• Lti Flexible Products, Inc. D/B/A Boyd Corporation v. The Regents Of The University Of CaliforniaInstituted
  PTAB · Jan 11, 2022 · IPR2021-01189 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13, finding a reasonable likelihood that MacDonald anticipates claims 1–13 and that MacDonald with Ding renders claims 2, 3, and 7 obvious.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition, Preliminary Response, Reply, and Sur-reply and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–13 of the ’728 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther

    “figures and substantively identical specifications. See Pet. 16, 26; Prelim. Resp. 21; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 75–76. We agree with Petitioner that the Specifications of the parent applications, MacDonald, and the ’728 patent (“the common Specification”) do not disclose expressly the claimed pitch range of 5–500 microns. We also agree with Petitioner that the pitch range must be derived from the disclosed values of diameter of the pillars and spacing between pillars. Pet. 3, 18–22; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 98–112, 123–129. We further agree with Petitioner that none of the derived pitch ranges aligns perfectly with the claimed pitch range. Pet. 21, 23; Ex. 1012 ¶ 120. Petitioner presents sufficient argument and evidence that the common Specification may not provide sufficient “blaze marks” for the claimed pitch range and that the derived pitch ranges may not reasonably convey to one of ordinary skill in the art the claimed pitch range. Pet. 17–26; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 92– 140. Patent Owner disputes, at least, whether the common Specification provides adequate “blaze marks” and whether the derived pitch ranges would reasonably convey the claimed pitch range. Prelim. Resp. 11–18. The parties’ dispute presents a factual issue that would benefit from a fuller record developed at trial. Gen. Hospital Corp. v. Sienna Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., 888 F.3d 1368, 1371 (2018) (“Sufficiency of written description is a question of fact.”).” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artOther

    “Petitioner contends that MacDonald is prior art under § 102(a)(1) because MacDonald was published a year before the filing date of the application that issued as the ’728 patent. Pet. 7. If the ’728 patent is entitled to the benefit of the filing dates of the PCT and ’111 applications (collectively, “the parent applications”), then MacDonald would not qualify as prior art, as argued by Patent Owner. Prelim. Resp. 27–28.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

    “3. Claims 1–13 Petitioner argues with citations to MacDonald and declarant testimony that, because MacDonald has the same figures and substantively same Specification, MacDonald anticipates independent claims 1 and 9. Pet. 26– 37, 53–58. In particular, for the claimed pitch range, Petitioner argues that, because MacDonald discloses pillar spacings between 1–500 microns and pillar diameters between 5–500 microns, MacDonald discloses, at least, two pitches of 6 microns and 253.5 microns, both of which are in the claimed pitch range. Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 176–178). For dependent claims 2–8 and 10–13, Petitioner argues with citations to MacDonald and declarant testimony that MacDonald discloses all their limitations. Id. at 37–53, 58– 62. Other than the arguments discussed above regarding written description and effective filing date, Patent Owner does not argue that Petitioner fails to show that MacDonald discloses the limitations of claims 1 and 9. See generally Prelim. Resp. Patent Owner also does not provide separate arguments for the challenged dependent claims. See generally id. Based on the preliminary record, Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its anticipation challenge of dependent claims 1– 13.” slip op. at 20

  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,309,728
• Ice Castles, LLC v. James YoungstromInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 7, 2022 · IPR2021-01179 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of proving any remaining challenged claim unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied

    “determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). We may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by both parties, we determine Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims of the ’204 patent.” slip op. at 2

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “D. Challenged Claims Petitioner challenges claims 1–20 of the ’204 patent. Pet. 4. Patent Owner has disclaimed claims 1, 2, 4–6, 8–12, 15, 16, and 18–20. Prelim. Resp. 3; Ex. 2009, 1. Consequently, only claims 3, 7, 13, 14, and 17 remain in this proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.); Gunn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent.”).” slip op. at 6

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “amplitude and experience with cold weather could be a considered a [person of ordinary skill in the art]” (id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1004, comments)). Patent Owner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been a person who had built structures out of snow or ice, including the building of snow forts, ice castles and the like.” Prelim. Resp. 18. Based on our review of the current record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with level of skill reflected in the ’204 patent and the cited references. Furthermore, the parties’ proposals for the level of ordinary skill in the art are similar, and we do not discern a meaningful distinction between them. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary art skill in the art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under this standard, we construe the claim “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id. Furthermore, we expressly construe the claims to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). The parties propose constructions of the claims terms “ice log” and “sleeve.” Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 18–20. Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in sections III.D–H, we determine that no claim term requires an express construction for the purpose of determining whether to institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,663,204
• Immersion Systems LLC v. Midas Green Technologies, LLCInstitution denied
  PTAB · Jan 6, 2022 · IPR2021-01176 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution

