• Thermaltake Technology Co., Ltd. / Thermaltake Inc. v. Chien-Hao ChenAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 17, 2026 · IPR2024-01230 · APJ Andreas Baltatzis · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5 are unpatentable; substitute claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable, and the Revised Motion to Amend is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “our Institution Decision comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ’336 patent and the prior art of record. Inst. Dec. 15. Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill discussed in our Institution Decision. C.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Pharms. Inc. v. Amino Chemicals Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Accordingly, Patent Owner applies a different definition of “side,” in claim 1’s recitation of “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at top of the body,” to that definition used to understand “side[s] of the body,” discussed above. Specifically, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s dictionary definition of “side,” including “an area next to something” applies to “an illumination area on at least two sides of the fan at the top of the body.” See id. at 8–9.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “Hasegawa, and Huang teaches or suggests the limitations of claim 3, and that one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine those teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 136– 140; Ex. 1008, 8:4–15, 3:20–29. Accordingly, we determine that claim 3 would have been obvious over Lai and Huang, or Lai, Hasegawa, and Huang. F.” slip op. at 50

  • 112 supportMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “c) Conclusion We conclude that Patent Owner's Revised Motion to Amend adds new” slip op. at 90

  Patent outcomesUS 10,690,336 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,690,336
• Dr. Squatch, LLC v. The Procter & Gamble CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 28, 2026 · IPR2024-01173 · APJ Susan L C Mitchell · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 9–13, and 16–19 are unpatentable: claims 16–17 are anticipated by Lesniak, and the remaining challenged claims are obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “argument that the Lesniak fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 8 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32).” slip op. at 22

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “POSITA”) at the time of the invention “would have (1) at least a B.S. or equivalent degree; and (2) at least two years of experience in cosmetics formulations.” Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–28). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal about the POSA’s qualifications. See generally PO Resp. We adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSA, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that the preamble of independent claim 1 reciting “a deodorant stick” is limiting” as it provides antecedent basis for certain other claim elements, specifically, for the recitation of “said deodorant stick being free of an aluminum salt” and “said deodorant stick” having a particular hardness range. PO Resp. 8–9. Patent Owner also points to dependent claims 5–8 as relying on the preamble reciting “a deodorant stick” as antecedent basis for claim elements. Id. at 10. We agree.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We find that the evidence of record fails to support Patent Owner’s argument that the Lesniak fails to enable a stable deodorant stick. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner that Lesniak sufficiently teaches compositions with the relevant ingredients and achieves stable compositions through the use of a second wax having a melting point of 73 to 90° C. Pet. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1003, 1:39–54). For example, Lesniak’s compositions (nos. 8 and 11) that used such a second wax, namely CastorWax MP80, are disclosed as sufficiently stable. Ex. 1003, Table 2. Here, we further credit the testimony of Dr. Michniak-Kohn that secondary wax, such as castor wax, with a sufficiently high melting point. Ex. 1003, 1:39-54, 5:23-32, Table 2. Both of the compositions (nos. 8 and 11) tested by Lesniak that had such a wax passed the stability tests. Ex. 1086 ¶ 7; see also Reply 8 (“Lesniak overcame any stability issues, as it expressly discloses compositions that are ‘physically stable at high and low temperatures.’”) (citing Ex. 1003, 5:23–32). Having considered the parties’ positions and evidence of record, summarized above, we determine that Lesniak provides sufficient disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to formulate a deodorant stick within the parameters of claims 16 and 17. e) Conclusion as to Claims 16 and 17 We agree with Petitioner that “the challenged claims recite nothing more than well-known deodorant ingredients performing their conventional functions.” Pet. Reply 2. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of evidence that Lesniak anticipates claims 16 and 17.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 10,905,647 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,905,647
• 3d Diagnostix, Inc. v. Watson Guide IP, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 27, 2026 · PGR2024-00040 · APJ James A Tartal · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–7, 10, 12, 14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable under § 103, including over Llop ’126 and Sichuan, and over Llop ’126, Sichuan, and Scherer for claims 5, 6, and 12.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the earliest priority date of the ’209 patent “would at least have had a doctoral degree in dentistry and at least three to four years of experience working with guided dental surgery for installing dental implants and prostheses.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Resp. 4. Based on our review of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s uncontested definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, because it is supported by the evidence of record and consistent with the disclosure in the ’209 patent and in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “1. “drill guide” and “fixation base” Petitioner contends that the claim terms “drill guide” and “fixation base” require construction “to resolve certain of the unpatentability grounds presented.” Pet. 13–14. In particular, Petitioner proposes that “drill guide” means “drill guide made from metal or metallic alloy without traditional plastic or acrylic,” and that “fixation base” means “fixation base made from metal, metallic alloy or other strong material without traditional plastic or acrylic.” Id. According to Petitioner, the Specification “teaches that the composition of the drill guide is ‘a metal or metallic alloy,’” and provides no other alternatives. Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:35–36). Petitioner similarly alleges that “fixation base” is described as “being fabricated from a metal, metal alloy, or other strong material,” and that “traditional plastic or acrylic” is excluded in light of disclosures in a provisional application. Id. at 21–24. According to Petitioner, its proposed constructions should be adopted “based on disclaimer of claim scope in the provisional application incorporated into the [’209] patent specification.” Id. at 14–24. Patent Owner contends that we need not address the constructions proposed by Petitioner because the issues addressed by Petitioner’s proposed constructions only concern allegations of unpatentability directed to claims 11 and 13, which Patent Owner disclaimed. Resp. 4–5; Disclaimer 1. In Reply, Petitioner argues that its proposed constructions are relevant to Patent Owner’s evidence of objective indicia of non-obviousness, including the alleged nexus. Reply 18–19 n.3. In light of our analysis below, because no determination in this Decision turns on whether we adopt Petitioner’s proposed constructions of “drill guide” and “fixation base,” we find that no express construction of these terms is required. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “substitution of the word ‘enclose’ for the term ‘surround.’” Sur-reply 6. We noted in the Institution Decision that “construing the claim term ‘surround’ to mean ‘enclose’ does not further inform or clarify to a person of ordinary skill in the art what is encompassed by the claim limitation.” Dec. 15. We reach the same conclusion here on the full record and find no basis to rewrite the Challenged Claims to replace “surround” with “enclose.” To the extent Patent Owner can be understood to suggest that we import additional limitations into the claims based on the exemplary figures in the ’209 patent, we decline to do so. Regardless, given the recognition by the Parties that “surround” and “enclose” are synonymous, our determinations in this Decision would have been the same had we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed definition of “surround” to mean “enclose.” Further, with regard to the claim language “configured and dimensioned to surround at least a portion of the teeth of the patient,” Patent Owner proposes construing “a portion of the teeth” as “at least some teeth.” Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2007 ¶ 44). Patent Owner, however, offers no sufficient explanation in its Response to explain how why a “portion of the teeth” means “at least some teeth.” The Specification does not provide an explicit definition of “a portion of the teeth” and does not suggest an intention to use a meaning of the term “a portion of the teeth” that is particular to the ’209 patent. To the extent Patent Owner can be understood to imply that we should import additional limitations into the Challenged Claims based on the exemplary figures in the ’209 patent, we decline to do so. For that reason, alone, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “38; Sur-reply 9–10. First, Patent Owner argues that Sichuan is non-analogous art. Resp. 34–38. “To be considered within the prior art for purposes of the obviousness analysis, a reference must be analogous.” Circuit Check Inc. v. QXQ Inc., 795 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 11,806,209 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,806,209
• Solaris Oilfield Site Services Operating, LLC / Solaris Oilfield Site Services Personnel, LLC v. Masaba, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01179 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 are unpatentable under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Waldner, Dynatek, and additional references; the Board cancelled all challenged claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Also, to the extent Masaba relies on extrinsic expert testimony, we note that Masaba’s expert cites absolutely no support for his understanding of the claims, much less explains why we should adopt his understanding over the plain and ordinary meaning of “conveying aggregate” and “moving aggregate.” See Ex. 2004 ¶ 34. Absent supporting citations, such extrinsic testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. As such, we reject the notion that Waldner’s discharge chute member 242 is not a conveyor “for conveying aggregate” or “for moving aggregate,” as required by claim elements 1[h] and 1[i].” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree that Dr. Durham does not possess the necessary level of skill in the art to qualify as an expert in this case. Looking at the specification of the ’689 patent and the prior art of record, we think Masaba sets the bar too high. We acknowledge that one of ordinary skill in the art should have some education and/or experience in the mechanical art of conveying aggregate materials, but we do not think opining on the ’689 patent and asserted prior art necessarily requires that person to have the amount of education and experience that Masaba advocates. The ’689 patent relates generally to an “aggregate transferring system for receiving aggregate from a vehicle and elevating the aggregate to a higher vertical level for deposit into, for example, a silo.” Ex. 1001, 1:15– 18. And, as described in the ’689 patent and discussed later, the transferring system is an assembly of known types of conveyors, such as a belly-dump truck conveyor, a bucket elevator, and an articulated belt conveyor, for transferring the aggregate horizontally and vertically from a belly-dump truck to the discharge point, such as a silo. Without doubt, Dr. Durham has enough education and experience to reliably opine on the combination of known parts.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction needed

