- Forte Biosciences, Inc. v. University Of MassachusettsAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · PGR2023-00014 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable for lack of written description and enablement under § 112(a); the Board did not reach the § 103 challenge.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition, except to modify the level such that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have been familiar with well-known inhibitors of IL-15 and IL-15R as described in the ’505 patent and recognized in the art as of April 2017.” Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 94). We adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art with Patent Owner’s proposed modification because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’505 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“this stage of the proceeding and that all terms are to given their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 23; Resp. 38. We agree. Construction is needed only for those terms “that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Here, we determine that no claim construction is necessary.” slip op. at 8
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“Finally, we are reminded that “a sufficient description of the genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350. “[F]unctional claim language can meet the written description requirement when the art has established a correlation between structure and function.” Id. Here, however, the challenged claims are directed to methods using a wide range of different types of compounds purported to be “IL-15/IL-15R inhibitors” that are not part of a known or readily identifiable class, do not target the same biological pathway, do not have any common structural features, and do not appear to always function as inhibitors. See Ex. 1018, Abstr., 1575–77, 1579; Ex. 1046, 189:4–19, 191:15–192:15, 193:18–196:22, 198:21–199:21, 197:12–198:19, 200:1–8, 207:11–14, 203:3–10, 207:15–21, 236:12–24; Ex. 1047 ¶¶ 19–23, 56, 63–64, 80–85. Therefore, we find there is neither a representative number of species disclosed, nor a sufficient” slip op. at 21
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable
“598 U.S. at 610. A “specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a patented invention. What is reasonable in any case will depend on the nature of the invention and the underlying art.” Id. at 613. But the person of ordinary skill in the art cannot be left with merely “a hunting license” or obligated to engage in “painstaking experimentation” or “trial and error” to “see what works.” Id. at 614. Patent Owner argues that “the IL-15/IL-15R inhibitors disclosed in the specification were known in the art and “share the common ‘general quality’ of inhibiting a pathway known to be relevant to and having ‘particular fitness for the particular purposes’ of (id.) treating certain autoimmune diseases by blocking IL-15 signaling.” Sur-reply 14 (citing Ex. 1011, 22; Ex. 2013, 3; Ex. 2017, Abstr.; Ex. 2024, 17; Ex. 2025, 2–3, 6; Ex. 2027, 4; Ex. 2028, 9; Ex. 2029, 4; Ex. 2031, 23; Ex. 2118, 53:22–54:9; Ex. 1018, 1; Ex. 2005, ¶¶ 52–63, 80–83, 130; Ex. 1046, 231:20–25). Patent Owner’s argument is unavailing, however, because the record shows that different IL-15-specific inhibitors may operate in different ways that may result in differential effects, some of which may not include inhibition at all. See Ex. 1047 ¶¶21, 23, 40, 71; Ex. 1018, Abstr., 1576, 1579; Ex. 2013, 4:1– 8; Ex. 2014, 4:9–15; Ex. 2015 ¶ 22; Ex. 2025, 4:34–5:2; Ex. 1046, 166:21– 24, 168:25–169:5, 207:23–209:22, 210:4–17, 210:24–211:6; Ex. 1011, 1:67–2:4; Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 116, 134. Thus, we find that the record supports Drs. Abbas and Plott’s testimony, which we credit, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be forced to hunt down and test every compound through painstaking Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 85–90, 92; Ex. 1047 ¶ 53 (Dr. Plott’s testimony that the “specification of the ’505 patent is essentially a black box (so far as which aspects of IL-15 signaling it inhibits and how it operates), leaving the reader to guess through trial and error which molecules might operate similarly to ChMBC7 and which do not.”); Ex. 1004 ¶ 61 (Dr. Plott’s testimony that “from the perspective of a clinician, the amount of experimentation required would be extremely burdensome and success would be speculative.”); Ex. 2007, 93:16–97:25, 38:208; Ex. 1046, 234:20–236:11. This is due to the fact that the claims (without limit) encompass any inhibition of any one of the various types of IL-15 signaling and various versions of the receptor, and even implicate other compounds that act on different targets but which inhibit the IL-15 signaling pathway. See Ex. 1047 ¶¶ 10, 53, 68; Ex. 2005 ¶ 71; Ex. 1046, 254:4–255:11, 158:12–160:20. The evidence has shown that IL-15/IL-15R inhibition is complicated and unpredictable, with some inhibitors also capable of enhancing forms of IL-15 signaling rather than preventing it. See Ex. 1047 ¶¶ 10, 25–26, 53; Ex. 2013, 2:10–18; Ex. 2014, 2:12–20; Ex. 2015 ¶ 3; Ex. 2025, 2:10–18; Ex. 2078, 267.” slip op. at 32
Patent outcomesUS 11,278,505 unpatentableClaim construction§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,278,505 - PTAB · Mar 19, 2024 · PGR2022-00052 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · PGR · Final written decision
