- Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 31, 2025 · IPR2024-00508 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18, 21–24, and 26–29 are unpatentable as anticipated by Rosenberg; the Board did not reach the alternative Brock grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry experience or graduate-level academic experience with human-computer interaction.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–45). This level of skill appears reasonable in view of the disclosures in the ’546 patent and asserted prior art. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill for this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that we need not construe any claim terms explicitly because “the Petition’s prior art discloses each element of the challenged claims under any plausible construction.” Pet. 8. We agree with Petitioner that, for this Decision, we do not need to construe any of the terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent that we discuss specific claim language, we do so below in the context of the prior art. See, e.g., infra Section III.C.2(e).” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“To show anticipation under § 102, a petitioner must locate every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, in a single prior art reference. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The limitations may be present in the reference “either explicitly or inherently.” In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In making this determination, we consider the reference “together with the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“A claim is unpatentable for obviousness under § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.4 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 7
Patent outcomesUS 9,116,546 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,116,546 - Microchip Technology Inc. v. Aptiv Technologies AGAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 30, 2025 · IPR2024-00230 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision
Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Chang and Chang II; the Board did not reach the Chang, Chang II, and Chutorash ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner and find that “computer network protocols” is correct in light of the ’072 patent’s disclosure and claim 1. In particular, the ’072 patent teaches that it “generally relates to [USB] connectivity between, for example, mobile consumer devices and vehicle electronic systems.” Ex. 1009, 1:21–23. And the ’072 patent’s teachings focus on common network components (e.g., hub, bridge, ports) and common networking concepts (e.g., master/slave network architecture and bridging) which are used in the USB context, rather than detailed aspects (e.g., signal timing, signal levels, power levels) of the USB protocol. See generally Ex. 1009; see also Ex. 1084, 103:21–104:2, 104:24–105:4; Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1084,7 100:17–101:12 (acknowledging that Dr. Houh testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art “would know basic USB concepts like bridging, master/slave architecture, etc.”), 102:3–8, 103:21– 104:2, 104:24–105:4). Likewise, claim 1 repeatedly recites “USB,” but does so to identify that all of the components of the data system (i.e., USB ports, USB hub, USB bridge, USB host, USB multiplexing switches) employ the USB protocol. Ex. 1009, 9:15–10:18. As the ’072 patent teaches, “USB 7 Houh Deposition Tr. (2024/12/18, Day 1). technology . . . [wa]s commonly available, familiar to the end user, cost effective and ubiquitous.” Id. at 1:35–37. Thus, although the ’072 patent is taught in the USB context, “computer network protocols” concepts are the focus. For these same reasons, we find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have been well-versed in USB standards (including the USB 2.0 and 3.0 Specifications and the OTG Supplement) and the design/deployment of USB hosts, USB devices, and USB hubs, including suitable environments for USB systems.” Pet. 26.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Lastly, we give little weight to Mr. Welch’s testimony regarding the level of one of ordinary skill as he does not indicate what precisely constitutes the basis of his testimony on this issue. See Ex. 1013 ¶ 47.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Here, Petitioner argues that “embedded USB host” means “USB host physically embedded in a vehicle.” See Pet. 27–28. “Patent Owner does not contend that any claim construction is required.” PO Resp. 5. We agree with Patent Owner that we do not need to construe any term to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). And we afford the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product that ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). In other words, “[a] presumption of nexus requires both that the product embodies the invention and is coextensive with it.” Id. at 1211 (citing Brown, 229 F.3d at 1130). Patent Owner fails to show either of these requirements. First, Patent Owner argues that in his Supplemental Declaration, Dr. Houh “provides on a per limitation basis how [Patent Owner]’s dual role hub meets all limitations of claim 1.” PO Resp. 73 (citing Ex. 2019 ¶ 136). Notably, Patent Owner cites to a single paragraph in this declaration, without providing any specific arguments in its Response that its product practices claim 1. Id. Rather, Patent Owner incorporates its arguments by reference, which is not permitted. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.6(a)(3) (“Arguments must not be incorporated by reference from one document into another document.”). Thus, we do not consider these arguments, and we are not persuaded that Patent Owner’s product practices claim 1. Consolidated Trial Practice Guide November 2019,8 35–36 (citing Cisco Systems, Inc. v. C-Cation Techs., LLC, IPR2014-00454, Paper 12 (PTAB Aug. 29, 2014) (informative)) (“[P]arties that incorporate expert testimony by reference in their petitions . . . without providing explanation of such testimony risk having the testimony not considered by the Board.”).” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 11,176,072 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,176,072 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00556 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–18 are unpatentable as obvious over Astala and Shahoian; claims 1, 6–9, 13, 14, and 18 also over Keely and Kolmykov-Zotov; claims 2–5, 10–12, and 15–17 also over those references with Shahoian.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther
“As we explained in the Institution Decision, we have reviewed the Board’s prior decision in IPR2016-01777 and we disagree with Valve that the previous Board panel actually construed the “determining a press” limitation. See Dec. on Inst. 9–10. The previous Board panel was merely making the point that the three conditions in the “determining a press” limitation had to be related in some way, and pointed to Figure 3 of the ’507 patent as an example of that relationship. IPR2016-01777, Paper 7 at 14–15 (Ex. 1023) (explaining that the interval in Figure 3 is “an integral part of the ‘determining a press imitation’”). The prior Board decision in IPR2016-01777 did not contain a claim construction because, in its Decision on Rehearing, the previous Board panel stated that it “did not expressly construe the ‘determining a press limitation’ or interpret[] the limitation to require the first two conditions recited in the limitation to be maintained for the duration of the first interval.” Apple Inc. v. Immersion Corp., IPR2016- 01777, Paper 9 at 3 (PTAB Apr. 27, 2017) (Decision Denying Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing). Thus, the prior Board decision outcome was not reliant on any particular claim interpretation or characterization of Figure 3; instead, it faulted the petitioner in that case for not considering the three conditions as a whole in the manner required by the claims. Id. at 3–4 (explaining that the petitioner needed to show the “‘first interval has elapsed’ condition as a part of the ‘determining a press limitation’” (emphasis added)). Notwithstanding, and for the sake of clarity, to the extent the prior Board decision in IPR2016-01777 characterized Figure 3 of the ’507 patent to require the pressure and change in pressure conditions to be met during the entire interval, we agree with Valve that such a reading of Figure 3 is incorrect. As Valve points out in its analysis, with which we agree, the flowchart in Figure 3 allows for both the pressure and change in pressure conditions to be met during some but not all of the entire time interval in certain circumstances. Pet. 12–14.3 In summary, we agree with Valve that the three conditions of the “determining a press” limitation are independent insofar as satisfaction of one condition is not predicated on the satisfaction of another condition. In our view, however, that point is merely reciting what the claim already requires—namely, that “determining a press” is defined as the satisfaction of the three conditions. Nothing more is required. Thus, we do not see the need to construe independent claim 1 beyond its plain language.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Relying on the testimony of Mr. Ward, Valve argues the following: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art . . . on November 26, 2003 would have had a Bachelors’ degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies. Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 47–51). Accordingly, we maintain our preliminary determination regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Dec. on Inst. 8. That is, we adopt Valve’s proposed assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art because (1) it is consistent with the ’507 patent and the asserted prior art; and (2) it is supported by the testimony of Mr. Ward. We apply this assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art in our obviousness evaluations below.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Turning to rationale to combine, Valve contends that, because Shahoian recognizes that “[o]ne problem with existing touchpads is that there is no haptic feedback provided to the user” to “assist and inform the user” when interpreting gestures, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that Astala’s input touch screen 70 was ready for the improvement that Shahoian provides—namely, “haptic feedback associated with touchpad/touchscreen input gestures.” Pet. 17–18 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 6) (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 158–160). Valve argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that incorporating Shahoian’s haptic feedback into Astala’s input touch screen 70 would have introduced certain benefits taught by Shahoian, including, but not limited to, using haptic feedback to inform users of touchpad gestures by “assist[ing] users in noisy environments . . . where sound may not be easily heard by the user.” Id. at 18 (quoting Ex. 1006 ¶ 178) (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 6, 187, 188, 193; Ex. 1003 ¶ 161). Valve also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Shahoian’s pressure-sensing components in Astala’s input touch screen 70 because, among other reasons, using actual pressure sensors in a touchpad would have provided more accurate determinations of user input. Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 41; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 164–166). Valve asserts there was a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination because it involves “us[ing] Shahoian’s haptic feedback and pressure sensors for their intended use.” Pet. 19–20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 180, 181). In addition, Valve asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably expected Shahoian’s haptic feedback and pressure sensors to succeed in Astala because “Shahoian demonstrates that algorithms for haptic feedback were known and predictable.” Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 182). In summary, upon reviewing Valve’s unrebutted arguments and evidence explaining how the combined teachings of Astala and Shahoian account for all the limitations of independent claims 1, 9, and 14, we agree with and adopt Valve’s analysis. See Pet. 17–31, 38–41. Accordingly, Valve has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of these independent claims would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Astala and Shahoian.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 8,749,507 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,749,507 - AT&T Mobility LLC / AT&T Services Inc. et al. v. Daingean Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00402 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted Patent Owner’s revised non-contingent motion to amend, canceling claims 1–4 and substituting claims 7 and 8, which Petitioner did not prove unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2019) (precedential). A “patent owner bears the burden of persuasion to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the motion to amend complies” with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(d)(1). Specifically, a patent owner must demonstrate the following: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent; and (4) the amendment does not introduce new matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)–(b). For the reasons explained below, Patent Owner satisfies its burden of persuasion to show that the amendments comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Both parties rely on expert testimony for their respective positions relating to the number of years of experience needed to attain ordinary skill, but neither expert cites supporting evidence for their testimony. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 2002 ¶ 15. Our decision is the same regardless of whether the length of experience is two years or three. We find Patent Owner’s proposed “wireless communications” is more consistent with the ’958 patent than Petitioner’s proposed “telecommunication,” which encompasses a variety of technologies including, e.g., landline and wireless telephones, cable, and satellite. See Ex. 1001, 1:11–62 (describing the invention in terms of wireless communications). Accordingly, we adopt a modified version of Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art, substituting “wireless communications” for “telecommunication.” Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the recited second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. The plain meaning of “first type” and “second type” indicates that the first type and second type are different in kind. RMTA 22 (App. A). Our interpretation is consistent with the Specification, which explains that second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. As Patent Owner points out, the ’958 patent discloses “first type of system information (1TYP SIB) is . . . essential . . . for initial system access” and “second type of system information (2TYP SIB) is nonessential system information . . . defined as all other types of information, and thus excludes the [] information required for initial access.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:34– 46); see also Ex. 1001, Abstract (interchangeably using the terms second type and non-essential). Despite Petitioner’s argument that this disclosure is non-limiting and directed to a disclaimed example embodiment (Opp. 8–9), Petitioner could not identify any embodiment, among the approximately forty disclosed embodiments, describing something other than the first type SIB being essential information and the second type SIB being non-essential information. Tr. 22:18–26. Even the Petition acknowledges that “the ’958 Patent further classifies a second type of system information, the ‘non-essential’ SI, which is defined as all other types of information excluding that first type of information required for initial access.” Pet. 5. Furthermore, the prior art of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill would have understood second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. See Ex. 1008 ¶ 48 (describing two categories of system information, “essential SI” and “Other SI”). Patent Owner’s expert also understood the recited first and second type SIBs as being mutually exclusive. See Ex. 1011, 49:10–13. For the above reasons, we do not agree with Petitioner that the recited second type SIB lacks any requirements, nor do we interpret claims 7 and 8 such that the first type SIB could be a second type SIB.” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“(d) Limitation 7h: Analysis We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments with respect to limitation 7h are insufficient because they fail to address the limitation as written and improperly incorporate previous arguments by reference. For example, Petitioner did not map the recited “group identifier” when opposing Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend. See Opp. 16–17. In its Sur-reply, Petitioner contends that limitation 7h’s requirement of transmitting the group identifier was previously “set out in Patent Owner’s prior papers,” but does not refer to any specific papers or exhibits. Pet. Surreply 11–12. We decline to search for and piece together Petitioner’s arguments and evidence to develop a persuasive theory of unpatentability. See 37 C.F.R. section 42.6(a)(3). Petitioner similarly failed to address adequately where Lee discloses or suggests the recited “compressed format” and “plural parameters.” See Opp. 16–17. Aside from the above concerns, we also do not see sufficient explanation with respect to limitation 7h’s requirement that the transmitting by broadcast be based on a comparison of the value tag. Petitioner argues that, because Patent Owner does not dispute limitation 7g, “it would have been obvious to a POSITA to use the same value tag[] to determine the system information broadcast in Lee’s compressed format embodiment.” Pet. Sur-reply 12. This conclusory statement is not supported by any citations to evidence and was improperly introduced in the Sur-reply. Moreover, whether it was obvious to determine what system information is broadcast is not commensurate with the claim scope because limitation 7h requires that the broadcasting (not the broadcast content) be based on a comparison of the value tag. See supra III.B.4 and IV.B. Further, we are not persuaded that Lee’s transmitting by broadcast is” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 10,841,958 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,841,958 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00477 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable as anticipated by and obvious over Komata; the Board did not reach the Tsuji or Rosenberg grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer science (or an equivalent degree), and two years of practical or industry experience in the field of human computer interaction (HCI), including implementation of computer-based systems and software for providing haptic feedback effects to a user. . . . Also, a person could have qualified as a [POSITA] with more formal education and less practical or industry experience, or vice versa. PO Resp. 17–18 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 17). Although these level of skill definitions are not the same, the differences are minor, and Patent Owner does not argue that its level of skill definition is dispositive. To the contrary, Patent Owner asserts that “[i]n any event, the challenged claims of the ’260 Patent are patentable under either . . . definition.” Id. at 18. We apply Petitioner’s level of skill but would have reached the same result had we applied Patent Owner’s.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“As we explained in our Institution Decision, we disagreed then, and still disagree, “that the second pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected (or that the third pressure must be detected after the first pressure is detected) simply because the second pressure is greater than the first pressure (and the third pressure is greater than the second pressure).” Dec. 27. As we explained there, “[t]he claimed relative magnitudes of the first, second, and third pressures do not define any temporal relationships regarding the detection of the pressures.” Id. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 recites quantitative relationships for the pressures, not temporal relationships. Reply 4. For example, claim 1 requires “the second pressure greater than the first pressure” but says nothing about when the second pressure must be greater than the first pressure. A key misconception undergirding Patent Owner’s argument is its statement that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” PO Resp. 27 (emphasis added). The claim does not require detecting that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure. Limitation [1c] simply says, “detect a second pressure on the first input device, the second pressure greater than the first pressure.” In other words, all the detection that this limitation requires is detecting a second pressure. The claim then observes that the second pressure is greater than the first pressure but does not require detecting this. Limitation [1e] similarly detects pressure but not the comparison: “detect a third pressure on the first input device, the third pressure greater than the second pressure.” Thus, it does not follow that “a ‘first pressure’ must first exist before the invention can detect that the ‘second pressure’ is greater.” See id. Accordingly, we determine that Patent Owner’s analysis of the claim language is unpersuasive.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Our decision here does not depend on the meaning of this term. Patent Owner only argues the phrase “tactile sensation” for Petitioner’s challenge over Rosenberg, which we do not reach because Petitioner’s challenge over Komata is dispositive. See PO Resp. 63–66. Accordingly, we do not construe this term.