    “We reject this argument for several reasons. First, nowhere does the plain language of the claims specify how the aggregate is conveyed or moved from the conveyor extension assembly’s inlet to its outlet, be it passively by means of gravity or actively by means of a conveyor belt. Instead, the claims simply use those verbs according to their plain and ordinary meaning, which is “to transfer or deliver” or “to cause to go or pass” from one place to another. See Ex. 3001, 253 (defining “convey”), 760 (defining “move”).10 Second, the specification of the ’689 patent similarly uses these terms in a plain and ordinary sense, without ever attributing to them some sort of special meaning. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 4:9–12 (“The apparatus 10 is suitable for performing the transfer of aggregate from 10 We reference the original pagination of the dictionary in which these definitions appear. one location to another, such as, for example, from a vehicle carrying the aggregate to a silo 1 for storing the aggregate.”). The ’689 patent specification also makes clear that active conveyance of the aggregate is an option and not a requirement of the claimed invention, stating that the conveyor extension assembly “may further include a conveyor belt 150.” Ex. 1001, 10:60–66 (emphasis added). Limiting claim elements 1[h] and 1[i] to a device “for actively conveying” or “for actively moving aggregate” would improperly import limitations from the specification into the claims. Thus, based on the intrinsic evidence, we determine that claim elements 1h and 1k are properly construed to encompass passive and/or active movement of the aggregate via the conveyor extension assembly.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached

    “Owner asserts” that two claim terms—“unloader structure” and “trailer structure”—should be construed as means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), Solaris submits an express construction detailing the corresponding structure in the specification for performing the recited function of the claimed unloader and trailer structures. See id. at 24–25. Only in disputing Solaris’s Ground 3 does Masaba advocate that the claim term “trailer structure” should be construed under § 112(f), and then only in conjunction with dependent claims 3 and 21. See PO Resp. 58. As such, we address Masaba’s proposed construction in our analysis of Ground 3. We now turn to Solaris’s grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 11,780,689 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,780,689
• Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01084 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 8–18, 22–30, and 34–39 are unpatentable as obvious over Shiplacoff and over Shiplacoff combined with Nan.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner’s declarant, Loren Terveen, Ph.D., testifies that “[s]uch experience could be obtained through research and study in a graduate program or through comparable exposure through industry employment, and additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner agrees with this definition. PO Resp. 13 (citing Dec. 5). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. Also, the level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references cited, and we find it commensurate with the cited references in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “according to the Phillips standard.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner contends that under the plain language of claim 1, the “one or more criteria” is satisfied when a “movement parameter” of “the second input” is detected to be “above a movement threshold.” PO Resp. 14. Patent Owner contends that under the plain language of claim 27, the “second one or more criteria” is satisfied when “a duration parameter” of the “second input” is detected to be “above a duration threshold.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner contends that the plain language of limitations [1j] and [1k] requires an operation capable of detecting a second input by a second contact that includes movement across a display in a direction, determining whether the second input meets or does not meet the recited criteria, and triggers performance of each of the corresponding display actions as appropriate. Id. at 15–19. Patent Owner 15. Id. at 21–23. Patent Owner contends that the plain language of limitations [27d]–[27f] recited in claim 27 require an operation that enables the device to detect a second input by a second contact that includes movement across the display in a direction, determine whether the second input meets or does not meet the two recited criteria, and trigger performance of each of the recited display actions as appropriate. Id. at 19– 20. Patent Owner contends that for “the second input” recited in limitations [1j] and [1k], “the second input” must be detected in the same operational context. Id. at 23–24. In particular, Patent Owner contends that limitations [1j] and [1k], and similar limitations recited in claims 15 and 27, “require a single, common contact event as the starting point of the claimed logic operations.” Id. at 24; see id. at 25–26. We do not need to determine whether Patent Owner’s proposed constructions are correct, because under either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s proposed constructions, we find that the prior art would have rendered all challenged claims obvious as discussed below in our patentability analysis.” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “at 418; see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is . . . a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Patent Owner’s contention and the supporting testimony of Dr. Madisetti does not address Shiplacoff’s teaching of using a gesture, such as Shiplacoff’s flick gesture, to return to launch screen. We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen in finding that Shiplacoff’s disclosure that “returning to the launch screen . . . is performed by performing a gesture” (Ex. 1004 ¶ 99) such as a flicking gesture (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 126, 129; Ex. 1023 ¶ 13) teaches using a flicking gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. See Pet. 16, 22–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53, 59; Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Reply 7–10. Because Dr. Terveen’s testimony is consistent with and supported by the teachings of Shiplacoff as a whole (in contrast to that of Dr. Madisetti), we credit the testimony of Dr. Terveen in finding that using a gesture to return from home screen to launch screen as taught by Shiplacoff, where the gesture is a flick gesture as taught by Shiplacoff, yields the predictable result of using a flick gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “articulate why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Shiplacoff’s flicking gesture to switch from full screen mode to the launch screen. PO Resp. 47–49. Petitioner contends that Shiplacoff’s swipe up gesture teaches limitation [1j] by including a movement parameter above a movement threshold. Pet. 17–23. Petitioner contends that Shiplacoff teaches that a user can perform another gesture to return to the home screen. Id. at 23. Petitioner contends that when a gesture different from the swipe up gesture