- NVIDIA Corporation v. Polaris Innovations LimitedNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 20, 2018 · IPR2017-01781 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 8–12, 14, 16–23, 26–31, 43–45, and 48–51 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish data arrangement alteration or a sufficient motivation to combine.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the ’344 patent (POSITA) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering and at least 2 years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” Ex. 1019 ¶ 13. Neither Patent Owner, nor its declarant, Dr. Przybylski, offers a different assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 36 (“I am applying the definition of the level of experience of a person of ordinary skill in the art that has been put forward by Dr. Tredennick in his declaration. I do not necessarily agree with the definition offered there, but I do not presently believe that the exact level of experience of a person of ordinary skill impacts my opinions offered herein.”). Based on the evidence of record, we adopt Dr. Tredennick’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art with the exception of the language “at least.” Thus, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Even if so, the arrangement of the data must be altered to give full effect to the claim language. The portions of the specification of the ’344 patent cited by Petitioner confirm this. In one instance, the ’344 patent states: In the first error coding path 120, the first data arrangement alteration device 122 is adapted to create a second data block on the basis of the first data block, which comprises the given number of data in a second arrangement, and to output it to the first error coder 124. Ex. 1001, 3:63–67 (emphasis added), cited in Paper 47, 2. Another passage states: The data arrangement alteration device 222 is adapted to receive, at the input 222E or 102, a first data block comprising a given number of data in the first arrangement, and to generate, on the basis of the first data block, a second data block comprising the given number of data in a second arrangement . . . . Ex. 1001, 6:14–18 (emphasis added), cited in Paper 47, 2. These passages show that data arrangement alteration takes data and puts those data into a different arrangement. Petitioner also cites the ’344 patent’s disclosure of a deserializer changing the “representation” of data. Paper 47, 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:58–62, 9:2–7). But, in this operation, “the second data block 440 . . . comprises the same data, namely the 72 bits of the first data block 435 in a second arrangement which is different from the first arrangement of the first data block.” Ex. 1001, 9:32–35 (emphasis added). Petitioner also cites an example in the ’344 patent in which the burst length is halved from eight time pulses to four time pulses. Ex. 1001, 11:52–61, cited in Paper 47, 4. The ’344 patent describes that, in this scenario, only half of the bits (36 out of 72) “will be occupied with processable data.” Ex. 1001, 11:59–60. Petitioner contends that this describes an output of 72 bits that is larger and different than the input of only 36 bits. Paper 47, 4. The ’344 patent, however, describes providing “a further subarea of the matrix 420 for this mode, and to control the multiplexer 430, via the mode register 110, such that this subarea will be read out, so that, for example, only 36 of the 72 bits will be occupied with processable data.” Ex. 1001, 11:56–60 (emphasis added). Thus, it is the subarea having the 36 bits of processable data that is read out. But even if Petitioner is correct that the output is larger than the input in this example, data arrangement alteration still requires an alteration of the arrangement of the input data, even if the output contains additional data. In all of the examples in the specification of the ’344 patent, therefore,” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“a data arrangement alteration algorithm’ is described in the ’344 patent as a ‘data arrangement alteration device,’ which is part of the ‘one or more devices’ of the first means of claim 19. Thus, the corresponding structure is ‘a data arrangement alteration device.’” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:14–25, 6:42–65, 7:10–24; Ex. 1019 ¶ 32). In the Decision on Institution, we addressed Petitioner’s proposed construction for “means for performing a data arrangement alteration algorithm,” but we did not adopt it. Dec. on Inst. 11–12. Rather, we set out the following construction of this term: Limitation Function and Structure Claim 19: means for performing a Function: performing a data data arrangement alteration arrangement alteration algorithm algorithm Structure: data arrangement alteration devices 122, 132, and 222 and equivalents. See id. at 3:27–34, 5:65–6:25, 6:42–65, 8:55–57, 10:34–45, Figs. 1–4. During the trial in this proceeding, neither party further disputed this interpretation. Having considered the entire record developed during trial, we determine that this is the proper interpretation for “means for performing a data arrangement alteration algorithm.” Thus, we apply this interpretation in our analysis below.” slip op. at 13
