• Micron Technology, Inc. v. Yangtze Memory Technologies Company, Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00189 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 19 is unpatentable as obvious over Kim and over Nam; the challenge based on Lee and Park fails for lack of a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “B. Patent Owner’s Disclaimer of Claims 17 and 20 As indicated above, Patent Owner filed a statutory disclaimer of claims 17 and 20 of the ’666 patent. See Ex. 2005. In view of Patent Owner’s statutory disclaimer, we treat claims 17 and 20 as having never been part of the ’666 patent. See Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., ‘considered as part of the original patent’ in [35 U.S.C.] § 253 to mean that the patent is treated as though the disclaimed claims never existed.”). Because inter partes review cannot be instituted based on disclaimed claims, we do not consider claims 17 and 20 to be within the scope of this proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”); General Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (denying institution in view of a statutory disclaimer of all the challenged claims). Thus, we confine our analysis in this Decision to claim 19, the challenged claim that has not been disclaimed.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “(“POSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a similar discipline, along with 2–3 years of professional experience working with (e.g., researching, designing, or teaching) 3D memory devices, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge and experience (e.g., an advanced degree may substitute for professional experience).” Pet. 24–25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37). Petitioner further contends that the “POSITA would also have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about 3D memory’s structure, its component parts, and how it operates.” Id. at 25 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 34–37).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “evidence from the complete record now before us, we determine that the claim term “curved side surface” encompasses any outer surface of the structure with curvature. See Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’real Foods, LLC, 908 F.3d 1328, 1338–1339 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding that it is acceptable for the Board to adopt its own claim construction where the parties “had notice of the contested claim construction and an opportunity to be heard”). We do not adopt Patent Owner’s position that “curved side surface” requires the side surface to be curved along a direction perpendicular to the top surface of the structure (e.g., the z-axis).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “curved side surface” are premised on its proposed claim construction which, as set forth above, we decline to adopt. Instead, we determined that “curved side surface” as used in the challenged claim encompasses any outer surface of the structure with curvature, which does not need to be curved in any specific direction. See § II.B.1, supra. Kim states: Embodiments of the inventive concepts in which the protrusion pad PAD_P has a rectangular parallel[] shape is illustrated, but the protrusion pad PAD_P is not limited thereto and, in some embodiments, may have a shape including a curved surface based on a virtual rectangular parallel[] shape, a cylindrical shape, or any shape. Ex. 1005, 8:29–34 (emphases added). Dr. Lee testifies that “[a] POSITA would have recognized that this includes configurations where the sides of the protrusion pads are curved, particularly to optimize electrical connectivity and mitigate stress at material interfaces.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 201. Dr. Lee further testifies that a POSITA would have understood Kim’s disclosure “teaches a variety of different protrusion pad PAD_P shapes” including “pads with curved sides when viewed in cross-section or pads with curved sides when viewed from above.” Id. ¶ 202. Accordingly, we determine that Kim discloses a cylindrically-shaped PAD_P that has a “curved side surface” as required by the challenged claim. slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,145,666 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,145,666
• X Corp. v. Sterling Computers CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00299 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated Dumais-based and Kircher/Krug grounds; Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s motions to exclude are dismissed as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 8–9. In its response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 14–15 (“Patent Owner and its expert adopt the Board’s definition for purposes of this Response”). Having considered the record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’217 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached

    “1. “computer program modules” The parties dispute whether four “computer program modules comprising” (1) “a monitoring module,” (2) “a first relevance measurement module,” (3) “a second relevance measurement module,” and (4) “a relevance analysis module” (collectively, “module limitations”) invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and should be treated as means-plus-function limitations. See Pet. 8–18; PO Resp. 15–18; Pet. Reply 3–5; PO Sur-reply 4–7. However, the parties do not argue that the construction of these terms affects the analysis of Petitioner’s challenges. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Moreover, our analysis does not rely on any particular construction of these terms and, so, we need not resolve this dispute.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “2. “one or more measures derived from the group consistent of” Petitioner asserts limitations 1[g] and 1[g][i]–1[g][iv] recite an open Markush group listing alternatively useable members. Pet. 20–21 (citing Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbot Lab’ys v. Baxter Pharm. Prod., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that the listing of specified alternatives within a claim is referred to as a Markush group or Markush grouping)); See Ex. 1001, 47:47–58. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction. See PO Resp; PO Sur-reply. As these terms are not in controversy, we need not opine on this construction.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s respective constructions overlap in their requirement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. See Pet. 18; PO Resp. 20–21; PO Sur-reply 10. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s construction “exclude[s] ‘groups’ from the claims” and further limits the scope of to users who share actions (Pet. Reply 8–9), but Patent Owner states that its proposed construction does not so limit the claims (PO Sur-reply 10). As such, there is no disagreement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. As there is no controversy, we need not, and do not, construe the meaning of “cognate.” However, Patent Owner’s requirement that “at least one other of the plurality of users” is specifically cognate to “the user” who was sent the content is plainly recited in the claim language itself. The claim recites a “relevance score of a piece of electronic content sent from a sender to a user” in the preamble and similarly again in limitation 1[g]. See Ex. 1001, 47:25–28 (emphasis added), 45:62–64. The limitation in question directly references the claimed “user” when reciting the cognate relationship: “identify at least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user.” Ex. 1001, 47:43–45 (emphasis added). As such, the claim language plainly supports Patent Owner’s requirement and Petitioner does not contest that requirement. See Pet. Reply 8. least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user” as requiring that the identified other user is cognate specifically to the user whose relevance score is being determined.” slip op. at 12

  Patent outcomesUS 7,716,217 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,716,217
• Rocket Media, LLC D/B/A Launch Labs v. Fullthrottle Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00148 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Doughty and Van Boucq, and over Doughty, Van Boucq, and Maginnis.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art in June 2021 would have had “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field plus at least one year of experience working on computer networking, or (2) at least 3 years of experience working on computer networking, even without a formal degree.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 44–47). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered definition. PO Resp. 23. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’947 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We determine that no terms require express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes in this case, but address certain claim construction arguments made by the parties in the analysis below. See id.; Inst. Dec. 11 (determining that “no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms”); PO Resp. 23 (agreeing that “no express constructions are necessary to resolve this IPR”). slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner has shown that the combination of Doughty and Van Boucq accounts for these limitations. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that claim 1 somehow excludes, what Patent Owner calls, the “Unique Identifier/Tracker Embodiment.” See PO Resp. 27, 31. Beginning with the language of the claims, the claims are silent as to where the “location data” recited in limitation 1[c] is stored. See Tr. 21:7– 16 (Patent Owner agreeing that “the stored location data does not actually have a required location at all” in the claim, and need not be stored in a database). Nor does Patent Owner direct us to any claim language that would specifically exclude “location data” stored on the user’s device. See Sur-reply 2–3. “The patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning unless the patentee clearly redefines the term (lexicography) or disavows claim scope (claim disavowal).” Aortic Innovations LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 159 F.4th 1, 8 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Patent Owner directs us to statements in the Specification, stating “[f]or example, the computing device may access a database or other storage location that maintains a mapping of unique identifier to a browser session, a user computing device, and/or location data.” Ex. 1001, 9:52–55; see also id. at 39:26–30 (same), 43:55– 59 (same). But none of those passages amounts to lexicography or disavowal of claim scope. Indeed, when read in their full context, these passages support a broad reading, not a narrow reading, of the claims. The full passage of the Specification states: The computing device may determine, at 406, whether there is a unique identifier that is associated with the user (e.g., the user computing device, the browser, and/or