• Grünenthal GmbH v. Antecip Bioventures II LLCRehearing granted
  PTAB · Nov 10, 2020 · PGR2018-00092 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · PGR · Rehearing

  The Board granted the petitioner’s rehearing request, vacated the final written decision, and will issue a revised decision after overlooking Varenna 2012 in Grounds 5–7.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “the party challenging the decision.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,768 (Aug. 14, 2012). In its request for rehearing, the dissatisfied party must (1) “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked” and (2) identify the place “where each matter was previously addressed.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,768.” slip op. at 2

  None
  Patents in suitUS 9,820,999
• Grünenthal GmbH v. Antecip Bioventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 28, 2020 · PGR2019-00027 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–29 are unpatentable as obvious over Harden combined with one or more of Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore; the written-description challenge was not proven.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “Based on the full trial record, we find that Petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious. Varenna 2011 teaches that neridronate “seems to possess an excellent efficacy profile” in treating CRPS. Ex. 1006, 233. In the context of reporting the use of “[n]eridronic acid for the treatment of bone metabolic diseases,” Gatti teaches that “[i]ntravenous high doses of bisphosphonates are increasingly used for the treatment of [CRPS].”13 Ex. 1008, 1305, 1308. Gatti also reports that a clinical trial of neridronic acid “is underway.” Id. Muratore teaches that neridronate was “efficacious in the treatment of [CRPS].” Ex. 1007, 89. Thus, on this record, each of these references sufficiently teaches the efficacy of neridronic acid or its salt in treating CRPS, suggesting that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use neridronic acid in treating CRPS. With respect to the limitation of claim 1 requiring that the neridronic acid be “parenterally administer[ed],” each of Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore teaches intravenous administration of neridronic acid. Ex. 1006, 233; Ex. 1007, 89; Ex. 1008, 1308. Intravenous administration is a type of parenteral administration. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. 13 Gatti uses the terms “reflex sympathetic dystrophy syndrome” and “algodystrophy.” Ex. 1008, 1308. On the present record, we interpret both of these terms as synonymous with “complex regional pain syndrome,” “CRPS,” “complex regional pain syndrome type I,” “CRPS I,” “reflex sympathetic algodystrophy,” “reflex sympathetic dystrophy,” and “causalgia.” Ex. 1006, 227 (equating “algodystrophy,” “complex regional pain syndrome type I,” and “CRPS I”); Ex. 1007, 89 (using the term “reflex sympathetic algodystrophy”); Ex. 1019, 713 (equating “complex regional pain syndrome,” “CRPS,” “reflex sympathetic dystrophy,” and “causalgia”). Harden teaches that the Budapest Criteria are used as “clinical diagnostic criteria for CRPS” and that they include changes in skin blood flow, by reference to the symptoms of “temperature asymmetry” and “skin color asymmetry.” Ex. 1009, 274 (Appendix II). Further, Harden teaches that 69.4% of patients diagnosed with CRPS were observed on examination to exhibit temperature asymmetry, and 83.9% were observed on examination to exhibit skin color asymmetry. Id. at 271 (Table 2). Thus, Harden teaches that a majority of patient with CRPS suffer from changes in skin blood flow. Because Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore teach that neridronic acid is effective in treating CRPS, the combination of any of those references with Harden14 would have suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art that neridronic acid would be effective in alleviating changes in skin blood flow associated with CRPS. Thus, the combination of Harden and one or more of Varenna 2011,” slip op. at 26

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “Assuming that “October 2011” is hearsay, it is still admissible evidence under Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Opp. Mot. 3–4 (asserting this hearsay exception). Under Rule 807, a statement “is not excluded,” even if it is hearsay, if it meets two requirements. First, the statement must be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness— after considering the totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence, if any, corroborating the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(1). Second, the statement must be “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.” Id. at 807(a)(2). Here, both requirements are satisfied. The statement “October 2011” on the face of Varenna 2011 is offered to prove that Varenna 2011 was published in October 2011. This statement is accompanied by several guarantees of trustworthiness. The statements “Received on July 15, 2011” and “Accepted on August 30, 2011,” when offered as corroboration of the October 2011 publication date, are not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801 (statement is hearsay only if offered in evidence “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”). Accordingly, they may be admitted for this purpose, and they corroborate a publication in October 2011. Moreover, Exhibits 1038 and 1040 also provide some evidence that Varenna 2011 was published in October 2011. Ex. 1038, 1 (article with same title as Varenna 2011 published in “Fascicolo 5 2011”); Ex. 1040, 1 (“Fascicolo 5 2011” published in 2011). Thus, the record contains sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness of Varenna 2011’s statement that Varenna 2011 was published in October 2011. See Opp. Mot. 3 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 39–40). We find that Varenna 2011’s statement, indicating that the reference was published in October 2011, is “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(2). It is difficult to imagine evidence more probative of the publication date of a journal article than the article’s own contemporaneous statement about when it was published.19 See Opp. Mot. 2–4 (for well-supported arguments on point). Accordingly, we determine that the exception of Rule 807 applies, and we conclude that the statement “October 2011” in Varenna 2011 should not be excluded.” slip op. at 48