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“As discussed above in the section addressing claim interpretation, “data arrangement alteration” requires alteration of the arrangement of data, not merely alteration of data. Petitioner’s allegation that Yoon’s data bus inversion alters some portion of the data is insufficient to show that Yoon describes altering the arrangement of data, as required by the claims. For the same reasons, we are not persuaded that Yoon’s data bus inversion devices describe the same or equivalent structure as that set forth in the specification of the ’344 patent, namely data arrangement alteration devices 122, 132, and 222, as set forth in our claim interpretation discussion above. Because Petitioner has not shown Yoon describes the “data arrangement alteration” limitations of independent claims 1, 16, 19, and 43, Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Yoon anticipated these claims. Dependent claims 8–12, 14, 26–31, and 48–51 incorporate the “data arrangement alteration” limitations by virtue of their dependency from their respective independent claims, and, therefore, Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Yoon anticipated these claims.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,161,344 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,161,344 - NVIDIA Corporation v. Polaris Innovations LimitedSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 20, 2018 · IPR2017-01346 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, 8–12, 16, 18, 43, 45, and 48–51 are unpatentable; claims 2, 19, 20, 22, 26–30, and 44 were not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Tredennick, testifies that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the ’344 patent (POSITA) would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering and at least 2 years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 13. Neither Patent Owner, nor its declarant, Dr. Przybylski, offers a different assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 2002 ¶ 38 (“I am applying the definition of the level of experience of a person of ordinary skill in the art that has been put forward by Dr. Tredennick in his declaration. I do not necessarily agree with the definition offered there, but I do not presently believe that the exact level of experience of a person of ordinary skill impacts my opinions offered herein.”). Based on the evidence of record, we adopt Dr. Tredennick’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art with the exception of the language “at least.” Thus, we determine that the skill level of a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been that of a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of experience working in the field of semiconductor logic design.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“Thus, “data arrangement alteration” requires the alteration of the arrangement of data, not merely the alteration of data.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownOther
“Structure: first error coding path 120 and equivalents. See Ex. 1001, 3:27–34, 3:57–4:25, 5:53–64, Figs. 1A, 1E. Function: performing a data Claim 19: means for performing a data arrangement alteration arrangement alteration algorithm algorithm Structure: data arrangement alteration devices 122, 132, and 222 and equivalents. See id. at 3:27–34, 5:65–6:25, 6:42–65, 8:55–57, 10:34–45, Figs. 1–4. Dec. on Inst. 8–9.” slip op. at 14
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) Metallic Interface, and it bears a copyright date of 1999. Ex. 1004. Citing the Declaration of Jessica Coral Sheldon- Hess, Petitioner contends ADSL is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1014, 4–5). Ms. Sheldon-Hess testifies that, based on ADSL’s Machine Readable Cataloging (MARC) record obtained from Illinois State Library, ADSL was available to the public as of 1999. Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 8–10. Patent Owner does not dispute the prior art status of ADSL. Petitioner’s evidence establishes that ADSL was publicly available as a printed publication more than one year before the U.S. filing date for the ’344 patent, which is March 11, 2008. See Ex. 1001, [22]. Based on this evidence, we determine that ADSL qualifies as a prior art printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 8,161,344 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,161,344 - Coastal Industries, Inc. v. Shower Enclosures America, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 19, 2018 · IPR2017-00573 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11–14, and 16–26 are unpatentable; claims 4, 6, 10, and 15 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 33 and 34 are granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“invention. Pet. 26. Patent Owner sets forth many assertions related to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. PO Resp. 3–14, 20–30; PO Supp. Resp. 15–20. Petitioner responds to those assertions. Pet. Reply 2–4, 9–18; Pet. Supp. Reply 15–16. While we will address each of those assertions, as a substantive matter, Petitioner asserts that “PO does not dispute the definition of a PHOSITA, offer a contrary definition, explain how a different definition might affect the Board’s analysis, nor contest the Board’s specific interpretation of the prior art references to put the PHOSITA determination at issue.” Pet. Reply 16–18; Pet. Supp. Reply 15– 16. We agree with that assessment. Moreover, we note that the level of ordinary skill in the art is often reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Accordingly, as an initial matter, we address Petitioner’s unopposed substantive assertion with respect to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“1. “track members” Independent claims 1, 12, 19, and 22 each recite “track members.”” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“B. Patentability of Substitute Claims 33 and 34 Petitioner asserts that various claim limitations are disclosed in the” slip op. at 100