  The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 14, exercising § 314(a) discretion after its holistic Fintiv assessment.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner states: A POSITA as of December 13, 2013 would have had a [sic] either a (a) Bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or an equivalent degree, with five years of liquid cooling systems experience including responsibility for designing such systems, or (b) Master’s Degree in mechanical engineering, or an equivalent degree, including liquid cooling systems research and system design. Ex-1020, ¶75. A POSITA would also have had, through education or experience, familiarity and experience in particular with immersion cooling systems. Additional education could compensate for less practical experience and vice versa. Id. Pet. 10. Other than arguing that the date for defining the ordinarily skilled artisan should be earlier than that used by Petitioner because the ’457 patent is entitled to priority to provisional applications, Patent Owner “does not offer a competing definition for POSITA.” Prelim. Resp. 25. For the purposes of this Decision, we accept, as has Patent Owner, Petitioner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art. (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “CLAIM CONSTRUCTION “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Neither party asserts that any claim term should be expressly construed, and we do not expressly construe any claim language. Pet. 10–11; Prelim. Resp. 25–29; see also Ex. 2006 (district court claim construction order declining to expressly construe and claim language). C.” slip op. at 8

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

    “litigation approximately three months prior to when a final written decision would be statutorily due in this inter partes review, and the district court has indicated that any changes to the schedule, including the trial date, are disfavored. We find these facts weigh in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution under this factor.” slip op. at 13

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied

    “In our view, some challenges likely satisfy the “reasonable likelihood” threshold standard for instituting trial, and some may not. We would not characterize any challenge as sufficiently strong to override concerns about duplication of effort by the Board and the district court.” slip op. at 18

  Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,405,457
• One World Technologies, Inc., D/B/A Techtronic Industries Power Equipment v. Chervon (HK) LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 3, 2021 · IPR2020-00888 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12, 15–17, and 19–21 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted §103 combinations lacked persuasive support for the claimed safety control devices.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “lawnmower and Nakano’s control device that disables the motor when the telescoping tubes are partially collapsed is premised on the safety issue of a user getting too close to the blade path when the user rotates Reichart’s handle between the in-use and storage positions. Even if we agree with Petitioner that this safety issue exists, it is the rotation, not the telescoping, of the handle that causes a user to get too close to the blade path. Reichart discloses the shortest length of the handle in the in-use position maintains minimum spacing “a” with respect to blade circular path 8. Ex. 1007, 4:31–5:5, 6:1–5. Although reducing minimum spacing “a” could bring a user and the operating elements on the handle too close to the blade path, such a reduction is effected by rotating telescopic tube 3 over casing 1, not sliding upper part 3b of telescopic tube 3 relative to lower part 3a. Moreover, as shown in Petitioner’s annotated version of Reichart’s Figure 4, telescoping the handle to a different length would not cause a user to stand in a different position other than the unsafe position shown with the red footprints to rotate the handle between the in-use and storage positions. Given that rotation, not telescoping, of Reichart’s handle brings a user and the operating elements too close to the blade path, we agree with Patent Owner that modifying Reichart’s lawnmower to include Nakano’s control device that activates and deactivates the motor based on the sliding position of the telescopic tubes would not have ensured that the operating elements and the user are a safe distance from the blade path. Petitioner’s rationale for adding Nakano’s control device to Reichart’s lawnmower lacks rational underpinning. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006))).” slip op. at 38

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “18 We do not understand Petitioner to be arguing that it would have been obvious to combine hold-to-run control component 30 and the electrical supply contactor associated therewith from Outils’s embodiment shown in Figure 1 with activation actuator 23 and cam 24 of Outils’s embodiment shown in Figure 10. A petitioner must explain why a POSITA would have combined the elements, including those disclosed in separate embodiments described in a single reference. See KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.”); In re Stepan Co., 868 F.3d 1342, 1345–46 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Whether a rejection is based on combining disclosures from multiple references, combining multiple embodiments from a single reference, or selecting from large lists of elements in a single reference, there must be a motivation to make the combination and a reasonable expectation that such a combination would be successful . . . .”). Petitioner does not provide any such explanation, reinforcing our understanding that Petitioner relies on the position that a POSITA would have understood the embodiment of Figure 10 to include, without modification, hold-to-run control component 30 controlling the electrical supply contactor from Figure 1. electrical supply contactor. Ex. 1014, 8:22–9:13.19 Similarly, Petitioner does not direct us to, nor do we discern, any depiction associated with Outils’s Figure 10 of a hold-to-run control component connected to an electrical supply contactor.” slip op. at 44