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “regardless of whether the preambles are limiting. Even if the preambles are limiting, their scope is so broad as to be hardly different from no limitation at all. The specification of the ’774 patent defines “treating” as “includ[ing] any kind of treatment activity, including the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease in man or other animals, or any activity that otherwise affects the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” Ex. 1002, 7:43–47. This definition exhibits “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” and is “‘set out . . . within the patent disclosure’ so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, we give effect to this definition of “treating.” Under the definition of “treating” in the specification of the ’774 patent, “[a] method of treating” changes in skin blood flow (claim 1) or abnormal sudomotor activity (claim 16) “associated with complex regional pain syndrome” means a method of diagnosing, curing, mitigating, or preventing that condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome, or otherwise affecting the structure or any function of the body of someone suffering from the condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome. To the extent that this requires carrying out the method on a patient suffering from changes in skin blood flow (claim 1) or abnormal sudomotor activity (claim 16) associated with complex regional pain syndrome, this is already part of the method recited in the body of the claims, Ex. 1002, 90:33–40, 91:14–21, so the preambles provide no additional limitation. To the extent that the preambles require some particular result to be brought about, that result could be the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of the symptom in question, or it could be any effect at all on the structure or any function of the patient’s body. Thus, even when construed as limiting, the preambles provide little, if any, further restriction on the scope of the challenged claims beyond that set forth in the body of the claims.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “regardless of whether the preambles are limiting. Even if the preambles are limiting, their scope is so broad as to be hardly different from no limitation at all. The specification of the ’774 patent defines “treating” as “includ[ing] any kind of treatment activity, including the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease in man or other animals, or any activity that otherwise affects the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” Ex. 1002, 7:43–47. This definition exhibits “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” and is “‘set out . . . within the patent disclosure’ so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, we give effect to this definition of “treating.” Under the definition of “treating” in the specification of the ’774 patent, “[a] method of treating” changes in skin blood flow (claim 1) or abnormal sudomotor activity (claim 16) “associated with complex regional pain syndrome” means a method of diagnosing, curing, mitigating, or preventing that condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome, or otherwise affecting the structure or any function of the body of someone suffering from the condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome. To the extent that this requires carrying out the method on a patient suffering from changes in skin blood flow (claim 1) or abnormal sudomotor activity (claim 16) associated with complex regional pain syndrome, this is already part of the method recited in the body of the claims, Ex. 1002, 90:33–40, 91:14–21, so the preambles provide no additional limitation. To the extent that the preambles require some particular result to be brought about, that result could be the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of the symptom in question, or it could be any effect at all on the structure or any function of the patient’s body. Thus, even when construed as limiting, the preambles provide little, if any, further restriction on the scope of the challenged claims beyond that set forth in the body of the claims. Moreover, as discussed below with respect to the asserted grounds of obviousness, Petitioner directs us to evidence that the prior art teaches or suggests the subject matter of the preambles, even when those preambles are construed as limiting in accordance with the meaning of “treating” provided in the specification.8 Thus, whether or not we treat the preambles as limiting, the outcome does not change. Given this circumstance, we treat the preambles of the challenged claims as limiting and assign them a meaning consistent with the specification’s definition of “treating.”” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 10,039,774 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 10,039,774
• Grünenthal GmbH v. Antecip Bioventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 28, 2020 · PGR2019-00026 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Harden and one or more of Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore; the written-description challenge fails.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “INTRODUCTION A. Background Grünenthal GmbH (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”) requesting a post-grant review of claims 1–30 of U.S. Patent No. 9,931,352 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’352 patent”). Antecip Bioventures II LLC (“Patent Owner”) did not file a Preliminary Response. We instituted review of all challenged claims on each of the grounds asserted in the Petition. Paper 6 (“Dec. Inst.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingOther

    “regardless of whether the preambles are limiting. Even if the preambles are limiting, their scope is so broad as to be hardly different from no limitation at all. The specification of the ’352 patent defines “treating” as “includ[ing] any kind of treatment activity, including the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease in man or other animals, or any activity that otherwise affects the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.” Ex. 1001, 7:43–47. This definition exhibits “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” and is “‘set out . . . within the patent disclosure’ so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, we give effect to this definition of “treating.” Under the definition of “treating” in the specification of the ’352 patent, “[a] method of treating” hyperalgesia (claim 1) or edema (claim 17) “associated with complex regional pain syndrome” means a method of diagnosing, curing, mitigating, or preventing that condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome, or otherwise affecting the structure or any function of the body of someone suffering from the condition associated with complex regional pain syndrome. To the extent that this requires carrying out the method on a patient suffering from hyperalgesia (claim 1) or edema (claim 17) associated with complex regional pain syndrome, this is already part of the method recited in the body of the claims, Ex. 1001, 90:39–43, 91:23–27, so the preambles provide no additional limitation. To the extent that the preambles require some particular result to be brought about, that result could be the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or prevention of the symptom in question, or it could be any effect at all on the structure or any function of the patient’s body. Thus, even when construed as limiting, the preambles provide little, if any, further restriction on the scope of the challenged claims beyond that set forth in the body of the claims. Moreover, as discussed below with respect to the asserted grounds of obviousness, Petitioner directs us to evidence that the prior art teaches or suggests the subject matter of the preambles, even when those preambles are construed as limiting in accordance with the meaning of “treating” provided in the specification.8 Thus, whether or not we treat the preambles as limiting, the outcome does not change. Given this circumstance, we treat the preambles of the challenged claims as limiting, and assign them a meaning consistent with the specification’s definition of “treating.”” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner’s asserted references provides data showing that administering neridronic acid improves the symptoms of CRPS. PO Resp. 18–19. But “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–904 (Fed. Cir. 1988). It is sufficient that Varenna 2011, Gatti, and Muratore would have informed the ordinarily skilled artisan that successful treatment of CRPS and its symptoms was likely; there is no requirement that Petitioner show that the prior art taught that success was certain.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “qualifies as a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102. PO Resp. 4–17; PO Sur-Reply 14–21. “To qualify as a printed publication, a reference ‘must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). “A reference will be considered publicly accessible if it was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Id. (quoting Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, there are two ways to show that a reference was sufficiently accessible: show it was disseminated or show it was “otherwise made available to the extent that” interested people of ordinary skill in the art could have located it after exercising reasonable diligence. Id. Here, according to Petitioner, the asserted references “are articles published in periodical journals by an identified and reputable publisher.” Reply 3.11 Petitioner argues that the references were “disseminated on the[ir] stated publication date[s].” Id. at 5. We agree.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 9,931,352 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosure
  Patents in suitUS 9,931,352
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Nucurrent, Inc.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Feb 7, 2020 · IPR2019-00861 · APJ Wesley B Derrick · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board granted Samsung’s rehearing request and instituted review on all challenged claims and all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “in an unusual place in time. As noted, the Petition was filed (March 22, 2019), and the Preliminary Response submitted (June 26, 2019), before promulgation of our 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update (July 16, 2019). At the time of filing, Petitioner could not have known of the guidance set forth in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update concerning multiple petitions. Although Petitioner “could, in theory, have filed a single petition including all of its grounds within the page limits,” Petitioner, acting on the guidance available to it at the time of filing, “determined that filing two separate IPR petitions allowed each asserted ground of unpatentability to be presented in a more clear and comprehensive manner.” Req. 4. Thereafter, the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update issued on the same day as our conference call to discuss the parties’ requests for additional briefing (July 16, 2019), and these concurrent events would not have allowed the parties time to review and apply the guidance in a manner that would have permitted them to tailor their requests for additional briefing or their filing strategy to accommodate the newly-issued guidance. In the subsequent briefing by both parties, the impact of the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update, although discussed briefly, was not the primary focus. See generally Reply; Sur-Reply. This is understandable, given the breadth of the complex estoppel issues raised in this case as well as the contemporaneous issuance of the guidance in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update. Thus, on account of the timing of the Petition filed in this case relative to other events, and based on the reasoning presented by Petitioner in the Request, which we discuss in more detail below, we are persuaded that we should reconsider whether to allow institution of inter partes review based on the arguments presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 11