is used to return to the home screen, a person of ordinary skill would have used a flicking gesture because the flicking gesture has a different movement parameter than the swipe up gesture, namely, a movement parameter that does not meet the movement threshold. Pet. 23– 24 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 99–102, 167; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–61). We agree with Petitioner for the reasons given in the Petition and as discussed above. We reiterate that using a gesture to return from home screen to launch screen as taught by Shiplacoff, where the gesture is a flicking gesture as taught by Shiplacoff, yields the predictable result of using a flicking gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that Shiplacoff teaches away from using the flicking gesture to switch from full screen mode to the launch screen because, according to Patent Owner, Shiplacoff already uses the flick gesture to perform scrolling in full screen mode. PO Resp. 49–52 the same gesture in a given mode can be assigned to different functions depending on where, when, and how the gesture is input by the user, as discussed above. Reply 11–12 (discussing Shiplacoff’s teaching of associating the same tap gesture with different functions depending on where the tap occurs), 13–14 (discussing Duarte’s teaching of associating both a drag gesture and a scrolling gesture to the same mode). Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 16–19. We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen, that based on the teachings of Shiplacoff (and, by incorporation, Duarte), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that a flick started in area 102 or near an edge of screen 101 and continuing onto screen 101 would be distinguished from a flick entirely within screen 101 based on location, and would perform a different function. Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 18–19. We also agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen, that Duarte teaches associating a gesture with one function when a modifier key is not pressed, and associating the same gesture with a different function when the modifier key is pressed, such that a flick performed when the key is not pressed would perform one function such as scrolling and a flick performed when the key is pressed would perform another, such as changing the display mode. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 64; Ex. 1023 ¶ 20). We agree with Petitioner that Shiplacoff does not teach away from using a flicking gesture to change from full screen mode to home screen because it “does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.” Reply 10 (quoting Depuy Spine, 567 F.3d at1327).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,649,578 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,649,578
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 22, 2026 · IPR2024-01093 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 are unpatentable: claims 1–13 and 15–16 on anticipation and obviousness grounds, and claim 14 on obviousness over Choulis.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention of the ’164 patent would have had a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, or a comparable field of study, and at least three years of research or industrial experience with organic optoelectronic light-emitting devices. An individual with additional education could have less research or industrial experience and vice versa. Pet. 12. Patent Owner repeatedly refers to “a POSITA” without addressing the definition of that term or contesting Petitioner’s proposed definition. See Resp. 1, 2 n.1, 3, 8, 9, 15–21, 23, 26, 29, 32–33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44–49, 51–57, 61, 62 (bare references to “a POSITA”). Neither party indicates that the ultimate result on patentability would change depending on the definition selected. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition, which is not contested, because it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art. See Ex. 1004, (code 57); Ex. 1006, code (57); Ex. 1008, code (57); Ex. 1009, code (57) (abstracts of the references asserted in the patentability challenges).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “because no information raised during the trial phase of this review changes the calculus: First and foremost, the plain terms of claim 1 include no language from which we reasonably can impose limits on the phrase “matrix material” as urged by Patent Owner. In addition, the specification includes no special definition of that phrase that supports importing Patent Owner’s proposed narrowing limitation into the claim. Furthermore, we are directed to no disclaimer of claim scope during patent prosecution that would support Patent Owner’s twice-rejected argument that the phrase “matrix material” in claim 1 excludes embedded dopants and dispersed agglomerations. And the extrinsic evidence advanced by Patent Owner during this review is ineffective to override the clear interpretation of “matrix material” that is established by the intrinsic evidence. Reply 1–7.10” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “We find that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. We agree with Petitioner, in that regard, that Choulis explicitly teaches “using spin-coating as a method for depositing materials, which involves a simultaneous application process” as required by claim 13. Reply 16 (citing Pet. 40–41; Ex. 1044 ¶ 45).16 We 15 Petitioner raises Djobo as a background reference supporting that Choulis anticipates deposition of PVK by evaporation. Pet. 41. Patent Owner counters that Djobo, to the contrary, shows that Choulis does not teach deposition of PVK by evaporation. Resp. 48. In other words, both parties cite Djobo in connection with the ground based on anticipation by Choulis. Against that backdrop, we determine that Patent Owner waives any argument that Petitioner improperly cites Djobo as a background reference in support of the anticipation challenge, which is based on Choulis alone. Resp. 48 (nowhere asserting that the challenge is deficient on that basis). That waiver arises because no argument, in that regard, is raised in Patent Owner’s Response see Inst. Dec. 34 (“The Board shall deemed waived any issue not raised by Patent Owner in a timely response to the Petition . . . .”). 