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerGranted

    “v. Capella Photonics, Inc., our jurisdiction to consider a petition does not require a “correct” identification of all RPIs in a petition. IPR2015-00739, Paper 38, 6 (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (precedential); see also Blue Coat Sys., Inc. v. Finjan, Inc., IPR2016-01444, Paper 11, 10 (PTAB July 18, 2017) (“Evidence [of failure to identify all RPIs] is, at best, suggestive of an issue that is not jurisdictional.”). The Federal Circuit agrees that § 312(a)(2) is not jurisdictional. See Mayne Pharma Int’l Pty. Ltd. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 927 F.3d 1232, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[I]f a petition fails to identify all real parties in interest under § 312(a)(2), the Director can, and does, allow the petitioner to add a real party in interest.” (quoting Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc))). Accordingly, a petitioner may amend its mandatory notices to add a RPI and still maintain its original filing date. See, e.g., Adello Biologics LLC v. Amgen Inc., PGR2019-00001, Paper 11, 5 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2019) (precedential) (authorizing pre-institution update to Mandatory Notices to add a RPI); Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren Techs., LLC, IPR2017-01917, Paper 86, 7 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2019) (precedential) (“The Board may, under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a), accept updated mandatory notices as long as the petition would not have been time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) if it had included the real party in interest.”). In determining whether to permit a petitioner to amend its mandatory notices to add a RPI while maintaining the original filing date, we consider “whether there have been (1) attempts to circumvent the § 315(b) bar or estoppel rules, (2) bad faith by the petitioner, (3) prejudice to the patent owner caused by the delay, or (4) gamesmanship by the petitioner.” Proppant, IPR2017-01917, Paper 86 at 6–7.” slip op. at 59

  • ExcludeGranted

    “The moving party has the burden of proof in showing it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). The standard for granting a motion to seal is “good cause.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. “The ‘good cause’ standard for granting a motion to seal reflects the strong public policy for making all information in an inter partes review open to the public.” Argentum Pharm. LLC v. Alcon Research, Ltd., IPR2017-01053, Paper 27 at 3 (PTAB Jan. 19, 2018) (informative).” slip op. at 64

  Patent outcomesUS 10,070,588 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,070,588
• One World Technologies, Inc., D/B/A Techtronic Industries Power Equipment v. Chervon (HK) LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 3, 2021 · IPR2020-00887 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations failed to establish the claimed control devices and a reason to combine the teachings.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedOther

    “As set forth in our Trial Practice Guide12, there is no requirement of a perfect match between a declarant’s experience and the relevant field. CTPG 34 (citing SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). We generally permit testimony where the declarant’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the Board understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)). Mr. Smith has a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering and is a Certified Safety Professional in comprehensive practice. Ex. 2027 ¶¶ 3, 5. Mr. Smith is President of Alpine Engineering & Design, Inc., and has over thirty years of experience with mechanical design, including the design of lawnmower controls. Id. ¶ 6. Given his education in mechanical engineering and his experience with mechanical design, we find Mr. Smith’s testimony may be helpful in deciding factual issues in this proceeding. Moreover, when assigning weight to a declarant’s testimony, we consider the underlying facts or data upon which the testimony is based. CTPG 40–41. In our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability, we weigh Mr. Smith’s testimony accordingly.” slip op. at 26

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Petitioner contends a POSITA “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or similar technical field, with at least three years of relevant product design experience.” Pet. 12–13. Petitioner further contends “[a]n increase in experience could compensate for less education.” Id. at 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 46). Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art exclusively for this proceeding. PO Resp. 5. We find Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the asserted references, which involve various mechanical and electrical aspects of gardening tools such as lawnmowers. For instance, Reichart discloses a lawnmower having a handle that is adjustable to different heights to accommodate users of varying heights (Ex. 1007, code (57)), and Outils teaches a lawnmower having a safety device that prevents access to the rotating cutting blade (Ex. 1014, code (57)). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 27

