- PTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00763 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Zeira alone or Zeira with Yi renders at least one challenged claim obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Applying that standard, we institute an inter partes review of all the challenged claims of the ’838 patent based on all grounds set forth in the Petition for the reasons explained below. This is a preliminary decision, and we will base our final written decision on the full trial record.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and at least two years of practical experience with design or development of telecommunication and/or wireless communications systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21). Patent Owner does not contest this at this stage. See Prelim. Resp. Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill appears to be consistent with the problems addressed in the ’838 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:30–2:48. Therefore, we adopt it for this decision.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Zeira’s RRC message includes MAC timer information. Zeira explicitly discloses that the calculated duration information is transmitted to the WTRU. Ex. 1005 ¶ 74. Zeira also discloses that information to “[c]onfigure the MAC layer” is transmitted to the WTRU in the form of an RRC message. Id. ¶ 423. Further, the duration is calculated while considering the amount of time that the MAC layer would need to transmit the current buffered data. Id. ¶ 76. Given these disclosures, we find sufficiently credible Dr. Lo’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Zeira to disclose that the RRC message received by the WTRU includes MAC timer information, and that the extent it does not, it would have been a predictable variation, at the time of the claimed invention, to implement a timer relating to the duration of network resources at the MAC layer as Yi teaches. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–87, 107–113.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Zeira’s RRC message includes MAC timer information. Zeira explicitly discloses that the calculated duration information is transmitted to the WTRU. Ex. 1005 ¶ 74. Zeira also discloses that information to “[c]onfigure the MAC layer” is transmitted to the WTRU in the form of an RRC message. Id. ¶ 423. Further, the duration is calculated while considering the amount of time that the MAC layer would need to transmit the current buffered data. Id. ¶ 76. Given these disclosures, we find sufficiently credible Dr. Lo’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Zeira to disclose that the RRC message received by the WTRU includes MAC timer information, and that the extent it does not, it would have been a predictable variation, at the time of the claimed invention, to implement a timer relating to the duration of network resources at the MAC layer as Yi teaches. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–87, 107–113.” slip op. at 16
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,212,838 - Nokia Of America Corporation / AT&T Services, Inc. v. Iarnach Technologies LimitedSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · IPR2024-00899 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 10, 11, and 14 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 4, 12, 13, and 15 were not shown unpatentable under the asserted § 103 grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Patent Owner does not contest this proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 5. Also, neither party argues that the precise level of ordinary skill would be dispositive in this proceeding. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill because it is undisputed, supported by testimonial evidence, and consistent with the asserted prior art and the types of problems and solutions in the ’892 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:19–2:8.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. The evidence of record, including the ’892 patent and its prosecution history,9 indicates that the ordinary and customary meaning of “transitioning . . . from . . . to” encompasses both direct and indirect transitions. Looking first to the claim language itself, the word “directly” appears in claims 1, 6, and 10, but not claim 14, presumptively suggesting that claim 14 was intended to more broadly capture systems with either direct or indirect transitions. See CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of . . . different terms in the claims connotes different meanings.”). Holding otherwise would fail to give any effect to the word “direct” as it appears in claims 1, 6, and 10. See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denouncing claim constructions methodologies that render phrases in claims superfluous).” slip op. at 12
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“predictable and well-motivated variation of G.987.3, at the time of the claimed invention, to include a direct transition between the ONU’s two low-power states. See KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. at 417 (“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, . . . . If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”). We credit Dr. Sergienko’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to reduce power consumption and would have looked to ways of modifying G.987.3 to further that design goal. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; see also Ex. 1007, 97 (“For a variety of reasons, it is desirable to reduce the power consumed by an ONU as much as possible . . . .”). We also credit Dr. Sergienko’s testimony that there were only a small number of ways to modify the state transitions in G.987.3’s ONU, and that it would have been obvious to consider those possibilities. Ex. 1003 ¶ 70. Patent Owner does not contest this. Dr. Litvin concedes, for Patent Owner, that “there is no conceivable way the [ITU] did not consider the proposed transition” between the ONU’s two low-power states when drafting G.987.3, although he contends the standards body prohibited such direct transitions as “a conscious and reasoned design choice.