16 Patent Owner’s statement that “spin coating tends to cause phase separation” is not developed adequately on this record and, therefore, is further agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner “has not contested this point.” Resp. 48. “Therefore, there is no genuine dispute regarding the unpatentability of claim 13,” although Patent Owner raises “arguments concerning evaporation, which is a distinct process from spin-coating” relevant to the additional limitations of claim 14. Reply 16. We determine that Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 13. Patent Owner, however, has the better position on whether Choulis anticipates claim 14, which “includes the requirement of applying matrix materials via evaporation coating.” Reply 16. Petitioner seems to abandon that challenge in the Reply by raising arguments that appear, on this record, to bear exclusively on whether the subject matter of claim 14 would have been obvious over Choulis.17 Id. at 16–17. Those arguments are insufficient to counter Patent Owner’s reasons why Choulis does not anticipate the “evaporation coating” limitation of claim 14. Compare id., with Resp. 48. On this record, therefore, we determine that Petitioner does not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Choulis anticipates claim 14. unpersuasive to persuade us “that Choulis does not have three matrix materials.” Sur-reply 15. That argument runs counter to Choulis’s explicit, intrinsic disclosures, which illustrate (Ex. 1004, Fig. 4) and describe (id. ¶ 30) an organic light emitting layer composed of three matrix materials. See Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1004, Fig. 4, ¶ 30); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–88 (persuasive declaration testimony of Dr. Holmes, cited at Pet. 24–25). 17 There is some confusion on this point, given that both parties sometimes collapse, into a single argument, whether Choulis anticipates or renders obvious claim 1. Compare Resp. 48, with Reply 16–17.” slip op. at 35

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “On this record, therefore, we determine that Choulis, at minimum, suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have recognized PMMA as a suitable alternative to PVK in Choulis’s Figure 4 embodiment, notwithstanding any differences raised by Patent Owner. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. Patent Owner’s argument that no disclosure in Choulis suggests that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have found it desirable to use PMMA in place of PVK in Choulis’s devices” misses the mark, where Choulis includes both PMMA and PVK in lists of materials suitable for use as host or matrix materials. Resp. 38; Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. “Our caselaw is clear. It’s not necessary to show that a combination is ‘the best option, only that it is a suitable option.’” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Even if Choulis does not expressly disclose substituting PMMA for PVK in the Figure 4 embodiment, “an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to make that substitution.” Reply 10 (citing Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 100; Ex. 1044 ¶ 23)). The suggestion for that substitution is set forth unambiguously in Choulis’s listing of both “PVK” and “PMMA” as materials suitable for use as a first “host” material in Choulis’s organic functional layer; that is, “the light emitting layer” that is “described above” in Figure 4. Ex. 1004 ¶ 44. ii. Alternative Reasoning for Replacing PVK with PMMA Patent Owner counterargues that using PPMA in place of PVK would have been understood to “upset the hole and electron balance,” as well as “affect hole-charge recombination,” and “degrade the performance of the resulting OLED system.” Resp. 37. Petitioner responds with evidence that “it would have been a routine task for” an ordinarily skilled artisan “to optimize the composition of each component within the light-emitting layer to achieve the desired charge balance.” Reply 11 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 24). Petitioner’s response brings to light a second reason why an ordinarily” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 8,723,164 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,723,164
• Universal Electronics, Inc. / Gemstar Technology (Qinzhou) Co. Ltd. et al. v. ROKU, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 21, 2026 · IPR2022-00818 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claim 11 unpatentable under §103 over Wouters and Verzulli because Wouters’s fixer saves the combined codeset for reinstallation.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “We agree with Petitioner that the above-quoted paragraph of Wouters teaches “combining . . . correct working codes from the scanned remote control code-sets into a new custom configuration code set” using Wouters’s “fixer,” which combines the codes into a custom codeset, gives it a name, such as “user1,” and stores it in a memory (the “RC code set data base”). See Pet. Reply 2; Ex. 1009, 10:18–20. This custom codeset includes a combination of the working codes previously tested and installed by the user. Ex. 1009, 10:18–20. We also find that the above-quoted paragraph of Wouters teaches “installing . . . the combined correct working codes of the new custom configuration code set for use by the remote control.” Specifically, Wouters teaches that, when the remote control’s batteries die, “the user may easily reinstall the chosen code set by choosing ‘user1’ from the proposed list or immediately selecting ‘user1.’” Ex. 1009, 10:20–22 (emphasis added). This reinstallation is of the combined correct working codes of a new custom configuration codeset previously stored and named by the fixer, such as the “user1” codeset. Id. at 10:20–24. We find that Wouters’s “reinstallation” of the chosen code set (e.g., the “user1” codeset) is an “installation” of that codeset. The claim merely recites “installing” the codeset, and does not distinguish between an initial installation and a re-installation, such as after the batteries of the remote control die. Ex. 1001, 10:45. Patent Owner also does not point to anything in the ’875 patent Specification or the other intrinsic evidence that would limit the “installing” in limitation 11[e] to an initial installation, or that would exclude a re-installation after the remote control’s batteries die. Consequently, we find that Wouters’s reinstallation of the codeset after the batteries die is an “install[ation]” as required by limitation 11[e]. We further agree with Petitioner that the Wouters-Verzulli combination discloses that these operations would be performed using a processor and memory, which Patent Owner does not appear to dispute. FWD 52; Pet. 24–27, 37; PO” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “Additionally, the obviousness inquiry typically requires an analysis of “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)); see In re Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc., 