The Board cancelled claims 1–27 and denied substitute claims 28–51 because the original disclosure lacked written-description support for the claimed CSP limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with the exclusion of “at least” because it introduces ambiguity. Inst. Dec. 8. Patent Owner “does not dispute the Board’s findings on the qualifications of a POSA [person of ordinary skill in the art] for purposes of this proceeding.” See RMTA 13. We determine that Petitioner’s definition, with the exclusion of “at least,” is consistent with the prior art of record and the skill reflected in the Specification of the ’034 patent and we use this level of skill here in the evaluation of the Revised Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner argues that “claim construction is not necessary” and that “the meaning of the claims would be easily understood by a POSA.” RMTA 13. In the Petition, Petitioner proposed constructions for the terms “client device” and “first server,” and the original claims were rendered obvious under this construction. Pet. 23–27. Petitioner does not assert that the substitute claims of the Revised Motion to Amend are anticipated or rendered obvious by prior art or are patent ineligible. See generally RMTA Opp. Nor does Petitioner’s patentability challenge of the substitute claims contend that express construction is needed. See generally id. For purposes of this Decision, we determine that express claim construction is unnecessary. We need only construe terms that are necessary to resolve disputes. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 10
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDenied
“written description requirement. In re Wright, 866 F.2d 422, 425 (Fed. Cir. 1989); All Dental Prodx LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., 309 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The issue here, however, is whether the disclosure of the ’034 patent would have reasonably conveyed to a person of ordinary skill that the inventors had possession of the CSP Limitations. Ariad, 598” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part
“to cancelling claims 1–27; and deny-in-part the Motion to Amend as to proposed substitute claims 28–51. In summary: Motion to Amend Outcome Claim(s) Original Claims Cancelled by Amendment 1–27 Substitute Claims Proposed in the Amendment 28–51 Substitute Claims: Motion to Amend Granted Substitute Claims: Motion to Amend Denied” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,272,034 - PTAB · Mar 14, 2024 · PGR2022-00061 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · PGR · Final written decision
The Board granted Patent Owner’s non-contingent motion to amend, cancelling claims 1–34 and replacing them with substitute claims 35–66 supported by the written description.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“complies with the legal requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 326(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.221. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4, 7–8. Specifically, Patent Owner must show that the amendments do not enlarge the scope of the claims or introduce “new matter.” See 35 U.S.C. § 326(d)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(a)(2)(ii)). Lectrosonics describes “new matter” as follows:” slip op. at 4
- 112 supportGranted
“description support for the proposed substitute claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(9); 37 C.F.R. § 42.221; Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 7–8. The written description test is met when the original disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with this argument because it is not consistent with the ’953 patent specification or the plain meaning of “replace.” Neither party requested a special construction of the term “replace.” We see no merit in Petitioner’s contention that the plain meaning of “replace” in Figure 32 does not require removal of the device being replaced. The contention that the plain meaning of “replace” does not require “removing” was explored with Petitioner’s counsel at the oral argument: THE BOARD: If you replace a player in a football game or baseball game, a new player goes in and replaces that player. You don't add a 12th, a 12th player or a 10th player to a baseball team. You replace the player that’s there with a different player. Isn’t that what replacement is all about? COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER: Your Honor, in that context, it absolutely is. Because there’s no other way to understand that. You know, but we’re not talking about baseball or people here obviously. Hearing Tr. 18:23–19:3 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 15
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 11,349,953 - Ironsource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 12, 2024 · PGR2022-00053 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable under collateral estoppel; revised substitute claims 23–37 are allowed because Petitioner did not prove them unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableDecided for petitioner
“The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show: (1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) [the party against who collateral estoppel is being asserted] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. Google, 54 F.4th at 1381 (quoting In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Collateral estoppel may also operate to bar re-litigation of common issues in actions involving different but related patents. Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 98 F.3d 1328, 1329–32 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). We are persuaded that each of the four Google requirements is satisfied and, accordingly, agree with Petitioner that the challenged claims of the ’256 patent are unpatentable in light of our Final Written Decision in PGR2021-00096.” slip op. at 13
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable
“specific requirements of the claims.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). But “failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims” is what Petitioner’s analysis of the claim limitations appears to do. Petitioner’s argument that “the focus of the claims” is captured by a single claim element (f3) not only ignores that that limitation recites performing two specific software tasks simultaneously—which we are not persuaded is an abstract idea—but also asks us to disregard multiple technical aspects recited in the claims, such as identifying a link, determining whether an installation client is available on the device, invoking the installation client, and redirecting to the device an app store. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:12–41; Revised MTA 24–25. That is, under Step 2A of the Guidance, we are neither persuaded that limitation f3, which Petitioner points us to, recites an abstract idea (Prong 1), nor that the other limitations recited in the independent claims fail to integrate the alleged abstract idea into a practical application (Prong 2). Petitioner characterizes the claims as directed to multitasking, which Petitioner describes as an example applied to improve a user experience, i.e., as related to organizing human activity. Pet. 29. Although the Guidance recognizes certain methods of organizing human activity, including certain activity between a person and a computer, as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we are not persuaded that the claims here fall within the scope of such activity. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions, and managing personal behavior or relationships as organizing human activity). The claimed invention may result in multitasking on the device, but the background instead of directing the user to an app store, thereby maintaining user experience with the foreground application, and do not recite an abstract idea. And although that process does result in improving user experience, the claims recite more than that mere result; they recite specific steps—invoking, without exiting the foreground software application, the installation client for downloading and installing applications on the device to run in the background—that accomplish the desired result. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding a method that employs a new kind of file in a computer security system directed to a non-abstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea of computer security writ large). Petitioner thus fails to establish sufficiently that the claims are directed patent ineligible subject matter under Step 2A of the Guidance.” slip op. at 52
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“When the application package 172 has been received by the client system 130, the App Manager 180 may extract or retrieve a set of requested permissions 174 from the application package 172, and present a request to the user for asking for approval to perform operations corresponding to the requested permissions, e.g., opening files, accessing contact information, accessing a camera on the client device 130, and so on. . . . In particular embodiments, when the requested permissions 174 have been requested, and a response specifying a set of accepted permissions 176 has been received from the user, the set of accepted permissions 176 may be compared to the set of requested permissions 174. If the sets are the same, then the installation process may continue, and the App Manager 180 may invoke an installer 182 to install the application package 172. Ex. 1003, 8:67–9:22 (emphasis added). That is, the set of permissions to be checked are obtained by the App Manager once the download of the application package to be installed is initiated. See id. at 8:59–61 (“when the download is initiated by a request sent from the client system 130 to the server 162, the server 162 may send the requested object, e.g., the download page 168 or the application package 172, back to the client system 130”). And these permissions relate to operations that the installed applications may perform, e.g., opening files, accessing contact information, accessing a camera on the client device. Id. at 9:6–7. These permissions may also indirectly determine whether the installation client can install that app. See id. at 9:33–38. There is no suggestion in Pasha, however, that these permissions have anything to do with the host application, i.e., the second software application. said second software application is eligible to use capabilities of the installation client.” RMTA 25; see also Ex. 1001, 15:11–14 (“The installation client, upon receiving an instant install link, checks the eligibility of the caller and if identified as eligible continues the process of downloading the app.”). Pasha does not teach or suggest checking eligibility of its host application in any way or at any point. Moreover, as Patent Owner points out, Pasha’s App Manager performs the eligibility check after it downloads the app package, further supporting that Pasha’s eligibility check has nothing to do with the host application.9 Dr. Almeroth testifies that “Pasha discloses the App Manager 180 confirming that it has obtained the required permissions, which, in [his] opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand may include inter alia that the ‘second software application’ (e.g., the host application invoking the app manager) is eligible to use its capabilities.” Ex. 1035 ¶ 68. Dr. Almeroth fails to cite any supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Id. Because we find no basis in the record for Dr. Almeroth’s conclusion, we give little weight to this testimony.” slip op. at 40