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Patent Owner does not dispute that Komata discloses all the limitations of claim 1. Instead, Patent Owner disputes that Komata discloses the order of all the steps of claim 1, based on its construction requiring the steps to be performed in order. PO Resp. 50–54; Reply 17 (observing that Patent Owner “does not dispute that Ground 1 demonstrates how Komata anticipates or renders obvious claims 1–7 if [Patent Owner’s] ordered-steps argument is rejected”); Sur-reply 12–14 (not disputing the Reply’s observation). As Patent Owner’s argument relies on a claim construction we have not adopted, Patent Owner fails to undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing.7 To the extent, as we note above, that the claims may require a partial ordering (i.e., limitation [1a] preceding limitation [1b] and limitation [1c] preceding limitation [1d], see supra Section I.A.1.a), Petitioner has persuasively shown that Komata discloses such ordering. a. Summary as to Claim 1 For the above reasons, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata. 3. Dependent Claims 2–7 Petitioner also contends that claims 2–7 would have been obvious over Komata. Pet. 28–35. Patent Owner does not dispute these dependent claims. Petitioner provides detailed explanations indicating where Komata teaches or suggests the limitations of claims 2–7, supported by Mr. Ward’s testimony. Id. We determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2–7 are anticipated by and would have been obvious over Komata.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 7,336,260 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,336,260 - Valve Corporation v. Immersion CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00478 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable because Petitioner proved that Rosenberg I anticipates them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, plus at least two years of industry or graduate level experience with software engineering, haptics programming, and/or human-computer interaction, including experience with user-interfaces and applications involving touchscreens, touchpads, and related technologies.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” PO Resp. 28; Sur-reply 3. Petitioner “does not explicitly disagree” that a virtual detent is “vibrotactile feedback that simulates a mechanical detent.” Reply 2. Petitioner asserts that “[i]f there is a dispute, it is whether Rosenberg I’s vibrotactile feedback ‘simulates a mechanical detent’ because [Patent Owner] says such simulation requires a sense of mechanical resistance and Rosenberg I allegedly lacks such simulated resistance.” Id. (citing PO Resp. 58–59).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“To the extent Patent Owner urges us to require virtual detents to vary on a system or application basis, we do not find this interpretation required by the claims or specification either. Although the claims refer to “a plurality of systems,” they do not recite different detent profiles for each of those systems. Claim 1, for example, recites “receiving a detent profile associated with one of the systems.” The other claims are similar. Patent Owner’s reliance on non-limiting specification language is also unavailing. E.g., Ex. 1001, 8:38–46 (“can” and “may”), 4:30–44 (“embodiment” and “may”).” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingDecided for petitioner
“supports its proposed construction. See PO Resp. 32. Patent Owner argues that claim 15 recites a “system comprising” “an input device configured to control one of a plurality of systems,” and hence “the recited plurality of systems are subsystems in addition to the containing system.” Id. We question how this point supports Patent Owner’s proposal because this does not address why each system must “provide[] context for virtual detents.” But regardless, we find it unpersuasive because claim 15’s preamble is not limiting (merely reciting “A system comprising”). See Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]reamble language that merely states the purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting the scope of the claim.”); see also Tr. 80:4– 8 (Patent Owner conceding that the preamble is non-limiting). Nor is there any explicit language in claim 15 that would exclude any particular system, such as the system recited in the preamble, from the recited “plurality of systems.”” slip op. at 9
Patent outcomesUS 9,430,042 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 9,430,042 - Abbott Laboratories v. Newtonoid Technologies, L.L.C.Adverse judgmentPTAB · May 29, 2025 · IPR2024-00932 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment, terminated the trial, and cancelled claims 1 and 4–20.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Our rules provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). We understand Patent Owner’s May 19, 2025 email as a request for judgment against itself. Accordingly, on the record before us, we enter adverse judgment against Patent Owner pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) and terminate the trial pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that Patent Owner’s May 19, 2025 email request for adverse judgment pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b) is granted;” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,392,818 - Inductev, Inc. v. Witricity CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00105 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over the stated Fells-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had . . . a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, microelectronics, or