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner proposes constructions for three claim terms—“power supply circuit” and the related terms “locks” and “unlocks.” Pet. 14–17; Reply 5. Patent Owner “believes that no construction is required for [‘power supply circuit’] because the construction of this term is not relevant to the issues raised herein.” PO Resp. 11; see also Sur-reply 2 (arguing the construction of “power supply circuit” is not relevant to the issues raised in this proceeding). Moreover, for purposes of this proceeding only, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed constructions for “locks” and “unlocks.” PO Resp. 11. The parties do not dispute the meanings of the claims terms “locks” and “unlocks,” and we agree with Patent Owner that an express construction of the claim term “power supply circuit” is unnecessary to resolve the dispute. For the reasons set forth in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability, we determine that no claim term requires an express construction for us to ascertain whether Petitioner has shown the challenged claims to be unpatentable.” slip op. at 28

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “demonstrated Outils teaches or suggests a second control device that unlocks and locks the first control device, as recited in limitation [1f]. Also, as we explain in section III.D.1.b, Petitioner has not persuaded us that a POSITA would have combined the teachings of Reichart and Nakano to result in the claimed subject matter, including limitation [1g]. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject matter of independent claim 1 would have been obvious over Reichart, Nakano, Outils, and 16 CFR 1205. 2. Independent Claim 11 Like independent claim 1, independent claim 11 recites, in pertinent” slip op. at 51

  Patent outcomesUS 9,986,686 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,986,686
• One World Technologies, Inc., D/B/A/ Techtronic Industries Power Equipment v. Chervon (HK) LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 3, 2021 · IPR2020-00884 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable under four § 103 grounds because the petitioner failed to establish the claimed control system in Outils.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “evidence, and the parties’ arguments and counterarguments, we find that Petitioner fails to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Outils teaches or suggests the subject matter of the control system limitation, including both a first control device and a second control device. We find Petitioner fails to support its position that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the embodiment depicted in Outils’s Figure 10 includes a hold-to-run control connected to an electrical supply contactor with persuasive evidence. At the outset, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not argue that it would have been obvious to combine Outils’s disclosure of hold-to-run control component 30 controlling an electrical supply contactor from the embodiment of Figure 1 with the embodiment of Figure 10. That is, we understand that Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the embodiment of Outils’s Figure 10 already had a specific type of control device—the hold-to-run control component 30 controlling an electrical supply contactor from the embodiment of Figure 1. See Pet. 36 (indicating that the first control device is Outils’s electrical supply contactor); Reply 7 (“But while the Bowden cable of Figure 1 is replaced in Figure 10, [a person having ordinary skill in the art] would understand Figure 10 must still include a user’s on/off component even though none is illustrated.”); see also Reply 9 (“Thus, [a person having ordinary skill in the art] would have understood Outils’ Figure 10 to include hold-to-run lever 30 . . . and its electric supply contactor from Figure 1”).15” slip op. at 31

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityJoinder, grantedGranted

    “allow the petitioner to add a real party in interest.” (quoting Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc)). As such, a petitioner may amend its mandatory notices to add a real party-ininterest and still maintain its original filing date. See, e.g., Adello Biologics LLC v. Amgen Inc., PGR2019-00001, Paper 11, 5 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2019) (precedential) (authorizing pre-institution update to Mandatory Notices to add a RPI); Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren Techs., LLC, IPR2017-01917, Paper 86, 7 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2019) (precedential) (“The Board may, under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a), accept updated mandatory notices as long as the petition would not have been time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) if it had included the real party in interest.”) (“Proppant”). In determining whether to permit a petitioner to amend its mandatory notices to add a real party-in-interest while maintaining the original filing date, we consider “whether there have been (1) attempts to circumvent the § 315(b) bar or estoppel rules, (2) bad faith by the petitioner, (3) prejudice to the patent owner caused by the delay, or (4) gamesmanship by the petitioner.” Proppant, Paper 86, 6–7.” slip op. at 44

  • Strike new argumentNot reached

    “B. Patent Owner’s Motion to Strike Patent Owner moves to strike portions of Petitioner’s Reply as “includ[ing] numerous new improper arguments, rationales, and theories.” Paper 43, 1.21 Petitioner opposes. Paper 47. Because, even when considering Petitioner’s Reply as a whole, we conclude that Petitioner fails to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of the Challenged Claims are unpatentable, we dismiss Patent Owner’s motion as moot.” slip op. at 48