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 108; see also id. ¶ 109 (opining that there were only four possible choices for transitions in the ONU, and the ITU “undoubtedly considered all of them, including the direct transition from . . . Listen and . . . Asleep”); PO Resp 24 (conceding that “G.987 explicitly considered the very direct transitions that Petitioner say would be used”). We also find persuasive Petitioner’s additional or alternative argument that Röger would have motivated modifying G.987.3 by allowing the ONU, while in sleep mode, to periodically turn on its receiver and check for messages from the OLT, which would have been direct transitions between “first” and “second” states as recited in claim 1. Pet. 20–22 & n.4; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 82–84. The evidence suggests that modifying G.987 as Petitioner proposes would have been within the abilities of a person of the ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention—either to add a direct transition between Listen and Asleep states or to allow the ONU, while in its sleep (both transmitter and receiver off) mode, to periodically turn on its receiver temporarily to listen for polling messages from the OLT, as Röger teaches. Pet. 11–12, 14–15, 19; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70, 74. We also agree with Petitioner that there would have been motivation” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments that it would have been a predictable and well-motivated variation of G.987.3, at the time of the claimed invention, to include a direct transition between the ONU’s two low-power states. See KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. at 417 (“When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, . . . . If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”). We credit Dr. Sergienko’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to reduce power consumption and would have looked to ways of modifying G.987.3 to further that design goal. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; see also Ex. 1007, 97 (“For a variety of reasons, it is desirable to reduce the power consumed by an ONU as much as possible . . . .”). We also credit Dr. Sergienko’s testimony that there were only a small number of ways to modify the state transitions in G.987.3’s ONU, and that it would have been obvious to consider those possibilities. Ex. 1003 ¶ 70. Patent Owner does not contest this. Dr. Litvin concedes, for Patent Owner, that “there is no conceivable way the [ITU] did not consider the proposed transition” between the ONU’s two low-power states when drafting G.987.3, although he contends the standards body prohibited such direct transitions as “a conscious and reasoned design choice.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 108; see also id. ¶ 109 (opining that there were only four possible choices for transitions in the ONU, and the ITU “undoubtedly considered all of them, including the direct transition from . . . Listen and . . . Asleep”); PO Resp 24 (conceding that “G.987 explicitly considered the very direct transitions that Petitioner say would be used”). We also find persuasive Petitioner’s additional or alternative argument that Röger would have motivated modifying G.987.3 by allowing the ONU, while in sleep mode, to periodically turn on its receiver and check for messages from the OLT, which would have been direct transitions between “first” and “second” states as recited in claim 1. Pet. 20–22 & n.4; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 82–84. The evidence suggests that modifying G.987 as Petitioner proposes would have been within the abilities of a person of the ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention—either to add a direct transition between Listen and Asleep states or to allow the ONU, while in its sleep (both transmitter and receiver off) mode, to periodically turn on its receiver temporarily to listen for polling messages from the OLT, as Röger teaches. Pet. 11–12, 14–15, 19; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70, 74.” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 9,806,892 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,806,892 - PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00054 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–16 on all four grounds, finding at least one claim more likely than not unpatentable based on obviousness, indefiniteness, or lack of written description.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in a post-grant review. We institute a post-grant review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 321, if unrebutted, shows that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the petition is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 324. On the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’781 patent is unpatentable under a presented ground. See generally Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of post-grant review. Our reasoning is discussed below.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner
“STANDING Petitioner states that it certifies that: (1) the ’781 patent is available for post grant review because its earliest claimed effective filing date is October 9, 2018, and the patent issued less than nine months ago, on December 3, 2024; and (2) Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting a post grant review on the grounds in this petition. Pet. 5. This is sufficient. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(note)(A)–(B), § 321; 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(a). Patent Owner does not contest standing. See generally Prelim. Resp. B. REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST Petitioner states that “[t]he real parties-in-interest are Petitioner Straumann USA, LLC and its affiliates Institut Straumann AG and JJGC Indústria e Comércio de Materiais Dentários S.A.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner raises no objection and itself identifies “Smart Denture Conversions, LLC is the real party-in-interest.” Paper 4, 2; see generally Prelim. Resp. C.