- DISH Network LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2024-00393 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 3 are unpatentable as obvious over Kliger and Isaksson, and separately over Amit, Jacobsen, and Isaksson.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Although Patent Owner points to various parts of the ’518 patent as supporting its proposal, other parts of the patent are not so limited. For example, the ’518 patent repeatedly mentions prior art patents disclosing communication techniques applied to twisted pair wiring, including discrete multi-tone (DMT) modulation and bit loading. Ex. 1001, 3:49–50, 3:67–4:2, 8:19–26. The patent further mentions that its data network overlays cable or satellite services. See, e.g., id. at 5:1–6. Thus, a POSITA would not be limited to experience only with “coaxial cables” as opposed to work involving signal processing and/or communication systems/networks more generally. The ’518 patent describes the “Technical Field” as “broadband communication networks and specifically . . . communications using coaxial cable building wiring.” Id. at 1:25–30. We find it appropriate here to use the broader statement of “broadband communication networks” as the field of a POSITA’s experience. The challenged claims of the ’518 patent relate to a “data communication network” comprising “cable wiring” with “segments of coaxial cable.” Id. at 12:16–19. This does not mean that the “cable wiring” is strictly coaxial—only that it includes segments that are. Furthermore, the ’518 patent’s teachings are applicable to any network experiencing multipath reflections which degrade the ability to achieve high data rates regardless of the media over which those signals are transmitted. Id. at 4:19–32. Consequently, we determine the skill level as follows: A POSITA would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and two to three years of experience working in broadband communication networks. Additional education could substitute for professional experience, or vice versa. For the foregoing reasons, our adopted skill level is consisted” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are “obvious under any reasonable interpretation,” so “no express constructions are required.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not offer construction of any claim term, so there is no dispute over claim construction that we need to resolve. We apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Kliger and Isaksson are analogous art to the ’518 patent because they are from the same field of endeavor as the patent—wired networking systems— and because they are reasonably pertinent to the problem at issue in the patent—overcoming wired-network signal impairments.” Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 76–80); Pet. Reply 3–12. Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s contention that Isaksson is analogous art. PO Resp. 12–26; PO Sur-Reply 16–25. For the following reasons, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Isaksson is analogous art to the ’518 patent because it is reasonably pertinent to the problems identified in the ’518 patent. The ’518 patent seeks to overcome channel impairments by using probe messages to characterize the communication channel and determine optimum bit loading. Ex. 1001, code (57). These impairments include signal reflections, ISI, and signal attenuation. Pet. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:5–19). Similarly, Isaksson estimates channel characteristics by periodic transmission of a base sync frame from one transceiver to another where it is compared with a reference frame. Ex. 1013, 10. Isaksson’s channel characteristics may include attenuation, phase shifting, and variance, which are similar to the problems identified in the ’518 patent. Id. Both the ’518 patent and Isaksson address the problem of ISI by using bit loading to transmit data using sub-carriers less affected. Ex. 1001, 3:5–20; Ex. 1013, 16, 35, 79. Hence, we find the problems identified in the ’518 patent and Isaksson of how to overcome channel impairments reasonably pertinent such that Isaksson is analogous art to the ’518 patent. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s arguments that the ’518 patent is specific to in-home networks with coaxial cables and splitters whereas Isaksson is restricted to twisted pair, point-to-point networks having no intervening devices and which are located outside of homes. PO Resp. 15– 20; PO Sur-Reply 21–24. Any such differences do not change the fundamental nature of the problems of noise and interference affecting these environments. Such differences go more toward the field of endeavor than the reasonable pertinence of the problems each address. See Pet. Reply 10 (citing Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). Specifically, both the ’518 patent and Isaksson address the problem of channel impairments such as interference (e.g., ISI) and noise, and use the solution of bit loading to overcome them. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:42–47; Ex. 1013, 1:3–7, 6:17–20, 16:10–16, 79:5–14. Hence, we find that the ’518 patent and Isaksson are analogous art because Isaksson is reasonably pertinent to the problems addressed in the ’518 patent notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments. We do not reach the question of whether the two are in the same field of endeavor.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“symbol interference, external noise, and dynamic network conditions adversely affecting home network communications. Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶ 73; Ex. 1010, 5; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 65–68). Isaksson teaches using multi-carrier modulation, such as DMT and OFDM, to address frequency dependent loss and noise using synchronized bit-loading based on carrier SNR. Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 69; Ex. 1013, code (57), 26:4–20). We agree with Petitioner that the combination of Kliger and Isaksson amounts to the use of known techniques (Isaksson’s synchronized bit-loading) to improve similar devices in the same way (overcoming interference and maintaining connections with other modems). Id. at 26–27 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–421). We do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that Kliger already solves the issues that Petitioner identifies such that a POSITA would not have looked to Isaksson’s synchronized bit-loading. PO Resp. 50. Petitioner has established that Isaksson’s solutions would improve Kliger’s modulation by determining the number of bits-per-carrier based on SNR, disabling noisy carriers, and synchronizing bit loading. Pet. 23–28; Pet. Reply 23–24. Hence, a POSITA would have been motivated to improve Kliger with Isaksson. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a [POSITA] would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill”). Patent Owner alleges that Kliger’s network is coaxial whereas Isaksson’s is point-to-point, twisted pair with no intermediary devices such as splitters which would cause the interference, noise, and attenuation that the ’518 patent addresses. PO Resp. 50–55. However, we do not agree that these alleged differences would have precluded a POSITA from making the combination of references. “Signal impairments such as reflections, noise, attenuation, and inter-symbol interference (ISI) are common challenges in nearly all communication mediums.” Ex. 1036 ¶¶ 23–27. Communication networks experience these challenges, whether point-to-point or shared, twisted pair or coaxial, in-home or out-of-home, with or without splitters. Id. As Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Williams, puts it, “a POSITA can draw from the same toolbox of known solutions to address these impairments regardless of the medium.” Id. ¶ 27. Among those solutions is Isaksson’s approach of synchronized bit-loading. Moreover, Isaksson expressly states that “[i]t should be emphasized that the present invention can be used not only with the MUSIC system as herein described, but with other multi-carrier systems employing dynamic bit loading.” Ex. 1013, 72:5–8 (emphasis added); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 81–82. Hence, a POSITA would have been led to consider using Isaksson’s synchronized bit-loading with Kliger’s coaxial network which uses a multi-tone transmitter to determine whether to transmit power on each particular tone. See, e.g., Ex. 1007 ¶ 166; Ex. 1013 1:1–7. Further facilitating the combination is Kliger’s disclosure of using “a regular multi-tone transmitter (either OFDM or DMT) to determine whether to transmit power on each particular tone wherein tones can be silenced (which is, in effect, a form of bit-loading). See, e.g., Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 6, 166, Fig. 1; Ex. 1013, 1:1–7, 3:24–34, 4:21–25, 16:8–12. In addition, Kliger expressly recognizes and seeks to address signal impairments caused by splitters, including poor signal isolation, return loss performance, degradation at higher frequencies, and inter-symbol interference due to reflections (the same problems the ’518 patent addresses). Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 61, 73. Accordingly, a POSITA would have been motivated to combine teachings of Kliger and Isaksson. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner did not explain how a control channel would exist across a coaxial splitter’s multipath signal. PO Resp. 56–58 (citing Pet. 26; Ex. 1013, 73:4–15, 74:22–31, Fig. 33; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 147–148). Patent Owner does not explain why it would be necessary to use Isaksson’s control channel in Kliger, particularly when Kliger has its own control channel. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 63–64, 166. Patent Owner’s argument amounts to bodily incorporation of Isaksson in Kliger, which is not a proper approach to obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). We further disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Isaksson’s base sync frames (equivalent to the claimed probe messages) would not function in Kliger’s network. PO Resp. 58–60 (citing Pet. 26; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 55–57; Ex. 1013, 24:8–28, Fig. 1; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 149–154). Patent Owner’s arguments are directed toward an embodiment of Isaksson that Petitioner did not cite in its Petition. Pet. Reply 26. In any case, Patent Owner does not establish that using Isaksson’s base sync messages in Kliger’s system would have been beyond a POSITA’s skill. Id. at 25–26 (citing Ex. 1036 ¶¶ 90– 93). Patent Owner argues that Isaksson’s base sync frames would alter the principle of operation of Kliger because Kliger requires all devices to transmit fixed constellation size based on overall network characteristics rather than specific channel characteristics between each HNM. PO Resp. 60–63 (citing Ex. 1007, code (57), ¶¶ 40–44, 91, 99, Fig. 1; Ex. 1013, 3:24– 27, 20:24–25, 26:14–17, 78:5–79:5, Fig. 36; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 155–157). Patent Owner has not established, however, that fixed constellation size is a “principle of operation” of Kliger, or that Kliger would require substantial reconstruction or redesign to incorporate variable constellation sizes. See In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959). We agree with Dr. Williams that a POSITA would have sought to improve Kliger with Isaksson’s techniques. Ex. 1036 ¶ 95.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 7,295,518 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,295,518 - DISH Network LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2024-00373 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable as obvious, principally over Amit and Jacobsen and, for additional claims, Amit, Jacobsen, and DSL-Book; the Board did not reach grounds 1 and 2.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Considering the parties’ proposals and the record evidence, we adopt the following level of ordinary skill in the art, which we apply in this Decision: A POSITA would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and two to three years of experience with broadband communication networks. Additional professional experience could substitute for education, and additional education could substitute for professional experience. We find Patent Owner’s proposal to limit a POSITA’s education and experience to “broadband networks over coaxial cables” too narrow. Although Patent Owner points to various parts of the ’249 patent as supporting its restrictive proposal, other parts of the patent are not so limited. For example, the patent’s technical field and summary are not limited to coaxial cable, and the patent discusses LAN wiring, twisted pair, and satellite as communications media that can be used. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:11–16, 2:65–66, 3:9–37, 3:58–61, 7:4–5. In addition, while Patent Owner indicates that the ’249 patent addresses “the problem of tap port-to-port isolation and providing a suitable signal path for terminal-to-terminal communication in a coaxial cable wired building” (id. at 3:4–7), we see no reason why this problem and the solutions proposed in the ’249 patent (using frequency bins to bit load or equalization) would not be equally applicable to other kinds of communication media. Therefore, we find our adopted skill level to be consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’249 patent and prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted skill level consistent with the education and experience that a POSITA would have had. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17–18; Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 57–58.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that the challenged claims would have been “obvious under any reasonable interpretation, so no express constructions are required.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not offer any construction for any claim term. Accordingly, there is no dispute over claim construction that we need to resolve. We apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 15
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Jacobsen was publicly accessible more than one year before the ’249 patent. Jacobsen is thus § 102(b) prior art. By its own terms, Jacobsen indicates that it is one of the National Cable Television Association (“NCTA”) 1994 Technical Papers related to the 43rd Annual NCTA Convention and Exposition, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 22–25, 1994. Ex. 1007, 1–3, 6. This event and related papers address topics that would have interested persons in the field as we define their skill level. See § II.B, supra. The listing of Jacobsen as one of the papers covered in the event schedule suggests that POSITAs attending this event would have known of and had access to Jacobsen. Ex. 1007, 2–3. In fact, Mr. Bates, Patent Owner’s own expert witness, who was at least a person having ordinary skill in the art, testified that he was aware of Dr. Jacobsen’s work in the late 1990s, well before the priority date. See Ex. 1029, 52:10– 55:1. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known of Jacobsen before the priority date. See Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a catalog distributed at a conference was a printed publication); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding a slide presentation at a conference was a printed publication); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774, F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper disseminated to six people of ordinary skill in the art and discussed with between 50 and 500 people skilled in the art was a printed publication). The evidence further demonstrates that Jacobsen was acquired by the Linda Hall Library, Kansas City, Missouri, on September 19, 1995 and made available to the public shortly afterward. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 4–5, 13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 7, 17. Availability to interested persons more than one year before the ’249 patent is corroborated by other publications of Jacobsen, as well as Dr. Acton’s testimony. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 10–12, 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 247. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments against Jacobsen. There is no requirement in the law for Ms. Munford to be an interested person or POSITA in order for her to testify about how the Linda Hall Library acquired and cataloged Jacobsen so that interested persons would be able to access it. Her testimony relates to the public accessibility of Jacobsen, not its technical content. See, e.g., Ex. 1031 ¶ 6. She need not qualify as a POSITA to offer this testimony. Ms. Munford further testified that MARC records are used by the public to discover materials within a library’s collection, and that library users, which would include interested persons and POSITAs, do not require knowledge of how MARC records are maintained in order to use them. Ex. 1031 ¶ 8. And even if MARC records are editable, as Patent Owner argues, Patent Owner has not shown that the MARC record for Jacobsen was altered, and Ms. Munford states that such an alteration would have been unusual practice for a library. Ex. 1022 ¶ 4; Ex. 1031 ¶ 14.