  • Parallel petitionsInstitutedInstituted

    “review, addresses Lee-based grounds rooted in anticipation (and obviousness over Lee and secondary references). IPR2019-00859, Paper 1. The petition in IPR2019-00861 addresses Partovi-based grounds rooted in obviousness. IPR2019-00861, Paper 1. In the Request, Petitioner argues that there is “almost no overlap” between the Partovi-based Petition in this case and Petitioner’s Lee-based petition in IPR2019-00859 (Req. 3), noting that “all grounds of the instant Petition rely on Partovi as the primary reference while the ’859 proceeding grounds rely on Lee as the primary reference” (id. at 2). In support, Petitioner provides a table depicting the various grounds presented in the two cases, and the differences between the two. Id. at 3. Petitioner also argues that “Partovi’s teachings are not redundant of Lee’s” because the references “disclose the claimed features of the ’046 patent in different ways.” Id. More particularly, Petitioner explains that “Lee is generally focused on an inductor structure” while “Partovi contains a more complete and clear disclosure of methods and circuitry for operating inductors,” which is important because the “dependent claims involve additional circuitry used in an inductor’s operation.” Id. at 4. Although Petitioner acknowledges that it “could, in theory, have filed a single petition including all of its grounds within the page limits,” Petitioner contends that “doing so would have resulted in a reduction in the thoroughness and completeness of the analysis presented due to the large number of challenged claims.” Id. Specifically, Petitioner argues that “NuCurrent chose to assert 98 claims from four patents against Samsung in a parallel district court litigation” and that Petitioner had to file two petitions in order to address “the sheer number of claims at issue.” Id. at 5. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s arguments concerning the differences between the petitions, and Petitioner’s reasons for presenting its arguments in two petitions, as it did, merit reconsideration of our denial of institution. The differences between the petitions in this instance, as explained by Petitioner, support its position that there is a need for the Partovi reference to distinctly address certain limitations of the dependent claims. The number of claims asserted against Petitioner in corresponding litigation, as well, is a factor enumerated in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update as a circumstance in which more than one petition may be necessary. 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update, 26 (“circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary” include “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation”). We note again that although Patent Owner was authorized to file a ten-page response to Petitioner’s Request (Dec. 5), in which it could have addressed, inter alia, Petitioner’s arguments about the differences between these Petitions or the number of claims at issue, Patent Owner did not file a response to the Request, leaving Petitioner’s contentions regarding rehearing undisputed on the present record.” slip op. at 12

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)InstitutedInstituted

    “Rehearing, on this record, we do not agree that proceeding to trial would be an inefficient use of Board resources. The number of Patent Owner’s patents that are being challenged is not a reason to deny institution. “[R]ecogniz[ing] the potential for abuse of the review process by repeated attacks on patents,” the Board has enumerated factors that guide its discretion as to whether to deny institution under § 314(a), “especially as to ‘follow-on’ petitions challenging the same patent as challenged previously in an IPR . . . proceeding.” Trial Practice Guide Update 9 (August 2018) (quoting General Plastic, slip op. 16–17). Although a multiplicity of grounds relying on a number of principal references addressed in a number of separate petitions may raise concerns regarding fairness in some instances, we find no such concerns here, for largely the same reasons articulated above with respect to our disposition of the Request for Rehearing. In these circumstances, as discussed above, we are not persuaded that defending against both challenges is unfair, abusive, or unduly burdensome for Patent Owner. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Veveo, Inc., IPR2019-00237, Paper 15 at 14–15 (PTAB Jul. 5, 2019) (instituting inter partes review on two petitions addressing the same patent).” slip op. at 29

  • BurdenInstitutedInstituted

    “and 28, we discern no deficiency in Petitioner’s characterization of the cited references and the knowledge in the art, or in Petitioner’s assertions as to the reasonable inferences an ordinary artisan would have made from those references, to the extent the ground relies on AC current and voltage and the inherent characteristics of inductors for the limitation “wherein when an electrical current is propagated within at least the first conductor layer, a magnetic flux is generated within the inductor when a change occurs in at least one of a frequency, a magnitude, or a waveform shape of the propagated electrical current.” Because this showing is sufficient to demonstrate teaching of this claim element was in the prior art as alleged, we need not reach Petitioner’s alternative reasoning grounded on changes in the duty cycle as to frequency and waveform shape meeting this particular claim limitation. Thus, based on the information presented at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of independent claims 1 and 28 as obvious over Partovi in view of Chiang.” slip op. at 44