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 42. And, as set forth above, Patent Owner asserts that, for the sake of its present arguments, it matters not which of the two proposed definitions we use for this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 21. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’781 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This issue may be further developed at trial by the parties, if desired. C.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court thus, by default, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner indicates that None of the claim terms of claims 1–16 need to be construed to determine the patentability issues presented in this petition. The petition applies the ordinary meaning of the claim language as it would be understood by a POSA after reading the ’781 patent. Ex. 1002, ¶130. Petitioner will propose a construction if Patent Owner argues or the Board determines that one is required for any term. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1002). And, Patent Owner presents no express position on claim construction at this point. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not expressly construe any claim terms; however, this position is preliminary and we may change it based on the fully developed record at trial.8 D.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,156,781 - PTAB · Dec 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00756 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 on three §103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability over the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“III. CONCLUSION Because we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable, we institute inter partes review as to all challenged claims and grounds presented in the Petition. At this stage of the proceeding, we have not made a final determination as to the patentability of any of these challenged claims. ORDER For the reasons given, it is ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review is instituted as to claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 of the ’803 patent to determine whether: 1) claims 1, 5–7, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over TS 36.300, TS 36.321, and TS 36.331; 2) claims 1, 2, 5–8, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Ericsson and TS 25.331; and 3) claims 5, 6, 11, and 12 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Ericsson, TS 25.331, and Sebire; and” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“ordinary meaning, “primary” and “non-primary” cells are all cells that the WTRU is connected to (PO Resp. 16), the plain language in claim 1, and similarly in claim 7, does not require a “primary” node or “non-primary” cell to have a connection to the WTRU. See Ex. 1001, 10:38−56; 11:11–26. We find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that the claims require that the WTRU “be connected to more than one cell,” wherein cells that are “associated with a wireless network node,” but are not connected to the WTRU “at the same time” cannot be “primary” or “non-primary” cells. PO Resp. 16. In the ’803 patent, nothing in the Specification clearly limits “primary” and “non-primary” cells as Patent Owner proposes. Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner points to the Specification of the ’803 patent to show that, for softer handover, the WTRU is connected “with more than one cell [] which are controlled by the same Node-B,” and “[o]ne of the[se] cells 808 may be designated as a primary cell 808a, while other cells are designated as a non-primary cells 808b.” Id. (alterations in original) (citing Ex. 1001, 8:44–46, 9:4–6, Figs. 8A–B). However, this portion of the Specification (describing a softer handover embodiment in which a cell “may be designated” as a primary while other as non-primary) does not provide a clear definition to warrant interpreting the “primary” and “non-primary” cells as requiring “connection” to the WTRU “at the same time.” Id. That is, nothing in the Specification clearly precludes “primary” and “non-primary” cells from being “source” and “target” cell, as Patent Owner contends. PO Resp. 16. and the Specification, we determine that the terms “primary” and “non-primary” recited in claims 1 and 7 are not limited to cells connected to a WRTU at the same time. We determine no further explicit construction of this term is necessary to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“f) Motivation to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331 Petitioner contends that a “POSITA would have been motivated to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331 because they are directed to similar technologies and a skilled artisan would have understood the benefits of combining these two references,” and “would have understood that there was a high likelihood of success in making the combination.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 156–157). In particular, the references “are both reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor, namely protocols for handover in a telecommunications system.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). According to Petitioner, the combination “involves the predictable use of interchangeable prior art elements according to their established functions” more than routine engineering.” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 174). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not present arguments in the Preliminary Response addressing the specific merits of Petitioner’s contentions with respect to the motivation to combine Ericsson and TS 25.331. See generally Prelim. Resp. 15–18. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that Ericsson and TS25.331 are “directed to similar technologies,” and that a “skilled artisan would have understood the benefits of combining these two references.” Pet. 34. On this preliminary record, we are persuaded that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that a POSITA would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Ericsson and TS 25.331.” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner, relying on the testimony of Dr. Kakaes, contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a B.S. in Electrical Engineering or a related field with at least three years of experience designing, developing, and/or testing telecommunication systems,” and “would also have familiarity with the wireless standards and well-known protocols for accessing wireless networks existing at the relevant time,” wherein “[m]ore education may supplement practical experience or vice versa.” Pet. 12–13. At this stage in the proceeding, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or offer an alternative. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the technology described in the Specification and the cited prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,764,803 - Anker Innovations Ltd. v. Powermat Technologies Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2024-00994 · APJ Ken B Barrett · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 and 9–14 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Onishi, Flowerdew, Baarman392, Partovi, and Tocci.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s proposed experience of two years in the field of wireless/inductive charging is a bit more specific than Petitioner’s proposal of three years of experience with circuits and “familiarity with power electronics and inductive power transfer circuits.” We, however, discern little material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). For purposes of this decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that were we to adopt Patent Owner’s assessment, the outcome of this Decision would be the same.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Even if the Specification identified “linear regulation/control as being a central aim” of the ’696 patent, Patent Owner has offered no persuasive reason why a linear-control-related limitation should be read into independent claim 1, and we decline to do so. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“While we read claims in view of the specification, of which they are a part, we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims.” (citing Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); cf. Ex. 1105, 40 (the District Court, in the parallel litigation, excluding a witness’s testimony that the “substantially different” term requires “allow[ance] for some incremental change (increase or decrease) in frequency while remaining in the near-linear/linear regions” because, inter alia, Powermat “fails to offer any particularized arguments explaining why the ‘allow[ance]’ construction is proper.” (alterations in original)). Patent Owner also relies on dependent claim 2, which depends from independent claim 1. PO Resp. 28–29. Dependent claim 2 adds to claim 1 the requirement that the driver be configured to increase and decrease the transmission frequency when a particular signal is received. See Ex. 1001, 28:47–54. Patent Owner asserts that this means that the driver is configured to increase/decrease the “substantially different” frequency, namely a frequency that lies within the near-linear region of a frequency-amplitude graph, and argues that, “[i]n reading claim 2 as a whole, a POSITA would understand that the ’696 Patent is directed to a linear control technique for predictably regulating power transfer.” PO Resp. 28–29 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 101). Even if dependent claim 2 called for linear control as Patent Owner appears to assert, we would not read such a limitation into the underlying independent claim. See Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The doctrine of claim differentiation . . . normally means that limitations stated in dependent claims are not to be read into the independent claim from which they depend.”); but see PO Sur-reply 4 (arguing for a narrower interpretation of independent claim 1 because it must be read in the context of the entire patent, which includes dependent claim 2). In light of the parties’ agreement and the Specification’s description” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Woods testifies that Onishi’s “Paragraph [0180] is unambiguous that FIG. 4 does not illustrate the frequency-response of a single coil in isolation, but instead illustrates the ‘resonance characteristics of the primary coil L1 and the secondary coil L2’ when the coils are brought in electromagnetic proximity of each other for charging—i.e., in an inductively coupled state.” Ex. 1101 ¶ 18. Dr. Woods, in support of his opinion, notes that Onishi’s legend for Figure 4 describes f0 as the “RESONANCE FREQUENCY IN LOAD-CONNECTED STATE.” Id. We find Dr. Woods’s testimony more credible than Dr. Mercier’s. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument (PO Resp. 35) that Petitioner’s reliance on Onishi’s Figure 4 is misplaced, and we find that Figure 4 discloses a resonant frequency of the inductive couple between the primary and secondary coils, as recited in limitations 1.4 and 1.7.” slip op. at 32
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not find Patent Owner’s arguments persuasive. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s arguments are incorrectly premised on a hypothetical combination involving the bodily incorporation of the two references’ specific structures. See Pet. Reply 17. “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); see also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”). Rather, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417. Petitioner’s proposed combination is the application, to Onishi’s charging system, of Flowerdew’s general teaching of the technique of using an alignment mechanism in order to optimize the alignment of the inductive coils and to maximize the inductive coupling. See, e.g., Pet. 15 (“[A] POSITA would have been motivated to implement Onishi in a manner that includes an alignment mechanism as suggested by Flowerdew (e.g., a dished recess or other shaped surface feature, a directional logo/marker, or both) so that the primary and secondary coils would be more readily ‘optimized’ for alignment and the inductive ‘coupling is maximized.’”). Flowerdew teaches, for example, that, with the use of a dished charging surface, the secondary unit “tends to align in one axis” and “[t]his alignment is such that the coupling between a solenoid receive coil in secondary unit 304 and the charging coils of charger 302 is maximized.” Ex. 1005, 11:25–52. Petitioner, with the supporting testimony of Dr. Woods, contends, and we agree, that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been sufficiently skilled to implement [the proposed] combination given the predictable techniques disclosed in each reference and the relatively advanced state of the art at the time.” Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 55). We determine that Petitioner has shown that the proposed combination teaches or suggests the subject matter of limitation 1.3 and that Petitioner has set forth adequate and persuasive reasons with rational underpinning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Onishi’s system to utilize an alignment mechanism. We also determine, for the reasons stated by Petitioner, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination. See Pet. 16–17; Ex. 1003 ¶ 55.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 9,048,696 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,048,696 - Salvacion USA, Inc. v. Trutek CorpAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2024-00711 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3 and 8 are unpatentable as anticipated by Chen, Baker, Wahi ’005, and, for claims 1, 2, and 8, Rolf; the Board also finds them obvious over the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as it was undisputed at the time and consistent with the evidence of record. Inst. Dec. 7–8. Based on our consideration of the full record, we maintain our determination that a POSITA at the time the application for the ’802 patent was filed “would have had at least an undergraduate degree in pharmacy, chemistry, biochemistry, biomedical engineering or a closely related field, such that the POSITA generally understand[s] pharmaceutical formulation.” Pet. 12. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that “[a] POSITA would be familiar with the chemical ingredients in the [’802] Patent, biocidic agents, and cationic agents, have knowledge of airborne particles including viruses and bacteria, and understand electrostatic fields, electrostatic attraction and repulsion, adhesion and cohesion.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–39).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. Inst. Dec. 7–8. The parties do not dispute our construction of the preambles of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. See generally PO Resp.; Pet. Reply 2–4. After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction of the preamble of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting for the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision. Id. Briefly, the preamble of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 limits the challenged claims as both the preamble and the body are used to define the subject matter claimed. See Allen Engineering Corp., v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, the preamble is “necessary to give life, meaning and vitality” to the claim, see id., because it provides the only description in the claim for the application site of the formulation, i.e., “to skin or tissue of nasal passages,” and how the formulation is applied, i.e., “in a thin film.”” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction. From our perspective, the claims themselves support this construction as the claims expand upon the term “electrostatically inhibiting” with specific means for achieving such inhibition. Specifically, claims 1 and 2 recite electrostatically attracting the particulate matter, holding the matter in place, and inactivating the matter. Additionally, the Specification supports our construction as it describes the use of “an electrostatic field such that oppositely charged airborne particulates (including microorganisms) in the vicinity of the surface are electrostatically trapped, held thereto and one or more of the microorganisms so captured is neutralized, killed, inactivated, and rendered harmless.” Ex. 1001, 3:36–40; PO Resp. 10 n.6.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We adopt the parties’ construction of “adequate impermeability” that has been accepted in the related district court litigation: “Adequate impermeability” refers to the “thin film holding harmful particles in place and inhibiting them from penetrating the thin film and contacting the skin or tissue of an individual’s nasal passages. This is done by varying the concentration of ingredients . . .[,] thereby adjusting the adhesion and cohesion of the thin film.” Pet. Reply 3 (quoting Ex. 1010, 17). Furthermore, as stated in our Institution Decision, along with that term, the claim language explains that the thin film is meant to stick to the skin or tissue and to hold the particulate matter in place. Inst. Dec. 9–10. The claim language also explains that the cohesion of the formulation is adjusted to provide adequate impermeability to the thin film. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the recited impermeability is a function of the cohesive properties of the thin film, and that such impermeability refers to a property of the thin film, i.e., inhibiting the penetration or passage of matter through it onto the skin or tissue at the application site.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 8,163,802 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,163,802 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00956 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 under all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in an inter partes review. We institute an inter partes review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’992 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“These two proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan share many consistencies, for example, the types of degrees and experience such a person would have had, but differ in the number of years of experience. Petitioner proposes the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had at least five years of experience and Patent Owner proposes at least three years (which would necessarily include five years, too). Patent Owner also proposes that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have consulted a dentist, oral surgeon, prosthodontist, or periodontist with experience in dental implants and prosthetics. At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 40. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’992 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This parties may further developed this issue at trial, if desired. C.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board interprets claim terms in an inter partes review using the same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Here, the first claim limitation at issue is broad, i.e., different thread pattern/profile between a definite and a temporary screw, and the Specification’s and priority applications’ disclosure is narrow and specific, asymmetric buttress style threads in a temporary screw and symmetrical threads in a definite screw (are different). Any apparent predictability in or maturity of the relevant field here must be contrasted with the fact that the Specification, considering the ’992 patent itself or any of the identified priority applications, never once even discusses the (claimed) concept of specifically differing the thread style between a temporary and a definitive screw. Any differences in thread style are not called out by the disclosure, but are described and can be discerned only in relation to the respective threads’ functionality, i.e., Fig. 75’s temporary screw 190 has buttress-style threading so it can be pulled out rather than unscrewed from the abutment; Fig. 9’s definitive screw 75 has male threads that fill the female threads of the abutment 8 for a secure permanent engagement. Ex. 1001, 15:23–30, 21:25–44, 23:3–36; Ex. 1012, 97–98, Figs. 9, 75. And, although it is possible for a single disclosed species to provide written description support for a claimed genus, “a sufficient description of a genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350; see also Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That does not appear to be the case here—the present record does not support that the described asymmetrical buttress, serrated style of different temporary screw threading (relative to that of the definitive screw and regardless of the direction of the threads for rotation) is sufficiently representative of the genus’s “different” thread patterns/profiles. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 (a buttress style thread does not function the same as a buttress reverse or 75º joint profile or rounded, or trapezoidal thread).” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,937,992 - PTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · PGR2025-00053 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–3 and 5–15, finding written-description and enablement challenges more likely than not to succeed, but not the obviousness challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)) and in consideration of the Petition and the cited evidence of record, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability of claims 1–3 and 5– 15 of the ’773 patent, and therefore, we grant post-grant review for the reasons articulated below.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposal is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the level of skill reflected in prior art relevant to the ’773 patent. It is reasonably clear that, in indicating that a POSA would have an advanced degree (like a Pet. 7. We have adjusted the claims challenged to only those that remain in effect following Patent Owner’s disclaimer. See Ex. 2003. 3 US 7,767,429 B2, issued Aug. 3, 2010 (the “’429 patent”; Ex. 1005). 4 Chao et al., Structure of Human Hyaluronidase-1, a Hyaluronan Hydrolyzing Enzyme Involved in Tumor Growth and Angiogenesis, 46 Biochemistry 6911–6920 (2007) (Ex. 1006). Ph.D.) and years of experience in analysis of protein structure, Petitioner is asserting that knowledge of proteins generally is sufficient to understand the types of problems encountered in the art and the prior art solutions to those problems, and the ordinary artisan need not have expertise specifically in hyaluronidases. See Pet. 16–17. Petitioner requires that the POSA would be able to apply key scientific concepts (e.g., biochemistry, recombinant biology, sequence analysis and protein modeling) to enzymes such as hyaluronidases. See id. At this stage of the proceeding and on the record before us now, we apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA level, which appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“refers to a PH20 polypeptide that contains at least one amino acid modification, such as at least one amino acid replacement as described herein, in its sequence of amino acids compared to a reference unmodified PH20 polypeptide. A modified PH20 polypeptide can have up to 150 amino acid replacements, so long as the resulting modified PH20 polypeptide exhibits hyaluronidase activity. Typically, a modified PH20 polypeptide contains 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, or 50 amino acid replacements. It is understood that a modified PH20 polypeptide also can include any one or more other modifications, in addition to at least one amino acid replacement as described herein. Id. at 47:8–22 (emphasis added). On this record, however, we find that the definition of “modified PH20 polypeptide” permits amino acid replacements in the PH20 polypeptide but only “so long as the resulting modified PH20 polypeptide exhibits hyaluronidase activity.” Ex. 1001, 47:13–15. Indeed, while some of the language in the above paragraph is permissive in nature, i.e.., describing the number of amino acid replacements a modified PH20 polypeptide “can have” or “[t]ypically . . . contains” or the other modifications the polypeptide “can include,” the phrase “so long as” is not. See Ex. 1001, 47:8–22. This distinction demonstrates that hyaluronidase activity is not an optional feature of a non-limiting example, but a requirement of the “modified PH20 polypeptide” defined and claimed in the ’773 patent. See Alynylam Pharms., Inc. v. Moderna, Inc., 138 F.4th 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (explaining that the “contrast” between “non-limiting terms” and more definitive statements may indicate that the latter is definitional).