the browser session) stored on the computing device. For example, the script may inform the computing device that there is no unique identifier for the user computing device. The computing device may determine that there is no unique identifier associated with the user computing device when there is no location data stored for the user computing device. For example, the computing device may access a database or other storage location that maintains a mapping of unique identifier to a browser session, a user computing device, and/or location data. Additionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine whether there is a unique identifier for associated with the user based on presence of a location tracker (e.g., cookie) installed in the browser application on the user computing device. Ex. 1001, 9:43–59. The passage above is full of language that indicates that the patentee did not intend to limit the claims to a single embodiment. Indeed, the specific portion of the passage cited by Patent Owner begins with “[f]or example” and further states “[a]dditionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine whether there is a unique identifier for associated with the user based on presence of a location tracker (e.g., cookie) installed in the browser application on the user computing device.” Id. at 9:52–59 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Specification states “[a]dditionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine the location data using the tracker installed in the browser application on the user computing device.” Id. at 10:2–5. The Specification also explains that the tracker may “maintain data related to the user and/or user computing device.” Id. at 12:62–63. Based on these disclosures, we find that the Specification supports a reading where the location data are stored in the user computing” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive Petitioner’s reasoning that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Doughty, based on Doughty’s own teachings regarding cookies and similar files, and would have recognized that the techniques of Van Boucq would have offered an efficient and commonly used way to determine whether the user already has been assigned a unique identifier. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 153. Patent Owner’s arguments about the precise contents of Van Boucq’s connection cookie attack Van Boucq individually and ignore the combination and modifications that Petitioner proposes. In the combination, Petitioner proposes incorporating the unique identifier from Doughty into Van Boucq’s connection cookie. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1008, 16:59–17:33; Ex. 1007 ¶ 153). As for Patent Owner’s contention that “[n]othing in the record suggests that Van Boucq’s connection cookie could contain any information about either Doughty’s table 105 Profile ID or Doughty’s hashed email address,” PO Resp. 33, as Dr. Gottesman testifies, “[a] cookie is a small piece of data (text file).” Ex. 2012 ¶ 55. We fail to see why a skilled artisan at the time of the invention would have any difficulty incorporating Doughty’s alphanumeric unique identifier into a text file. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 153, 166. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown a motivation to combine Doughty and Van Boucq for these limitations.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,556,947 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,556,947
• Qiagen Sciences, LLC v. Tecan Genomics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00029 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12 and 14–19 are unpatentable as obvious over the listed combinations; Petitioner’s motion to strike is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “for purposes of this Decision, we find a POSA would have had a Ph.D. in molecular biology, molecular genetics, bioinformatics, biochemistry, or a related field. Alternatively, a POSA would have had a B.S. or M.S. degree with three to five years of experience working in any of those fields. Additionally, the POSA would have had experience with NGS sequencing methods and a working knowledge of how those methods functioned.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020). Under that standard, the words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to construe any claim term expressly.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

  Patent outcomesUS 10,876,108 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,876,108
• Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. Halozyme, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 12, 2026 · PGR2025-00003 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4 and 8–21 are unpatentable for lack of written description and enablement; obviousness over the ’429 patent and Chao was not shown.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “VII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART We consider the grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “term “modified PH20 polypeptide” in the ’600 patent supports the understanding that some type of activity is required for a polypeptide to be a “modified PH20 polypeptide”, and that the enzymatic activity of hyaluronidase is the most frequently identified activity recited in the definitions section of the ’600 patent. Id. at 48:38–53, 50:9‒17, 51:15‒18, 52:41–47, 55:9–23, 63:37–44, 64:14–19. In contrast, the discussion regarding the potential use of “modified PH20 polypeptides that are inactive” as antigens in contraception vaccines appears only in a non-definitional section of the ’600 patent. Id. at 75:56–58, 72:60–62. Accordingly, it does not modify the definition’s explicit requirement that the claimed “modified PH20 polypeptide” exhibit hyaluronidase activity. Id. at 48:38–53.” slip op. at 19