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“701, 702 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that Mr. Poenariu’s testimony is entirely based on his finding as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, and because Mr. Poenariu did not articulate a sufficient factual basis for his conclusion as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, his entire testimony us unreliable and should be excluded. PO Mot. 5–6. Petitioner responds that Mr. Poenariu discloses more than a sufficient amount of underlying facts on which to base his testimony, and, thus, Patent Owner’s assertions go to weight and not admissibility. Pet. Opp. 6–9. We agree with Petitioner.” slip op. at 105
Patent outcomesUS 7,174,944 mixedClaim constructioncites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 7,174,944 - Motorola Mobility LLC v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 16, 2018 · IPR2014-00504 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s request for rehearing of the SAS Order, leaving review instituted on all challenged claims and all grounds in the Petition.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). In particular, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)New argument disregardedDenied
“overlooked express statutory requirements that the Board was obligated to assess before considering the Petition for re-institution.” Reh. Req. 10 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)). Specifically, Patent Owner argues “the Petition fails to meet the particularity requirement [of 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)] at least with respect to the multiple grounds identified on pages 47–59 of the Petition” because of the “vague formulation” (i.e., Veeck in view of Kellerer, Boehm, and/or Mitchell). Id. at 12. Patent Owner, however, does not identify where this “matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply,” as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). We could not have misapprehended or overlooked something that was not presented previously. A Request for Rehearing is not an opportunity to raise new arguments against a petition. To the extent Patent Owner believes the grounds newly instituted in the SAS Order lack sufficient particularity under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3), it can make such arguments in its supplemental briefing.” slip op. at 10
- Director reviewOther
“The standard operating procedure exemplifies some of the reasons for which the Chief Judge may expand a panel. PTAB SOP 1, 15 (§ III.M). For example, the Chief Judge may expand a panel “where appropriate, to secure and maintain uniformity of the Board’s decisions, e.g., in related cases ordinarily involving different three judge panels.” Id. (§ III.M.1). In this case, the acting-Chief Judge has considered Patent Owner’s suggestion for an expanded panel, but has determined that an expanded panel is not warranted.” slip op. at 12
NonePatents in suitUS 7,382,771 - Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 16, 2018 · IPR2014-00787 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing request, leaving in place the SAS Order instituting review on all challenged claims and all petition grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A party requesting rehearing bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). In particular, “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“Our governing statutes and regulations do not provide for parties to request, or panels to authorize, an expanded panel. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 6; 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.1–42.412. The Chief Judge may consider panel expansions upon a “suggestion” from a judge, panel, or party. PTAB SOP 1, 15; see also Apple Inc. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., Case IPR2014- 00319, slip op. at 2 n.1 (PTAB Dec. 12, 2014) (Paper 20) (expanded panel) (per curiam). The standard operating procedure exemplifies some of the reasons for which the Chief Judge may expand a panel. PTAB SOP 1, 15 (§ III.M). For example, the Chief Judge may expand a panel “where appropriate, to secure and maintain uniformity of the Board’s decisions, e.g., in related cases ordinarily involving different three judge panels.” Id. (§ III.M.1). In this case, the acting-Chief Judge has considered Patent Owner’s suggestion for an expanded panel, but has determined that an expanded panel is not warranted.” slip op. at 11
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 6,121,960 - L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. University Of MassachusettsRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 16, 2018 · IPR2018-00779 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and affirmed denial of institution because Petitioner did not show that the Board abused its discretion in construing the adenosine concentration limitation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Accordingly, Petitioner has not persuaded us that we have misapprehended or overlooked any matters with respect to our decision to deny institution. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that the Board abused its discretion in denying institution of the challenged claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is denied.