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,300,046
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Nucurrent, Inc.Rehearing granted
  PTAB · Feb 7, 2020 · IPR2019-00860 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board granted Samsung’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1–8, 10, 12, 13, 15–22, and 24–30 on every asserted obviousness ground.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted

    “On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s arguments concerning the differences between the Petitions, and Petitioner’s reasons for presenting its arguments in two Petitions, as it did, merit reconsideration of our denial of institution. The differences between the Petitions in this instance, as explained by Petitioner, evince a need for the Partovi reference to distinctly address certain limitations of the dependent claims. The number of claims asserted against Petitioner in corresponding litigation, as well, is a factor enumerated in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update as a circumstance in which more than one petition may be necessary. 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update, 26 (“circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary” include “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation”). We note again that although Patent Owner was authorized to file a ten-page response to Petitioner’s Request (Dec. 5), in which it could have addressed, inter alia, Petitioner’s arguments about the differences between these Petitions or the number of claims at issue, Patent Owner did not file a response to the Request, leaving Petitioner’s contentions regarding rehearing undisputed on the present record.” slip op. at 12

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner

    “Rehearing, on this record, we do not agree that proceeding to trial would be an inefficient use of Board resources. We also do not agree that the number of Patent Owner’s patents that are being challenged is a reason to deny institution. “[R]ecogniz[ing] the potential for abuse of the review process by repeated attacks on patents,” the Board has enumerated factors that guide its discretion as to whether to deny institution under § 314(a), “especially as to ‘follow-on’ petitions challenging the same patent as challenged previously in an IPR . . . proceeding.” Trial Practice Guide Update 9 (August 2018) (quoting General Plastic, slip op. 16–17). Although a multiplicity of grounds relying on a number of principal references addressed in a number of separate petitions may raise concerns regarding fairness in some instances, we find no such concerns here, for largely the same reasons articulated above with respect to our disposition of the Request for Rehearing. In these circumstances, as we have already discussed above, we are not persuaded that defending against both challenges is unfair, abusive, or unduly burdensome for Patent Owner. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Veveo, Inc., IPR2019-00237, Paper 15 at 14–15 (PTAB Jul. 5, 2019) (instituting inter partes review on two petitions addressing the same patent).” slip op. at 27

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 (2019)). Under Phillips, claim terms are generally afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning,” read “in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner does not propose a construction for any of the limitations of the claims. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 37). Patent Owner also declines to address the construction of the claims. See generally Prelim. Resp. We decline to construe any claim term of the ’960 patent because it is not necessary to do so in reaching our decision that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 14

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “For the reasons set forth above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’960 patent. Thus, we institute an inter partes review. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that an inter partes review is instituted on each of the grounds asserted in the Petition; and” slip op. at 49

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,680,960
• L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. Liqwd, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 30, 2019 · PGR2018-00025 · APJ Timothy G Majors · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13, 19–23, 29, and 30 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 14–16, 18, and 24–28 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “combination of Pratt and Tanabe teaches or suggests all of claim 1’s limitations, and that the skilled artisan had a sufficient reason to combine the art as proposed with a reasonable expectation of success in arriving at the bleaching method that is claimed. Before reaching a conclusion of obviousness, however, we consider the parties’ argument and evidence related to alleged objective indicia of nonobviousness. WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 35

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “those exhibits) as discussed above in the context for which they were offered (objective indicia of nonobviousness as to alleged unexpected results and industry skepticism). We gave the exhibits little weight on those issues for the reasons explained, and ultimately found in Petitioner’s favor—that objective indicia of nonobviousness did not outweigh the evidence of obviousness on this record. Thus, excluding this evidence would not change the result. Accordingly, we dismiss Petitioner’s motion to exclude Exhibits 2038 and 2041 as moot.” slip op. at 85

  Patent outcomesUS 9,668,954 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 9,668,954
• Autodesk, Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc. And Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 11, 2017 · CBM2016-00043 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 12–19 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 3, 8–11, and 20 are subject to adverse judgment after disclaimer.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

