimed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 67 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 1216). At the very least, these issues preclude a finding of “particularly” slip op. at 20

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,219,020
• TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd. (F/K/A TCL Multimedia Technology Holdings, Ltd.) v. Maxell, Ltd.Institution denied
  PTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00134 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–11, 13, and 15–20, finding that the advanced Texas litigation and trial timing outweighed the Petition’s Sotera stipulation.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “September 22, 2025, which is less than four months after the statutory deadline for this Decision and “almost eight months before the projected statutory deadline for a final written decision.” Prelim. Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2004). Accordingly, the trial is currently set to occur several months before any Final Written Decision in this case will issue. Although trial delays are a possibility, there is no evidence before us that would indicate the likelihood of a trial postponement. Thus, this factor strongly favors discretionary denial.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied

    “transmits, over the USB cable, a first signal to the digital camera for causing the digital camera to output compressed first image information.” Petitioner addresses that requirement by asserting Lawther’s interface circuit “can also be adapted to enable exchange data with a connected external device.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 50). Although Lawther may “exchange data,” supporting that signals may be sent to a connected camera, Petitioner does not establish that such a signal would have been used as claimed. It may be that such a signal is inherently present in the interactions Lawther describes, but Petitioner does not assert or establish so, only that Lawther has the capability to “exchange data” with a connected camera. Because of this potential weakness in Petitioner’s showing, we cannot conclude that the Petition presents a particularly strong challenge.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “the Petition does not present a particularly strong challenge, because it inadequately addresses at least one claim limitation. In particular, limitation [1F] requires “USB interface circuitry [that] transmits, over the USB cable, a first signal to the digital camera for causing the digital camera to output compressed first image information.” Petitioner addresses that requirement by asserting Lawther’s interface circuit “can also be adapted to enable exchange data with a connected external device.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 50). Although Lawther may “exchange data,” supporting that signals may be sent to a connected camera, Petitioner does not establish that such a signal would have been used as claimed. It may be that such a signal is inherently present in the interactions Lawther describes, but Petitioner does not assert or establish so, only that Lawther has the capability to “exchange data” with a connected camera. Because of this potential weakness in Petitioner’s showing, we cannot conclude that the Petition presents a particularly strong challenge.” slip op. at 9

  § 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,650,780
• TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd. (F/K/A TCL Multimedia Technology Holdings, Ltd.) v. Maxell, Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00120 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–4 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that Acharya renders at least one challenged claim obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “asserted in the Texas litigation. Prelim. Resp. 14. Petitioner stipulates not to pursue in the Texas litigation “the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Pet. 68. Such a Sotera stipulation eliminates the substantive overlap between this proceeding and invalidity in the Texas litigation. See Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 18–19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). This factor weighs strongly against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “Petitioner points out differences between Acharya and Robbins, in that Robbins discloses Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) media distribution, whereas Acharya discloses a system for multiple users in a meeting to display media on a single display. Prelim. Reply 2. Petitioner asserts further that Robbins lacks the claimed communication path that bypasses the router, which is disclosed by Acharya. Id. at 2–3. And Petitioner points out that Acharya describes “the user’s ability to disconnect from the display and pass control to another participant—key to the ‘termination signal’ limitation.” Id. at 3.” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “educational background, such as a Bachelor of Science degree, in Electrical Engineering or Computer Engineering as well as some understanding of Wireless Communications” and “would have 2 years of practical experience in television or video display system development.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–51). Patent Owner adopts that proposed level of skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 5–6. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’341 patent, and we adopt it here.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We follow the parties’ agreed construction here, as adopted by the district court. Neither that construction nor any other affects our decision. Thus we do not expressly construe any claim term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent that the scope of a particular claim term impacts a party’s argument during trial, the party should propose an express construction and show how the record supports it.” slip op. at 12

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denial
  Patents in suitUS 10,375,341
• Hanshow America Inc. / Hanshow Technology Co., Ltd. v. Ses-Imagotag GmbHSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00188 · APJ Terrence W Mcmillin · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–10 and 12–15 are unpatentable as obvious over either asserted combination; claim 11 was not shown unpatentable under either ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “The only significant difference between the positions of Petitioner and Patent Owner is that Patent Owner would require that a skilled artisan have coursework or training or work experience in multimedia systems in addition to the other requirements. Otherwise, the positions of the parties are similar. Based upon this record and the qualifications on which the parties and their experts agree, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the ’669 patent relates would have at least a Master of Science Degree (or higher degree) in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a similar technical Master’s Degree; or alternatively, a Bachelor’s Degree (or higher degree) in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, or an equivalent field with two or more years of work experience in a relevant field or relevant industry experience. However, our decision on obviousness is supported by either of the definitions offered by the parties.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther

    “Accordingly, we determine that no claim terms require express construction. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . 4 Neither party argues lexicography or disavowal applies to any claim term. See generally Pet.; see generally PO Resp. that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). We apply the plain and ordinary meaning to all the claim terms. To the extent it is necessary to address the meaning of any claim term in order to make a final determination whether or not any challenged claim is unpatentable based on the arguments and evidence presented, we address the meaning as part of our unpatentability analysis.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner

    “[1.0] A video playback system (1), comprising The Petitioner contends that the preamble of claim 1 is not limiting. Pet. 17 (“The preamble of claim 1 is not limiting because it merely states the purpose or intended use of the alleged invention. It does not define any of the claim limitations, which are set forth fully in the body of the claim (i.e., a video playback system).”). Nonetheless, Petitioner cites both Swafford and Masumoto and shows both cited references disclose video playback systems. Id. at 17–18. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention that the preamble is not limiting or dispute that the cited art discloses the preamble. See generally PO Resp. We determine that the preamble is not limiting but, if it were, the cited art has been shown to teach it. [1.1] a number of playback devices (6A, 6B) to playback a video on their” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “However, we do agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s contention that the cited combination of teachings is supported “because of the structural similarity between Swafford’s and Masumoto’s devices” (Pet. 54– 55) does not provide a motivation to combine. PO Resp, 47–48. The only structural similarity relied on by Petitioner in support of this argument is that Swafford and Masumoto both disclose use of LCDs. See Pet. 54–55. Petitioner provides an inadequate explanation as to how or why the use of LCDs which are a common form of video displays would motivate the combination of the relied-upon teachings. But, this deficiency does not undermine the persuasiveness of Petitioner’s overall showing of motivation to combine. After considering all the arguments and evidence offered by the parties, we determine that Petitioner shows that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the relied-upon teachings of Swafford and Masumoto with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 11,405,669 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,405,669
• Hanshow America Inc. / Hanshow Technology Co., Ltd. v. Ses-Imagotag Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00189 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 were not shown unpatentable because Fujiwara lacks the claimed horizontal position, and Bandy with Fowler lacks the claimed vertical position.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had at least a Master of Science Degree in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, wireless telecommunication systems, or an equivalent field (or a similar technical Master’s Degree, or higher degree). Ex. 1009, ¶34. Alternatively, . . . a Bachelor’s Degree (or higher degree) in an academic area emphasizing electrical engineering, computer engineering, wireless telecommunication systems, or an equivalent field with two or more years of work experience in electrical engineering, wireless telecommunication systems, computer engineering, or an equivalent field. Id. Additional education in a relevant field or relevant industry experience may compensate for a deficit in one of the other aspects of the requirements stated above. Id. Pet. 9. Patent Owner applies the same definition. PO Resp. 17. We apply the parties’ proposed level of ordinary skill because it is reasonably consistent with the level of skill implied in the disclosure of the ’340 patent and the cited prior art.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownNo construction neededGranted in part

    “c) Conclusion Having reviewed the claim language and the specification, we determine that the claimed planogram stores one piece of data with respect to identification—a unique identifier—and two pieces of data with respect to location—a vertical position and a horizontal position. Further, claim 1 states that each location (i.e., each horizontal/vertical position pair) is unique (“one-to-one”) for each unique identifier. Ex. 1001, 8:25–27. Thus, we determine that no horizontal/vertical position pair will be associated with more than one unique identifier (and vice versa). No other terms require construction at this time. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “taught by “the horizontal position of the electronic shelf label along the horizontal shelf part 21, as shown in FIG. 4.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1009 ¶ 75). Certainly, each shelf label in the real world, as well as in the drawing of Figure 4, has a horizontal position. However, that does not mean that Fujiwara’s database stores information indicating the horizontal position of the shelf label as required by the claim. The claim is not calling for the shelf label to have a location; it is calling for location information to be accessible by the server so that the server can determine the location of the mobile terminal. Ex. 1001, 8:19–24 (claiming a “method being performed by a central server configured to access a planogram associating . . . identifiers . . . with . . . locations . . . defined by a vertical and horizontal position”), 8:41–46 (claiming a method step of “determining a location of the mobile terminal . . . based on . . . the planogram). For example, fields in a database storing horizontal and vertical positions would be sufficient. Id. at 6:31–36 (“The central server 2 determines the location of said mobile terminal 1 from the identifier of said electronic label 3 using the data of a planogram associating a location with the label identifier.”), 7:16–18 (calling for the planogram to be stored in a database). To the extent we accept that Fujiwara teaches a unique identifier (shelf label ID) and a vertical position (e.g., shelf number 21-1), we find Fujiwara to be missing a horizontal position as required by the claim because neither the shelf number nor the shelf label ID provides an indication of where along the shelf the shelf label is located.” slip op. at 14

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “III. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1013–1021 and 1024–1027. PO Mot. Excl. 1. Our analysis above focuses on a dispositive issue regarding the claimed planogram. We are not apprised of any citations to these documents in the briefing regarding the planogram issue. Indeed, according to Patent Owner, Exhibits 1013–1021 involve one of the issues we did not address, regarding near-field communications. PO Mot. Excl. 3–4. Because this motion involves a question on evidence that is not relevant to the issues discussed in this Decision, we need not rule on the motion at this time. We dismiss Patent Owner’s motion to exclude as moot.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 10,674,340 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 10,674,340

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.