832 F.3d 1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that the above-quoted paragraph of Wouters teaches “combining . . . correct working codes from the scanned remote control code-sets into a new custom configuration code set” using Wouters’s “fixer,” which combines the codes into a custom codeset, gives it a name, such as “user1,” and stores it in a memory (the “RC code set data base”). See Pet. Reply 2; Ex. 1009, 10:18–20. This custom codeset includes a combination of the working codes previously tested and installed by the user. Ex. 1009, 10:18–20. We also find that the above-quoted paragraph of Wouters teaches “installing . . . the combined correct working codes of the new custom configuration code set for use by the remote control.” Specifically, Wouters teaches that, when the remote control’s batteries die, “the user may easily reinstall the chosen code set by choosing ‘user1’ from the proposed list or immediately selecting ‘user1.’” Ex. 1009, 10:20–22 (emphasis added). This reinstallation is of the combined correct working codes of a new custom configuration codeset previously stored and named by the fixer, such as the “user1” codeset. Id. at 10:20–24. We find that Wouters’s “reinstallation” of the chosen code set (e.g., the “user1” codeset) is an “installation” of that codeset. The claim merely recites “installing” the codeset, and does not distinguish between an initial installation and a re-installation, such as after the batteries of the remote control die. Ex. 1001, 10:45. Patent Owner also does not point to anything in the ’875 patent Specification or the other intrinsic evidence that would limit the “installing” in limitation 11[e] to an initial installation, or that would exclude a re-installation after the remote control’s batteries die. Consequently, we find that Wouters’s reinstallation of the codeset after the batteries die is an “install[ation]” as required by limitation 11[e]. We further agree with Petitioner that the Wouters-Verzulli combination discloses that these operations would be performed using a processor and memory, which Patent Owner does not appear to dispute. FWD 52; Pet. 24–27, 37; PO” slip op. at 20

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “We also find that Petitioner has not forfeited its argument that Wouters’s fixer and reinstallation functionality satisfies limitation 11[e]. The Petition pointed to Wouters’s “fixer” for limitation 11[e], and cited Dr. Houh’s Declaration specifically identifying and quoting Wouters’s disclosure of reinstallation at page 10, lines 14 through 24. Pet. 35 (quoting Ex. 1009, 10:14–20) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 167); Ex. 1003 ¶ 167 (quoting Ex. 1009, 10:14–24). We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the Petition and its cited evidence (including paragraph 167 of Dr. Houh’s first Declaration) would be apprised that Petitioner was relying on the portion of Wouters describing the “fixer” and reinstallation functionality.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,378,875 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,378,875
• Facebook, Inc. / SAP America, Inc. et al. v. Express Mobile, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2022-00572 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 6 are unpatentable under §103 because the prior-art combinations teach the limitations at issue under the Federal Circuit’s construction of “style.”

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. Lemay Web discloses that the style settings of width, height, pause, and repeat for the pocket watch images can be changed by changing the values for width, height, pause, and repeat in the HTML file. Ex. 1004, 89–90. This results in changing the size, duration, and frequency of the display of the multiple pocket watch image objects without changing the image files or the Java applet. Id. That is, the 12 image objects of Lemay Web can be uniformly formatted by applying and altering the style settings of the HTML file, which is stored separately from the image objects and the Java applet. Id. at 88– 89. In our Final Written Decision, we wrote that “Lemay Web discloses that the image files that are displayed as the animation object are separate from the HTML.” Ex. 1004, 88–89.” Dec. 22. The Federal Circuit wrote that “how the Board evaluated what constitutes separateness in the prior art software is less than clear.” Opinion, 13 n.7. To be clear, the animation of Lemay Web comprises 12 different pocket watch image objects. Ex. 1004, 89. The HTML file that contains the style settings for the 12 different pocket watch image objects is stored separately from the 12 different pocket watch image objects. Id. at 88–91. The style of the 12 different pocket watch image objects can be altered by changing the values of the style settings in the separate HTML file, thus allowing the style to be uniformly applied to each of the associated 12 pocket watch image objects when the pocket watch image objects are created on the web page. Id.; see Ex. 1030 ¶¶ 28–29; Dec. 21–22. In conclusion for issue (B), we find that Lemay Web teaches applying the style located in the separate HTML file to the pocket watch image objects when creating the pocket watch image objects on the web page. Therefore, Lemay Web’s style is “defined separately from any single object” as claimed. Because Lemay Web’s style can be applied to one object and more than one object and Lemay Web’s style is defined separately from any single object, we find that the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style.”” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

    “As directed by the Federal Circuit, we determine whether the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style,” but otherwise do not revisit our analysis of claim 1. Remand Opinion 7, 13–14. The Federal Circuit construed “style” to mean “a collection of one or more settings that is defined separately from any single object but can be associated with one or more objects,” with the understanding that “associated with one or more” means capable of being associated with both one object and more than one object. Id. at 14.” slip op. at 4