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“We determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms for the purpose of deciding whether to institute post-grant review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,195,773 - PTAB · Nov 19, 2025 · PGR2025-00050 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–3 and 6–10 because Petitioner showed they were more likely than not to lack written-description support and enablement.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 324. Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Applying that standard on behalf of the Director (37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a)) and in consideration of the Petition and the cited evidence of record, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing unpatentability of claims 1–3 and 6– 10 of the ’791 patent, and therefore, we grant post-grant review for the reasons articulated below.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposal is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the level of skill reflected in prior art relevant to the ’791 patent. It is reasonably clear that, in indicating that a POSA would have an advanced degree (like a Ph.D.) and years of experience in analysis of protein structure, Petitioner is asserting that knowledge of proteins generally is sufficient to understand the types of problems encountered in the art and the prior art solutions to those problems, and the ordinary artisan need not have expertise specifically in hyaluronidases. See Pet. 20. Petitioner requires that the POSA would be able to apply key scientific concepts (e.g., biochemistry, recombinant biology, sequence analysis and protein modeling) to enzymes such as hyaluronidases. See id. At this stage of the proceeding and on the record before us now, we apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA level, which appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“refers to a PH20 polypeptide that contains at least one amino acid modification, such as at least one amino acid replacement as described herein, in its sequence of amino acids compared to a reference unmodified PH20 polypeptide. A modified PH20 polypeptide can have up to 150 amino acid replacements, so long as the resulting modified PH20 polypeptide exhibits hyaluronidase activity. Typically, a modified PH20 polypeptide contains 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, or 50 amino acid replacements. It is understood that a modified PH20 polypeptide also can include any one or more other modifications, in addition to at least one amino acid replacement as described herein. Id. at 47:4–18 (emphasis added). On this record, we find that the definition of “modified PH20 polypeptide” permits amino acid replacements in the PH20 polypeptide but only “so long as the resulting modified PH20 polypeptide exhibits hyaluronidase activity.” Ex. 1001, 47:9–11. Indeed, while some of the language in the above paragraph is permissive in nature, i.e.., describing the number of amino acid replacements a modified PH20 polypeptide “can have” or “[t]ypically . . . contains” or the other modifications the polypeptide “can include,” the phrase “so long as” is not. See Ex. 1001, 47:4–18. This distinction demonstrates that hyaluronidase activity is not an optional feature, but a requirement of the “modified PH20 polypeptide” defined and claimed in the ’791 patent. See Alynylam Pharms., Inc. v. Moderna, Inc., 138 F.4th 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (explaining that the “contrast” between “non-limiting terms” and more definitive statements may indicate that the latter is definitional). Thus, the evidence of record shows the ’791 patent recognizes a broad understanding of a “modified PH20 polypeptide” as encompassing PH20 sequences from a variety of different mammalian species, with or without precursor or signal sequences, with or without post-translational modifications, and with up to 150 amino acid replacements. The express definition of “modified PH20 polypeptide” in the ’791 patent permits up to 150 amino acid replacements but only “so long as the resulting modified PH20 polypeptide exhibits hyaluronidase activity.” Ex. 1001, 47:9–11. That is, the provided definition of “modified PH20 polypeptide” in the ’791 patent expressly requires some hyaluronidase activity. On the current record, we therefore adopt the definition for “modified PH20 polypeptide” as recited in the ’791 patent to encompass polypeptides with some hyaluronidase activity. We determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms for the purpose of deciding whether to institute post-grant review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateInstituted
“As we noted, on the current record claim 1 is reasonably interpreted to encompass PH20 polypeptides with some hyaluronidase activity. But even if we were to find that immunization using PH20 polypeptide as a contraceptive antigen serves to satisfy the utility requirement for the instant claims, there is a similar concern as to whether modified PH20 polypeptides with significant differences from the native protein as encompassed by claim 1 would maintain the antigenic determinants necessary to function as contraceptives. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 122. That the modified PH20 polypeptides would be homogenous in function is contradicted both by evidence in the ’791 patent itself and by Dr. Hecht and Dr. Parker. The ’791 patent discloses synthesis of 6,753 single amino acid mutations in residues 1‒447 of SEQ ID NO: 3. See Ex. 1001, 199:15–200:34. The ’791 patent teaches that just under 10% of these mutations, i.e. over 600, “exhibit activity that is increased compared to wildtype.” Id. at 233:1–2. Appendix A of Dr. Hecht’s Declaration shows 3,380 of these mutations were inactive, or 57.13%. See Ex. 1003, Appendix A-1, 171. Thus, the ’791 patent evidences that even when only a single mutation is made in the PH20 polypeptide, that single mutation is more likely than not to alter the structure in such a way as to inactivate the hyaluronidase activity found in the native PH20 polypeptide. On this record, Dr. Hecht persuasively demonstrates that when the full scope of claim 1 is addressed, which includes not just single mutations in the PH20 polypeptide, but also multiple mutations, there is no expectation of structural homogeneity, stating that “[i]ntroducing multiple amino acid changes simultaneously . . . could prevent the folding of sequences into secondary structures and structural motifs and can destabilize those structures if they do form.