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“related grounds: that claims 1–7, and 9 are anticipated by JP ’1532; that claim 4 is obvious over JP ’153; and that claims 1–7 and 9 would have been obvious over the combination of JP ’153 and DE ’1073. Pet. 6–7. We declined to institute inter partes review. Dec.” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“adenosine may be topically applied to the epidermal layer of the skin, but also that adenosine so applied will penetrate the epidermis to reach the dermal layer. Dec. 9 (citing Ex. 1002, 5:20–23 (“For topical application, the penetration of the adenosine into skin tissue may be enhanced by a variety of methods known to those of ordinary skill in the art.”)). Topical application of adenosine will, therefore, result in adenosine being brought into contact with both the epidermis and the dermis. As also discussed in the Decision, the specification provides examples in which a concentration of adenosine within the range recited in the claims (10-4 M) is applied directly to dermal cells (fibroblasts), suggesting that the inventors considered it desirable for the dermal cells to receive the claimed concentration of adenosine. Id. In this context, the meaning of claim 1 is clear: adenosine is first topically applied to the epidermal layer of the skin and, only after it penetrates this outer skin layer, is a specific concentration (10-4 M to 10-7 M) of the adenosine “applied” to the dermal cells.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for patent owner
“A prosecution history disclaimer must be clear and unambiguous. “[W]hile the prosecution history can inform whether the inventor limited the claim scope in the course of prosecution, it often produces ambiguities created by ongoing negotiations between the inventor and the PTO. Therefore, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer only applies to unambiguous disavowals.” Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). A “heavy presumption” exists in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To overcome this presumption, the patentee must “clearly set forth” and “clearly redefine” a claim term away from its ordinary meaning. Id. The disavowal must be “unmistakable” and “unambiguous.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013). This standard is “exacting.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012).” slip op. at 7
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,645,513 - L’Oréal USA, Inc. v. University Of MassachusettsRehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 16, 2018 · IPR2018-00778 · APJ David Cotta · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied for claims 1–7 and 9 because Petitioner did not show an abuse of discretion in the claim construction underlying the denial.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be found if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors. Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The party requesting rehearing has the burden of showing the decision should be modified, which includes specifically identifying all matters the party believes we misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer not foundDecided for patent owner
“A prosecution history disclaimer must be clear and unambiguous. “[W]hile the prosecution history can inform whether the inventor limited the claim scope in the course of prosecution, it often produces ambiguities created by ongoing negotiations between the inventor and the PTO. . . . Therefore, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer only applies to unambiguous disavowals.” Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). A “heavy presumption” exists in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To overcome this presumption, the patentee must “clearly set forth” and “clearly redefine” a claim term away from its ordinary meaning. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The disavowal must be “unmistakable” and “unambiguous.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013). This standard is “exacting.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“As discussed in the Decision, the Specification discloses not only that adenosine may be topically applied to the epidermal layer of the skin, but also that adenosine so applied will penetrate the epidermis to reach the dermal layer. Dec. 10 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:13–14 (“For topical application, the penetration of the adenosine into skin tissue may be enhanced by a variety of methods known to those of ordinary skill in the art.”)). Topical application of adenosine will, therefore, result in adenosine being brought into contact with both the epidermis and the dermis. As also discussed in the Decision, the specification provides examples in which a concentration of adenosine matching the high end recited in the claims (10-4 M) is applied directly to dermal cells (fibroblasts), suggesting that the inventors considered it desirable for the dermal cells to receive the claimed concentration of adenosine. Id. In this context, the meaning of claim 1 is clear: adenosine is first topically applied to the epidermal layer of the skin and, only after it penetrates this outer skin layer, is a specific concentration (10-4 M to 10-7 M) of the adenosine “applied” to the dermal cells.” slip op. at 6
Claim constructioncites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,423,327 - PTAB · Nov 16, 2018 · IPR2017-02046 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the petitioner’s rehearing request, leaving in place the denial of institution for claims 1–24 because it found no abuse of discretion in its analysis of “network access.”