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that Amit is restricted to “single frequency” modulation. PO Resp. 52–56. As Petitioner notes, Amit describes that its HCNM modem uses a channel (e.g., DOCSIS) containing two sub-channels for upstream and downstream signals. Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1005, 15:18–28). This meets Patent Owner’s definition for multicarrier communications as multiple subcarriers to provide communications of a single channel. PO Sur-Reply 6. We further note that the claims do not recite “multicarrier communications” so the distinction Patent Owner attempts to draw is not supported by commensurate language in the claims. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (limitations not appearing in a claim cannot be relied upon for patentability). Furthermore, even if Amit were restricted to single carrier modulation, as Patent Owner argues, Petitioner relies on Jacobsen for its teaching of multicarrier modulation. Pet. 62–66; PO Resp. 52–56. In essence, Patent Owner attacks Amit individually and does not properly consider how a POSITA would have understood the combined teachings of Amit and Jacobsen. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the [challenge] is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)).” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 7,594,249 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,594,249 - DISH Network LLC v. Entropic Communications, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 22, 2025 · IPR2024-01060 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: claims 1–2, 4–6, 8–10, 12–14, and 16–17 as obvious over Amit and Jacobsen; claims 2–3, 7, 9–13, 15, and 17 as obvious over Amit, Jacobsen, and DSL-Book.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“Considering the parties’ proposals and the record evidence, we adopt the following level of ordinary skill in the art, which we apply in this Decision: A POSITA would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a related field, and two to three years of experience with broadband communication networks. Additional professional experience could substitute for education, and additional education could substitute for professional experience. We find Patent Owner’s proposal to limit a POSITA’s education and experience to “broadband networks over coaxial cables” too narrow. Although Patent Owner points to various parts of the ’249 patent as supporting its restrictive proposal, other parts of the patent are not so limited. For example, the patent’s technical field and summary are not limited to coaxial cable, and the patent discusses LAN wiring, twisted pair, and satellite as communications media that can be used. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:11–16, 2:65–66, 3:9–37, 3:58–61, 7:4–5. In addition, while Patent Owner indicates that the ’249 patent addresses “the problem of tap port-to-port isolation and providing a suitable signal path for terminal-to-terminal communication in a coaxial cable wired building” (id. at 3:4–7), we see no reason why this problem and the solutions proposed in the ’249 patent (using frequency bins to bit load or equalization) would not be equally applicable to other kinds of communication media. Therefore, we find our adopted skill level to be consistent with the problems and solutions identified in the ’249 patent and prior art references asserted by Petitioner. In addition, we find the adopted” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner contends that the challenged claims would have been “obvious under any reasonable interpretation, so no express constructions are required.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not offer any construction for any claim term. Accordingly, there is no dispute over claim construction that we need to resolve. We apply the ordinary and customary meanings consistent with 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b).” slip op. at 15
- BurdenUnpatentable
“On this record, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Jacobsen was publicly accessible more than one year before the ’249 patent. Jacobsen is thus § 102(b) prior art. By its own terms, Jacobsen indicates that it is one of the National Cable Television Association (“NCTA”) 1994 Technical Papers related to the 43rd Annual NCTA Convention and Exposition, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 22–25, 1994. Ex. 1007, 1–3, 6. This event and related papers address topics that would have interested persons in the field as we define their skill level. See § II.B, supra. The listing of Jacobsen as one of the papers covered in the event schedule suggests that POSITAs attending this event would have known of and had access to Jacobsen. Ex. 1007, 2–3. In fact, Mr. Bates, Patent Owner’s own expert witness, who was at least a person having ordinary skill in the art, testified that he was aware of Dr. Jacobsen’s work in the late 1990s, well before the priority date. See Ex. 1029, 52:10– 55:1. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known of Jacobsen before the priority date. See Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a catalog distributed at a conference was a printed publication); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding a slide presentation at a conference was a printed publication); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774, F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper disseminated to six people of ordinary skill in the art and discussed with between 50 and 500 people skilled in the art was a printed publication). The evidence further demonstrates that Jacobsen was acquired by the Linda Hall Library, Kansas City, Missouri, on September 19, 1995 and made available to the public shortly afterward. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 4–5, 13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 7, 17. Availability to interested persons more than one year before the ’249 patent is corroborated by other publications of Jacobsen, as well as Dr. Acton’s testimony. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 10–12, 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 247. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments against Jacobsen. There is no requirement in the law for Ms. Munford to be an interested person or POSITA in order for her to testify about how the Linda Hall Library acquired and cataloged Jacobsen so that interested persons would be able to access it. Her testimony relates to the public accessibility of Jacobsen, not its technical content. See, e.g., Ex. 1031 ¶ 6. She need not qualify as a POSITA to offer this testimony. Ms. Munford further testified that MARC records are used by the public to discover materials within a library’s collection, and that library users, which would include interested persons and POSITAs, do not require knowledge of how MARC records are maintained in order to use them. Ex. 1031 ¶ 8. And even if MARC records are editable, as Patent Owner argues, Patent Owner has not shown that the MARC record for Jacobsen was altered, and Ms. Munford states that such an alteration would have been unusual practice for a library. Ex. 1022 ¶ 4; Ex. 1031 ¶ 14.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Jacobsen was publicly accessible more than one year before the ’249 patent. Jacobsen is thus § 102(b) prior art. By its own terms, Jacobsen indicates that it is one of the National Cable Television Association (“NCTA”) 1994 Technical Papers related to the 43rd Annual NCTA Convention and Exposition, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 22–25, 1994. Ex. 1007, 1–3, 6. This event and related papers address topics that would have interested persons in the field as we define their skill level. See § II.B, supra. The listing of Jacobsen as one of the papers covered in the event schedule suggests that POSITAs attending this event would have known of and had access to Jacobsen. Ex. 1007, 2–3. In fact, Mr. Bates, Patent Owner’s own expert witness, who was at least a person having ordinary skill in the art, testified that he was aware of Dr. Jacobsen’s work in the late 1990s, well before the priority date. See Ex. 1029, 52:10– 55:1. Therefore, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known of Jacobsen before the priority date. See Nobel Biocare Servs. AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that a catalog distributed at a conference was a printed publication); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding a slide presentation at a conference was a printed publication); Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774, F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a paper disseminated to six people of ordinary skill in the art and discussed with between 50 and 500 people skilled in the art was a printed publication). The evidence further demonstrates that Jacobsen was acquired by the Linda Hall Library, Kansas City, Missouri, on September 19, 1995 and made available to the public shortly afterward. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 4–5, 13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 7, 17. Availability to interested persons more than one year before the ’249 patent is corroborated by other publications of Jacobsen, as well as Dr. Acton’s testimony. Ex. 1022 ¶¶ 10–13; Ex. 1031 ¶¶ 10–12, 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 247. We do not agree with Patent Owner’s arguments against Jacobsen. There is no requirement in the law for Ms. Munford to be an interested person or POSITA in order for her to testify about how the Linda Hall Library acquired and cataloged Jacobsen so that interested persons would be able to access it. Her testimony relates to the public accessibility of Jacobsen, not its technical content. See, e.g., Ex. 1031 ¶ 6. She need not qualify as a POSITA to offer this testimony. Ms. Munford further testified that MARC records are used by the public to discover materials within a library’s collection, and that library users, which would include interested persons and POSITAs, do not require knowledge of how MARC records are maintained in order to use them. Ex. 1031 ¶ 8. And even if MARC records are editable, as Patent Owner argues, Patent Owner has not shown that the MARC record for Jacobsen was altered, and Ms. Munford states that such an alteration would have been unusual practice for a library. Ex. 1022 ¶ 4; Ex. 1031 ¶ 14.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,594,249 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,594,249 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2021-01150 · APJ Stacey G White · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held that Petitioner had not shown claims 1–18 unpatentable under § 103 over Paxton, Sutton, and Ivershen because the combination did not teach or motivate transmission responsive to correlation.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“the Final Written Decision for “not clearly explaining its holding or rationale regarding motivation to combine and whether the proposed combination teaches the final limitation of claim 1: transmitting an indication of the first host responsive to the correlating.” Palo Alto Networks, 122 F.4th at 1384. In the opinion, the Federal Circuit explained that the Final Written Decision “never made a clear finding on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Paxton by adding Sutton’s step of transmitting a notification of malicious activity after Paxton’s correlation step,” as proposed by Petitioner. Id. at 1385. The Federal Circuit stated that the Board “failed to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to modify Paxton to provide the recited notification as taught by Sutton in response to the correlation disclosed in Paxton.” Id. The Federal Circuit concluded that “[b]y reading Paxton and Sutton in isolation, the Board erred,” and that we vacate and remand for the Board to clarify and explain its holding on whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to transmit the identity of the first host (e.g., to an administrator) as taught by Sutton, responsive to the correlating disclosed by Paxton to improve network security.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the alleged invention of the ’903 patent “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2–3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). Petitioner further notes that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill is similar, with Patent Owner contending that the ordinary skilled artisan “would be someone with a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or related field, and either (1) two or more years of industry experience and/or (2) an advanced degree in computer science or related field.” PO Resp. 12–13 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 27– 31). Similar to Petitioner, Patent Owner also states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “may have additional industry experience in lieu of a formal degree.” Id. at 13.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“After review of the current record, we conclude that no express claim construction is necessary for the purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“responsive to the correlation, we are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of these references in the manner advocated by Petitioner. Petitioner contends that this combination would only involve “[t]he application of known techniques (e.g., Sutton’s implementation of rules and data to define security policies, disallowed websites, etc.) to improve similar devices (e.g., servers, gateways, firewalls, etc. in Sutton’s and Paxton’s systems) to provide predictable results in the same way (e.g., to provide packet-filtering functions preventing communications with potentially malicious hosts).” Id. at 22–23.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,530,903 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,530,903 - Neurent Medical Inc. / Neurent Medical Ltd. v. Aerin Medical Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00282 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 7–9 are unpatentable as obvious, principally over Edwards-’535 and Stern for claims 1–3 and 7–9, and Makower, Edwards-’535, and Stern for claims 1, 2, and 4.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Petitioner’s definition could be interpreted to encompass someone who only has experience using or testing unrelated medical devices, we tend to agree with Patent Owner. But it does not follow that experience with the clinical use and testing of medical devices, including those that deliver energy to tissue, would not be relevant background for one of ordinary skill. See Reply 27–28 (identifying evidence that clinical experience is relevant). The devices and methods in the challenged patent and asserted prior art are designed to be used by clinicians. Accordingly, clinical experience using and testing them would inform their design and therefore be relevant experience for one of ordinary skill in the art. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed modification of Petitioner’s definition, which would remove clinical use and testing from the list of activities in Petitioner’s POSITA definition. See PO Resp. 7 (proposing redlines). Instead, after reviewing the record, we adopt Petitioner’s definition as it is consistent with the prior art’s demonstration of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Regardless, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Martin, is qualified to offer opinions under either definition. Moreover, the parties do not argue that their respective position would be different under either POSITA definition. See PO Resp. 8 (Patent Owner arguing that the challenges fail “[r]egardless of how a POSITA is defined”); Ex. 1083 ¶ 88 (Dr. Martin testifying that his opinions “remain the same regardless of which definition applies”). Accordingly, all of the findings and conclusions herein would be the same under either side’s definition of a POSITA.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that the part of claim 1’s preamble “to treat rhinitis” is not limiting. Pet. 18. According to Petitioner, the body of claim 1 recites a structurally complete apparatus, and the preamble only states an intended use for the device without limiting the claimed structure. Id. at 18–19. Patent Owner neither addresses this issue, nor proposes any other claim construction. PO Resp. 13 (“Patent Owner believes that no claim constructions are required to resolve the issues raised [in this IPR].”). On this record, we find Petitioner’s argument persuasive and determine that the part of claim 1’s preamble “to treat rhinitis” is not limiting.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“techniques of delivering bipolar RF ablation energy through expandable devices to the mucosal tissue of different body cavities.” Id. at 39. According to Petitioner, “combining Edwards-’535 and Stern involves applying Stern’s known bipolar pairing technique to Edwards-’535’s known device that was ready for improvement (because Edwards-’535 omits electrode wiring details) to yield predictable results.” Id. Thus, Petitioner concludes that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success when modifying Edwards-’535 in view of Stern. Id. at 38–40. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s mapping for claim limitations 1[a]-1[c] and 1[f] above, nor does Patent Owner challenge Petitioner’s reasoning for combining Edwards-’535 with Stern. See PO Resp. 14. Patent Owner, however, argues that Petitioner has failed to show Stern teaches limitations 1[d] and 1[e] “because Stern teaches a device comprising only a single pair of bipolar radiofrequency electrodes and a single radiofrequency output channel.” Id. We find that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Edwards-’535 and Stern and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so for the reasons set forth in the Petition. We also find that the articulated combination of Edwards-’535 and Stern teaches all of the limitations of claim 1. We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed analysis of claim limitations 1[a]-1[c] and [f] and reasoning for combining the references, and credit its supporting evidence. See Pet. 26–33, 43–46; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 84–102, 159–165. Below we address the parties’ arguments regarding the disputed limitations 1[d] and 1[e].” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“In our view, nothing is missing. Stern teaches that the circuitry in Figure 15 is configured to form multiple pairs of bipolar RF electrodes. Ex. 1033, 12:61–13:2 (explaining “[a]s an example” the closing of certain switches in Figure 15 to activate a bipolar pair between electrodes 220 and 224 and a second bipolar pair between electrodes 222 and 226 and further noting that “[c]learly bipolar operation is not limited to these . . . pair couplings” because other switches could be operated to activate a bipolar pair between electrodes 220 and 222); Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 108–111, 135–138. Indeed, Stern consistently uses the word “pairs,” i.e., the plural not the singular, to describe the bipolar operation of its device. See, e.g., Ex. 1033, 2:36–40, 3:38–40, 12:20–25, 12:29–30, 13:27–44, 20:9–10 (describing the bipolar operation of “pairs” nine times). Accordingly, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Stern teaches a device configured to have at most only a single pair of bipolar RF electrodes. Second, Stern teaches that the “embodiment of FIG. 15 . . . provides flexibility within the bipolar operation so that any pair or any combination of pairs may be utilized together.” Ex. 1033, 13:39–43 (emphasis added). Thus, even if claim 1 did require simultaneous activation of multiple bipolar pairs, we agree with Petitioner that such functionality is also taught by Stern. See Reply 5–6.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 11,766,286 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,766,286 - Neurent Medical Inc. / Neurent Medical Ltd. v. Aerin Medical Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00278 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4–6, 9, 10, 12, 13, and 15–17 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior-art combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner disputes the second part of Petitioner’s definition “because the ‘and/or’ encompasses within the definition . . . persons who only have experience with the clinical use or testing of medical devices.” Resp. 6. According to Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill “would have had more experience than just clinically using medical devices or simply conducting tests with medical devices” Id. at 6–7. To the extent Petitioner’s definition could be interpreted to encompass someone who only has experience using or testing unrelated medical devices, we tend to agree with Patent Owner. But it does not follow that experience with the clinical use and testing of medical devices, including those that deliver energy to tissue, would not be relevant background for one of ordinary skill. See Reply 33–34 (identifying evidence that clinical experience is relevant). The devices and methods in the challenged patent and asserted prior art are designed to be used by clinicians. Accordingly, clinical experience using and testing them would inform their design and therefore be relevant experience for one of ordinary skill in the art. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed modification of Petitioner’s definition, which would remove clinical use and testing from the list of activities in Petitioner’s POSITA definition. See Resp. 7 (proposing redlines). Instead, we apply Petitioner’s definition. Regardless, Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Martin, is qualified to offer the opinions in his declarations under either definition. Moreover, Patent Owner does not identify any testimony it contends would be different under its POSITA definition. See Ex. 1083 ¶ 103 (Dr. Martin testifying that his opinions “remain the same regardless of which definition applies”). Accordingly, all of the findings and conclusions herein would be the same under either side’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Neither side proposes any terms for express construction. Petitioner contends “the Board need not construe any terms because the Challenged Claims are invalid under any reasonable interpretation.” Pet. 20. “Patent Owner believes that no claim constructions are required to resolve the issues raised” in this IPR. Resp. 13. Nevertheless, in their arguments over whether the prior art teaches certain claim elements, each side accuses the other of misinterpreting or reading requirements beyond their ordinary meaning into those terms. See Reply 3–10 (urging that Patent Owner’s arguments read requirements into elements 1[d] and 1[e]); Sur-Reply 9–15 (arguing Petitioner applies an incorrect definition of “radio frequency output channel”). To the extent the parties’ arguments raise any implicit issues of claim construction, we address those issues within the context they are raised in our analysis below. No further express claim construction is necessary for this decision.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Edwards-535 and Stern, and had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so for the reasons set forth in the Petition. We also find that the articulated combination of Edwards-535 and Stern teaches all of the limitations of claim 1. We adopt Petitioner’s undisputed analysis of claim elements 1[a]-[c] and [f] and reasoning for combining the references, and credit its supporting evidence. See Pet. 7–14, 17–20; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 79–103, 113–21. Below we address the parties’ arguments regarding the disputed elements 1[d] and 1[e].” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We find that Petitioner has the more persuasive position and has demonstrated that Stern teaches element 1[e]. Petitioner demonstrates Stern’s multiple RF output channels with the annotated version of Figure 15 shown below. Pet. 42–43. As shown by Petitioner’s annotations above, the channel (highlighted in orange) connecting the output received from voltage source 228 to the first bipolar pair (circled in green on the left) is distinct from the channel connecting the output to the second bipolar electrode pair (circled in purple on the right) because depending on which switches are closed, energy travels through a separate connection between those switches and the corresponding electrodes. We agree with Petitioner, and credit Dr. Martin’s testimony, that each of the output channels highlighted in orange in Stern’s Figure 15 above “are output channels as required by the claims because the channels are separately/individually connected to the electrodes” and “control individual pairs of bipolar RF electrodes.” Id. at 43–44; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 124–128; see also Ex. 1083 ¶ 45 (“an ‘output channel’ connects electrodes and provides the ability to independently control pairs of electrodes”). This understanding of the term “output channel” is consistent with the claim language. Claim 1 recites “multiple radiofrequency output channels” wherein “each pair” of bipolar RF electrodes “is connected with a respective one of the multiple radio frequency output channels.” Ex. 1001, 52:27–33. The RF generator itself and its connection to the output channels is not recited in claim 1. Instead, the claim language focuses on the connection between the electrode pair and its respective output channel. The description in the specification also focuses on the connection to the electrodes and further explains that having a “separate, controlled electrical channel” for “each pair of electrodes” allows for “different regions of the treatment element to be activated separately.” Ex. 1001, 24:45–52, 48:63–65; see also Ex. 1083 ¶ 33 (“[e]very time the patent mentions ‘electrical channel’ or ‘output channel,’ it is referring to connections to electrodes”). This aligns with the depiction of the output channels in the ’318 patent’s figures. See Ex. 1001, Figs. 39–44 (showing RF output channel 961 connected to electrodes). Petitioner demonstrates this in the annotated version of Figure 39 shown below. Reply 8.