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Because the Specification discloses that data defines an object, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “object,” read in light of the Specification of the ’168 patent, as encompassing data that defines the object. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The “specification . . . is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); (Excluding an embodiment in the specification from “the scope of the patent claim . . . is rarely, if ever, correct.”). Further, because the Specification discloses that data defines image objects, and that objects include images, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “image object,” read in light of the Specification, as encompassing data that defines an image, such as one of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “What you see in the bottom right is an excerpt from the Lemay Web book . . . [y]ou can still use the Java applet just by putting this applet code into your HTML file. So this shows the animator class is going to be run within height or how big a window within the browser should be allocated in this applet. You can . . . tell the animator class how long to pause in between each image. So that’s a style that’s being applied to all of the multiple images that make up this animation. Ex. 2029, 746:23–747:7. Patent Owner then asked GoDaddy’s expert “for each unique animation you want to create with this animator class that’s shown here, you’re going to have to have a unique set of HTML code with the settings along with any of the images you’ll want to associate with the animator class, right?” Ex. 2030, 793:7–11. GoDaddy’s expert testified, with reference to Exhibit 2027, 80, that “Yeah. I’m not a hundred percent sure I understand your question, but yes, if you had six animations on a page, for example, you’d have six blocks of markup that looked like the markup at the bottom right of that slide, starting with applet.” Id. at 793:12–16. In addressing Patent Owner’s question about “each unique animation,” GoDaddy’s expert provided a hypothetical example of a web page having six animations, and explained that the six animations have six blocks of markup. Ex. 2030, 793:13–16. We find that this testimony means that if a web page has six unique animations, then for each unique animation, a corresponding HTML file contains the style settings for the image objects of that animation, such that the “six animations on a page . . . have six blocks of markup.” Id. We find that the subsequent testimony of GoDaddy’s expert cited by Patent Owner is consistent with the expert’s initial testimony that Lemay Web’s style is “applied to all of the multiple images that make up this animation.” Ex. 2029, 747:5–7. We also find that the subsequent testimony is consistent with and supported by the disclosure of Lemay Web, which teaches that an animation has a set of image files and is added to a Web page using the Animator applet. Ex. 1004, 88 (“[Y]ou’ll learn just enough about Java applets to set up animation on your Web page. . . . To create animation using Java and the Animator applet, you’ll need . . . [a] set of image files . . . that make up your animation.”); see id. at 88–91. That is, Lemay Web, consistent with the testimony of GoDaddy’s expert, discloses that the style settings for the animation of the pocket watch in the HTML file are uniformly applied to the 12 pocket watch image objects. Id. at 88–91.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,168 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,168
• Facebook, Inc. / SAP America, Inc. et al. v. Express Mobile, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2022-00597 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–4 and 6 are unpatentable under §103 over both listed prior art combinations; Lemay Web teaches the claimed style under the Federal Circuit’s construction.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “As directed by the Federal Circuit, we determine whether the prior art combination teaches limitations 1(c) and 1(g) under the proper construction of “style,” but otherwise do not revisit our analysis of claim 1. Remand Opinion 7, 13–14. The Federal Circuit construed “style” to mean “a collection of one or more settings that is defined separately from any single object but can be associated with one or more objects,” with the understanding that “associated with one or more” means capable of being associated with both one object and more than one object. Id. at 14.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. As discussed above, the plain meaning of an “image object” read in light of the Specification encompasses data that defines an image, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web. Ex. 1004, 89–90. Therefore, the HTML file of Lemay Web, which specifies attributes including width, height, pause value, and repeat value of the pocket watch image objects, is “capable of being applied to more than one” image object, such as each of the 12 different pocket watch image objects described by Lemay Web. Id.” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner. The Board and Petitioner understood the meaning of “or” in the phrase “one or more objects” in Patent Owner’s proposed construction of style as meaning that “a style . . . can be associated with just one object.” Dec. 22; see Reply 4–5. The Federal Circuit “ultimately conclude[d] that Express Mobile’s proposed construction, with ‘or’ properly interpreted,” means “that the claimed ‘style’ must be capable of being applied to both one and more than one ‘object,’” and “remand[ed] for further proceedings in view of the correct claim construction.” Remand Opinion 13. In doing so, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]t may be that under the correct claim construction, the Board finds that Lemay Web teaches the claimed ‘style’; however, that is still an open fact question for the Board to decide in the first instance.” Id. at n.6. Given that the Federal Circuit has ordered the Board to determine whether the prior art teaches the claimed “style” under the proper construction, we find that Petitioner’s arguments on this issue are timely.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “Contrary to Patent Owner’s contention, the Specification discloses, “Data that defines text button, image, paragraph, or other parent objects . . . can be stored in two-dimensional arrays (by web page and by object number).” Ex. 1001, 22:11–13 (emphasis added). The Specification further discloses that “objects . . . include colors, fonts, images, audio clips, video clips, text areas, URLs and thread objects.” Id. at 2:16–17 (emphasis added); see id. at 8:40. We highlight that the Specification’s use of “object” is consistent with a definition of “object” in the computing art at the time of the invention, which is “(2) A passive entity that contains or receives data; for example, bytes, blocks, clocks fields, files . . . .” George McDaniel, IBM Dictionary of Computing, McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1994, p. 471 (Ex. 3001). Because the Specification discloses that data defines an object, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “object,” read in light of the Specification of the ’168 patent, as encompassing data that defines the object. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The “specification . . . is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); (Excluding an embodiment in the specification from “the scope of the patent claim . . . is rarely, if ever, correct.”). Further, because the Specification discloses that data defines image objects, and that objects include images, we construe the plain meaning of the claimed “image object,” read in light of the Specification, as encompassing data that defines an image, such as one of the 12 different pocket watch images of Lemay Web.” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 7,594,168 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,594,168