    “B. Statutory Disclaimer During the pendency of this proceeding, Patent Owner filed a disclaimer pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Ex. 2014. According to this disclaimer, Patent Owner disclaims claims 3, 8–11, and 20 of the ’820 patent. Id.; see also Resp. 1 (“Contemporaneously with the filing of this Response, Patent Owner is disclaiming claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 20 of the ’820 Patent.”). Our rules provide for entry of adverse judgment against a Patent Owner who disclaims “a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Although Patent Owner does not disclaim all the challenged claims, and although Patent Owner therefore has some claims remaining in this trial, we construe the disclaimer of claims 3, 8–11, and 20 as a request for the entry of adverse judgment solely with respect to those claims. We grant the request and enter adverse judgment with respect to claims 3, 8–11, and 20.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “1. Add-On Computer Software Code Both parties propose construing “add-on computer software code,” a term that appears in every challenged claim. Ex. 1001, 78:43–82:36. Petitioner argues that this term should be interpreted as a “set of computer code that cannot be run independently from a parent program.” Pet. 22. Patent Owner argues that the term should be interpreted as “set of computer code that is designed to run within a parent computer software application or code, particularly architectural CAD software (or another architectural, civil, industrial, or other software design tool), as an internal component.” Resp. 42–43. We agree with Patent Owner. Patent Owner’s construction is taken directly from the written description of the ’820 patent, which provides a reasonably clear, deliberate, and precise definition of the term. See Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480; Ex. 1001, 61:42–51 (“The plug-in (add-on) computer software code is . . . .”). To the extent that Petitioner’s proposed construction seeks to limit add-on software code further by requiring that the software code be incapable of running independently from a parent program, as opposed merely to being designed to run within the parent program as an internal component, this further limitation is inconsistent with the lexicography undertaken by the patentee of the ’820 patent. Accordingly, we construe “add-on computer software code” as a “set of computer code that is designed to run within a parent computer software application or code, particularly architectural CAD software (or another architectural, civil, industrial, or other software design tool), as an internal component.”” slip op. at 6

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “As discussed above, the ’820 patent describes solving problems with the generation of cost estimates of construction projects, including that the process takes significant time and effort, that the estimates produced are difficult to revise, and that the estimates can be inaccurate, leading to cost overruns and difficulties obtaining construction loans. Ex. 1001, 1:15–62. The claims recite a computer readable medium or system for automating the process of generating a price schedule, which is used to develop the overall project cost estimate. Id. at 78:43–82:36. In so doing, the claims do not recite any “specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities,” such as the “self-referential table for a computer database” in Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. Instead, the claims of the ’820 patent “invoke[]” known aspects of computer technology, including “[a] non-transitory computer readable medium,” “a computer that includes a processor and a memory,” “an add-on computer software code,” “a software design tool,” and “a database,” “merely as a tool” for solving the problem of improving the known process of generating construction project cost estimates. Id.; Ex. 1001, 78:43–60. Accordingly, the claims of the ’820 patent are not like those considered in Enfish, where the claims were determined at the first step of the Alice framework not to be directed to abstract ideas because they were directed to “[a] specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities.” 822 F.3d at 1336. Instead, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims of the ’820 patent are focused “on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea.’” Id. The ’820 patent makes clear that the heart of the claimed subject matter is generating prices for construction projects, a process that can be accomplished without automation technology. Ex. 1001, 1:15–62. The claims themselves recite “[a] non-transitory computer readable medium [that] causes [a] computer to generate a price schedule” and “[a] system for creating a pricing schedule.” Id. at 78:43–51, 82:4. As discussed above, the computer technology recited in the claims is used merely as a tool to automate the process of determining the price of a construction project. Determining a price is an abstract idea. See Versata Dev. Grp., 793 F.3d at 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, on the current record, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that the claims of the ’820 patent are directed to an abstract idea under the first step of the Alice analysis.” slip op. at 20

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “application of an abstract idea. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78. Petitioner argues that the challenged claims have no such elements, because “the challenged claims add nothing more than well-understood, routine, conventional activity to the abstract idea of calculating a price.” Pet. 32–48. Patent Owner argues that the presence of the add-on computer software code limitations in the challenged claims transforms those claims into patent-eligible applications. Resp. 49–50. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims of the ’820 patent do not add an inventive concept sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the abstract idea itself. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,515,820 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · Enfish
  Patents in suitUS 8,515,820
• Pungkuk Edm Wire Manufacturing Company v. Seong, Ki ChulNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 16, 2017 · IPR2016-00764 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board entered adverse judgment against claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9; Petitioner did not prove claims 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10 anticipated by Mukherjee because cracks were not shown to be necessarily …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