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 11,033,318 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,033,318 - Neurent Medical Inc. / Neurent Medical Ltd. v. Aerin Medical Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 11, 2025 · IPR2024-00277 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–12, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the Edwards-535, Kong, and Stern combinations, with Edwards-886 added for claim 4.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Petitioner’s definition could be interpreted to encompass someone who only has experience using or testing unrelated medical devices, we tend to agree with Patent Owner. But it does not follow that experience with the clinical use and testing of medical devices, including those that deliver energy to tissue, would not be relevant background for one of ordinary skill. See Reply 29–31 (identifying evidence that clinical use and testing experience is relevant). The devices and methods in the challenged patent and asserted prior art are designed to be used by clinicians. Ex. 1083 ¶¶ 5, 14–15 (explaining that clinicians who use such devices gain extensive experience regarding how they work); see also Ex. 1084, 82:13–83:20 (Dr. Bikson testifying that a physician would perform the claimed method steps). Accordingly, clinical experience using and testing them would inform their design and be relevant experience for one of ordinary skill in the art. For these reasons, we do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed modification of Petitioner definition, which would remove clinical use and testing from the list of activities in Petitioner’s POSITA definition. See Resp. 7 (proposing redlines). Instead, we apply Petitioner’s definition. Regardless, Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Martin, is qualified to offer the opinions in his declarations under either definition and Patent Owner does not identify any testimony it contends would be different under its POSITA definition. See Ex. 1097 ¶ 49 (Dr. Martin testifying that his opinions “remain the same regardless of which definition applies”). Moreover, as explained below, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s challenge to Dr. DelGaudio’s qualifications and give his testimony appropriate weight in our analysis. For these reasons, our findings and conclusions would be the same under either side’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Third, nothing suggests that Dr. DelGaudio is not qualified to offer opinions regarding the knowledge and skill of one of ordinary skill in the art. In addition, to his relevant clinical experience, Dr. DelGaudio has experience designing different types of medical devices and consulting with device manufacturers to provide feedback and improve devices used in nasal surgery. Ex. 1083 ¶¶ 9–11. Thus, even if we had adopted a POSITA definition requiring design and development experience, Dr. DelGaudio would qualify as one of ordinary skill in the art because he has such experience in addition to his extensive clinical background. Id. Nevertheless, Patent Owner argues he is “not an individual capable of designing and developing the medical device used in the claimed method” because “Dr. DelGaudio has no experience in designing medical devices that deliver energy to tissue.” Sur-reply 22–24 (emphasis added). That argument is unavailing because such devices and methods of using them such as those recited in the claims of the ’271 patent are often developed by a team of individuals with different backgrounds and expertise. That Dr. DelGaudio working alone may not be capable of designing and developing such a device does not disqualify him from offering testimony from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, particularly as it relates to those claim elements that recite the use of the device as opposed to its technical details.8 Moreover, Dr. DelGaudio was careful not to overstep the bounds of his expertise, relying on testimony from Dr. Martin to confirm his understanding concerning some of the engineering details of the devices themselves. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 94, 124, 127, 130, 151; see also Ex. 1083 ¶ 12 (explaining he relied on Dr. Martin to confirm his understanding of teachings in Stern that disclose “implementation details about circuitry used to operate the bipolar electrodes, the physics of delivering energy to tissue, among other things”); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 66–131 (Dr. Martin testifying regarding a POSITA’s understanding of the prior art as it relates to such elements). Fourth, even if Dr. DelGaudio did not himself qualify as one of ordinary skill, we could still consider his testimony on those matters on which he was qualified. See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 52, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents /tpgnov.pdf (“CTPG”) (“A person may not need to be a person of ordinary skill in the art in order to testify as an expert under Rule 702, but rather must be ‘qualified in the pertinent art.’”) (citing cases). We agree with Petitioner that this would include matters such as the use of the devices described in the cited references in a clinical setting. See Reply 28. 8 Indeed, by its logic, Patent Owner’s own expert would not be one of ordinary skill in the art because he is not himself capable of practicing the claimed method. See Ex. 1084, 24:13–22, 82:19–83:8 (testifying he has never used an RF device to treat a patient and would not himself perform the recited method).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner’s position is persuasive. Even without taking into account the reasoning based on Baker (which we address separately below), Petitioner has demonstrated a sufficient rationale for incorporating Stern’s arrangement of two rows of bipolar electrode pairs into Edwards-535’s device. Edwards-535 teaches that a plurality of electrodes may be positioned on the surface of its treatment element, but does not specify how those electrodes are arranged or controlled. Ex. 1010, 8:25–27; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 68–69. Stern teaches a control system for selectively delivering power to bipolar electrode pairs arranged in two rows on the surface of its device that provides even heating and precise control. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 80–85. As Dr. DelGaudio explains, one of ordinary skill in the art would have regarded these attributes to be particularly beneficial when delivering treatment to the “nasal passages . . . given the uneven morphology of nasal cavity tissue and the proximity of the RF energy delivery to a patient’s brain and other critical tissues within the head.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 94. We credit the testimony of Petitioner’s experts that one of ordinary skill would have been motivated to incorporate Stern’s teachings, including the complementary two-row surface electrode arrangement shown in Figure 19, for these reasons. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 93–94; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 72–73, 75–88, 96–97 (explaining that Stern’s techniques would have been used to improve Edwards-535’s device in a similar way). Petitioner’s reasoning that “arranging electrodes in rows . . . facilitates simple spatial resolution of the applied energy” is also persuasive. See Pet. 47–48. As Dr. Martin explains, one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that arranging bipolar electrodes in two or more rows was a “common way to arrange such electrodes” (Ex. 1004 ¶ 34) and a “simple way to direct energy to specific locations for treatment would have been to place pairs of electrodes in rows . . . along the device at the locations being treated.” Id. ¶ 95.” slip op. at 41