• Canadian Solar Inc. v. Maxeon Solar Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01040 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 9–20 are unpatentable as obvious over the Froitzheim/Gan and Froitzheim/Kwark combinations, with Hartiti or Sivoththaman for the specified dependent claims.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the discipline of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner contends that “the term ‘in situ’ in dependent claim 15 is appropriate for construction because it is defined in the 053 Patent.” Pet. 20. In particular, Petitioner argues that “in situ” refers to processing that occurs after a single manual loading of the substrate into a furnace or other single chamber or multi-chamber processing tool. EX1003, ¶157. Therefore, in the context of claim 15’s diffusion steps, the single, simultaneous drive-in/diffusion of the front and back dopants would constitute “in situ” steps that satisfy the claim. Pet. 56–57 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 157); see Ex. 1001, 5:9–18. Patent Owner argues that “in the parallel district court litigation, [Petitioner] advocates for an additional limitation on what constitutes the claimed ‘in situ.’” PO Resp. 35–36. In particular, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner urges that “in situ” processing “covers only ‘in situ’ diffusion and not ‘in situ’ doping.” PO Resp. 36. But, Patent Owner states that it applies the construction adopted by Petitioner here. PO Resp. 36 Because the outcome of this Decision does not rest on any particular” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner explains that “Froitzheim and Gan are analogous art because each is in the same field of endeavor—solar cell design” and “[e]ach is reasonably pertinent to the problems of efficiencies and cost-effectiveness of solar cell designs.” Pet. 29 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶94; Ex. 1006, Abstr., ¶¶ 1, 9; Ex. 1007, 245, 249). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to replace Froitzheim’s diffused emitter with a deposited polysilicon emitter along with an oxide layer because Gan taught and suggested that this modification would be an improvement.” Pet. 29 (Ex. 1003 ¶ 95). Gan teaches that “the cell performance can be improved if the diffused-emitter [e.g., of Froitzheim] is replaced with the polysilicon emitter” and that “the J0 [i.e., measure of surface recombination] of the p-type polysilicon emitter (Fig 5) [beneficially] appears to be much lower than what has been previously reported,” which Gan attributes to the thermal oxide interfacial layer. Pet. 29–30 (quoting Ex. 1007, 245, 248); see also Ex. 1007, 249 (“polysilicon emitters with these qualities can be quite useful for silicon concentrator solar cells”). Petitioner also argues that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success because the combination is simply” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “reflected in the Gan Thesis, does not defeat obviousness because “obviousness cannot be avoided simply by a showing of some degree of unpredictability in the art so long as there was a reasonable probability of success.” Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 896 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Only a reasonable expectation of success, not absolute predictability, is necessary for a conclusion of obviousness.”). In addition, “[w]hen prior art contains apparently conflicting references, the Board must weigh each reference for its power to suggest solutions to an artisan of ordinary skill” and, in so doing, “consider the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit another.” In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The Gan Thesis describes known techniques that the skilled artisan could have employed to improve thin oxide growth. The Gan Thesis states that “it appears that the variation of the oxide thickness results mainly from the oxide-growth step. If this is the case, it is possible that the thin-oxide growth can be improved by performing the oxidation at a lower temperature such that the oxidation rate can be controlled more precisely.” Ex. 2003, 112. Though Patent Owner characterizes this disclosure as “an unproven assumption” or “speculation at best” (Tr. 32:23–26), Drs. Banerjee and Ruby disagree. For example, Dr. Banerjee explains that [l]owering the temperature slows down the chemical reaction between silicon and oxygen in the formation of silicon oxide and thus allows for greater control on the thickness of the oxide layer. As Gan Thesis shows, the oxide thickness increases with time, and slowing that process down by lowering the temperature allows a Skilled Artisan to optimize the oxygen flow time in order to achieve the desired thickness. Ex. 1082 ¶ 19 (citing Ex. 2003, 111). Dr. Banerjee further testifies that “since at least the 1990s,” the ordinarily skilled artisan was equipped with methods to reliably grown oxide layers with controlled thicknesses. Ex. 1082 ¶ 12. “These methods were able to finely tune conditions such as reaction time, temperature, pressure, and oxygen concentration of the oxidation reaction as it occurs to obtain reliable formation of thin oxide layers.” Ex. 1082 ¶ 12; see id. ¶ 19; Ex. 1048; Ex. 1078. Dr. Ruby, Patent Owner’s declarant, offers similar testimony explaining that prior to 2008, the purported date of invention, it was known that lowering the temperature at which the oxide is formed will slow the growth rate of that oxide. Ex. 1081, 103:3–18. Accordingly, the evidence of record suggests that the skilled artisan, at the time of invention, would have had a reasonable expectation of success in the combination of Froitzheim and Gan.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,878,053 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,878,053

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.