    “and instead only addresses the patentability of claims 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10 of the ’036 patent over Mukherjee. See PO Resp. 2–3, 9–28. We asked Patent Owner during the hearing whether it was conceding the unpatentability of the claims that it did not address in the Patent Owner Response (i.e., claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9). Tr. 55:20–56:4 (“[W]e instituted on a number of grounds that you did not -- and on a number of claims that you did not address in your patent owner response. Are you conceding unpatentability of those claims on those grounds?”). Patent Owner’s counsel responded that Patent Owner was conceding the unpatentability of those claims. Id. at 55:20– 56:10 (“JUDGE KOKOSKI: You're conceding that they're [claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9] not patentable? MR. SUTTON: That they're not patentable, that's correct.”). The Board’s rules permit a party to “request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). The Board construes a party’s “[a]bandonment of the contest” as a request for adverse judgment. Id. § 42.73(b)(4). Accordingly, we construe Patent Owner’s concession that claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9 are unpatentable to be an “abandonment of the contest” and a request for adverse judgment as to those claims. Therefore, we enter adverse judgment against claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the ’036 patent. C.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends that the term “cracks,” which, for purposes of the Decision on Institution, we determined did not require an explicit construction (Dec. on Inst. 11), should be construed to be mean “narrow breaks.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner did not address Patent Owner’s proposed construction in its Reply, but when asked during the hearing if it disagreed with it, Petitioner indicated that Patent Owner’s construction was “fine.” Tr. 18:3–21. Based on the record developed at trial, and in the absence of controversy about the construction of the term, we construe “cracks” to mean “narrow breaks.” B.” slip op. at 7

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Inherency requires that the claim limitation in question is necessarily present in the reference. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”); see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (patent challenger must demonstrate “that ‘the disclosure [of the prior art] is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught [in the prior art] would result in’ the claimed product.”) (citations omitted). “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). “If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.” Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Petitioner, therefore, must show that cracks in the alloy layer and the coating layer are necessarily present in Mukherjee.” slip op. at 10

  • ExcludeOther

    “III. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1014–1017, 1019, and 1020. Paper 59. We do not consider the merits of Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude because, as explained above, even if the disputed evidence is considered, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10 of the ’036 patent are unpatentable as anticipated by Mukherjee. Accordingly, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 6,492,036 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 6,492,036
• Parrot S.A. / Parrot, Inc. v. Drone Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 20, 2015 · IPR2014-00730 · APJ Howard B Blankenship · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–14 are unpatentable: claims 1–3, 5, 10–14 anticipated by Smith; claims 6–7 and 8–9 obvious over Smith with Barr and Fouche, respectively. Claims 4 and 15 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenMixed