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 59. Dr. Hecht notes that claim 1 allows “up to 21 changes, with each additional change (except at position 309) being to any of 19 alternative amino acids. But the up to 21 changes also can be at any of 433 different positions.” Id. ¶ 129. Dr. Park calculates that the number of distinct polypeptides that meet the claimed criteria “is extremely large by all accounts, ranging from 1049 to 1060 distinct polypeptides.” See Ex. 1004 ¶ 161. Dr. Hecht characterizes the number of possible mutations as “astronomical in size.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 134.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 12,077,791 - PTAB · Nov 13, 2025 · PGR2025-00042 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1, 2, 5, and 7–33, finding likely written-description and enablement failures; it found the obviousness showing insufficient.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“XII. CONCLUSION Petitioner has, at this stage of the proceedings, established that it will more likely than not prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. This determination is, however, based on a preliminary record and is not final on any issues of patentability. We will make a final determination on the patentability of the challenged claims, as necessary and applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, based on a fully developed record through trial. XIII. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) post grant review of claims 1, 2, 5, and 7–33 of the ’618 patent is hereby granted on the grounds set forth in the Petition, commencing on the entry date of this Order, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; and” slip op. at 46
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner’s proposal is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the level of skill reflected in prior art relevant to the ’618 patent. It is reasonably clear that, in indicating that a POSA would have an advanced degree (like a Ph.D.) and years of experience in analysis of protein structure, Petitioner is asserting that knowledge of proteins generally is sufficient to understand the types of problems encountered in the art and the prior art solutions to those problems, and the ordinary artisan need not have expertise specifically in hyaluronidases. See Pet. 15–16. Petitioner requires that the POSA would be able to apply key scientific concepts (e.g., biochemistry, recombinant biology, sequence analysis and protein modeling) to enzymes such as hyaluronidases. See id. At this stage of the proceeding and on the record before us now, we apply Petitioner’s proposed POSA level, which appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“On this record, however, we find that the entire text quoted above is part of the definition of “modified PH20 polypeptide” because it continues to detail specific elements required including a requirement that replacements in the PH20 polypeptide are permitted “so long as the resulting modified PH20 polypeptide exhibits hyaluronidase activity.” Ex. 1001, 47:2–4; see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 48, 67 (stating a “patent’s definition controls”). Indeed, while some of the language in the definitional paragraph is permissive in nature, i.e.., describing the number of amino acid replacements a modified PH20 polypeptide “can have” or “[t]ypically . . . contains” or the other modifications the polypeptide “can include,” the phrase “so long as” is not. See Ex. 1001, 47:1–11. This distinction demonstrates that hyaluronidase activity is not an optional feature of a non-limiting example as Patent Owner posits, but a requirement of the “modified PH20 polypeptide” defined and claimed in the ’618 patent. See Alynylam Pharms., Inc. v. Moderna, Inc., 138 F.4th 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (explaining that the “contrast” between “non-limiting terms” and more definitive statements may indicate that the latter is definitional). Moreover, Dr. Triggs-Raine recognizes the “therapeutic use of hyaluronidases” and notes that “different hyaluronidases were known to have different functions and substrates.” Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29, 113.6 That is, Dr. Triggs-Raine recognizes hyaluronidase activity as the primary utility for the modified PH20 polypeptides recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 13
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Instituted
“Every patent must describe an invention. It is part of the quid pro quo of a patent.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1345. Ariad explains that for generic claims the question may still remain whether the specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus. The problem is especially acute with genus claims that use functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus. In such a case, the functional claim may simply claim a desired result, and may do so without describing species that achieve that result. But the specification must demonstrate that the applicant has made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the functionally-defined genus. Id. at 1349. Ariad explains “that an adequate written description requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials.” Id. at 1350. Ariad also held that functional claim language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a correlation between structure and function. . . . But merely drawing a fence around the outer limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a species. Id. slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,037,618
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.