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable

    “been able to use the data in the Specification to make reasonable predictions about the effect of multiple modifications on hyaluronidase activity, we view this testimony to at most describe a research plan (i.e., a “tool to engage in further modification”14) for finding the recited polypeptides rather than demonstrating the inventors were in possession of the full scope claimed. This is particularly so given the limits of the then-available analytical tools noted above and the fact that the structural connections and three dimensional modeling Patent Owner’s experts attempt to make (see, e.g., Ex. 2070 ¶¶ 129–213; Ex. 2068 ¶ 123) do not appear in the written description itself. To the extent the experts disagree on this point, we credit the testimony of Petitioner’s experts over that of Patent Owner’s. For these reasons, we find that a preponderance of the evidence of record better supports a finding that in the 2011–12 timeframe, it would have been unpredictable to identify which multiple mutants retained hyaluronidase activity, even with the single substitution data provided by the ’600 patent.” slip op. at 51

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable

    “8. Conclusion We find that the balance of evidence supports a finding of undue” slip op. at 101

  Patent outcomesUS 11,952,600 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,952,600
• Stryker Corporation / Wright Medical Technology, Inc v. Osteomed LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00191 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 15 and 21 unpatentable as anticipated by Slater.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court issued its decision in Stryker Corp. v. OsteoMed LLC, No. 2023-1925, 2025 WL 2814019 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“Stryker”) (Paper 381), affirming-in-part, reversing-in-part, vacating and remanding-in-part our Final Written Decision (Paper 35) for further proceedings. In its opinion, the Federal Circuit reversed our finding of no anticipation as to independent claims 1, 10, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 9,763,716 B2 (“the ’716 patent,” Ex. 1001), and vacated and remanded for further proceedings to evaluate whether either of dependent claims 15 and 21 is unpatentable. Stryker, slip op. at 17.” slip op. at 2

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the undisputed limitations of claims 15 and 21 and find that Petitioner establishes that Slater discloses each limitation of claims 15 and 21 for the reasons provided by Petitioner. Specifically, Petitioner shows, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that Slater describes a plate with “flared hips” comprising opposing “generally parabolic wings” as recited in dependent claims 15 and 21. Pet. 31–33; Ex. 1005, Fig. 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 124. We adopt Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to these limitations as our own. See Pet. 31–33. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Slater anticipates claims 15 and 21.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 9,763,716 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation
  Patents in suitUS 9,763,716
• Google LLC / Motorola Mobility LLC v. Multifold International Incorporated Pte. Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2026 · IPR2025-00060 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–9, 12–16, and 20 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 12, 13, and 20 as anticipated by Ogawa, and claims 4–9 and 14–16 as obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Claim 1 also recites “wherein the first and second states comprise an open application state.” Given the usage of “comprise” in this clause, we determine that the possible first and second states must include an open application state but the states are not limited to an open application state. Claim 12 similarly recites a processor that is operable to “displaying an icon associated with the application in at least one of the first display and the second display, wherein the icon indicates that the application is in one of two or more states associated with a display status of the application” and “wherein the first and second states comprise an open application state.” Ex. 1001, 16:12–19. Given the usage of “comprise” in these clauses, we determine that the first and second states must include an open application state but are not limited to an open application state that is being displayed in the corresponding display status as argued by Patent Owner. Patent Owner’s proposed construction, which requires the application to be “open and being displayed in the corresponding display condition/status,” further narrows the wherein clauses of claims 1 and 12 which do not require the application to be open and displayed. In fact, Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Surati, testified that the applications have multiple states and are not limited to open application states. Ex. 1016, 50:4–51:4. Patent Owner does not cite to an any portion of the Specification or prosecution history in support of its construction. PO Resp. 7–9.” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with two years of work experience in the field of user interface technologies, including e.g., graphical interface technologies, or a related field. . . . More education can supplement practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20–21). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 10. We apply Petitioner’s uncontested definition because it appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’080 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “For the following reasons, we find that Petitioner establishes that Ogawa discloses this limitation. Patent Owner’s contentions are not responsive to Petitioner’s mapping of Ogawa to claim limitation [1.f]. This claim limitation recites that “the morphing comprising changing the shape and size of the icon.” Ex. 1001, 15:4–7. Petitioner relies on the size and shape of access bar 42 changing as shown by a comparison of Ogawa’s Figure 4(B) and Figure 4(C). Pet. 24– 25. Patent Owner does not dispute that the size and shape of access bar 42 changes from Figure 4(B) to Figure 4(C). See PO Resp. 10–16. Patent Owner focuses on the color of access bar 42 shown as cross- hatching in Figure 4 to argue that the icon does not represent the state of the application. PO Resp. 12–14. However, the color of access bar 42 and the size and shape of access bar 42 are set independently of each other by different functions. Ogawa explains that: [t]he splitting position of the screen is indicated by a pointer 44. When the pointer 44 is designated with the pen 12 and the pen is moved left or right (along the access bar 42), the splitting ratio (horizontal size ratio) of the two screens 13A, 13B changes as depicted in FIG. 4(C). Ex. 1005 ¶ 19.” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner next contends that it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan to modify “Ogawa’s display control method using Yook’s technique such that Ogawa’s method would have included first displaying a program across both logically divided displays of display input surface 13 . . . to increase the viewing area for the program as shown and described [in] Yook’s figures 4b and 4d.” Pet. 54–55 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 137). Petitioner further contends that the modification would “include[] minimizing the program to occupy only one of the first and second parts of display input surface 13 . . . as also shown and described with reference to Yook’s figures 4b and 4d.” Id. at 55. Petitioner then provides an example of the modification. Id. Namely, Ogawa’s operation would have been modified so that “when a user elects to split a screen in figure 4(A) using the split screen menu 41, the program is first displayed like in figure 4(C) . . . across two displays and then, based on user input to minimize the program size” resulting in the program displayed on one display. Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 137; Ex. 1005, Figs. 4(A)–4(C)). Petitioner next contends that the modification of Ogawa with Yook “would have involved the substitution of one known way of displaying a program” as shown in Ogawa “with another known display method” as shown in Yook, “and thus would yield a predictable result.” Pet. 56–57 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 139). Patent Owner does not address claim 4. See PO Resp. 10–18. We have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and argument and find that Petitioner has shown that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Ogawa and Yook as a simple substitution of one known way of displaying a program for another with a predictable result. Ex. 1002 ¶ 139. Further, Petitioner has also shown that the combination of Ogawa and Yook teaches the limitations of claim 4. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance” slip op. at 43

  Patent outcomesUS 8,842,080 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,842,080
• Apple Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2026 · IPR2022-01002 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1–9 and 12–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Paulraj and Heath under § 103.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “determining no challenged claim had been proved unpatentable by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Apple Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”). Paper 41. Petitioner appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Papers 43, 44. On January 13, 2026, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, on the basis that the Board erred by not considering certain alternative arguments presented in the Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 29), which were properly responsive to claim construction proposed in the Patent Owner Response and adopted by the Board.1 Paper 45. In its Reply, Petitioner alternatively argued that even under the Patent Owner’s claim construction relating to “the plurality of antennas,” the same prior art references nonetheless still rendered obvious the challenged claims. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing, despite having been given an opportunity to make and explain such a request. Paper 51. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. Having considered all of the arguments presented in Petitioner’s Reply, we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–9 and 12–20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,191,083 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’083 patent”) are unpatentable. A.