    “construe “difference of motion” in claim 4 as relative motion. Pet. Reply 5– 6. Petitioner in its Reply does not, however, provide a persuasive explanation with respect to how the signal sent by the remote controller in Smith, or its “target motion signal” in the terms of claim 4, may contribute to getting the relative motion between the remote controller and the remotecontrolled device.2 Petitioner submits that “[i]t bears noting, moreover, that the ‘target motion signal’ (STAR3) of Fig. 5 of the ’071 Patent, also is a combination of the remote-controller’s measured orientation and the angle of the joystick, just as in Smith. Ex. 1001, 6:39-51. In that embodiment, it is ‘STAR3’ that is used to calculate the ‘difference of motion.’” Pet. Reply. 7. Petitioner refers to no evidence of record, however, to establish that this “third operation mode” described by the ’071 patent necessarily sends, as in Smith, a target motion signal that is the summation of the terrestrial magnetism signal and the orientation of the joystick relative to the remote 2 Although we did not institute trial on the alternative ground that claim 4 would have been obvious over Smith and Fouche (or the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art) (Pet. 29), the alternative ground for obviousness would suffer from the same deficiency as the anticipation ground. controller. Although attorney arguments are helpful when directing us to evidence in the record, the arguments themselves do not constitute evidence. Arguments of counsel cannot take the place of evidence in the record. See, e.g., Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (CCPA 1977); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). In consideration of the foregoing, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 4 is unpatentable as anticipated by Smith.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “The ’071 patent, thus, makes clear that, in the preferred embodiment of the invention, “detecting” the remote controller’s motion is detecting the change in terrestrial magnetism relative to the horizontal ground surface as the controller is moved or rotated, with the resulting terrestrial magnetism sensing signal SG changing accordingly. The “terrestrial magnetism” of the Earth “directs to a fixed direction parallel to the horizontal ground surface.” Id. at col. 3, ll. 63–65. Detecting the orientation of a remote controller with respect to magnetic North is, at the least, within the scope of “detect[ing] the remote controller’s motion” as claimed. “A claim construction that excludes the preferred embodiment ‘is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.’” Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “in orientation.” Pet. 17. As Petitioner indicates (id.), the ’071 patent does not provide a definition of the relevant terms different from the ordinary meaning of the words. At the preliminary proceeding stage, we interpreted “difference of motion” simply to mean, under the required broadest reasonable interpretation, relative motion. Dec. on Inst. 10. That interpretation is consistent with the language of claim 4. Claim 4 recites that the “calculated result” — the calculated current motion of the remote-controlled device — is compared with the target motion signal to get the “difference of motion” (relative motion) between the remote-controlled device and the remote controller. In relation to Petitioner’s proffered interpretation, because a change in orientation is a type of motion, relative orientation would be a type (or species) of “difference of motion.”” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Thus, “detecting” the remote controller’s motion is detecting the change in terrestrial magnetism relative to the horizontal ground surface as the controller is moved or rotated, with the resulting terrestrial magnetism sensing signal SG changing accordingly. Patent Owner has not pointed to any disclosure in the ’071 patent of the remote controller storing a previous orientation for comparison with a present orientation to effect “detect[ing] the remote controller’s motion” as claimed. We, therefore, remain convinced that detecting the orientation of a remote controller with respect to magnetic North — which Patent Owner admits Smith to disclose — is, at the least, within the scope of “detect[ing] the remote controller’s motion” as claimed.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 7,584,071 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,584,071
• Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited / Apotex, Inc. et al. v. Novartis AG And Mitsubishi Pharma Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 24, 2015 · IPR2014-00784 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–32 are unpatentable as obvious over Chiba and Aulton; the motion to amend with proposed claims 33–64 is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

    “institute an inter partes review of claims 1–32 of U.S. Patent No. 8,324,283 B2 (“the ’283 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 2 (“Pet.”).1 On December 1, 2014, the Board instituted trial to review patentability of the challenged claims. Paper 11 (“Dec. on Inst.”). Apotex, Inc. and Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Apotex,” or, together with Torrent, “Petitioners”) filed a separate Petition also seeking to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–32 of the ’283 patent. IPR2015-00518, Paper 1 (“IPR-518 Pet.”). This second Petition was accompanied by a motion seeking joinder with the trial that had been instituted in IPR2014-00784. IPR2015-00518, Paper 2 (“IPR-518 Joinder Mot.”). On February 17, 2015, the Board instituted trial in IPR2015-00518 and joined the proceedings in IPR2014-00784 and IPR2015-00518. IPR2015-00518, Paper 8 (“IPR-518 Dec.”).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “unexpired patent according to its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under that standard, absent any special definitions, we assign claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For this reason, we do not construe several terms for which constructions were proposed in the Petition but about which the parties do not disagree.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Where the prior art teaches the claimed invention, a claim is not rendered patentable by virtue of being motivated in the inventors’ minds by a newly-discovered advantage of the prior-art combination; allowing such a claim to stand “would remove from the public that which is in the public domain.” In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 1022 (CCPA 1979); see also Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“One of ordinary skill in the art need not see the identical problem addressed in a prior art reference to be motivated to apply its teachings.”). Here, Patent Owners argue that the newly discovered low-dose instability of fingolimod when mixed with common excipients motivated the inventors’ choice of the allegedly less common mannitol as an excipient. PO Resp. 12–15 (citing Ex. 2043 ¶¶ 14–19, 22, 24–36). As explained above, though, it does not matter that the prior art failed to recognize this advantage of a fingolimod-mannitol combination. “[T]he motivation in the prior art to combine the references does not have to be identical to that of the [patentee] to establish obviousness.” In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1996).” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 8,324,283 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,324,283

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.