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted

    “The moving party has the burden of proof in showing it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). The standard for granting a motion to seal is “good cause.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. “The ‘good cause’ standard for granting a motion to seal reflects the strong public policy for making all information in an inter partes review open to the public.” Argentum Pharm. LLC v. Alcon Research, Ltd., IPR2017-01053, Paper 27 at 3 (PTAB Jan. 19, 2018) (informative).” slip op. at 49

  Patent outcomesUS 9,596,806 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,596,806
• One World Technologies, Inc., D/B/A/ Techtronic Industries Power Equipment v. Chervon (HK) LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 3, 2021 · IPR2020-00886 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable: the Outils, Roelle, and Matsunaga combination did not establish the claimed control system, and the second ground did not cure that deficiency.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “experience could compensate for less education.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 44). Mr. Reed’s opinion testimony merely repeats Petitioner’s conclusion without any analysis and without disclosing the underlying facts or data on which his opinion is based. Accordingly, his testimony on this issue is entitled to no probative weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). In our Decision to Institute, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of skill. Dec. Inst. 36. Patent Owner states that “[f]or purposes of these proceedings only, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 4. Neither party provides any evidence of the factors listed above that normally inform our determination of the level of ordinary skill. For the purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, we maintain” slip op. at 24

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “Power Supply Circuit” Patent Owner believes that no construction is required for the term “power supply circuit” because “the construction of this term is not relevant to the issues raised herein.” PO Resp. 10. Patent Owner also asserts that the “District Court in the parties’ related district court litigation rejected Petitioner’s proposed construction.” Id. (citing Ex. 2025, 8). Petitioner disputes Patent Owner’s characterization of the District Court’s claim construction. Reply 5. Moreover, Petitioner asserts that the District Court’s construction of “power supply circuit” “would not impact the Petition’s demonstration of the challenged claims’ unpatentability.” Id. We maintain that the determination in our Decision to Institute that we need not construe this term to resolve the dispute before us.” slip op. at 25

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “determine that Patent Owner’s proposed construction of the “accommodating position” phrase, which is a “horizontal position over the main body” (PO Resp. 13) is not supported by the evidence. We agree with Petitioner’s proposed construction that the “accommodating position” phrase is a position relative to the main body for when the gardening tool or mower is not being used (Reply, 6), with a minor clarification. As Patent Owner argues, Petitioner’s proposed construction “is incorrect because it encompasses any handle position when the mower is turned off, and thus reads out the claimed “accommodating position.” Sur-reply 3. Our proposed construction modifies Petitioner’s construction to recognize Patent Owner’s argument. For purposes of this Decision, the phrase “accommodating position relative to the main body” in claims 1 and 11 is given its ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. This meaning is any position of the handle, other than the “secure position,” that prevents the motor from being started by the operation assembly and stops the motor if it is running. This is the construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention.” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “14 A petitioner must explain why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the elements, including those disclosed in separate embodiments described in a single reference. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“[A] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.”); In re Stepan Co., 868 F.3d 1342, 1345–46 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Whether a rejection is based on combining disclosures from multiple references, combining multiple embodiments from a single reference, or selecting from large lists of elements in a single reference, there must be a motivation to make the combination and a reasonable expectation that such a combination would be successful, otherwise a skilled artisan would not arrive at the claimed combination.”). Petitioner does not provide any such explanation, reinforcing our understanding that Petitioner relies on the position that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood the embodiment of Figure 10 to include, without modification, hold-to-run control component 30 controlling an electrical supply contactor from Figure 1. light of Outils’s disclosure of control components other than an electrical supply contactor connected to hold-to-run control component 30 in the embodiment of Figure 1; (3) Petitioner’s reliance on 16 C.F.R. Part 1205 to support the understanding of a person having ordinary skill in the art; (4) Petitioner’s reliance on Outils’s disclosure at page 2, lines 24–27, to support the understanding of a person having ordinary skill in the art; and (5) Petitioner’s contention that it would have been obvious to add an operation assembly to the embodiment of Outils’s Figure 10. First, it is undisputed that the text describing Figure 10 does not mention a hold-to-run control component connected to an electrical supply contactor. See Ex. 1014, 8:22–9:13.15 Similarly, Petitioner does not direct us to, nor do we discern, any depiction associated with Outils’s Figure 10 of a hold-to-run control component connected to an electrical supply contactor. Second, in describing the embodiment of Figure 1, Outils discloses that hold-to-run control component 30 can function in one of three different ways. Control 30, through remote control cable 29, can act on (1) a motor brake, (2) a brake coupling, or (3) an electrical supply contactor. See Ex. 1014, 4:5–8; see also Pet. 31 (acknowledging that Outils’s hold-to-run control component 30 “acts on a motor brake, a brake coupling or an electrical supply contactor” (emphasis added)). Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Reed persuasively explains why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood the embodiment of Figure 10 to have hold-to-run control component 30 connected to an electrical supply contactor, rather 15 Outils references Figures 9 and 10 at page 7, line 15. This reference is a typographical error. The reference should be to Figures 8 and 9, which include means 4 and actuator 20. See Ex. 1014, 7:15–8:20, Figs. 8, 9; Dec. Inst. 30; Reply 9 n.5. than a motor brake or brake coupling. That is, Petitioner does not provide persuasive evidence supporting the contention that, out of the three possible control devices disclosed as connected to hold-to-run control component 30—a motor brake, a brake coupling, or an electrical supply contactor—a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood from Outils’s disclosure that the embodiment of Figure 10 specifically includes an electrical supply contactor. There is no persuasive evidence that the embodiment of Figure 10 in Outils, which includes actuator 23 and cam 24, also includes hold-to-run control component 30 and only the electrical contactor to the exclusion of the other two control components. There also is no persuasive evidence, in this embodiment, actuator 23 and cam 24 enable, i.e. unlocks, or disables, i.e., locks, hold-to-run control component 30 and the associated electrical supply contactor from starting the motor, as required by the control system limitation.” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 9,826,686 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,826,686
• One World Technologies, Inc., D/B/A/ Techtronic Industries Power Equipment v. Chervon (HK) LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 3, 2021 · IPR2020-00884 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish that Outils disclosed or suggested the claimed first and second control devices.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityGranted

    “In determining whether to permit a petitioner to amend its mandatory notices to add a real party-in-interest while maintaining the original filing date, we consider “whether there have been (1) attempts to circumvent the § 315(b) bar or estoppel rules, (2) bad faith by the petitioner, (3) prejudice to the patent owner caused by the delay, or (4) gamesmanship by the petitioner.” Proppant, Paper 86, 6–7.” slip op. at 44

  • Strike new argumentNot reached

    “Patent Owner moves to strike portions of Petitioner’s Reply as “includ[ing] numerous new improper arguments, rationales, and theories.” Paper 43, 1.21 Petitioner opposes. Paper 47. Because, even when considering Petitioner’s Reply as a whole, we conclude that Petitioner fails to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of the Challenged Claims are unpatentable, we dismiss Patent Owner’s motion as moot.” slip op. at 48

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted

    “The moving party has the burden of proof in showing it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). The standard for granting a motion to seal is “good cause.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. “The ‘good cause’ standard for granting a motion to seal reflects the strong public policy for making all information in an inter partes review open to the public.” Argentum Pharm. LLC v. Alcon Research, Ltd., IPR2017-01053, Paper 27 at 3 (PTAB Jan. 19, 2018) (informative).” slip op. at 49

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Constitutional / APA (Arthrex, Oil States, due process)Not reached

    “Patent Owner argues that “[t]his proceeding should be dismissed because the assigned Administrative Patent Judges are principal officers of the United States and yet were not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate” in violation of the Appointments Clause. PO Resp. 52–53. We decline to address Patent Owner’s constitutional challenge except to note that the constitutionality of the appointments of the Administrative Patent Judges was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1986–87, 1997 (2021).” slip op. at 50

  Patent outcomesUS 9,596,806 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,596,806
• Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 22, 2021 · IPR2020-00712 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3–6, 9–12, and 15–18 were not shown unpatentable over Schulman, the Fischell Article, or the Fischell Article combined with Fischell ’260.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “We agree with Patent Owner that we should not address the patentability of claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 13, and 14 in this Decision. See PO Resp. 15 n.4. Rather, we treat claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 13, and 14 as if they never existed. See Gunn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent.”). We address the patentability only of the Challenged Claims not disclaimed. See Intel Corp. v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2018-01040, Paper 36, 16 (PTAB Feb. 12, 2020) (“Consistent with other Board decisions in which some, but not all, challenged claims have been disclaimed after institution, we address the patentability only of the remaining claims.” (collecting decisions)).” slip op. at 4