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Petitioner additionally states that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not in its Response address the level of ordinary skill. Patent Owner’s expert witness, Dr. Cooklev, testifies that he “will apply the same definition of the level of skill of a POSITA [as Petitioner].” Ex. 2004 ¶ 19. Based on the evidence of record, we determine a person of ordinary skill would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems. This is consistent with Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill, with the exception of Petitioner’s open-ended reference to “at least” two years of experience, because that would improperly encompass a level of experience only possessed by an expert. This articulation of the level of ordinary skill is also the same as what we determined in the Final Written decision issued on November 30, 2023. Paper 41, 6. C. slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends: “The plain meaning of the claims requires that the same ‘plurality of antennas’ be used for transmitting and receiving the plurality of signal streams.” PO Resp. 5, 9–12. Citing Dr. Cooklev’s testimony, Patent Owner contends that the ’083 patent’s Specification describes embodiments that use the same antennas for both transmitting and receiving data streams. PO Resp. 7–9 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 34–35). In the Final Written Decision, we determined: Although we do not understand the claims to require both transmission and reception “via all antennas” all of the time, we determine the claims require a set of antennas in which at least some of the antennas are for both transmitting and receiving. We disagree with Petitioner that two separate sets of antennas— one set of transmitting antennas and a separate, nonoverlapping set of receiving antennas—fall within the scope of the challenged claims. Paper 41, 13 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit agreed with our claim construction. Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLC, U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir., slip op. 24-1419 (January 13, 2026) (2026 WL 91021) (Paper 45, 2–4). We continue to apply the same construction here that we adopted in the Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “legally sufficient motivation for modifying Paulraj, but only attempted to show that the modification “could” have been made by one of ordinary skill in the art which is not enough for a showing of obviousness. Sur-reply 8–9. We disagree with Patent Owner. Establishing that certain technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date of the challenged patent constitutes sufficient motivation to make a modification in accordance with what was well-known in the art to one of ordinary skill, absent factors not present here. Indeed, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. That would be the situation where a technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art, unless there is actual difficulty in making the application. The “improvement” here, although not articulated by Petitioner, is inherent with the technique, not requiring use of separate antennas for transmitting and receiving, i.e., eliminating the need for additional parts. Further, it is not necessary to show that a modification is the “best option,” because any “suitable option” would suffice. See Intel Corporation v. Qualcomm Incorporated, 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, Patent Owner does not assert that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had difficulty modifying Paulraj to use some of the same antennas both for transmitting and for receiving. Nor does Patent Owner dispute that it was well known to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the same antenna(s) for both transmitting and for receiving. We further note the following description in the Specification of the ’083 patent: “The typical CT/MD [cellular telephone/mobile device] has one transmitter and one receiver (T/R), with one antenna.” Ex. 1001, 1:47–48. That statement is fully consistent with Petitioner’s assertion that it was well-known to use the same antenna for transmitting and for receiving. For the foregoing reasons, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, we determine that Petitioner sufficiently has shown that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Paulraj such that some of the same antennas would be used both for transmitting and for receiving, according to limitations 1[b], 1[d], and 1[e].” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 9,191,083 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,191,083
• Runergy Alabama Inc. / Runergy USA Inc. et al. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00187 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable under § 103, principally because Chang in view of Jin renders them obvious; the Jin/Feldmann grounds were not shown.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been someone with an advanced degree involving the disciplines of electrical engineering, applied physics, chemistry, or materials science, and at least two years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Alternatively, that person would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, applied physics, or materials science, and at least three years of experience designing, developing, or researching in the field. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 49).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is believed to be necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 24. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally Resp.; Sur-reply. For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “gap-T isolation region would prevent shorting and that extending the tunnel oxide layer the edge “could trap impurities and create negative fixed oxide charges, which could then create a p-type inversion in the n-type base substrate, leading to a leakage path to the p-type emitter on the front of the solar cell” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 116 (emphasis added)) but are not convinced by his equivocal testimony. Notably too, neither Jin nor Feldmann discuss issues relating to trapped impurities and Petitioner, as well as Dr. Banerjee, fail to direct our attention to any record evidence to support their contentions. Rather, we are persuaded by Dr. Peckerar’s testimony that as a general rule in semiconductor process technology, a bare silicon surface should not be left unpassivated after processing. Elemental silicon is highly chemically reactive. As such, the bare surface is a “magnet” for defects and contamination. Leaving the tunnel oxide in place across the entire substrate backside would reduce this problem. Ex. 2001 ¶ 142. Dr. Peckerar further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to avoid shorting and leakage. In particular, he testifies that the manner by which charge is transported through a tunnel oxide can be controlled by adjusting manufacturing parameters such as time, temperature, thickness, and ambient impurities. A POSITA would plainly have adjusted these parameters to ensure that the tunnel oxide operates as intended (i.e., minimizes recombinant losses while transporting charge carriers to the backside of the solar cell) while avoiding undesirable leakage current. Because unwanted leakage charge can be avoided via other means during manufacture, there would have been no reason to reduce the physical extent of the tunnel oxide. Ex. 2001 ¶ 152 (referring to Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 149–151). Moreover, Dr. Peckerar testifies that “Dr. Banerjee also appears to be arguing that incorporation of impurities into the oxide will produce a MOSFET-like structure, with the contaminated oxide acting as a MOS gate leading to enhanced leakage,” but, for that to occur, “the source and drain areas would need to be of the same type.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Here however, “the tunnel oxide layer is located between an n-type polysilicon layer and p-type frontside emitter layer” so “[n]o MOSFET-like structure can form because the source and drain are of different types.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Banerjee address or dispute this testimony. See generally Reply; Ex. 1037. We credit Dr. Peckerar’s testimony in this regard. Without an apparent reason to modify the teachings of Jin and Feldmann to” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “On this complete trial record, we agree with Patent Owner. It is improper to base a conclusion of obviousness upon facts gleaned only through hindsight. “The invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made.” Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “to establish a prima facie case of obviousness based on a combination of elements disclosed in the prior art, the [Petitioner] must articulate the basis on which it concludes that it would have been obvious to make the claimed invention.” Id. Impermissible hindsight is inferred when the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art that would motivate one (with no knowledge of the claimed invention) to make the proposed combination has not been explained. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 10,230,009 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,230,009
• Runergy Alabama Inc. / Runergy USA Inc. et al. v. Trina Solar Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 15, 2026 · IPR2025-00006 · APJ Debra L Dennett · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable under § 103, principally over Chang and Jin; the Board rejected the Jin and Feldmann combinations for lack of a reason to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’009 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’009 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that “[n]o claim construction is believed to be necessary to resolve this Petition.” Pet. 24. Patent Owner does not address claim construction. See generally Resp.; Sur-reply. For purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “However, Petitioner proposes to remove the tunnel oxide layer from the edge and offers little explanation of why the skilled artisan would apply Jin’s gap- T isolation region to both of Feldmann’s polysilicon and tunnel oxide layers. As noted above, Petitioner states that the skilled artisan would have included Jin’s gap-T isolation region in order to prevent shorting. Pet. 26. Petitioner’s reasoning is questionable—supported only by the conclusory testimony of Dr. Banerjee. Dr. Banerjee’s testimony offers no more evidentiary support than provided in the Petition. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶ 116 with Pet. 26). Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” See Magnum, 829 F.3d at 1380. We acknowledge Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that the combination of Jin’s gap-T isolation region would prevent shorting and that extending the tunnel oxide layer the edge “could trap impurities and create negative fixed oxide charges, which could then create a p-type inversion in the n-type base substrate, leading to a leakage path to the p-type emitter on the front of the solar cell” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 116 (emphasis added)) but are not convinced by his equivocal testimony. Notably too, neither Jin nor Feldmann discuss issues relating to trapped impurities and Petitioner, as well as Dr. Banerjee, fail to direct our attention to any record evidence to support their contentions. Rather, we are persuaded by Dr. Peckerar’s testimony that as a general rule in semiconductor process technology, a bare silicon surface should not be left unpassivated after processing. Elemental silicon is highly chemically reactive. As such, the bare surface is a “magnet” for defects and contamination. Leaving the tunnel oxide in place across the entire substrate backside would reduce this problem. Ex. 2001 ¶ 142. Dr. Peckerar further explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known how to avoid shorting and leakage. In particular, he testifies that the manner by which charge is transported through a tunnel oxide can be controlled by adjusting manufacturing parameters such as time, temperature, thickness, and ambient impurities. A POSITA would plainly have adjusted these parameters to ensure that the tunnel oxide operates as intended (i.e., minimizes recombinant losses while transporting charge carriers to the backside of the solar cell) while avoiding undesirable leakage current. Because unwanted leakage charge can be avoided via other means during manufacture, there would have been no reason to reduce the physical extent of the tunnel oxide. Ex. 2001 ¶ 152 (referring to Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 149–151). Moreover, Dr. Peckerar testifies that “Dr. Banerjee also appears to be arguing that incorporation of impurities into the oxide will produce a MOSFET-like structure, with the contaminated oxide acting as a MOS gate leading to enhanced leakage,” but, for that to occur, “the source and drain areas would need to be of the same type.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Here however, “the tunnel oxide layer is located between an n-type polysilicon layer and p-type frontside emitter layer” so “[n]o MOSFET-like structure can form because the source and drain are of different types.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 159. Neither Petitioner nor Dr. Banerjee address or dispute this testimony. See generally Reply; Ex. 1037. We credit Dr. Peckerar’s testimony in this regard.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “configuration in which the emitter area and back surface field area are not adjacent to each other, thus eliminating “the necessity of performing an isolation process when the emitter area [] and the back surface field are [] are formed to be adjacent to each other.” Resp. 42 (citing Ex. 1013 ¶ 76). In so doing, Patent Owner side steps Chang’s unambiguous definition that “‘entirely formed’ means that an element such as a layer is formed over an entire surface without an empty area or a non-coverage area, or is formed over an entire area excluding pre-designated or inevitably formed regions such as periphery region, isolation region or the like.” Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 45, 51, 56, 62 (emphasis added). Chang discloses that a first tunneling layer, a first portion of an emitter area, a second tunneling layer, and a back surface field area may each be “formed over an entire area excluding pre-designated or inevitably formed regions such as periphery region, isolation region or the like.” Id. Chang’s definition of “entirely formed” (“excluding pre-designated or inevitably formed regions such as periphery region, isolation region or the like”) implies use of a mask. See Chang ¶ 62; Tr. 15:20–17:11. Dr. Banerjee testifies that the need to electrically isolate the emitter region from the back surface field was well known in the field, and both Chang and Jin teach backside isolation regions. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 73, 217 (citing Ex. 1023 § 1). Chang also discloses that the emitter area may be formed by thermal diffusion, ion implantation or the like. Ex. 1013 ¶ 98. Petitioner persuasively argues that Chang’s disclosure of thermal diffusion of the emitter layer would result in dopants diffused into not only the top surface of the substrate, but also the exposed lateral surfaces, a problem also noted in Jin. See Pet. 11–12; Reply 6–7; Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 57–58. Jin discloses avoiding shorting of the emitter layer and back surface field layer by edge isolation on the back surface field layer using a mask to create a “gap-T.” Ex. 1009 ¶¶ 57–58, 83. Chang discloses excluding a tunneling layer and a base surface field area from periphery region and isolation region. Ex. 1013 ¶¶ 56, 62. Using a mask, as implied in Chang and explicitly disclosed in Jin, would “pre-designate” and/or “inevitably form” the regions where the tunneling layer and back surface field area are excluded. We credit Dr. Banerjee’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art reviewing Chang would therefore understand the importance of implementing the isolation region in Chang’s device, and would therefore be motivated to look to other references, such as Jin (which was assigned to the same original assignee as Chang, LG Electronics, EX1009-Jin, face; EX1013-Chang, face) to understand details regarding Chang’s isolation region.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 10,230,009 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,230,009

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.