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s position is persuasive. Stern’s Figure 15 shows bipolar electrodes 220 and 224 in a first horizontal row and electrodes 222 and 226 in a second horizontal row. Stern teaches that bipolar pairs can be formed between various combination of these electrodes resulting in both pairs within a row and pairs formed across two rows. See Ex. 1033, 12:61–13:2 (explaining that “bipolar operation is not limited to [electrode] 220-224 and 222-226 pair couplings” because pairs could also be formed across rows, e.g., between electrodes 220 and 222). Stern’s Figure 19 likewise depicts a plurality of electrodes arranged in two rows. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 71–74 (Dr. Martin explaining that the physical arrangement in Figure 19 is complementary to the control structure in Figure 15 and that there are two rows regardless of which electrodes are paired). In bipolar operation, each of these figures depicts “two rows of bipolar electrode pairs” as recited in element 1[a] because there are two rows comprising multiple pairs.15 Patent Owner’s narrower interpretation of the phrase “two rows of bipolar electrode pairs” is not consistent with the intrinsic record. According to Patent Owner and Dr. Bikson, it is not enough that there are two rows of electrodes comprising multiple pairs––rather each row must itself contain multiple pairs. See Resp. 23; Ex. 2001 ¶ 75 (“A row of only two electrodes is not a row of bipolar electrode pairs because a row of only two electrodes has at most a single pair (not multiple pairs).”). As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner’s interpretation assumes that the “s” in “pairs” modifies each row individually, rather than the recited “rows” collectively. But the claim 15 In reply to Patent Owner’s argument that there must be at least three electrodes in a row for that row to contain multiple pairs, Petitioner shows that Stern also discloses rows with three or more electrodes. Ex. 1083 ¶¶ 36– 40; Ex. 1097 ¶¶ 39–41 (identifying rows with three or more electrodes in Stern’s Figures 4a and 19). We need not address that showing in detail because, as explained below, element 1[a] does not require that there be more than one pair in each row. language does not specify that each row has pairs (plural). Rather, given its plain meaning, “two rows of bipolar electrode pairs” encompasses an arrangement like that shown in Stern’s Figure 15. Ex. 1097 ¶ 30 (Dr. Martin explaining that “what is required is (1) more than one bipolar electrode pair that are (2) spread across rows”). This broader understanding is confirmed by the specification of the” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 11,241,271 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,241,271 - PTAB · Jul 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 because Tesla showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 would have been obvious over Wallen and Berggren.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewOther
“Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on April 7, 2025. Paper 6. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 27, 2025. Paper 8. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 9.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“establishes sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the combined teachings of Wallen and Berggren teach or suggest all of the limitations recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,206,670 - Dropbox, Inc. v. Motion Offense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00287 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 9–12, 14–16, and 22–24 are unpatentable under § 103 over Riepling and Meisels, or Riepling, Manzano, and Meisels; claim 13 was disclaimed.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579. We apply Petitioner’s articulation.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“construction of “representation of the at least one file.” Petitioner is correct that a representation of a file is not the file itself, but (in keeping with the ordinary meaning of “representation”) is rather some sign or symbol that stands for the folder. Reply 2. This is confirmed by the explicit example of a representation of a folder in the ʼ906 application, illustrated in the portion of Figure 6B reproduced below (highlighted here for purposes of explanation). This portion of Figure 6B depicts representations of two files: “FamilyHistory.docx” and “XmasLetter-2012.pdf.” The ’906 application specifically states: [A] located data resources dialog UI element 630b . . . includes a presentation space 632b for presenting a user detectable representation of some or all of the data objects identified in the received data object identification response from . . . second node 504. Ex. 2004 ¶ 147 (emphasis added). The entries in the above figure are representations of the files, not the files themselves. The actual files are stored in the file system storage associated with the user’s node, and only retrieved if the user selects the “Access” or “Access All” elements. Id. ¶ 148. Patent Owner misconstrues the claim 22 language, “a first representation of the at least one file, in a location among one or more folders, that is stored at the at least one server” and “a second representation of the at least one file, in a location among one or more folders, that is stored at the first node.” Patent Owner infers from this language that the representation is itself a file that is “in a location among one or more folders” and is stored on a server or at a node. PO Resp. 17. Not so — the representation of a file, such as “FamilyHistory.docx” in the above figure, is not stored at a server or node, but rather is simply displayed on a screen. As the ’906 application states: A representation of a program entity may be stored and/or otherwise maintained in a presentation space. As used in this document, the term “presentation space” refers to a storage region allocated and/or otherwise provided for storing presentation information . . . . A screen of a display, for example, is a presentation space.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“because (i) Riepling and Meisels are from the same field of endeavor, directed to sharing files over a network; (ii) the combination would have yielded expected, predictable results, using known and routine computer programming principles, to modify Riepling’s system to generate an electronic message that includes a link pointing to an uploaded file; (iii) the combination would have been readily implemented given Meisels’ teachings of inserting, in an electronic message, a link to a shared location where a file is uploaded; and (iv) the combination was suggested because Meisels expressly disclosed a benefit of sending an email message with a link, to avoid multiple copies of a file from existing at multiple locations, and sending links to one file to multiple recipients and managing permissions on an individual recipient basis. Pet. 67–70 (citing Ex. 1107, Fig. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4, 19; Ex. 1108, Fig. 4, ¶¶ 1, 3, 41–45, 56; Mowry Decl. ¶¶ 194–198). In addition, for reasons similar to the motivation basis, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the combination. Id. at 70–71 (citing Mowry Decl. ¶¶ 199–200). Other than its arguments directed to ’520 claim requirement 9[l], discussed below in Section III.D.4.d), Patent Owner does not further address Petitioner’s arguments regarding the combination of Riepling and Meisels. As discussed in that section, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s expert’s testimony that one of ordinary skill would have applied the document link teachings of Meisels to modify Riepling. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Riepling and Meisels in the manner argued by Petitioner.” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that set content field 325 of Riepling teaches or suggests claim requirement 9[b]. As Petitioner’s expert explains, the fact that field 325 has an appearance identical to that of fields 321–324 in Figure 3, which fields are specifically stated to be “text field[s],” strongly suggests that field 325 is also a text field. Mowry Decl. ¶ 70; see also Reply 10–11. Patent Owner’s suggestion that field 325 could be a dropdown list or other type of field is contradicted by the fact that it does not show the typical dropdown arrow associated with a dropdown box, or other typical non-textbox appearance such as the checkbox appearance of field 320. Moreover, in the example of Figure 3, the “Set Content” entry is “audio,” which is a file description. Reply 10. The fact that “JPEG” is checked in field 320 is not inconsistent with the “audio” entry in field 325, given that, as Riepling explains, “it may be possible for audio files such as MP3 files to contain non-MP3 data, such as JPEG data embedded within the MP3 files.” Id. at 11 (citing Ex. 1107 ¶ 32; Mowry 2nd Decl. ¶ ¶ 101–104). Also, there is no reason why the Figure 5 response that gives the uploader the ability to provide additional description of the file being uploaded is inconsistent with the ability of the requester first describing what type of file is being requested via field 325 in Figure 3. Id. at 11–12. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we are persuaded that the record supports Petitioner’s arguments regarding claim requirement 9[b].” slip op. at 37