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“What Petitioner describes, however, is not an “abuse of discretion,” but rather our determination based on the evidence and the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “network access.” As we explained in our Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, consistent with the “broadest reasonable construction” standard, “we assign claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent disclosure.” Inst. Dec. 6 (citing In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“[i]ndependent Claims 1, 15, and 24 separately recite, and therefore, distinguish between, “a request from the user to access a content provider web site” and “network access.” These claims also require that the historic information retrieved for the user include “times and locations of network access and number of previous network accesses by the network access device. Id. (citing Ex. 1001, cols 12–14 (emphasis added)). Thus, in light of this record, we are unpersuaded that we erred. Instead, our decision was based on a reasoned analysis of the evidence and applied the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “network access,” as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish persuasively, that our decision not to institute an inter partes proceeding was based on an erroneous interpretation of law, not supported by substantial evidence, or an unreasonable judgment weighing relevant factors.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“but rather our determination based on the evidence and the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “network access.” As we explained in our Decision Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review, consistent with the “broadest reasonable construction” standard, “we assign claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in the context of the entire patent disclosure.” Inst. Dec. 6 (citing In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).” slip op. at 4
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 7,657,594 - Fasteners For Retail, Inc. v. RTC Industries, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 15, 2018 · IPR2018-00744 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Fasteners for Retail’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied because it failed to identify Olympus as a real party in interest.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s argument is without merit because it mischaracterizes our Order. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion (Request 5), our Order does not “instruct” or “direct” Petitioner to file a reply brief if it believes Olympus is not an unnamed RPI. Rather, our Order explicitly provides that if “Petitioner does not believe that Olympus is an unnamed real party in interest, in lieu of updating its mandatory notices, Petitioner may file a reply brief.” Order 3 (emphasis added). In other words, the Order does not state “Petitioner must file a reply brief,” as Petitioner’s argument would have us believe. The Order further provides:” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for patent owner
“We entered a decision denying institution (Paper 25, “DDI”), in which we explained that Petitioner failed to persuade us that Olympus was not an RPI. DDI 14.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,635,957 - Fasteners For Retail, Inc. v. RTC Industries, Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 15, 2018 · IPR2018-00743 · APJ Michael L Woods · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Fasteners for Retail’s rehearing request and left institution denied because it failed to identify Olympus as a real party in interest.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“Petitioner’s argument is without merit because it mischaracterizes our Order. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion (Request 5), our Order does not “instruct” or “direct” Petitioner to file a reply brief if it believes Olympus is not an unnamed RPI. Rather, our Order explicitly provides that if “Petitioner does not believe that Olympus is an unnamed real party in interest, in lieu of updating its mandatory notices, Petitioner may file a reply brief.” Order 3 (emphasis added). In other words, the Order does not state “Petitioner must file a reply brief,” as Petitioner’s argument would have us believe. The Order further provides: ORDERED that within 7 days of the entry of this Order, Petitioner may amend its mandatory notices to name other parties, including Olympus as a real party in interest in each [proceeding] . . . FURTHER ORDERED that in lieu of updating its mandatory notices, Petitioner may file a 7-page reply brief to address Patent Owner’s RPI arguments in each [proceeding].” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityInstitution denied rpiDecided for patent owner
“We entered a decision denying institution (Paper 25, “DDI”), in which we explained that Petitioner failed to persuade us that Olympus was not an RPI. DDI 14.” slip op. at 2
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,504,321
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.