equivalent, and . . . two to three years of industry or research experience,” and “a higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–44). Patent Owner “does not disagree with Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art,” but “does not believe that resolution of the Petition depends on the precise definition of the level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 12. Petitioner’s proposed articulation is supported by testimonial evidence and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’184 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–2:53. As it is uncontested, we adopt it for this decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that the terms of the contested claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning, but neither party argues that we should construe any claim terms explicitly. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62– 63); PO Resp. 12. We agree with the parties that, for this decision, we do not need to construe any of the terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). However, the meaning of certain terms are contested, including most notably “magnetic field sensor,” and we discuss those terms below in the context of the prior art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached
“Petitioner argues that, to the extent the preamble is limiting, Fells discloses the recited wireless energy transfer system, and that the system includes facilities to detect FOD. Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 191, Fig. 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–71, 96–101). Patent Owner does not specifically contest Petitioner’s arguments. See PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner’s argument that Fells discloses the preamble; thus, we need not decide whether the preamble is limiting. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 191, Fig. 2.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that the ordinary and customary meaning of “magnetic field sensor” refers to a device that measures only external magnetic fields. There is nothing in the claim language to suggest such a limitation: the plain language simply refers to a “magnetic field sensor,” without regard to how the sensor works or where it senses magnetic fields from. Ex. 1001, 12:16. In fact, the claim does not explicitly require sensing anything at all using the magnetic field sensor, merely reciting a “foreign object debris detection system” comprising the sensor and that the “foreign object debris detection system is configured to verify” the presence of FOD. The very general nature of how the magnetic field sensor is recited, without any explicit recitation of how its output may be used, undermines Patent Owner’s overly restrictive interpretation. Although the ’184 patent specification includes examples of measuring external magnetic fields to detect FOD, Patent Owner has not pointed to anything in the specification indicating an intent to restrict the term “magnetic field sensor” to only those sensors that measure external magnetic fields. Nor is there intrinsic evidence that an “eddy-current sensor” would not also be a magnetic field sensor, given that it senses magnetic fields. Indeed, as Petitioner persuasively argues, an eddy-current sensor still measures external magnetic fields—albeit magnetic fields generated within FOD through interaction with a powered sensor. Pet. 6–7; Ex. 1037 ¶¶ 14– 16, 25–29.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,027,184 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,027,184 - TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd. (F/K/A TCL Multimedia Technology Holdings, Ltd.) v. Maxell, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00135 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on all challenged claims, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the parallel litigation was advanced and trial would precede a final written decision.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Under the latest applicable guidance, Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation “is highly relevant, but [is] not . . . dispositive by itself.” CAPJ Memo at 2– 3. Accordingly, we consider Petitioner’s stipulation “as part of [our] holistic analysis under Fintiv.” Id. at 2. In theory, Petitioner’s stipulation could “mitigate[] any concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions” regarding unpatentability/ invalidity. Sotera, Paper 12 at 19. We note that Petitioner’s initial invalidity contentions included the two asserted references here, Bennett and Nashida. Although Petitioner served those contentions before the filing of the instant Petition—in which it proffered its stipulation—we cannot discern from the instant record whether Petitioner’s present invalidity positions in the underlying litigation incorporate any aspects of its grounds here based on Bennett and Nashida. Still, we view Petitioner’s stipulation as significantly mitigating potential conflict given the likelihood that the court would hold Petitioner (and its privies) to Petitioner’s representations made here.5” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Board, however, has discretion to deny a petition even when a petitioner meets that threshold. Id.; see, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential) (“NHK”). For the reasons that follow, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“controller” that “receive[s] an identifier for identifying a second video content from [an] external mobile terminal” and “acquire[s] the second video content via the internet using said identifier.” Ex. 1001, 20:29–31, 20:46–47, 20:52–55 (alterations and emphasis added). In the Bennett obviousness ground, Petitioner cites Bennett’s control signal that directs display of a video stream on a television screen for teaching the recited “identifier.” Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 32). Petitioner further cites Bennett’s teaching of an Internet server as a media source for teaching the “acquire[s]” limitation. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 55). Petitioner alternatively cites its declarant’s testimony and contends that it would have been obvious “to use an identifier such as URL in Bennett’s system to retrieve video content from the Internet.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 87). Yet Patent Owner’s arguments (see Prelim. Resp. 59–64) call into question whether Bennett teaches or suggests the use of either Bennett’s control signal or a URL to “acquire the second video content via the internet.” In addition, we preliminarily agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments regarding the URL “focus on justifying an example of what an identifier could be, and fail[] to address a scenario that would justify the receipt of a URL from a phone/remote” in Bennett’s system. Id. at 63. Petitioner’s further contentions for these limitations in the Bennett– Nashida obviousness ground (see Pet. 73–75) do not necessarily cure the deficiencies mentioned by Patent Owner. Petitioner contends that “Nashida discloses the use of identifiers, such as URLs, for retrieving internet content” and cites Nashida’s teaching of “‘controller 1010 transmit[ting] a command of requesting a transmission of a URL’ for retrieving and displaying web content on a display apparatus.” Id. at 73 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 120). Yet, according to Patent Owner, Nashida appears to show the URL moving in the opposite direction of Petitioner’s intended mapping: “It is therefore the image display apparatus (the alleged ‘display apparatus’) that sends the URL to the remote controller . . . , and not the other way around, as claimed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 67 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 1216). At the very least, these issues preclude a finding of “particularly” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,219,020 - TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd. (F/K/A TCL Multimedia Technology Holdings, Ltd.) v. Maxell, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00134 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–11, 13, and 15–20, finding that the advanced Texas litigation and trial timing outweighed the Petition’s Sotera stipulation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“September 22, 2025, which is less than four months after the statutory deadline for this Decision and “almost eight months before the projected statutory deadline for a final written decision.” Prelim. Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2004). Accordingly, the trial is currently set to occur several months before any Final Written Decision in this case will issue. Although trial delays are a possibility, there is no evidence before us that would indicate the likelihood of a trial postponement. Thus, this factor strongly favors discretionary denial.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“transmits, over the USB cable, a first signal to the digital camera for causing the digital camera to output compressed first image information.” Petitioner addresses that requirement by asserting Lawther’s interface circuit “can also be adapted to enable exchange data with a connected external device.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 50). Although Lawther may “exchange data,” supporting that signals may be sent to a connected camera, Petitioner does not establish that such a signal would have been used as claimed. It may be that such a signal is inherently present in the interactions Lawther describes, but Petitioner does not assert or establish so, only that Lawther has the capability to “exchange data” with a connected camera. Because of this potential weakness in Petitioner’s showing, we cannot conclude that the Petition presents a particularly strong challenge.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“the Petition does not present a particularly strong challenge, because it inadequately addresses at least one claim limitation. In particular, limitation [1F] requires “USB interface circuitry [that] transmits, over the USB cable, a first signal to the digital camera for causing the digital camera to output compressed first image information.” Petitioner addresses that requirement by asserting Lawther’s interface circuit “can also be adapted to enable exchange data with a connected external device.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 50). Although Lawther may “exchange data,” supporting that signals may be sent to a connected camera, Petitioner does not establish that such a signal would have been used as claimed. It may be that such a signal is inherently present in the interactions Lawther describes, but Petitioner does not assert or establish so, only that Lawther has the capability to “exchange data” with a connected camera. Because of this potential weakness in Petitioner’s showing, we cannot conclude that the Petition presents a particularly strong challenge.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,650,780
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.