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Dr. Almeroth testifies that “Pasha discloses the App Manager 180 confirming that it has obtained the required permissions, which, in [his] opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand may include inter alia that the ‘second software application’ (e.g., the host application invoking the app manager) is eligible to use its capabilities.” Ex. 1035 ¶ 68. Dr. Almeroth fails to cite any supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Id. Because we find no basis in the record for Dr. Almeroth’s conclusion, we give little weight to this testimony. 9 During oral argument, Petitioner pointed us to disclosure in Pasha that teaches that the permission dialog may be displayed to the user at different points in the download process. Tr. 47:24–48:8 (citing Ex. 1003, 22:21–42). As Patent Owner pointed out, this disclosure was not relied up on by Petitioner in its papers and is new evidence. Id. at 51:19–22; Paper 46, 4. Petitioner’s argument based on this new evidence is therefore forfeited. But even if we were to consider the cited disclosure from Pasha, it still only suggests that permissions need to come from the server after the download process has been initiated, and are therefore, unrelated to the host application. See Ex. 1003, 22:46–49 (“the requested permissions may be downloaded prior to downloading the application or may be extracted from the application package”). 24, 2022) (precedential) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)). As the Board explained in Xerox, such expert testimony “is particularly problematic in cases where, like here, expert testimony is offered not simply to provide a motivation to combine prior-art teachings, but rather to supply a limitation missing from the prior art.” Id. (citing Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple, Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 11,157,256 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Berkheimer · Enfish · PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,157,256 - PTAB · Jan 31, 2024 · PGR2023-00043 · APJ Tina E Hulse · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR of claims 1–22 on all petitioned grounds, finding at least one claim more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), which provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . ., if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon considering the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the Petition is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Although Patent Owner’s definition of a POSA includes an additional four to six years of experience, we do not discern a substantive difference between the parties’ respective definitions for purposes of our analysis. Both definitions provide for a highly skilled POSA with experience in formulating drugs, and our Decision would be unchanged whether we applied Petitioner’s definition or Patent Owner’s. Nevertheless, on this record, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition as it is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art as reflected by the prior art in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). To the extent the parties dispute the level of ordinary skill and its impact on the analysis of the challenged claims, we encourage the parties to address this issue further during trial.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“We determine it is unnecessary to expressly construe any other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Because Petitioner’s construction—with Patent Owner’s addition—is consistent with the Specification, we apply that construction of “enteric capsule” in this proceeding. See Ex. 1001, 39:22–26. We also note that Patent Owner appears to construe the claim phrase “the compound of Formula (III) is (Z)-endoxifen” to be limited to the free base form of (Z)-endoxifen. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 2 (“The ’334 patent claims enteric coated capsule formulations containing at least 90% (Z)- endoxifen free base, methods of delivering such formulations to a patient resulting in specific pharmacokinetic parameters, and methods of treating hormone-dependent breast and reproductive tract disorders.”) (emphasis added). The Specification, however, expressly states “‘a compound’, such as compounds of . . . Formula (III) . . . include the polymorphic salt, free base, co-crystal, and solvate forms of the formulas and/or compounds disclosed herein.” Ex. 1001, 12:48–52; see also id. at 12:52–59 (stating “‘compounds of Formula (III)’ . . . include . . . the free base of the compounds of Formula (III), and/or the gluconate salts as described herein”). To the extent there is any dispute as to the scope of “the compound of Formula (III) is (Z)-endoxifen” in the claims, the parties should address that construction at trial. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the express definition set forth in the Specification. That is, we construe “the compound of Formula (III) is (Z)-endoxifen” to include the polymorphic salt, free base, co-crystal and solvate forms of (Z)-endoxifen. See Ex. 1001, 12:48–59.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,572,334 - Advance Medical Designs, Inc. v. Corbin Clinical Resources, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jan 23, 2024 · PGR2023-00041 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR on claims 1, 4–6, 11–13, 16–18, 23, 24, 28, and 29 under § 325(d), finding substantially the same art was previously presented and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Section 325(d), the Board uses the following two-part framework: (1) determining whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, determining whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“are defined by the claims themselves. For example, claim 1 recites “coupling the access needle to one of the plurality of needle receiving ports of the displacement member of the transperineal biopsy guide such that a position and angle of the access needle relative to the displacement member is retained.” Ex. 1001, 36:1–5 (emphasis added). Similarly, claim 13 recites “securing the access needle to the displacement member such that a position and angle of the access needle relative to the displacement member is maintained.” Id. at 36:59–61 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“Further, although Petitioner contends that BK Medical’s needle guide “maintains and stabilizes” the needle position, they provide no explanation as to how it does so and do not appear to account for forces that would move the position of the needle during insertion. Petitioner cites to testimony from their declarant, Dr. Yun, to provide support for this argument; however, Dr. Yun’s testimony is essentially a verbatim repetition of Petitioner’s argument without a discussion of how BK Medical’s needle guide provides such stability. Compare Pet. 59–60 with Ex. 1003 ¶ 107. Thus, we accord little weight to Dr. Yun’s testimony on this topic. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”); see also Xerox Corp. et al., v. Bytemark, IPR2022-00624, Paper No. 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential) (“Conclusory expert testimony “is particularly problematic in cases where, like here, expert testimony is offered not simply to provide a motivation to combine prior-art teachings, but rather to supply a limitation missing from the prior art.”).” slip op. at 31
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“V. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) Patent Owner also contends that the Board should discretionarily deny institution of the post-grant review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in view of the co-pending Maryland District Court litigation, pursuant to Fintiv. Prelim. Resp. 21–32; see Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB 20 Although we do not specifically discuss the “securing” limitation of claims 13 and 24, the same analysis would apply. 21 We also do not find the testimony of Dr. Záťura or Ex. 1009 to be relevant to the question of whether the Examiner materially erred in finding that the prior art does not teach the “coupling” limitation. Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential). Because we deny the petition under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), this argument is moot. Further, we note that Petitioner has filed a stipulation under Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 at 19 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). Pet. 112. Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memorandum”).22 Pursuant to the Director’s Memorandum, we “will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Director’s Memorandum, 7.” slip op. at 38
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,547,436 - C4 Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foghorn Therapeutics, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Jan 23, 2024 · PGR2024-00005 · APJ Jamie T Wisz · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution of PGR2024-00005 because the Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed all challenged claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentDenied
“Patent Owner has disclaimed all claims of the ’381 patent and paid the requisite fees. See Ex. 2001; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (setting forth requirements for statutory disclaimer). Accordingly, we deny institution of the requested post-grant review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); see also General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution of inter partes review under analogous rule 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) based on disclaimer) (“General Electric”). In the present instance, and consistent with Rule 42.207(e) and the Board’s precedential General Electric decision, we determine that a denial of institution is sufficient to dispose of this case. See also Kymera Therapeutics, Inc. v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Inc., PGR2021-00115, Paper 13 at 3 (PTAB March 2, 2022) (denying institution based upon disclaimer of all claims of the challenged patent); Celltrion Inc. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc., PGR2021-00117, Paper 16 at 3 (PTAB March 15, 2022) (denying institution based on disclaimer of all claims). Because the Board cannot institute trial on disclaimed claims and all the challenged claims have been disclaimed here, no post-grant review will be instituted.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied
“requisite fees. See Ex. 2001; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (setting forth requirements for statutory disclaimer). Accordingly, we deny institution of the requested post-grant review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.207(e) (“No post-grant review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); see also General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution of inter partes review under analogous rule 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) based on disclaimer) (“General Electric”). In the present instance, and consistent with Rule 42.207(e) and the Board’s precedential General Electric decision, we determine that a denial of institution is sufficient to dispose of this case. See also Kymera Therapeutics, Inc. v. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Inc., PGR2021-00115, Paper 13 at 3 (PTAB March 2, 2022) (denying institution based upon disclaimer of all claims of the challenged patent); Celltrion Inc. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc., PGR2021-00117, Paper 16 at 3 (PTAB March 15, 2022) (denying institution based on disclaimer of all claims). Because the Board cannot institute trial on disclaimed claims and all the challenged claims have been disclaimed here, no post-grant review will be instituted.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,560,381 - Danxiao Information Technology Ltd. v. Shenzhen Svakom Technology Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 19, 2024 · PGR2022-00050 · APJ Jason W Melvin · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, 14–17, 19, and 20 are anticipated; claims 3 and 13 are obvious. The revised motion to amend is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would “have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, software engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience related to development of software for distributed or networked applications.” Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 51). Patent Owner does not dispute or otherwise address Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. We adopt Petitioner’s definition, as it appears to be consistent with the ’041 patent’s description and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner asserts that no term requires construction. Pet. 13. Patent Owner agrees “that all terms in the challenged claims should be given their plain and ordinary meanings” and does not propose any constructions under that standard. PO Resp. 8. We agree that no claim term requires express construction to resolve the disputes in this proceeding. slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Patent Owner contends that the 2019 Lovense System does not disclose “receiving the interactive result and controlling said adult toy to actuate according to the interactive result” in each independent claim, in particular pointing to the “according to the interactive result” phrase. PO Resp. 18–20.7 In Patent Owner’s view, under its plain meaning, “‘according to’ means ‘in a manner corresponding or conforming to; in proportion or relation to; in accordance with.’” Id. at 18. Thus, Patent Owner submits, in the claim “the system needs to issue control instructions to the adult toy such that the adult toy exhibits different actuations in a manner corresponding or conforming to different interactive results.” Id. Addressing Petitioner’s evidence, Patent Owner contends that, in the 2019 Lovense System, 7 Throughout its arguments, Patent Owner cites to the Declaration of Mingshao Zhang. In resolving the parties’ disputes, we have considered the extent to which Dr. Zhang’s opinions lend a persuasive viewpoint to Patent Owner’s arguments. “regardless of the interactive result of the dice roll, all the toys always actuate by vibrating for 3 seconds.” Id. at 19. Petitioner responds that the 2019 Lovense System “discloses the toy vibrating for different lengths of time, and at differing vibration speeds, in response to different dice rolls.” Pet. Reply 15. We agree. As Petitioner shows, the configuration instructions state that, “[y]ou, the model, well also set a prize for each dice roll number” and show a configuration in which each roll corresponds to a different actuation time. Ex. 1009-2, 51, 52. Patent Owner focuses on Exhibit 1010-1, in which the narrator discusses configuring “what each dice roll will do” and states that, in the displayed configuration, “you can see all toys are going to vibrate for three seconds.” Ex. 1010-1, 5:10–5:11; accord id. at 4:28–4:44 (“And then I’ve just checked all toys to react for three seconds.”). But the screens depicted show without ambiguity that each distinct roll is associated with a setting for reaction time. Id. at 4:28–4:44. Thus, the system depicted in Exhibit 1010 (the video) is consistent with Exhibit 1009, the configuration instructions. Based on the foregoing, we find the software is configured to actuate the toy according to the interactive result in the 2019 Lovense System.8 Patent Owner does not otherwise contest Petitioner’s anticipation challenge. We have reviewed Petitioner’s assertions, agree with them, and adopt them. Pet. 28–69; Pet. Reply 14–18. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown anticipation of claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, 14–17, 19, and 20 by the 2019 Lovense System.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner challenges Petitioner’s reliance on Wiltshire, arguing that it “is not an analogous prior art to Olivares or the 2019 Video.” PO Resp. 22–23. The correct inquiry is whether Wiltshire is analogous to the ’041 patent. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Petitioner asserts that Wiltshire is “in the field of online games of chance.” Pet. Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶¶ 8, 11, 31–36). The ’041 patent states it is “directed methods and systems for interactive online adult entertainment.” Ex. 1001, 1:7–9; see Pet. Reply 20. As Petitioner’s expert points out, the ’041 patent includes “casino style games such as a ‘dice game’ and a ‘lottery game.’” Ex. 1020 ¶ 8 (citing Ex. 1001, Fig. 4). Petitioner’s expert also identifies that Wiltshire discloses “dice games (e.g., craps) and lottery games (e.g., keno), in addition to many other casino style games.” Id. (citing Ex. 1011, 1:25–45). We conclude that Petitioner has shown Wiltshire is in the same field as the ’041 patent and, at a minimum, reasonably pertinent to problems addressed in the ’041 patent. Namely, both the ’041 patent and Wiltshire address providing online versions of casino-style games. Thus, we find that Wiltshire is analogous art to the ’041 patent.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 11,134,041 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 11,134,041 - Life Vac, LLC v. Dcstar Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Nov 29, 2023 · PGR2023-00032 · APJ Michael L Woods · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show that claims 1–17 were more likely than not unpatentable over Lih, Tarrats, and da Costa or anticipated by Lih.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“institute an post-grant review if “the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that the Petition fails to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the Challenged Claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we deny institution of post-grant review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s proposed definitions are similar, with a primary difference being that Petitioner’s definition more broadly includes people having experience with “medical devices in general.” Compare Pet. 18–19, with Prelim. Resp. 6–7. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s standard is “unreasonably broad,” arguing that Patent Owner’s definition for a skilled artisan “more reasonably focuses on the nature of the subject invention.” Prelim. Resp. 7. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. We are not persuaded that a skilled artisan would have necessarily required experience with respiratory devices, as Patent Owner proposes. See Prelim. Resp. 6–7. We find Petitioner’s definition, which would include “a mechanical or biomedical engineer with at least 5 years of experience in designing or developing medical devices in general,” is consistent with the ’575 patent and the asserted prior art. Pet. 18–19; see Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner expressly construes “bottom plate” and “check valve.” See Pet. 20–21. Patent Owner proposes a construction for “bottom plate,” “check valve,” and “connector.” Prelim Resp. 8–11. For purposes of this Decision, we need not and do not formally construe any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Each of the Challenged Claims requires a connector with a “bottom plate,” yet Petitioner fails to explain how the combined references would yield a connector with such a plate. See Prelim. Resp. 30–33 (arguing the same); see also Ex. 1001, 10:14–17 (independent claim 1), 10:46 (independent claim 3), 11:63 (independent claim 9); 12:35–36 (independent claim 13). Neither of Lih’s connector (element 118, Fig. 3) nor Tarrats’s “connector” (element 15, Fig. 1) has a “plate,” and Petitioner fails to explain how the lower surface of da Costa’s piston is being used to modify Lih’s or Tarrats’s connector to satisfy the claimed structure. See 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(b)(5); see also Pet. 28–29. Further, Petitioner relies on da Costa’s heart resuscitating device, rather than its dechoking device, in modifying Lih. See Pet. 29 (citing da Costa’s Figure 6 and relief valves 55, 56). da Costa’s heart resuscitation device, however, is used for pumping air into a patient’s lungs for the purpose of initiating blood circulation in the event the patient’s heart stopped working. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 6:43–52. The pressure relief valves cited by Petitioner are presumably used to prevent over-pressurizing and under-pressurizing the patient’s lungs, which we understand would be dangerous for the patient. We do not see a skilled artisan as incorporating da Costa’s pressure relief valves into Lih’s choking intervention device, which is structured to prevent pumping air into a patient. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 4:3–5 (“bellows assembly 102 may include a relief valve 108 configured to allow air to escape . . . when the bellows 104 is being compressed”). Petitioner explains that the combination would “avoid pushing the obstruction farther into the user’s airway while in use and to initiate blood circulation” (see Pet. 29), yet Lih’s valve 108 already “avoid[s] pushing the obstruction farther into the user’s airway” and “initiat[ing] blood circulation” benefits a heart-resuscitation device, not Lih’s dechoking device. Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that the proposed combination lacks sufficient reasoning. See Prelim. Resp. 33–37. We further agree with Patent Owner that modifying Lih’s device so that it pumps air into a patient’s lungs for the purpose of “initiating blood circulation,” as reasoned by Petitioner (see Pet. 29), would render Lih’s device unsuitable as a dechoking device, which is its intended purpose. See Prelim. Resp. 37–38 (arguing the same). To reiterate, Lih’s dechoking device avoids introducing air into the patient’s lungs, which would further lodge an obstruction in the patient’s trachea. See Ex. 1004, 4:3–5.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 11,478,575 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Memoryweb, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 16, 2023 · PGR2022-00034 · APJ Kevin C Trock · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–34 are unpatentable: claims 1–25 and 27–34 over Pogue and Engst, and claim 26 over Pogue, Engst, and Ripps.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“Cir. 1986)) for its point is also misplaced. In re Hall stands for a different proposition, one which states that “competent evidence of the general library practice may be relied upon to establish an approximate time when a thesis became accessible.” Id. at 781 F.2d at 898. Although Pogue and Engst are not doctoral theses, the principal espoused in In re Hall is still applicable here. Ms. Munford’s testimony provides competent evidence of general library practices which can be relied upon to establish an approximate time when a printed publication became publicly accessible. Accordingly, we credit Ms. Munford’s testimony on general library practices and accept her testimony as credible that Pogue was made available to the public by the Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh shortly after acquiring it on January 21, 2009, and that Engst was made available to the public by the Illinois State University Library shortly after acquiring it on May 25, 2009. Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 8–13.” slip op. at 35
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“determination in this case. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibits 1030–1033 is denied as moot.” slip op. at 100
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“d) Conclusion on Independent Claims 1 and 29 We have considered the evidence and arguments with respect to” slip op. at 86
Patent outcomesUS 11,163,823 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,163,823
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.