Patent outcomesUS 11,611,520 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,611,520 - Dropbox, Inc. v. Motion Offense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00286 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 17–21 are unpatentable under § 103 over Houston and Garcia; the Board did not reach the alternative grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We conclude that there is no basis for Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “representation of the at least one folder.” Petitioner is correct that a representation of a folder is not the folder itself, but (in keeping with the ordinary meaning of “representation”) is rather some sign or symbol that stands for the folder. Reply 2. This is confirmed by the explicit example of a representation of a folder in the ’635 application, illustrated in the portion of Figure 6D reproduced below (highlighted here for purposes of explanation). This portion of Figure 6D depicts representations of several folders, including the highlighted “Music” folder. The ’635 application specifically states: A folder content pane UI element 648d in navigation window UI element 646d is presented including representations of one or more data objects[11] at a location, identified in a path UI element 650d. A pointer UI element 652d illustrates a drag and drop operation of a “Music” folder represented in contents pane UI element 648d, dropped on edit window UI element 602d. Ex. 2004 ¶ 123 (emphasis added). The word “Music” in the above figure is a representation of a folder, not the folder itself. The actual folder is an entity in a file system that stores files (in the case of a “Music” folder, presumably MP3 or WAV files, or the like).” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s arguments are not pertinent to Petitioner’s proffered combination of Houston with Garcia as applied to the remaining challenged claims 17–21. As discussed further below, Petitioner relies on Garcia as supplementing Houston for details regarding the requirements of generating and sending an email with a link to a folder but without a file attachment, and for synchronizing folders and providing interfaces for display of shared folders. Pet. 26–27, 36–39, 57–60. For the challenged claims, Petitioner does not need to rely on the combination to modify Houston’s system such that, when an icon for a shared folder is created in Houston’s interface at an invited user’s client, the client does not store a file in the shared folder — 14 For this argument and others, Patent Owner cites for additional support portions of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/233,787. PO Resp. 18, 42, 46; Sur-Reply 9–12. This application is designated in Houston as a related application, and incorporated by reference therein. Ex. 1003, code (60), 1:6–10. We denied as untimely Patent Owner’s request to belatedly add this application to the record. Ex. 3002; Paper 39. Even accepting Patent Owner’s representations of the relied-on disclosures in that application, those disclosures are cumulative to Houston’s criticisms of systems that store documents remotely, and are irrelevant for the same reasons as discussed herein with respect to those Houston disclosures. that aspect of the Houston/Garcia combination is only relevant to claims 1–8, which have been disclaimed. Id. at 40–41; Ex. 2045.15 Thus, Patent Owner’s argument that Houston teaches away from combining with Garcia to delay storing a file when a folder is shared is not applicable to Petitioner’s challenges of claim 17–21, in light of our conclusion set forth above in Section III.C rejecting Patent Owner’s proposed construction of claim 17. The fact that the Houston system ensures the availability of synchronized local copies of files at each user’s local system and criticizes systems that store documents remotely, such as in Garcia, is irrelevant to those claims. On this record, there is nothing about that particular difference in the approaches of Houston and Garcia that would support a finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been discouraged from adopting Houston to take advantage of the teachings in Garcia regarding use of email and folder interfaces. In sum, Patent Owner focuses on a specific irrelevant detail of Houston regarding local storage of files, whereas Petitioner relies on other features of the combination of Houston and Garcia. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary” slip op. at 41
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“To give substantial weight to objective indicia of nonobviousness such as commercial success, a proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention. ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Nexus is a legally and factually sufficient connection between the objective evidence and the claimed invention, such that the objective evidence should be considered in determining nonobviousness. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988). “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). A patentee is entitled to a presumption of nexus “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “[T]he patentee retains the burden of proving the degree to which evidence of secondary considerations tied to a product is attributable to a particular claimed invention.” Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1378. The Federal Circuit has held that “if the marketed product embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them, then a nexus is presumed and the burden shifts to the party asserting obviousness to present evidence to rebut the presumed nexus.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000). “A finding that a presumption of nexus is inappropriate does not end the inquiry into secondary considerations”; rather, “the patent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.’” Fox Factory, 994 F.3d at 1373–74 (quoting In re Huang, 100 F.3d 125, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “Ultimately, the fact finder must weigh the [objective indicia] evidence presented in the context of whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious to a skilled artisan.” See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 33, 33 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2020) (precedential) (citing WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“However, as Petitioner argues above, Houston discloses that a client can provide an email to the server to invite others to share a folder, and Houston explains that “attaching files [to emails is] cumbersome for many computer users.” Pet. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1003, Fig. 4, 1:41–42, 3:40–43, 7:50–51). From this, Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious for the email invitation to notify how to access the folder, rather than sending the folder contents itself. Id. Petitioner further argues that the claim 17[d] requirement would have been obvious over the combination of Houston and Garcia given the disclosure in Garcia of sharing a folder by sending an email with a link to the folder, instead of an attachment. Id. at 27, 57 (citing Ex. 1004, Figs. 9, 11–12, 10:32–34, 10:38–40, 11:39–43, cl. 3). We are persuaded that the record supports Petitioner’s arguments regarding this claim requirement. Both Houston alone, and the combination of Houston and Garcia, teach or suggest sending an email with a link to a folder to be shared, rather than the folder contents. Only if the recipient clicks on the link are the contents of the folder shared. Ex. 1004, 11:29–31. The act of clicking on the link in the email after the email is received is the required “initiation of the communication” that must occur separately from the email itself, as required by claim 17[d]: “causing generation of at least one email [that] does not include a file attachment, for permitting avoidance of at least one file from being communicated to and stored at the second node until an initiation of the communication of the at least one file by a user of the second node is detected and the communication commences via at least one server that stores the at least one file” (emphasis added). It does not matter if Houston or Garcia automatically downloads local copies of files when a recipient clicks on the email link, because that is a separate step following the step of claim 17[d].” slip op. at 46
Patent outcomesUS 11,611,520 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,611,520
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.