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “of the invention “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or an equivalent as well as at least five years of experience in the industry working with implantable medical devices such as cardiac pacemakers or defibrillators.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a relevant field (e.g., electrical, mechanical, or biomedical engineering) with at least two years of experience with the design of components (e.g., circuitry) for implantable medical devices and associated external devices (e.g., a charging unit),” and that “[m]ore education can substitute for practical experience and vice versa.” PO Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 21–22). Patent Owner further disagrees with Petitioner’s proposed level of skill because it does not specify “experience and background with electronics and circuitry.” Id. at 5. Patent Owner, however, further concedes that the result of this proceeding “would not be different even if Petitioner’s level of skill were to apply.” Id. (citing Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 23–24). The parties did not further address this issue at trial. See generally Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Patent Owner fails to provide any rational explanation or support to show that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill—a person having a least five years of experience in the industry working with implantable medical devices such as cardiac pacemakers or defibrillators” —corresponds to a person who lacks “experience and background with electronics and circuitry.” Further, we discern no substantial difference between the parties’ proposed definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art that impacts our determination in this Decision. We, therefore, agree with Patent Owner that our analysis in this case does not turn on which of the parties’ competing definitions of ordinary skill is applied and apply the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, consistent with the Decision on Institution. See Inst. Dec. 11 (stating that “the ’148 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of appropriate skill reflected in these references is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner” (citing Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “the [S]pecification teaches that the power source can automatically vary its power output based on multiple inputs, where each input is associated with or proportional to “said current passing through said internal battery.” (Ex. 2002 at ¶ 35.) In one example, two separate inputs are utilized in deciding how to vary the power output of the external power source 50: (1) the voltage across rechargeable power source 24; and (2) the charging current through rechargeable power source 24: If no over temperature condition exists, charging unit 50 checks (328) to determine if the voltage across rechargeable power source 24 is over a voltage at which the charging rate should begin to decrease, e.g., 4.05 volts. If the voltage across rechargeable power 24 is greater than 4.05 volts, then charging unit 50 begins to taper charging power (330). If the voltage across rechargeable power source 24 is not over 4.05 volts, charging unit 50 checks (332) to determine whether the charging current through rechargeable power source 24 is over a current rate that is not desirable, e.g., 50 milliamperes. If the charging current is over 50 milliamperes, then the charging power level is decreased (334) by an appropriate, e.g., by 35 milliwatts. (Ex. 1001 at 21:58-22:3, emphasis added.) As described in the passage above, both a voltage across the rechargeable power 8 Patent Owner’s additional citations to cases for the proposition that different claim terms are presumed to have different meanings does not support its arguments. PO Resp. 9–10 (citations omitted). As Petitioner notes, there is no dispute that “value,” “measured voltage,” and “signal proportional to said current” have different meanings. Pet. Reply 5. The issue is whether a single input can satisfy both limitations at issue. utilized to control the operation of the external charging device. A POSITA would understand that each of these two inputs is associated with or proportional to a current passing through the internal power source. (See also Ex. 1001 at 20:65-21:6; Ex. 2002 at ¶ 35.) PO Resp. 11–12. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasively supported by Dr. Mihran, who explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the claim language requires two inputs, in part, because the Specification of the ’148 patent “provides support for the use of multiple inputs as a basis to vary power output of the power source as claimed.” Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 33, 35.” slip op. at 23

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Schulman still anticipates” claims 3, 9, and 15.9 Pet. Reply 12–14. Petitioner then proceeds to argue for the first time that features of Schulman correspond to a second input that automatically varies the power output of the external power source. Id. In so doing, Petitioner fails to meet its burden to show in the Petition “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” but instead relies on Patent Owner to show in its Response to the Petition the proper construction. 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). Indeed, Petitioner does not argue, much less show that its “mapping” of the claims to Schulman in the Petition corresponds to two inputs that automatically vary the power output. Petitioner’s Reply is not an opportunity to advance new arguments based on new testimony in an effort to show that challenged claims are unpatentable where the proper claim construction requires additional features, such as two inputs instead of one input, contrary to the position taken by Petitioner in the Petition. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (stating in regard to inter partes review that “petitioner’s petition . . . is supposed to guide the life of the litigation”); see also Sirona Dental Sys. GmbH v. Institut Straumann AG, 892 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that “[b]ecause an IPR must proceed ‘[i]n accordance with’ or ‘in conformance to’ the petition,” it would “not be proper for the Board to deviate from the grounds in the petition”) (quoting SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1357)). Patent Owner argues, and we agree, that consideration of arguments raised improperly by Petitioner for the first time in its Reply is unwarranted.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,738,148 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,738,148
• Axonics, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 22, 2021 · IPR2020-00713 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 9–13 and 20 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 1–7, 16–18, and 22 were not shown unpatentable, principally because the proposed combinations lacked motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentOther

    “Trademark Office, and such disclaimer “shall thereafter be considered as part of the original patent”). Patent Owner asserts that in light of the Disclaimer, claims 8, 14, 15, 19, and 21 are to be “treated as though they never existed.” PO Resp. 17 n.9 (citations omitted). Patent Owner further argues that we should “not address the disclaimed claims in the Final Written Decision.” Id. (citation omitted). Petitioner does not dispute the effect of the Disclaimer. See Reply 11–13, 18–22 (arguing that the challenged claims not disclaimed are unpatentable). We agree with Patent Owner that we should not address the patentability of claims 8, 14, 15, 19, and 21 in this Decision. See PO Resp. 17 n.9. Rather, we treat claims 8, 14, 15, 19, and 21 as if they never existed. See Gunn v. Kopf, 96 F.3d 1419, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A statutory disclaimer under 35 U.S.C. § 253 has the effect of canceling the claims from the patent and the patent is viewed as though the disclaimed claims had never existed in the patent.”). We address the patentability only of the challenged claims not disclaimed. See Intel Corp. v. VLSI Tech. LLC, IPR2018-01040, Paper 36, 16 (PTAB Feb. 12, 2020) (“Consistent with other Board decisions in which some, but not all, challenged claims have been disclaimed after institution, we address the patentability only of the remaining claims.”).” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner “disagrees with Petitioner’s definition as it is too generic and does not require design experience.” Id. Patent Owner, however, does not explain why the level of ordinary skill in the art requires experience with designing the components for implantable medical systems, as opposed to experience, in general, with implantable medical systems. Moreover, Petitioner defines the level of ordinary skill in the art in two ways. One way expressly requires design experience. The other is an alternative thereto, and Patent Owner acknowledges education can substitute for experience. We see no meaningful distinction between Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art and that of Patent Owner. Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art finds support in the evidence. The ’112 patent is directed to a mechanism for transferring energy from an external power source to an implantable medical device to transcutaneously charge the battery of the implantable medical device. Ex. 1001, Title, Abstract, 1:31–33, 5:14–47, Fig. 3. Similarly, Torgerson and Barreras ’313 are directed to rechargeable implantable medical devices. Ex. 1005, Title, 1:5–6, Figs. 3–5; Ex. 1010, Title, 1:8–11, Figs. 1, 3–6. In view of the foregoing, the evidence reflects Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which does not differ significantly from Patent Owner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art. Our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability does not turn on which of the parties’ definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art we apply, and we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedOther

    “As set forth in our Trial Practice Guide9, we generally permit testimony where the declarant’s scientific, technical, or other specialized 9 USPTO, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 2019, https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated (“TPG”); see also Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, November 2019 knowledge will help the Board understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. TPG 34 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)). Given their education and experience with the charging of implantable medical devices (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4–11; Ex. 2022 ¶¶ 3–9), we find Dr. Colvin’s testimony and Dr. Haller’s testimony helpful in deciding factual issues in this proceeding. Moreover, when assigning weight to a declarant’s testimony, we consider the underlying facts or data upon which the testimony is based. TPG 40–41. In our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability, we weigh Dr. Colvin’s testimony and Dr. Haller’s testimony accordingly.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner proposes constructions for the claim term “programmable limit” and each of the “means for” limitations in independent claim 18. Pet. 6–15. Patent Owner also proposes a construction for “programmable limit” and disagrees with Petitioner’s proffered construction of this term. PO Resp. 8–15. Patent Owner additionally argues: “The Board can resolve the parties’ dispute in this proceeding without construing ‘programmable limit’ because none of the prior art arguments offered below implicate the meaning of ‘programmable limit.’ The same is true for the means plus function terms.” Id. at 7 (citations and footnote omitted). We agree with Patent Owner that we need not expressly construe the claim term “programmable limit” or the means-plus-function limitations in independent claim 18 to resolve the dispute. For the reasons set forth in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability, we determine that no claim term requires an express construction for us to ascertain whether Petitioner has shown the challenged claims to be unpatentable.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 9,821,112 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,821,112

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.